Ds 2011:35
Sweden´s fourth national report under the Joint Convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management
Sweden’s fourth national report under the
Joint Convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management
Swedish implementation of the obligations of the Joint Convention
This page is intentionally left blank
Sweden’s fourth national report under the Joint Convention on the safety of spent fuel management and the safety of radioactive waste management
Swedish implementation of the obligations of the Joint Convention
This report is on sale in Stockholm at Fritzes Customer Service, which sells reports in the series Swedish Government Official Reports (SOU) and in the Ministry Publications Series (Ds).
Address: Fritzes, Customer Service SE-106 47 Stockholm Sweden Fax: 08 598 191 91 (national) +46 8 598 191 91 (international) Telephone: 08 598 191 90 (national) +46 8 598 191 90 (international) E-mail: order.fritzes@nj.se Internet: www.fritzes.se
Printed by Elanders Sverige AB Stockholm 2011
Contents
List of Tables and Figures
5
Foreword 7
Section A - Introduction
9
A.1 Purpose and structure of this report
9
A.2 Summary results from the previous review
10
A.3 Summary of developments since previous report
12
A.4 Developments as regards the legal and regulatory infrastructure
14
A.5 General overview and context
17
A.6 The management system for spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste
30
A.7 Swedish participation in international activities to enhance safety
and radiation protection
42
Section B - Policies and Practices
45
B.1 Article 32.1: REPORTING
45
Section C - Scope of Application
49
C.1 Article 3: SCOPE OF APPLICATION
49
Section D - Inventories and Lists
51
D.1 Article 32.2: REPORTING
51
Section E - Legislative and Regulatory System
69
E.1 Article 18: IMPLEMENTING MEASURES
69
E.2 Article 19: LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
69
E.3 Article 20: REGULATORY BODY
99
Section F - Other General Safety Provisions
113
F.1 Article 21: RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENCE HOLDER
113
F.2 Article 22: HUMAN AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES
116
F.3 Article 23: QUALITY ASSURANCE
119
F.4 Article 24: OPERATIONAL RADIATION PROTECTION
123
F.5 Article 25: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
130
F.6 Article 26: DECOMMISSIONING
139
Section G - Safety of Spent Fuel Management
145
G.1 Article 4: GENERAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
145
G.2 Article 5: EXISTING FACILITIES
151
G.3 Article 6: SITING OF PROPOSED FACILITIES
152
G.4 Article 7: DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES
157
G.5 Article 8: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY OF FACILITIES
169
G.6 Article 9: OPERATION OF FACILITIES
176
G.7 Article 10: DISPOSAL OF SPENT FUEL
184
This report is on sale in Stockholm at Fritzes Customer Service, which sells reports in the series Swedish Government Official Reports (SOU) and in the Ministry Publications Series (Ds).
Address: Fritzes, Customer Service SE-106 47 Stockholm Sweden Fax: 08 598 191 91 (national) +46 8 598 191 91 (international) Telephone: 08 598 191 90 (national) +46 8 598 191 90 (international) E-mail: order.fritzes@nj.se Internet: www.fritzes.se
Printed by Elanders Sverige AB Stockholm 2011
Section H - Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
185
H.1 Article 11: GENERAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
185
H.2 Article 12: EXISTING FACILITIES AND PAST PRACTICES
192
H.3 Article 13: SITING OF PROPOSED FACILITIES
194
H.4 Article 14: DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES
198
H.5 Article 15: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY OF FACILITIES
201
H.6 Article 16: OPERATION OF FACILITIES
207
H.7 Article 17: INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES AFTER CLOSURE
216
Section I - Transboundary Movement
219
I.1 Article 27: TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENT
219
Section J - Disused Sealed Sources
223
J.1 Article 28: DISUSED SEALED SOURCES
223
Section K - Planned Activities to Improve Safety
229
K.1 Review of the license application for an encapsulation plant
229
K.2 Review of the license application for disposal of spent nuclear fuel
229
K.3 License application for a disposal facility for decommissioning waste
229
K.4 Development of waste acceptance criteria for long-lived waste
229
K.5 Effects from the Fukushima accident
230
K.6 Updated decommissioning plans
230
List of abbreviations
231
List of Tables and Figures
Table A1
Joint Convention Reporting Provisions
Table A2
Updated Overview Matrix
Figure A1
Legal & regulatory framework - organizational structure
Figure A2
Licensing system basic principles
Figure A3
Basic requirements and general obligations
Figure A4
Flow of funds in the financing system as regards nuclear power utilities
Figure A5
Flow of funds according to the Studsvik Act
Figure A6
Nuclear facilities in Sweden
Figure A7
Management system for spent fuel and nuclear waste
Figure A8
The Clab facility
Figure A9
