Opinion of the European Central Bank of 10 June 2025 on the pensions of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (CON/2025/13)

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 10 June 2025 on the pensions of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (CON/2025/13) Introduction and legal basis

On 14 May 2025, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Belgian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finances and Pensions for an opinion on a draft law for temporary public pension sustainability measures (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The draft law amends the rules applicable to the pension of certain members of the board of directors and staff of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (NBB). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), third indent, of Council Decision 98/415/EC , as the draft law relates to the NBB. In accordance with Article 17.5, first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

1. Purpose of the draft law

1.1 The law of 5 August 1978 on economic and budgetary reforms (hereinafter the ‘Wijninckx law’) provides for a maximum amount for pensions in the public sector (hereinafter the ‘Wijninckx cap’). The Wijninckx cap applies to the pensions of staff members and members of the management bodies of, inter alia, public institutions of credit (organismes publics de crédit / openbare kredietinstellingen) such as the NBB, even though the NBB is organised as a public limited company, independent from the government. 1.2 The draft law adapts the rules applicable to the Wijninckx cap. In particular, the draft law would suspend the annual adjustment of the Wijninckx cap on the basis of the Belgian consumer price index from 1 July 2025 until 31 December 2029 . According to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law, the draft law aligns with the 2025-2029 federal coalition agreement, which notably limits the indexation of the State pension for civil servants and persons with mixed public and private careers when the Wijninckx cap is exceeded. As noted in the consultation request accompanying the draft law, the

measures in the draft law primarily aim to reduce pension costs as part of broader fiscal measures addressing the fiscal sustainability risks faced by Belgium.

2. Observations

2.1 As the draft law applies to and directly affects the NBB’s board members and some of its staff, the draft law should primarily be examined from the perspective of central bank independence requirements . 2.2 Financial independence 2.2.1 Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’) require that third parties may not influence, directly or indirectly, a national central bank (NCB) in the performance of its tasks or as regards its ability to fulfil its mandate both operationally in terms of manpower, and in terms of appropriate financial resources . In this regard, Member States may not impair an NCB’s ability to employ and retain the qualified staff necessary for the NCB to perform independently the tasks conferred on it by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. An NCB may not be put into a position where it has limited control or no control over its staff, or where the government of a Member State can influence its policy on staff matters. Amendments that lead to reductions in remuneration for members of an NCB’s decision-making body and its staff members should not interfere with that NCB’s powers to administer its own financial resources, including the funds resulting from any reduction in salaries that it pays. Autonomy in staff matters extends to issues relating to staff pensions . 2.2.2 To protect autonomy in staff matters, the ECB has consistently recommended in its previous opinions and in its convergence reports that any amendment to legislation on remuneration for members of an NCB’s decision-making bodies and its staff members should be decided in close and effective cooperation with the NCB, taking due account of its views, to ensure the ongoing ability of the NCB to independently carry out its tasks . 2.2.3 Situations where the government of a Member State exempts the NCB of that Member State from the scope of the legislation involved, while at the same time inviting the NCB to consider whether the underlying reasons for the legislative provisions can be achieved without prejudicing the performance of the NCB’s tasks under the Treaty, the Statute of the ESCB and national legislation , or where the relevant national legislative provisions provide that the public service pension plan is only applicable to the NCB with its consent, constitute examples of effective cooperation between a Member State government and an NCB. These approaches would allow the NBB to take into account the particularities of its own legal framework and special legal regime as well as any other relevant considerations – in

particular, obligations arising under the Treaty – in deciding upon the form and extent of its consent or objection to the application of the plan to NBB staff . 2.3 Personal independence of the members of the NBB’s decision-making bodies 2.3.1 Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB prohibit national governments from seeking to influence the members of an NCB’s decision-making bodies in the performance of their tasks. The ECB understands that the Wijninckx cap applies generally to all public servants in Belgium who come within its scope, including the Governor of the NBB and the members of the NBB’s board of directors. In view of this, the draft law does not seek to influence the NBB’s decision-making bodies either directly or indirectly in the performance of their tasks. 2.3.2 However, to comply with the Treaty requirements with regard to the personal independence of members of an NCB’s decision-making bodies and to exclude any kind of influence on the members of an NCB’s decision-making bodies in the performance of their tasks, adjustments to the remuneration, including the pensions, of the Governor and other members of an NCB’s decision-making bodies who are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks may not affect the terms under which the current members of an NCB’s decision-making bodies have been appointed. Therefore, such adjustments may only apply to future appointments . The requirements in respect of the principle of financial independence discussed in paragraphs 2.2.1 to 2.2.3 must also be taken into account . 2.4 Compliance with the prohibition of monetary financing The ECB understands that any savings resulting from the suspension of the yearly adjustment of the Wijninckx cap on the basis of the Belgian consumer price index would be returned to the NBB, as the employer . The ECB understands that the draft law would not therefore trigger any financing by the NBB of the Belgian State that could raise concerns from the prohibition of monetary financing under Article 123 of the Treaty. This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 10 June 2025.

[signed]

The President of the ECB

Christine LAGARDE