Opinion of the European Central Bank of 22 January 2026 on limitations to cash payments (CON/2026/3)

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 22 January 2026 on limitations to cash payments (CON/2026/3) Introduction and legal basis

On 17 November 2025 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Dutch Minister for Finance for an opinion on a draft law on the exceptions to the mandatory acceptance of cash (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), second indent, of Council Decision 98/415/EC , as the draft law relates to means of payment. In accordance with Article 17.5, first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

1. Purpose of the draft law

1.1 The draft law supplements Article IIA of the Law amending the Law on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing and Book 6 of the Civil Code in connection with the prohibition of cash payments for goods worth EUR 3 000 or more and the right of consumers to make smaller cash payments (anti-money laundering action plan) (hereinafter the ‘AML Law’). Under the AML Law, a creditor must accept the debtor’s obligation to pay a sum of money in cash, of which the amount must be lower than EUR 3 000. This applies where the debtor is a natural person who is acting for purposes outside their business, trade or profession, and where the creditor is not a natural person acting for purposes outside their business, trade or profession. 1.2 Article IIA of the AML Law sets out the text of Article 113 of Book 6 of the Civil Code. Article 113(2) of Book 6 of the Civil Code provides for the possibility of deviating from the obligation to accept cash payments by means of an administrative order where this is necessary due to the specific nature of the activities or for security reasons. The draft law gives substance to this provision. According to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law (hereinafter the ‘explanatory memorandum’), the guiding principle behind the latter is to achieve a balance between the importance of an inclusive and robust payment system and the importance of an efficient and secure payment system.

1 Besluit van houdende uitzonderingen op de verplichte acceptatie van contant geld (Besluit uitzonderingen acceptatie contant geld), available on the Overheid’s website at www.overheid.nl.

2 Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj).

3 Wet van 11 juni 2025, houdende wijziging van de Wet ter voorkoming van witwassen en financieren van terrorisme en Boek 6 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met het verbod op contante betalingen voor goederen vanaf 3.000 euro en het recht van consumenten op kleinere contante betalingen (Wet plan van aanpak witwassen), Staatsblad 2025, 262. 1.3 The draft law lists six exceptions to the mandatory acceptance of cash payments based on the specific nature of the activities . 1.4 First, the mandatory acceptance of cash payments will not apply to an underlying contract where the obligation to pay a sum of money arose without the simultaneous physical presence of the creditor, including a person acting on his or her behalf, and the debtor . According to the explanatory memorandum, this exception primarily contributes to public order and security. 1.5 Second, for reasons of practicality, the requirement to accept cash payments will not apply to distance contracts, such as those concluded online, by mail order or by telephone . 1.6 Third, the requirement to accept cash will not apply to periodic payments . As stated in the explanatory memorandum, the reason behind this exception is that the administrative burden on the creditor to record and link every cash payment to the supply of goods or services associated with it was considered disproportionate. 1.7 Fourth, the draft law provides an exception to the obligation to accept cash payments when these are made outside the creditor’s commercial premises . According to the explanatory memorandum, this exception is legitimate due to broader security concerns. 1.8 Fifth, the draft law provides an exception to the obligation to accept cash payments when these are made on board means of transport . According to the explanatory memorandum, this exception is justified on grounds of broader security concerns. 1.9 Sixth, the draft law provides an exception to the obligation to accept cash payments made between 22:00 and 06:00 . According to the explanatory memorandum, this exception is justified due to broader security concerns. 1.10 Furthermore, the draft law stipulates that a creditor may temporarily refuse cash payments entirely or cap the cash payment at an amount lower than EUR 3 000 if there is an essential security reason to justify doing so . According to the explanatory memorandum, a refusal of cash for an essential security reason should in principle not be permanent since even a persistently elevated security risk can be mitigated over time. 1.11 The draft law further provides that enterprises with fewer than four people working in them may permanently refuse to accept cash if there is an essential security reason to justify doing so . According to the explanatory memorandum, the reason behind this exception is that small enterprises cannot be expected to permanently mitigate an increased security risk, considering that this would not be proportionate with the limited resources at their disposal.