The SFR facility
Figure A10
Planned extension of disposal facility for short-lived low- and intermediate level waste (SFR)
Figure A11
The reference method KBS-3 for disposal of spent nuclear fuel
Figure A12
The encapsulation process for spent nuclear fuel
Figure A13
Time table for establishment of the spent fuel disposal facility and Clink
Figure A14
The Äspö Hard Rock Laboratory
Figure A15
The Canister Laboratory´s equipment for development of friction stir welding
Figure A16
Stacking tests performed at the Bentonite Laboratory on Äspö
Figure A17
Time table for the LILW management programme
Table D1
Inventory of spent fuel in NPP pools
Table D2
Spent fuel from the research reactor R1 temporarily stored in Studsvik
Table D3
Principal data for Clab
Table D4
Inventory of spent fuel stored in Clab 2010-12-31
Figure D1
Standard packages for short-lived LILW used in Sweden
Table D5
Waste treatment methods at the Nuclear Power Plants
Table D6
Inventory of disposed radioactive waste in AM 2010-12-31
Table D7
Principal data for SFR
Table D8
Inventories of disposed radioactive waste in SFR 2010-12-31
Figure D2
Activity content in SFR
Figure D3
Principle section of shallow land burial at OKG
Figure D4
The shallow land burial at OKG
Table D9
Inventories of disposed waste in shallow land burials
Figure E1
Licensing procedure for the KBS-3 system
Figure E2
SSM organisation
Table E1
Educational background of SSM staff
Figure E3
The SSM management system process scheme
Table E2
Budget of SSM in kSEK
Table E3
Breakdown of the 2010 research budget allocated for research related to spent fuel and radioactive waste management at SSM
Figure F1
Work doses to the personnel at Clab 1998-2010
Figure F2
Estimated radiation doses from releases of radioactive substances at Swedish nuclear facilities in the period 2005-2010
Figure F3
Division of responsibilities during decommissioning
Figure G1
Workmethology during construction of a spent fuel repository
Figure G2
A presentation of the ingoing document for the license applications
Figure G3
The structure of the documentation of the post-closure safety
assessment
Table J1
Registration and Deregistration of Radioactive Sources
Table J2
Inventory of disused sealed sources stored by Studsvik Nuclear AB
Table J3
Inventory of radioactive waste stored by Studsvik Nuclear AB
Foreword
Sweden has been active for many years in the international effort to enhance nuclear safety and radiation protection with regard to the operation of nuclear reactors as well as the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. The Convention on Nuclear Safety was an important first step to deal with the most immediate safety issues, i.e. the safety of operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management constitutes another important step by promoting the safe handling and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
The areas covered by the Joint Convention have been incorporated in the Swedish system for spent fuel and radioactive waste management for a long time. The Swedish Government considered at the time of signing the Joint Convention that the safety philosophy, legislation and the safety work conducted by the licensees and the authorities in Sweden complied with the obligations of the Convention.
A summary of highlights and issues raised about Sweden during the third review meeting May 11 to 20, 2009 can be found in section A.2. This section also includes an overview of those issues Sweden was asked to report about in its fourth national report (i.e. the present report). A summary of developments since the last national report can be found in section A.3.
This report has been produced by a working group with representatives from, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) and the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co (SKB). It constitutes an up-dated document with basically the same structure as the previous national reports under the Joint Convention, although the information in section A, Introduction, has been slightly reorganized. Before submission to the Government for formal approval the report was sent for comments to relevant organizations including the nuclear industry.
This page is intentionally left blank
Section A – IntroductIon
A.1 Purpose and structure of this report
Sweden signed Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (Joint Convention) September 29, 1997. Sweden ratified the Joint Convention about two years later and is a Contracting Party to the Joint Convention since July 29, 1999. The Joint Convention entered into force on June 18, 2001.
Each member nation having ratified the Joint Convention (Contracting Party) is obligated to prepare a National Report covering the scope of the Joint Convention and subject it to review by other Contracting Parties at Review Meetings held in Vienna, Austria. Sweden participated in the First Review Meeting in November 2003, the Second Review Meeting in May 2006 and the Third Review Meeting in May 2009. This report is the fourth Swedish National Report under the Joint Convention.
