Opinion of the European Central Bank of 3 November 2025 on the independence of the members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije and the prevention of conflicts of interest (CON/2025/33)

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 3 November 2025 on the independence of the members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije and the prevention of conflicts of interest (CON/2025/33) Introduction and legal basis

On 29 September 2025 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Slovenian Ministry of Finance for an opinion on a new draft law on banking (hereinafter the ‘draft law’) , which would repeal and replace the existing Law on banking . The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), third indent, of Council Decision 98/415/EC , as the draft law relates to Banka Slovenije and the specific tasks conferred upon the ECB concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to Article 127(6) of the Treaty. In accordance with Article 17.5, first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion.

1. Purpose of the draft law

1.1 The main purpose of the draft law is to amend and replace the existing Law on banking in order to transpose into Slovenian law the amendments to Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council introduced by Directive (EU) 2024/1619 of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter the ‘CRD6’). In particular, several provisions of the draft law seek to transpose Article 4a of Directive 2013/36/EU, which relates to the supervisory independence of competent authorities and the prevention of conflicts of interest involving their officials and employees. 1.2 According to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law (hereinafter the ‘explanatory memorandum’), while the application of the requirements of the CRD6 to governors of national central banks (NCBs) is excluded, since their position is regulated by the Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter, the ‘Statute

1 Law on Banking (Zakon o bančništvu (ZBan-4)).

2 Law on Banking (Zakon o bančništvu (ZBan-3) Uradni list RS, št. 92/21 z dne 8. 6. 2021).

3 Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42).

4 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338).

5 Directive (EU) 2024/1619 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks (OJ L, 2024/1619, 19.6.2024). of the ESCB’), those provisions are general in nature and still require concretisation in national law. The Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB only specify that governors must serve a minimum term of five years and set out restrictions on dismissal, but they do not regulate conditions for appointment, which are left to Member States to regulate. The explanatory memorandum clarifies that the abovementioned exclusion in the CRD6 is to be understood as meaning that the requirements of the Member States for governors may differ, and not that such requirements may not be introduced under national law at all. As the Law on Banka Slovenije does not specify any specific objective conditions for the Governor and Vice-Governors, it is, according to the explanatory memorandum, considered reasonable to lay down such conditions for all members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije, including the Governor, given that it would not be logical for the Vice-Governors, who have fewer powers compared to the Governor, to be subject to stricter conditions than the Governor. According to the explanatory memorandum, the same applies, to the limitation of the term of office for members of the competent authority’s governance body. 1.3 The draft law provides that Banka Slovenije, the members of its Governing Board and its employees are independent in the exercise of supervision and act objectively in the performance of their tasks under the draft law, and are not bound by the decisions, positions or instructions of supervised institutions, the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, any Union body, any government of a Member State, State bodies, or any other public or private entity, State or any other body, nor may they request or receive instructions from them or turn to them for instructions for their work or guidelines. The draft law further provides that the requirements concerning the supervisory independence of Banka Slovenije are implemented with regard to the role and responsibilities of the members of its Governing Board and its employees under the principle of proportionality . The explanatory memorandum notes in this respect that the European Banking Authority (EBA) is required, by 10 July 2026, to issue guidelines on the proportionate application of Article 4a of Directive 2013/36/EU. 1.4 The draft law provides that the provisions of the chapter on supervisory independence of Banka Slovenije do not prejudice the requirements regarding the handling of conflicts of interest (including reporting of personal interests), prohibitions on private financial transactions and cooling-off periods that apply to members of the Governing Board and employees of Banka Slovenije under other regulations and internal acts adopted on the basis thereof . The draft law also provides that Banka Slovenije, by an internal act, determines the requirements, procedures and measures to prevent conflicts of interest among Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board members and employees, in connection with the performance of their professional duties at Banka Slovenije, taking into account the principle of proportionality in relation to the role and responsibilities involved in the exercise of Banka Slovenije’s powers and tasks of under the law . 1.5 The draft law amends the current Law on Banka Slovenije by introducing, inter alia, conditions for the appointment of members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije, and a provision limiting the