4 Article 1 of the draft law.

5 Article 1, point (a), of the draft law.

6 Article 1, point (b), of the draft law.

7 Article 1, point (c), of the draft law.

8 Article 1, point (d), of the draft law.

9 Article 1, point (e), of the draft law.

10 Article 1, point (f), of the draft law.

2. General observations

2.1 The ECB was consulted on a draft amendment to a legislative proposal regarding the AML Law, pursuant to which the draft law is to be adopted, and has adopted an opinion thereon . 2.2 Although electronic payment instruments are increasingly used for retail payments in a number of Member States, cash continues to play an important role in society and is still widely used throughout the entire population. Euro cash has legal tender status and should be generally accepted as a means of payment. As the ECB has noted previously, cash is secure, widely accepted, fast and facilitates control over the payer’s spending. Moreover, it is currently the only payment instrument that allows citizens to settle a transaction instantly and directly between two parties in central bank money, while ensuring privacy . 2.3 The ability to pay in cash remains particularly important for those who, for various legitimate reasons, prefer to use physical money for payments rather than other payment instruments, or do not have access to the banking system and electronic means of payment. These groups include not only elderly people but also people with disabilities, immigrants, socially vulnerable people, minors and others with limited or no access to digital payment services . Furthermore, cash may play an important role in the event of a disturbance in the payment system and it is robust against cybercrime and power outages as it guarantees person-to-person payment transactions in such situations. Cash also has an important function as a store of value. The availability and accessibility of cash and its fallback function in case of disruptions to electronic payment systems contribute to trust in the financial system, which is important for the smooth functioning of monetary policy . 2.4 The ECB has the exclusive right to authorise the issue of euro banknotes within the Union, and the euro banknotes issued by the ECB and the national central banks of the euro area are the only

13 See Opinion CON/2024/39. All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex.

14 See, for example, paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2017/8, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2019/41, paragraph 9.2.1 of Opinion CON/2020/13, paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2020/21, paragraph 7.2.1 of Opinion CON/2021/9, paragraph 2.1 of CON/2021/18, paragraph 2.1 of CON/2023/7, paragraph 2.5 of CON/2024/39, paragraph 2.2 of CON/2025/21, and paragraph 2.2 of CON/2025/26.

15 See, for example, paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2017/8, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2019/41, paragraph 9.2.1 of Opinion CON/2020/13, paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2020/21, paragraph 7.2.1 of Opinion CON/2021/9, paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2021/18, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2023/13, paragraph 1.7 of Opinion CON/2023/31 of the European Central Bank of 13 October 2023 on a proposal for a regulation on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (OJ C, C/2023/1355, 1.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1355/oj), paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2024/1, paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2024/2, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2024/3, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2024/8, paragraph 2.5 of Opinion CON/2024/39, and paragraph 2.2 of CON/2025/26.

16 See, for example, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2019/41, paragraph 9.2.1 of Opinion CON/2020/13, paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2021/18, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2024/1, paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2024/2, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2024/3, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2024/8, paragraph 2.5 of Opinion CON/2024/39, and paragraph 2.2 of CON/2025/26.

17 See, for example, paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2021/32, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2024/1, paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2024/2, paragraph 2.5 of Opinion CON/2024/39, and paragraph 2.2 of CON/2025/26.