This report satisfies the requirements of the Joint Convention for reporting on the status of safety at spent fuel and radioactive waste management facilities within Sweden. It constitutes an updated document with basically the same structure as the previous national reports under the terms of the Joint Convention and reflects developments in Sweden through December 2010. It will be subject to review at the Fourth Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties in Vienna, Austria, in May 2012.
The report format and content follow the revised guidelines for structure and content of the report, as agreed at the Second Review Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention in May 2005. Chapters in this report have the same titles as in these guidelines, facilitating review by other Contracting Parties. Table A1 provides a cross-reference between the chapters in this report and the specific reporting provisions in the Joint Convention.
Table A1: Joint Convention Reporting Provisions
Section A.2 provides for a summary of highlights and issues raised about Sweden during the third review meeting. This section also includes an overview of those issues Sweden was asked to report about in its fourth national report (the present report).
National Report Section Joint Convention Section
A. Introduction B. Policic and Practices Article 32, Paragraph 1 C. Scope of Application Article 3 D. Inventories and Lists Article 32, Paragraph 2 E. Legislative and Regulatory Systems Article 18; Article 19; and Article 20 F. General Safety Provisions Articles 21-26; Articles 4-9; Articles 11-16 G. Safety of spent Fuel Management Articles 4-10 H. Safety of Radioactive Waste Management Articles 11-17 I. Transbounddary Movement Article 27 J. Disused Sealed Sources Article 28 K. Planned Activities to Improve Safety Multiple Articles L. Annexes Multiple Articles
Section A – IntroductIon
Section A.3 contains a summary of developments since the previous national report.
Section A.4 provides information about the new regulatory authority, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, as well as on the Committee of Inquiry on harmonising the Swedish acts regulating activities in the field of nuclear technology and radiation protection.
Section A.5 provides some basic information about the development of a national strategy and its transformation into a national programme for management of spent fuel and nuclear waste.
Section A.6 presents an overview of the existing management system for spent fuel and nuclear waste.
Section A.7 contains an account for Swedish participation in international activities.
Section B provides information on policies and practices according to Article 32.1 of the Convention.
Section C addresses scope of the report according to Article 3 of the Convention.
Section D provides information on inventories and lists according to Article 32.2 of the Convention.
Section E presents the legislative and regulatory system according to Articles 18,19 and 20 of the Convention.
Sections F to J include facts and information to substantiate compliance with the obligations of the Convention. Every chapter in these sections corresponds to one Article of the Convention. The chapters in sections F to J have a similar structure where information is provided about the regulatory requirements related to the respective Article. In addition, information is provided about measures taken by the licence holders to comply with the regulatory requirements as well as own safety initiatives. Finally, information is provided about the means used by the regulatory bodies to supervise the measures taken by the licence holders. Taken together this will provide evidence for meeting the obligations of the Convention.
A.2 Summary results from the previous review
During the period before the third review meeting, Sweden received in total 132 questions on the report from 21 countries. The questions touched several articles of the Joint Convention and were mostly requests for clarifications, additional information and reports on experiences with specific practices. All questions were answered on the Joint Convention website and commented in a general sense at the review meeting.
During the discussion at the review meeting it was agreed that Sweden seems to comply well with the obligations of the Joint Convention. It was concluded that a comprehensive regulatory framework is in place focusing on targets rather
Section A – IntroductIon
than prescriptive requirements. Sweden has made good progress in realisation of repository projects and the existing policy of transparency and openness has contributed to a high level of acceptance in the public with regard to these projects. Another conclusion was that the financing system for decommissioning and disposal is designed to provide funding for the implementation of the Swedish waste management concept.
The meeting emphasized that Sweden is in the forefront of several aspects of spent fuel and radioactive waste management, and expressed a desire for Sweden to provide information on developments in these areas in the next report.
It was noted that Sweden demonstrated good practices with regards to:
- responsibilities for spent fuel and waste safety is clearly defined in the legal framework
- arrangements in place to finance all items related to spent fuel and radioactive waste management as well as decommissioning
- funding mechanism is available for costs for orphan sources and other legacy waste
- long term strategy is in place for disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste
- provisions for transparency of nuclear activities in legislation
- extensive public consultation in the decision making process
- constructive relationship between regulatory bodies and licensees
The following challenges were identified for the future development as regards management of spent fuel and radioactive waste:
- Continued implementation of the long term strategy to complement the existing management system for spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste, i.e. siting and licensing of new facilities (e.g. an encapsulation plant and a spent fuel disposal facility). Development in this regard is found in section A.6..3.2.