6 See Article 22 of the draft law.

8 See Article 23 of the draft law. maximum combined duration of their terms of office to 14 years, regardless of any interim interruptions, with this restriction applying only to appointments made after 11 January 2026 . 1.6 According to the explanatory memorandum, the requirement in CRD6 concerning the dismissal of a member of a competent authority’s governance body in the event of a conviction of a serious criminal offence is already reflected in the Law on Banka Slovenije, which provides for dismissal in the event that a member of the Banka Slovenije Governing Board has committed a serious violation . In this regard, the explanatory memorandum notes that Article 4a of the CRD6 is generally speaking a minimum harmonisation provision, meaning that Member States may introduce stricter requirements. With regard to the obligation to publish the reasons for dismissal, the explanatory memorandum clarifies that the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly ensure the publicity of dismissal proceedings, which allow non-public sessions where the chairperson determines the text of the official notification of such sessions. 1.7 The draft law provides that Banka Slovenije is competent and responsible for the supervision of banks in accordance with the draft law and that it must adopt and publish the objectives regarding the implementation of this supervision at least once a year . 1.8 The draft law prohibits Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board members and employees from trading in financial instruments issued by, or relating to, credit institutions or investment firms, including their direct or indirect parent companies, subsidiaries or affiliated companies, except for: (1) instruments managed by third parties, provided that the owner of such instruments is prohibited from interfering in the management of the portfolio and the third party does not invest predominantly in instruments issued by or relating to credit institutions or investment firms, or (2) units of collective investment undertakings, provided that the collective investment undertakings concerned do not invest predominantly in instruments issued by or relating to credit institutions or investment firms. The draft law provides that more detailed requirements, procedures and measures regarding the ownership and disposal of financial instruments are to be determined by an internal act of Banka Slovenije . 1.9 The draft law further provides that Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board members and the employees that are directly involved in decision-making or the performance of supervisory tasks are subject to a cooling-off period following the termination of their office or employment. During this period, they may not take up employment or accept any contract for the provision of professional services with at least: (1) credit institutions or investment firms established in the Republic of Slovenia, including their direct or indirect parent companies, subsidiaries or affiliated companies of such credit institutions or investment firms, (2) credit institutions or investment firms established in other Member States with which the employee has directly cooperated for the purposes of supervision or decision-making, including direct or indirect superiors, subsidiaries or affiliated companies of such credit institutions or investment firms; (3) entities that provide services to any of the credit institutions or investment firms referred to under (1) and (2), unless the employee is strictly prohibited from participating in the provision of such services during the cooling-off period; (4) entities that carry out lobbying and interest

9 See Article 522 of the draft law.

10 See Article 39 of the Law on Banka Slovenije.

11 See Article 9 of the draft law.

12 See Article 24 of the draft law. representation activities at Banka Slovenije in relation to matters for which the employee was responsible during their employment with Banka Slovenije. The cooling-off period begins on the day on which the member of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije ceases to hold office or when the Banka Slovenije employee ceases to directly participate in decision-making or the performance of supervisory tasks over the abovementioned entities. During the cooling-off period, Banka Slovenije prevents the abovementioned Banka Slovenije Governing Board members and employees from having access to confidential or sensitive information relating to the abovementioned entities. The draft law further provides that the cooling-off period lasts for members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije for at least 12 months for employment in the entities referred to in (1), (2), and (3), and for at least three months for employment in the entities referred to in (4). For other employees directly involved in the performance of supervisory tasks, the draft law provides that the cooling-off period lasts for six months for employment in the entities referred to in (1), (2), and (3) and for three months for employment in the entities referred to in (4) . 1.10 The draft law provides that Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board members and the employees that are subject to a cooling-off period are entitled to appropriate financial compensation for compliance with the related restrictions . 1.11 The draft law provides that Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board members and employees must submit a declaration of personal interests before their appointment or employment and annually thereafter. Banka Slovenije is to specify the detailed content of such declarations in an internal act. The declaration must at least include information on holdings in the form of stocks, equity financial instruments, bonds of mutual funds, investment funds, mixed-type funds, hedge funds and investment funds traded on the stock exchange, that could give rise to a conflict of interest for Banka Slovenije . 1.12 The draft law provides that where Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board members or other employees own financial instruments, whether upon taking up employment or at any time thereafter, that could give rise to a conflict of interest, Banka Slovenije may, on a case-by-case basis, determine measures that the Governing Board member or employee must take into account regarding the ownership or disposal of those financial instruments, including the requirement that these instruments be sold or disposed of within a reasonable period of time and that the holder obtains the permission of Banka Slovenije before disposal .