18 See, for example, paragraph 2.2 of Opinions CON/2024/8 and CON/2024/19, paragraph 2.5 of Opinion CON/2024/39, and paragraph 2.2 of CON/2025/26. banknotes with legal tender status within the euro area . The legal tender status of euro coins is provided for in secondary Union law . 2.5 The concept of ‘legal tender’ as a means of payment denominated in a currency unit has been considered by the Court of Justice of the European Union. In particular, the Court of Justice clarified that the concept of ‘legal tender’ signifies that this specific means of payment cannot generally be refused in settlement of a debt, denominated in the same currency unit at its full-face value, with the effect of discharging the debt. In clarifying the concept of ‘legal tender’ under Union law, the Court of Justice took into consideration Commission Recommendation 2010/191/EU , which provides useful guidance for the interpretation of the relevant provisions of Union law. Point 1 of Recommendation 2010/191 states that, where a payment obligation exists, the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins should imply: (a) mandatory acceptance of those banknotes and coins; (b) their acceptance at full face value; and (c) their power to discharge from payment obligations. According to the Court of Justice, this shows that the concept of ‘legal tender’ encompasses, inter alia, an obligation in principle to accept banknotes and coins denominated in euro for payment purposes . 2.6 However, the Court of Justice further clarified that the status of legal tender calls only for acceptance in principle of banknotes and coins denominated in euro as a means of payment, not for absolute acceptance. The Union’s exclusive competence in matters of monetary policy is without prejudice to the competence of the Member States whose currency is the euro to regulate the procedures for settling pecuniary obligations, provided, in particular, that the legislation does not affect the principle that, as a general rule, it must be possible to discharge a payment obligation in cash. Thus, that exclusive competence does not prevent a Member State from adopting a measure falling within one of the Member State’s competences. For instance, a Member State may, based on its competence to organise its public administration, oblige the public administration to accept cash payments from citizens. Neither does it prevent a Member State, in the exercise of its own powers, from introducing, on legitimate public interest grounds, a derogation from that obligation for statutorily imposed payments, subject to compliance with certain conditions. In particular, the obligation to accept euro banknotes and coins may, in principle, be restricted by the Member States for reasons of public interest and subject to the principle of proportionality. This means that any such restrictions must be proportionate to the public interest objective pursued. When limiting the possibility, recognised by Union law, of generally discharging a payment obligation in banknotes and coins denominated in euro, Member States must ensure that all measures comply with the principle of proportionality, which requires in particular that they are appropriate for achieving the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and do not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives .

19 Article 128(1), first and third sentences, of the Treaty and Article 16, first paragraph, first and third sentences, of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.

20 Article 11 of Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998 on the introduction of the euro (OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1998/974/oj).

21 Commission Recommendation 2010/191/EU of 22 March 2010 on the scope and effects of legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (OJ L 83, 30.3.2010, p. 70, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2010/191/oj).

22 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk, C-422/19 and C-423/19, EU:C:2021:63, paragraphs 46 to 49.

23 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk, C-422/19 and C-423/19, cited above, paragraphs 55 to 56 and 67 to 70. 2.7 The Court of Justice has established that restrictions of the legal tender status of euro banknotes in particular require that the legislation (a) does not have the object or effect of establishing legal rules governing the status of legal tender of euro banknotes; (b) does not lead, in law or in fact, to abolition of those banknotes, in particular by calling into question the possibility, as a general rule, of discharging a payment obligation in cash; (c) has been adopted for reasons of public interest; (d) only entails a limitation on cash payments that is appropriate for attaining the public interest objective pursued; and (e) only entails a limitation on cash payments that does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the public interest objective . 2.8 Regarding the proportionality of a restriction of the legal tender status of euro banknotes, the Court requires not only that the measure is appropriate for attaining the public interest objective pursued, but also that it must not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective. The ECB has undertaken additional reflection in its opinions with respect to whether limitations may be considered proportionate . In particular, the ECB has noted that the broader and more general a limitation is, the stricter the interpretation of the proportionality requirement should be. When considering whether a limitation is proportionate, the adverse impact of the limitation in question and whether alternative measures capable of fulfilling the relevant objective with a less adverse impact should always be considered . 2.9 The Court of Justice has clarified that the concept of ‘legal tender’ is a concept of Union law that must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Union . It has also established that Article 133 of the Treaty empowers the Union legislature alone to specify the legal rules governing the status of legal tender accorded to banknotes and coins denominated in euro, insofar as that is necessary for the use of the euro as the single currency. Furthermore, the Union legislature’s exclusive competence precludes any competence on the part of the Member States in the matter, unless they have been empowered by the Union to do so or for the implementation of Union acts . In this respect, the ECB notes that, on 28 June 2023, the Commission published a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (hereinafter the ‘proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro cash’), which will establish rules on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins in binding Union secondary law The explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro cash states that discussions within the Euro Legal Tender Expert Group (ELTEG) confirmed the existence of legal uncertainty regarding the legal tender of euro cash and differing application of its

24 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk, C-422/19 and C-423/19, cited above, paragraph 78.