- Implementation of improvements to the system of management of non-nuclear waste. Development in this regard is found in section A.5.3.
- Integration of organisations and regulatory practices after merging the previously existing regulatory authorities (the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, SKI, and the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority, SSI). Development in this regard is found in section A.4.1
- Development of strategies and approaches for assuring adequate human resources for SSM. Development in this regard is found in section A.4.1.
Sweden was asked to report at the next review meeting in particular on the following planned measures to improve safety:
- License application for the repository for spent nuclear fuel planned for mid-
2010. Development in this regard is found in sections A.6.3.2.
- License application for the extension of the SFR for both operational and decommissioning waste planned for 2013. Development in this regard is found in sections A.6.3.3.
- Development of waste acceptance criteria for long-lived waste. Development in this regard is found in sections A.6.3.3.
- Development of a strategic National Waste Management Plan addressing both nuclear and non-nuclear waste management. Development in this regard is found in sections A.5.3.
Section A – IntroductIon
A.3 Summary of developments since previous report
In order to provide continuity from the second review meeting, the rapporteur’s matrix has been revised and supplemented with references to explanatory sections of the report, in table 1.
Table A2: Revised overview of the Swedish programme for management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.
TYPE OF
LIABILITY
LONG-TERM MANAGEMENT
POLICY
FUNDING OF LIABILITIES CURRENT PRACTICE /
FACILITIES
PLANNED FACILITIES
SPENT FUEL
NPP licensees jointly responsible.
Strategy in place for disposal
Funded by fees on production of nuclear energy collected in segregated funds (Nuclear Waste Fund)
Stored on site initially, then transferred to central interim storage facility (Clab)
Licence application for spent fuel disposal facility under review
See section
A.5.1, A.5.2, A.5.2.4, B.1.1
A.5.2.6, E.2.2.5, F.2.1.2 A.6.2, A.6.2.1, B.1.2, D.1.2.3 A.6.5.3, E.2.2.1, G.4.2.42
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE WASTES
NPP licensees jointly responsible.
Strategy in place for disposal
Funded by fees on production of nuclear energy collected in Nuclear Waste Fund
Disposal of short-lived operational LILW waste (SFR) from NPPs paid for directly by owners
Short-lived LILW disposal at existing repository (SFR);
Shallow land burial sites for VLLW short-lived waste exist at NPP sites
Preliminary plans for disposal facility for long-lived LILW (SFL). License application expected 2030
See section
A.5.1, A.5.2, A.5.2.4, B.1.3
A.5.2.6, E.2.2.5, F.2.1.2 A.6.2, A.6.2.2, B.1.4 A.6.3.3, H.5.2
NON-POWER WASTES
Strategy in place for disposal –
Further actions on-going
Funded by producers/ owners of waste
Government funding available for legacy wastes
Short-lived LILW disposal at existing facilities for nuclear fuel cycle waste (SFR) when appropriate;
Long-lived LILW to be interim storage pending disposal in facility for long-lived LILW nuclear fuel cycle waste (SFL)
To be disposed of in planned disposal facility for long-lived LILW nuclear fuel cycle waste (SFL)
See section
A.5.3
J.1.2
D.1.4.2
J.1.2
DECOMMIS-SIONING LIABILITIES
Licensee is responsible Funded by producers/owners of waste
Preliminary plans for decommissioning exist;
Reviews of the adequacy of funding on-going
Short-lived LILW to be disposed of in extension to existing SFR facility License application for extension expected in 2013
Long-lived LILW to be disposed of in planned disposal facility for long-lived LILW nuclear fuel cycle waste (SFL)
See section
A.5.2.4 A.5.2.6, E.2.2.5, F.2.1.2 F.6.2, G.6.2.7 A.6.3.3, H.5.2, K.3
DISUSED SEALED SOURCES
Returned to manufacturer
Funded by producers/ owners of waste
Government funding available for orphan sources
Returned to manufacturer, disposed of in SFR, or in interim storage pending disposal in facility for long-lived LILW nuclear fuel cycle waste (SFL)
To be disposed of in disposal facilities for nuclear fuel cycle wastes (SFR, SFL) as appropriate
See section
J.1 E.2.2.5, J.1
J.1
J.1
Section A – IntroductIon
The main elements in progress made since the third review meeting is summarized below:
- The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) and the Swedish Radiation
Protection Authority (SSI) were merged into a joint organization, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, July 1, 2008.
- Regulations from the former regulatory authorities have been reissued as
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority regulations.