2. General observations

2.1 Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB address the independence of central banks in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) , stipulating that when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute

13 See Article 25 of the draft law.

14 See Article 26 of the draft law.

17 Regarding the doctrine of the ECB as to independence and its ramifications, see the ECB’s Convergence Report 2025, Section 2.2. Available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. of the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor an NCB, nor any member of their decision-making bodies, are to seek or take instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body. This independence was thus entrusted to the ECB and Banka Slovenije, as an NCB, by primary law . 2.2 Based on considerations of central bank independence, and in order to ensure the independence of NCBs such as Banka Slovenije when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, the ECB has established an ethics framework. This includes the ECB’s Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials (hereinafter the ‘Single Code’), which applies, among others, to the members of the Governing Council of the ECB when exercising their functions as members of a high-level ECB body, and Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] of the European Central Bank (ECB/2021/49) , which is addressed to the NCBs of the Eurosystem and establishes ethics requirements applicable to the members of the decision-making bodies and staff of the NCBs . 2.3 The NCBs, as an integral part of the ESCB, must act in accordance with the guidelines of the ECB . Hence, national legislation transposing the CRD6 into Slovenian law is without prejudice to the ethics framework which the ECB has established in order to ensure the independence of the ECB and the NCBs when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, as both frameworks have their own scope and legal basis . 2.4 Furthermore, Article 19 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (hereinafter the ‘SSM Regulation’) stipulates that when carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation, the ECB and the national competent authorities acting within the SSM must act independently. Article 31(3) of the SSM Regulation furthermore requires the ECB, in cooperation with the national competent authorities, to: (a) establish and maintain comprehensive and formal procedures including ethics procedures and proportionate periods to assess in advance and prevent possible conflicts of interest resulting from subsequent employment within two years of members of the Supervisory Board; and (b) provide for appropriate disclosures. Those procedures are without prejudice to the application of stricter national rules . The legal basis for these provisions of the SSM Regulation is Article 127(6) of the Treaty.

18 See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2025/23, paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2025/27, and paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2025/32. All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex.

19 Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials (OJ C 478, 16.12.2022, p. 3).

20 Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down the principles of the Eurosystem Ethics Framework (ECB/2021/49) (OJ L 454, 17.12.2021, p. 7, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2021/2253/oj).

21 See paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2025/23, paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2025/27, and paragraph 2.2 of Opinion CON/2025/32.

22 See Article 14.3 of the Statute of the ESCB.

23 See paragraph 2.1.4 of Opinion CON/2025/19, paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2025/23, paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2025/27, and paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2025/32.

24 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1024/oj).

25 See paragraph 2.1.1 of Opinion CON/2025/19, paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2025/23, paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2025/27, and paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2025/32. 2.5 In view of this independence and these requirements of the SSM Regulation, the ECB has established an ethics framework to ensure the independence of national competent authorities, such as Banka Slovenije, when assisting the ECB in carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM Regulation. This ethics framework includes the Single Code, which applies, among others, to the members of the Supervisory Board of the ECB when exercising their functions as members of a highlevel ECB body, and Guideline (EU) 2021/2256 of the European Central Bank (ECB/2021/50) , which is addressed to the national competent authorities of the SSM and establishes ethics requirements applicable to the members of their bodies and the members of staff of the national competent authorities. In view of the responsibility of the ECB for the effective and consistent functioning of the SSM , the national competent authorities must comply with Guideline (EU) 2021/2256 (ECB/2021/50) . 2.6 In contrast to the ethics framework, which is ultimately based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty, the CRD6, including its provision on the supervisory independence of competent authorities , is based on Article 53(1) of the Treaty. A legal act based on this provision cannot alter the rights and obligations of the ECB and the national competent authorities when carrying out the tasks conferred on them by the SSM Regulation based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty. It follows from settled caselaw of the Court of Justice of the European Union that the different legal bases, namely Article 53(1) and Article 127(6) of the Treaty, cannot be combined as the legal basis for a legal act, in view of the different procedures involved. In particular, the measures adopted under Article 53(1) of the Treaty are adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee (and, if relevant, the ECB in accordance with Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty). By contrast, the regulations adopted under Article 127(6) of the Treaty are adopted by the Council alone, in a special legislative procedure in which the Council acts unanimously, after consulting the European Parliament and the ECB . 2.7 Hence, the amendments made by the CRD6 are without prejudice to the ethics framework which the ECB has established to ensure the independence of the national competent authorities in the context of the SSM, as both frameworks have their own scope and legal basis. The Union legislator acknowledged this through the CRD6’s amendments to Directive 2013/36/EU, which provide that Article 4a(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU is without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the national

26 Guideline (EU) 2021/2256 of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down the principles of the Ethics Framework for the Single Supervisory Mechanism (ECB/2021/50) (OJ L 454, 17.12.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/guideline/2021/2256/oj).