25 See paragraph 4 of Opinion CON/2022/5 of the European Central Bank of 16 February 2022 on a proposal for a directive and a regulation on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (OJ C 210, 25.5.2022, p. 15).

26 See paragraph 2.7 of Opinion CON/2017/8.

27 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk, C-422/19 and C-423/19, cited above, paragraph 45.

28 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk, C-422/19 and C-423/19, cited above, paragraphs 50 to 52.

29 COM(2023) 364 final. principles in the euro area . These differences would justify establishing rules on the legal tender of euro cash in a regulation adopted under Article 133 of the Treaty.

3. Specific observations

3.1 The explanatory memorandum states that the guiding principle behind its drafting was to strike a good balance between the importance of an inclusive and resilient payment system and that of an efficient and secure one. In Opinion CON/2024/39 , the ECB considered that since the legal tender status of euro banknotes and coins is already provided for in primary and secondary Union law, respectively , the draft amendment to the legislative proposal regarding the AML Law would not create an ex novo obligation to accept cash. Therefore, the ECB considers that by referring to the balance between the obligation to accept cash payments (inclusivity) and the efficiency and security arguments, the explanatory memorandum disregards the fact that primary Union law already establishes an obligation, as a general rule, to accept euro banknotes and coins in discharge of a payment obligation. In other words, this approach to the proportionality assessment does not align with that approach established by the Court of Justice, which consists of assessing the proportionality of a cash restriction by reference to an existing general obligation to accept cash in Union law. 3.2 The ECB is fully committed to ensuring that euro cash remains accepted in payments throughout the euro area, in line with the Eurosystem’s cash strategy . For this reason, the ECB welcomed the draft amendment to the legislative proposal regarding the AML Law, which clarified and strengthened the obligation to accept cash as a means of payment in business-to-consumer transactions in the Netherlands . However, the ECB notes that the overall effects of the draft amendments to the legislative proposal regarding the AML Law, namely the reinforcement of the obligation to accept cash for payments up to EUR 3 000, would be severely diminished by the draft law, under which the combination of several exceptions may lead, in law or in fact, to the abolition of the use of euro banknotes and coins in several sectors and situations (payments in the public space, payments in unattended commercial premises, payments on board public means of transport, payments during night hours, periodic payments, payments in enterprises refusing cash due to an essential security reason, and payments in enterprises with fewer than four people working in them refusing cash due to essential security reasons), in particular by calling into question the possibility, as a general rule, of discharging a payment obligation in cash. This casts doubt on the compliance of the measures proposed in the draft law with the criteria set out by the Court of Justice to guarantee the status of legal tender of euro cash. As a consequence, these measures may severely undermine the mandatory acceptance of euro cash in the Netherlands. The number and scope of the exceptions

30 See section 3, page 4 of the explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro cash and Principle 6 of the final report of ELTEG of 6 July 2022, available on the European Commission’s website at www.ec.europa.eu. See also Opinion CON/2023/31.

31 See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2024/39.

32 Article 128(1), third sentence, of the Treaty and Article 11 of Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998 on the introduction of euro (OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p.1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1998/974/oj).

33 Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. See also paragraph 1.7 of Opinion CON/2023/31 and paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2024/39.