- On January 1, 2011 the previous ban on constructing new reactors was removed through amendments to the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities and the Environmental Code, i.e. old reactors in Sweden may be replaced by new ones.
- A Committee of Inquiry on merging the provisions of the Act on Nuclear
Activities and the radiation Protection Act (1988:220) has submitted its final report to the Government (SOU 2011:18).
- By a new Ordinance on Supervision under the Environmental Code SSM on
March 31, 2011 took over the supervisory authority for matters relating to radiation safety under the Code from the County Administrative Boards.
- The Parliament has approved a Government Bill containing a proposal to extend the obligation to pay fees under the Studsvik Act until December 31, 2017.
- The arrangement for financial support to non-profit-making organizations to participate in the licensing process for establishing a spent nuclear fuel disposal facility has been prolonged.
- SKB has since July 1, 2009, taken over the operation of the disposal facility for short-lived low- and intermediate level waste (SFR) in Forsmark.
- SKB in September 2010 submitted the RD&D-programme 2010, the ninth
RD&D-programme on since 1986. The regulatory authorities have evaluated the programme and submitted a statement to the Government.
- SKB in January 2011 submitted updated cost estimates to be used for the determination of fees to be paid by the nuclear power plant owners organization to the Nuclear Waste Fund for the years 2012 through 2014.
- SKB in November 2009 submitted supplementary material to the license application for an encapsulation plant. The regulatory review of the application will be co-ordinated with the review of a license application for a disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel under the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities and the Environmental Code.
- SKB in March 2011 submitted a license application to site and construct a disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, at Forsmark in the municipality of Östhammar. The regulatory review of the application will be co-ordinated with the review of a license application for the encapsulation plant under the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities and the Environmental Code.
- SKB has initiated a process of regular consultation meetings with SSM on the planned extension of the disposal facility for short-lived long- and intermediate level waste (SFR) and relicensing of the facility to accommodate also decommissioning waste.
- SSM in June 2009 submitted a national waste management plan to the Government on the management and disposal of radioactive waste generated outside of the nuclear fuel cycle.
- By a government decision, AB SVAFO in December 2010 obtained the nu-
Section A – IntroductIon
clear license for R2 and R2-0, which earlier belonged to Studsvik Nuclear AB. This means AB SVAFO will now be responsible for the further decommissioning work.
- As a follow-up to the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP nuclear accident,
SSM, on May 25 2011, decided that the NPP licensees and SKB shall redo the safety assessments for the NPPs and for the interim storage for spent nuclear fuel at Clab at Oskarshamn.
A.4.1 the Swedish radiation Safety Authority
The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) was formed on July 1, 2008, in a merger between the former authorities the Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) and the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority (SSI). The motives for this change were:
- A general ambition by the Government to reduce the number of authorities and make the Swedish civil service more efficient
- A more efficient use of common resources for the supervision of nuclear facilities – where inspections will benefit from an integrated perspective
- An integrated competence within nuclear safety and radiation protection that will lead to a reinforced supervision of both nuclear and non-nuclear activities
- It will be easier for the licensees and other stakeholders to deal with one regulatory body, the risk for contradictory rules and decisions will be eliminated
SSM has been in operation as a regulatory authority for three years. The build-up is completed and although this required extra efforts and some temporary limitations, the supervising capacity was never jeopardized. The merger of the two authorities was done “within the existing budget” but SSM has since received additional funding to enhance its supervising activities. Some of the difficulties encountered, some common to organisational change in general, were/are:
- The differences in “work culture” of the earlier authorities were overcome by active efforts in which all staff was involved in establishing the work methods, vision and core values of the new authority. In addition, the rapidly increasing number of new employees has been a positive challenge in forming the new authority.
- The different terminology used in the radiation protection field and the nuclear safety area (safety, justification, optimisation, protection, graded approach etc.) has created some practical problems in communication and regulatory work. This will partly be resolved by the Government suggested new legislation which will include definitions on basic key terms.
- The objective of reinforcing the supervision in the nuclear field and towards hospitals is under way but the initial judgment of needed resources was underestimated. An initial loss of some experienced inspectors took 1-2 years to overcome.
- The creation of a new authority automatically resulted in many work hours being allocated to build-up of the organisation and internal activities, and less resources for supervision, information, communication etc. However, the
A.4 Developments as regards the legal and
Section A – IntroductIon
priorities were set in such a way that the prime safety and radiation protection functions of the SSM (e.g. emergency preparedness, major safety inspections and controls, licensing of high activity sources) was never negatively affected by the internal activities during the build-up phase.