28 See paragraph 2.5 of Opinion CON/2025/23, paragraph 2.5 of Opinion CON/2025/27, and paragraph 2.5 of Opinion CON/2025/32.

29 See Article 4a of Directive 2013/36/EU as inserted by the CRD6.

30 See judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 April 2004, Commission v Council, C-338/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:253, paragraphs 57 and 58; and judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 January 2006, Commission v Parliament and Council, C-178/03, ECLI:EU:C:2006:4, paragraphs 43 to 60.

31 See paragraph 2.6.2 of Opinion CON/2024/21, paragraph 2.1.3 of Opinion CON/2025/19, paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2025/23, paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2025/27, and paragraph 2.6 of Opinion CON/2025/32. competent authorities pursuant to the SSM established by the SSM Regulation . For the avoidance of doubt, the national legislator may wish to clarify this within the text of the draft law. From an ECB perspective, the provisions from the CRD6 may nevertheless serve as guidance for establishing safeguards for the independence of the ECB and the national competent authorities when carrying out the tasks conferred on them by the SSM Regulation . 2.8 The ECB considers that Article 22(3) of the draft law adequately reflects the relationship with the rules mentioned in the previous paragraphs by stating that the provisions of the chapter of the draft law on the supervisory independence of Banka Slovenije do not prejudice the existing rules on conflicts of interest (including the reporting of personal interests), prohibitions on private financial transactions and cooling-off periods that apply to members of the Governing Board and employees of Banka Slovenije .

3. Specific observations

3.1 The draft law proposes to limit the maximum combined duration of all terms of office of each member of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije, i.e. Governor or Vice-Governor, to 14 years , whereas currently they may be appointed for an unlimited number of six-year terms . In this context, the ECB highlights that, in accordance with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, statutes of NCBs must provide for a minimum term of office of five years for a Governor. This does not preclude longer terms of office. Applying the rules regarding the term of office of Governors to other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks also safeguards the personal independence of those persons . The application of the same rules regarding the term of office to both Governors and members of decision-making bodies is particularly pertinent where a Governor is ‘first among equals’ alongside other members who have equivalent voting rights, or where other members are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks , as is the case in Banka Slovenije. 3.2 It is therefore worth noting that a member of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board may not be appointed as a member of the Governing Board if, during the term of office for which they would have been appointed, the performance of their duties as a member of the Governing Board would exceed 14 years, taking into account the combined duration of all previous terms of office after 11 January 2026. Against this background, the ECB considers that the relevant provisions of the Law on Banka Slovenije are consistent with the requirements of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 3.3 The CRD6 provides that Member States must ensure that members of a competent authority’s governance body can be dismissed if they no longer meet the criteria of appointment or have been

32 See Article 4a(2), fourth subparagraph, of Directive 2013/36/EU, as inserted by the CRD6. This acknowledgement refers directly to the dismissal requirements included in Article 4a(2), second subparagraph, of Directive 2013/36/EU, as inserted by the CRD6.

33 See paragraph 2.1.4 of Opinion CON/2025/19, paragraph 2.7 of Opinion CON/2025/23, paragraph 2.7 of Opinion CON/2025/27, and paragraph 2.7 of Opinion CON/2025/32.

36 See Articles 35 and 36 of the Law on Banka Slovenije.

37 Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, which address the independence of central banks in the ESCB, refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs, rather than to Governors specifically.