34 Paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2024/39. create a high risk of undermining public trust in euro cash as legal tender and could render situations in which euro cash is currently accepted increasingly rare. 3.3 In this context, the ECB notes that the proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro includes an obligation on Member States to ensure cash acceptance in their territories. 3.4 Exceptions to the obligation to accept cash payments that relate to the specific nature of activities 3.4.1 According to the explanatory memorandum, the public interest justification applicable to a number of the exceptions to the obligation to accept cash is security . However, this public interest objective is described only in broad terms and without specifying how these exceptions will contribute to improving security in the Netherlands. The wide scope of the security justification used to support the measures included in the draft law suggests a direct link between cash acceptance and security risks, yet no supporting evidence is cited for the existence of such a causal link. 3.4.2 In relation to the exception that would apply where the debtor or creditor are not both present at the moment when the payment obligation is created , the explanatory memorandum only states in general terms that unattended sales outlets are vulnerable to robbery, burglary and vandalism. It makes no reference to the various types of security measures that may be implemented for unattended sales outlets, including self-checkout terminals equipped with robust vaults and advanced protective mechanisms designed to withstand vandalism, deter robbery attempts, and safeguard stored cash against unauthorised access and theft. Moreover, such unattended commercial premises may also be vulnerable to fraudulent activities involving card payments, where criminals may install devices to steal customers’ sensitive payment card data. 3.4.3 In relation to the exception that would apply to contracts concluded outside sales premises , the explanatory memorandum refers to the security concerns associated with cash payments in public spaces and the security of local residents, without reference to specific areas in the Netherlands or to any specific studies or other statistical evidence on the level of criminality involving the theft of cash in the Netherlands. The explanatory memorandum also argues that in the case of contracts made outside sales premises, it would be undesirable for sellers or service providers to be obliged to accept only cash. However, the obligation to accept cash does not imply that sellers would not be able to accept electronic payments in addition to cash payments. 3.4.4 The exception that would apply to payments made on board means of transport is justified in the explanatory memorandum only by reference to ensuring security on public transport, with no further explanation. Public transportation services are essential services that are used by a wide range of individuals, including some who may not have access to electronic means of payment. Denying the possibility to pay in cash could disproportionately affect vulnerable groups, such as the elderly or individuals without bank accounts, thereby undermining financial inclusivity. Furthermore, it should be noted that tickets for public transportation services are not only sold directly on buses, trams, or trains, but are also made available at stations, ticket counters, or through vending machines in many cases. In such contexts, there is no compelling justification for entirely excluding the possibility of

35 See Article 1, points (a), (d), (e) and (f), of the draft law.

36 Article 1, point (a), of the draft law.

37 Article 1, point (d), of the draft law.

38 Article 1, point (e), of the draft law. cash payments, especially since vending machines continue widely to be equipped with secure mechanisms to accept and process cash transactions. A blanket restriction on cash payments in public transportation does not appear proportionate, as it disregards the diverse methods of ticket distribution and the importance of ensuring that all passengers, regardless of their access to electronic payment tools and with due regard to their payment preferences, can use public transportation seamlessly. The ECB therefore urges the Dutch legislator to reconsider this exception to preserve the inclusive and non-discriminatory nature of payment systems in the public transportation sector. 3.4.5 Similarly, the explanatory memorandum refers to security risks associated with holding cash on premises after 22:00 and to security risks being greater in the evening hours, but does not elaborate. It justifies the exception that would apply to payments made between 22:00 and 06:00 by reference to the existence of a general prohibition under Dutch law on opening an enterprise or selling to the public on weekdays between 22:00 and 06:00 . However, this general prohibition is itself subject to numerous exceptions in respect of, for example, pharmacies, hospitals, nursing/care homes, road restaurants, stations, airports, petrol stations, professional shipping and newspapers, and can be regulated differently by way of a municipal license for hotels, bars, restaurants and cafés. The scope of the exception to accept cash between 22:00 and 06:00 in the draft law thus appears to be broader than it might seem at first sight, which raises doubts about the proportionality of the restriction to the public interest objective pursued. The explanatory memorandum fails to account fully for the fact that many essential services continue to operate during these hours, including pharmacies, petrol stations, restaurants, hotels, cinemas, and other establishments that often serve individuals who rely on cash payments. A number of social groups, such as shift workers, tourists, individuals without access to electronic payment methods, or those who prefer to use cash for budgeting purposes, may find themselves excluded from accessing necessary goods and services if cash is not accepted during these hours. The exception to the obligation to accept cash for payments made in the evening hours between 22:00 and 06:00 does not coincide with the definition of legal tender enshrined by the Court of Justice since it effectively denies legal tender status to euro cash for one third of the time. The ECB therefore urges the Dutch legislator to reconsider this exception . 3.4.6 Furthermore, the explanatory memorandum does not specify any other alternative, less restrictive measures to increase security around unattended sales outlets, public spaces, on public means of transport or in the night hours. 3.4.7 In addition, the broad nature of Article 1 of the draft law , which covers all kinds of unattended sales outlets, including those which located inside buildings, such as shopping centres or car parks equipped with security installations, calls into question whether its scope is proportionate to the public interest objective of security.

