Opinion of the European Central Bank of 1 October 2026 on empowering the competent authority under the market abuse regulation to impose a ban on exercising management functions in credit institutions (CON/2026/30)

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 1 October 2026 on empowering the competent authority under the market abuse regulation to impose a ban on exercising management functions in credit institutions (CON/2026/30) Introduction and legal basis

On 1 September 2026 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Belgian Minister for Finances and Pensions, in charge of the National Lottery and the Federal Cultural Institutions, for an opinion on Article 3 of a draft law on implementing the Listing Act and promoting the union of capital markets (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), third indent, of Council Decision 98/415/EC , as the draft law relates to the Nationale Bank van België/Banque nationale de Belgique (NBB/BNB), and the ECB’s tasks concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty. In accordance with Article 17.5, first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

1. Purpose of the draft law

1.1 One purpose of the draft law is to implement Article 30(2), points (e) and (f), of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter the ‘market abuse regulation’). 1.2 The draft law amends Article 25 of the Law of 2 August 2002 on the supervision of the financial sector and financial services (hereinafter the ‘Law of 2 August 2002’), which has implemented the market abuse regulation in Belgian law. Article 25 of the Law of 2 August 2002 provides, in particular, that the Financial Services and Markets Authority (FSMA) assumes the tasks assigned to the competent authority under the market abuse regulation and ensures compliance with the

market abuse regulation and with the provisions adopted on the basis or in implementation of, the market abuse regulation. Article 25(1), second subparagraph, lists the powers entrusted to the FSMA for that purpose. 1.3 The draft law amends Article 25 of the Law of 2 August 2002, by inserting two new measures that the FSMA may take in case of infringement of certain provisions of the market abuse regulation : (1) the FSMA may impose a temporary ban on any natural person held responsible for the infringement, from exercising management functions in investment firms, credit institutions, benchmark administrators or supervised contributors; and (2) in the event of repeated infringements of Article 14 or 15 of the market abuse regulation or of the provisions adopted on the basis of or in implementation of those articles, the FSMA may impose a ban of ten years on any natural person held responsible for the infringement from exercising management functions in investment firms, credit institutions, benchmark administrators or supervised contributors. 1.4 The draft law would thus empower the FSMA to impose a ban on exercising management functions in credit institutions. 1.5 According to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law this approach is justified because credit institutions, like investment firms, may be authorised to provide investment services, including the service of dealing on own account, and that it would therefore be logical to apply identical legal regimes to identical economic activities. In other words, it would be inconsistent for undertakings engaged in the same activities not to be subject to the same system of penalties solely because of their different legal status. The explanatory memorandum further notes that the powers conferred on the FSMA by the draft law fall strictly within the scope of the market abuse regulation and pursue objectives distinct from those of the measures that may be adopted by the ECB and the NBB/BNB in the context of their prudential supervision of credit institutions and stockbroking firms. In other words, the measures provided for in Article 30 of the market abuse regulation (and hence in the draft law) are not, as such, intended to ensure the sound and prudent management of credit institutions and investment firms, but rather to protect the integrity of the markets.

2. General observations

2.1 The draft law extends the FSMA’s power to impose a professional ban to the exercise of management functions in credit institutions. While this extension seeks to ensure a consistent enforcement framework irrespective of the legal status of the entity concerned, it is of particular relevance in relation to credit institutions, which are subject to prudential supervision within the Single Supervisory Mechanism. In that context, measures adopted under the market abuse regulation may affect institutions subject to the ECB’s prudential supervisory responsibilities. 2.2 The supervision and enforcement of the market abuse regulation pursue objectives distinct from those underlying the prudential supervision of credit institutions conferred on the ECB pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty, namely ensuring the safety and soundness of credit institutions and

the stability of the financial system. Nonetheless, measures adopted in the exercise of those powers may, in certain circumstances, have implications for prudential supervision. 2.3 In particular, measures prohibiting natural persons from exercising management functions in credit institutions may have a direct impact on the composition of management bodies and on the governance arrangements of supervised entities. Such measures are therefore relevant to the ECB’s exercise of its tasks under Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 , including its assessments of the suitability of members of management bodies and compliance with prudential governance requirements. It is therefore important that the potential implications of such measures for prudential supervision be duly taken into account when considering the draft law. 2.4 Moreover, the powers provided for in the draft law may, in certain circumstances, overlap in their practical application with prudential supervisory powers exercised by the ECB under Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 and, more generally, by competent authorities under Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council . While the respective frameworks pursue distinct supervisory objectives, the exercise of the powers conferred under those frameworks may concern the same natural persons and may require parallel supervisory action by different authorities. In order to promote supervisory consistency and facilitate the effective exercise of the respective authorities’ mandates, the ECB considers that appropriate coordination mechanisms between the FSMA and the relevant competent authority should be established. Such mechanisms could support the authorities in planning and executing the measures and in avoiding conflicts and unintended consequences, including the uncoordinated cumulation of supervisory measures . 2.5 In view of the above, it is important to ensure that, prior to the adoption of measures under the draft law in respect of natural persons exercising management functions in credit institutions subject to supervision within the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the FSMA coordinates its supervisory actions appropriately with the relevant competent authority. Such coordination would complement the existing arrangements under Union and national law for cooperation and information exchange between the FSMA and the prudential supervisory authorities, and would contribute to the consistent and effective exercise of their respective responsibilities. 2.6 Furthermore, where the FSMA adopts measures under the draft law that prohibit natural persons from exercising management functions in credit institutions, those persons are required to comply with the measures imposed for the full duration of the ban. However, in view of the relevance of such measures to the suitability of members of management bodies and to credit institutions’ compliance with prudential governance requirements as described above, appropriate arrangements should be in place to enable both credit institutions and the competent authority,

when conducting fit and proper assessments, to ascertain whether the FSMA has imposed a professional ban on the person concerned. This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 1 October 2026. [signed]

The President of the ECB

Christine LAGARDE