38 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2025, Section 2.2.3, p. 26. convicted of a serious criminal offence . Under the Law on Banka Slovenije, the members of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board may only be dismissed prior to the expiration of their term of office if they no longer meet the conditions required for the performance of their duties or if they have committed a serious violation . Against this background, the ECB understands that the provisions of the of the Law on Banka Slovenije regulating the appointment and dismissal of members of Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board are consistent with the principles of the CRD6 and that, therefore, it is not necessary for the draft law to include any provisions in this respect. 3.4 In this context, the ECB highlights that, pursuant to Article 14.2, second paragraph, first sentence, of the Statute of the ESCB, ‘a Governor may be relieved from office only if he no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he has been guilty of serious misconduct’. Applying the same rules regarding the grounds for relieving Governors from office to other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks also safeguards the personal independence of those persons . The application of the same rules regarding dismissal to both Governors and members of decision-making bodies is particularly pertinent where a Governor is ‘first among equals’ with other members who have equivalent voting rights, or where other members are involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks , as is the case in Banka Slovenije. The ECB considers that the relevant provisions of the Law on Banka Slovenije are consistent with the requirements of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB . 3.5 The minimum 12-month cooling-off period applicable to the members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije under the draft law is in line with the provisions of the Single Code, which allow for the imposition or extension of a cooling-off period of up to two years, when such an extension is justified under the Single Code . In this respect, the ECB considers that the internal act to be adopted by Banka Slovenije laying down the requirements, procedures and measures to prevent conflicts of interest among Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board members and employees, in connection with the performance of their professional duties at Banka Slovenije, could facilitate, from a legal perspective, the possibility of imposing and extending a cooling-off period of a maximum of two years. 3.6 In addition, the Single Code sets limits on the establishment of post-employment relationships, not only directly with credit institutions, but also with ‘other financial institutions’ or ‘any entity engaged in lobbying in relation to the ECB, or consultancy and/or advocacy for the ECB or for any [supervised] institution’ . For these two categories, the Single Code establishes a cooling-off period of six months

39 See Article 4a(2), second subparagraph, of Directive 2013/36/EU, as inserted by the CRD6.

40 See Article 39 of the Law on Banka Slovenije. On the issue of reproduction of relevant provisions of Union law directly applicable in the legal order of the Member State, see the ECB’s Convergence Report 2025, [Section 2.2.2, pp. 17- 19].

41 See Articles 36 and 39 of the Law on Banka Slovenije.

42 Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs, rather than to Governors specifically.

43 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2025, Section 2.2.3, p. 26.

44 See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2006, Section 7.2.2, p. 75-76.

46 See Article 17.3, point (b), of the Single Code.

47 See Articles 17.1, points (b) and (c), and 17.2, points (b) and (c), of the Single Code. for ‘members’ and three months for ‘alternates’ . In contrast, under the draft law, the categories of entities in respect of which a cooling-off period is applied extend to credit institutions and investment firms, entities that provide services to credit institutions and investment firms, and ‘entities that carry out lobbying and interest representation activities at Banka Slovenije in relation to matters for which the employee was responsible during their employment with Banka Slovenije’ . From this perspective, the cooling-off regime under the draft law appears to introduce slightly different provisions from those contained in the Single Code. The ECB notes further that the draft law must be interpreted without prejudice to the Single Code, as it may be amended from time to time. In addition, the ECB considers that the internal act to be adopted by Banka Slovenije could support alignment with the Single Code. 3.7 The prohibition on the trading by Banka Slovenije’s Governing Board members and employees of certain financial instruments is slightly less restrictive than the requirements of the Eurosystem and SSM Ethics Frameworks, which the ECB has established, and the requirements of the Single Code insofar as it limits the prohibition to financial instruments issued by, or referring to, credit institutions and investment firms and their direct or indirect parent companies, subsidiaries, or 53 54 affiliates , and does not extend to other regulated entities . The ECB understands that, as is explicitly clarified in the text of the draft law , the draft law is without prejudice to the Eurosystem and SSM Ethics Frameworks and to the Single Code, as it may be amended from time to time, and notes that it must not prevent the possibility of extending such prohibition to financial instruments issued by other regulated entities. Finally, the ECB considers that the internal act to be adopted by Banka Slovenije could support alignment with the Single Code. This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. Done at Frankfurt am Main, 3 November 2025. [signed] The President of the ECB Christine LAGARDE

48 See Articles 17.1, points (b) and (c), and 17.2, points (b) and (c), of the Single Code.

50 See Article 11 of Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] (ECB/2021/49).

51 See Article 11 of Guideline (EU) 2021/2256 (ECB/2021/50).

52 See Article 16 of the Single Code.

53 See Article 24 of the draft law.

54 As defined in Article 2, point (8), of Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] (ECB/2021/49) and Article 2, point (7), of Guideline (EU) 2021/2256 (ECB/2021/50).