39 Shop Opening Hours Act (Winkeltijdenwet, Stb. 2021, 376). Shop Opening Hours Act Exemptions Decree (Vrijstellingenbesluit Winkeltijdenwet, Stb. 2015, 267).

40 See also De Nederlandsche Bank, Response of 31 December 2025 to consultation on exceptions to cash acceptance (hereinafter the ‘Response of 31 December 2025 to consultation on exceptions to cash acceptance’), available on the Overheid’s website at www.overheid.nl.

41 Article 1 of the draft law. 3.4.8 The explanatory memorandum justifies the exception that would apply in relation to periodic payments , by citing the administrative burden that accepting cash would place on creditors who are subject to the Civil Code. The Court of Justice has acknowledged that an unreasonable financial burden justify an exception to accepting cash payments by a public authority , provided that such an exception is proportionate to the objective pursued. However, the interest identified in the explanatory memorandum to the draft law is the administrative burden for creditors who are subject to the Civil Code i.e. private parties, and not the public administration. In any case, the explanatory memorandum does not address whether the burden allegedly relieved by the measure outweighs its potential disadvantages, such as the financial exclusion of certain social groups in case alternative means of payment are not available to them. It should be considered whether other lawful alternative means of payment are readily accessible to everyone liable to make periodic payments. 3.5 Additional exceptions provided for in the draft law 3.5.1 As noted above, the draft law provides for two additional exceptions where cash may be refused. First, a creditor may temporarily refuse to accept of cash because of an essential security interest . Second, small enterprises with fewer than four people working in them are given the possibility to permanently refuse to accept of cash if there is an essential security reason . Such criteria are practically impossible to verify, both for consumers and for competent national authorities assessing the legality of cash refusals. Regarding the reference to a creditor who can ‘temporarily refuse the acceptance of cash’, the explanatory memorandum lacks legal certainty since no limit is placed on such temporary refusal. Furthermore, the concept of an ‘essential security interest’ is not sufficiently defined in the draft law or the accompanying explanatory memorandum. Without clear, objective, and narrowly tailored criteria to determine what constitutes an ‘essential security interest,’ there is a high risk of inconsistent application or overly broad interpretations that may unduly restrict the acceptance of cash payments. This lack of precision creates legal uncertainty for both creditors and debtors, undermining the predictability and uniformity of the legal framework governing cash acceptance. Moreover, the possibility of permanently refusing cash for small enterprises with fewer than four people working in them, even if justified by an essential security reason, is particularly problematic. Small enterprises often serve local communities and vulnerable groups, such as the elderly, low-income individuals, or those without access to electronic payment methods, who rely on cash as their primary means of payment. Allowing such enterprises to refuse cash payments entirely could disproportionately exclude these groups from accessing essential goods and services, thereby undermining the inclusivity of the payment system. Furthermore, the permanent nature of the exception for small enterprises raises serious concerns about its proportionality. Security risks associated with cash handling can be effectively mitigated through alternative measures, such as secure storage facilities, time-delayed safes, enhanced surveillance, or cash collection services. These measures are widely used and can address security concerns without permanently excluding cash as a means of payment. A blanket exception allowing the permanent refusal of cash, even for

42 Article 1, point (c), of the draft law.

43 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk, C-422/19 and C-423/19, cited above, paragraphs 76 and77. small enterprises, does not adequately balance the security interests of creditors with the obligations stemming from the legal tender status of euro cash . 3.5.2 Regarding the appropriateness of these measures to the public objective pursued, the explanatory memorandum does not provide evidence that the exceptions set out in Article 1 of the draft law are likely to achieve the aim of decreasing or otherwise mitigating security risks. 3.5.3 Moreover, the Dutch legislator has not indicated whether alternative measures that would fulfil the relevant objective and have a less adverse impact on the right to pay in cash could have been adopted. Since the public interest objective is related to increasing physical security in Dutch society, it is unclear whether an exception to the obligation to accept cash payments adequately addresses that public interest objective. The exception to the obligation to pay in cash does not appear to address the cause of potential heightened security risks in specific areas nor how to reduce such risks. 3.5.4 Furthermore, the explanatory memorandum does not address the social impact and risk of financial exclusion that would result from the introduction of these exceptions, in particular with regard to the application of the permanent exception for enterprises with fewer than four people working in them. 3.5.5 These measures would make it significantly more difficult to settle legitimate transactions using cash as a means of payment, which could endanger the concept of legal tender enshrined in the Treaty . Notably, the possibility for the restriction to be applied by an undertaking on a permanent basis is disproportionate in relation to the public interest pursued. In this regard, according to available public official statistics , more than 80 % of enterprises engaged in retail business in the Netherlands only have one or two people working in them. This indicates that a large majority of these enterprises could use this exception for security reasons, effectively undermining the legal tender status of cash and creating the risk that the acceptability of cash becomes the exception. Based on these calculations, the draft law would, in practice, lead to the abolition of cash in more than half of the sales outlets in the Netherlands, should all concerned creditors invoke an essential security reason to justify the non-acceptance of cash . 3.5.6 Regarding the proportionality of the exceptions, the explanatory memorandum refers to the existence of an ‘essential security interest’, which would be assessed by a competent organ or an emergency regulation proclaimed by the mayor at municipality level. The explanatory memorandum also states that the assessment may be based on the creditor having been a victim of an assault. However, the draft law itself does not lay down these criteria, which may lead creditors, including enterprises with fewer than four people working in them, to apply the exceptions based on essential security risks in a discretionary manner. 3.5.7 Granting such a discretionary leeway to enterprises would create uncertainty for consumers as to whether retailers will accept cash or not. This uncertainty is exacerbated by the fact that consumers

46 See the Response of 31 December 2025 to consultation on exceptions to cash acceptance.

47 See paragraph 3.1 of Opinion CON/2017/18 and paragraph 2.9 of Opinion CON/2017/27.

49 See the relevant dataset available on the website of the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek at www.cbs.nl.

50 See the Response of 31 December 2025 to consultation on exceptions to cash acceptance. do not have information on the number of people working in an enterprise. The draft law explanatory memorandum does not address this uncertainty for consumers. 3.5.8 Moreover, the explanatory memorandum clarifies that no public supervision or enforcement of the obligation to accept cash is envisaged. The draft law inappropriately shifts the obligation to ensure the mandatory acceptance of euro cash onto consumers and leaves the Dutch civil courts with the responsibility to enforce the obligation to accept cash in those cases where the creditor does not comply with the exceptions laid down in the draft law. It is therefore doubtful whether the draft law effectively achieves the objective of creating a higher level of consumer protection . In this context, the ECB notes that a lack of public supervision over the application of the exceptions provided for in the draft law could undermine cash acceptance, as envisaged in the proposed regulation on the legal tender of euro cash .

4. Concluding remarks

The ECB is profoundly concerned that the draft law, in its current form, risks undermining the legal tender status of euro cash in the Netherlands, which is enshrined in Union law. The extensive scope of exceptions, combined with a lack of supporting evidence to demonstrate a robust public interest justification, as well as adequate proportionality assessments threatens to erode public trust in cash as a universally accessible means of payment. Moreover, the lack of public oversight or enforcement could lead to a discretionary and arbitrary application of these exceptions, with the risk of disproportionately affecting, inter alia, vulnerable groups and increasing the risk of financial exclusion. The ECB strongly urges the Dutch legislator to reconsider the breadth of the exceptions under the draft law and ensure the proportionality of the measures proposed, safeguarding full compliance with Union law and the Court of Justice’s established criteria. It invites the legislator to amend the draft law to protect the mandatory acceptance of euro cash, preserve financial inclusivity, and uphold the legal tender status of euro cash, which is vital for the integrity and cohesion of the single currency area .

This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 22 January 2026.

[signed]

The President of the ECB

Christine LAGARDE

51 See the Response of 31 December 2025 to consultation on exceptions to cash acceptance.

52 COM(2023) 364 final.

53 See the Response of 31 December 2025 to consultation on exceptions to cash acceptance.