Some of the observed positive results are:
- SSM is better prepared (than the two earlier authorities) to assess applications from the nuclear industry and in particular the recent application for a spent nuclear fuel disposal facility.
- The merged resources have created better conditions for development of an effective management system, modernization of the authority work and administrative procedures, including the investment in documentation systems and new electronic technologies .
- The new authority can use its research resources in a more effective way, especially in areas where the former SKI and SSI had shared responsibilities.
- The common competences are used more efficiently, e.g. the expertise in the area of human factors of the former authority SKI is now used in other supervision areas.
- Inspection models have been shared between the different supervision fields.
As examples, the concept of “special supervision” has been applied to hospitals and “rapid investigations” were performed at a fuel factory and in connection with an accident with x-ray equipment.
- SSM is better prepared to handle nuclear emergencies and radiological crises, which was evident in the authority taking a central role in the Swedish response to the recent Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP nuclear accident. More information on the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority is found in section E.3.1.2 and on the SSM web-site: www.ssm.se.
A.4.2 Legislative amendments and proposals in the nuclear field
A.4.2.1 Amendments
Controlled generational shifts in the Swedish stock of nuclear power facilities
The parliament has decided to abolish the Nuclear Power Phase-Out Act and to remove the ban to construct new nuclear reactors in the Act on Nuclear Activities. Amendments made to the Environmental Code and the Act on Nuclear Activities provide the conditions for controlled generation shifts in Swedish nuclear power, making it possible to gradually replace existing nuclear power reactors with new ones. One precondition for obtaining the permission to construct new reactors in Sweden is that the new reactor replaces one of the older reactors and that the older reactor is permanently shut down. The legal definition of a permanently shut down reactor is as follows; ” a reactor where the production of electricity has ceased and will not be restarted, or a reactor that has not supplied electricity to the grid for the last five years”. The new nuclear power reactors may only be constructed on one of the sites where present reactors that are in operation are located. These changes entered into force 1 January 2011.
Section A – IntroductIon
Requirement of a regular overall assessment of reactor safety and the impact on security of supply in the area of electricity generation
The requirement in SSM:s general safety regulations SSMFS 2008:1, that nuclear plants shall conduct a unified analysis and overall assessment of safety at each nuclear power reactor at least every ten years, has been transferred to the Act on Nuclear Activities to emphasise its importance as a safety principle. The amendment entered into force 1 August 2010.
Extension of obligation for reactor operators to pay a fee to the Studsvik Act
In June 2011 the Parliament approved a Government Bill containing a proposal to extend the obligation to pay fees under the Studsvik Act until December 31, 2017. The reformed legislation will enter into force on 1 January 2012.
A.4.2.2 Proposals
Inquiry on Coordinated Regulation in the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Field
The Head of the Ministry of the Environment on 11 December 2008 appointed a Committee of Inquiry on harmonising the rules concerning activities in the field of nuclear technology and radiation protection.
The Inquiry’s final report (SOU 2011:18) was submitted to the Government February 2011. The report is currently sent out to a large number of referral respondents, including SSM.
The Inquiry suggests that the provisions in the Act on Nuclear Activities and the Radiation Protection Act are integrated in their entirety into the Environmental Code. No substantive material changes to the legislation are proposed.
The Inquiry suggests the introduction of the term “Radiation safety” which should be used as a collective designation for:
a) radiation protection: the protection of people and the environment against
the harmful effects of radiation, through justification of use, optimisation of protective measures and the limitation of radiation doses and exposure risks,
b) safety: protection against the harmful effects of radiation by taking whatever
steps are necessary to prevent defects in equipment, equipment failure, wrong handling or other circumstances that may lead to accidents, and to facilitate the combating of breakdowns and the limitation or delay of emissions should an accident nevertheless occur,
c) physical protection: protection of operations, facilities and equipment
against incursions, unauthorised use, theft, sabotage or other action liable to cause harm through radiation.
d) non-proliferation: measures designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons at both national and international level, and measures to verify that such proliferation is not occurring.
At the earliest the proposed legislative changes could enter into force during 2013 or 2014.
Section A – IntroductIon
A.5 General overview and context
A.5.1 development of a national Strategy
Past practices
No formal requirements for the management of spent fuel and nuclear waste were established in Sweden until the late 1970’s. Therefore, a study was initiated in the mid-1990’s with the objective to better understand past practices regarding management of radioactive waste. This knowledge is important to allow for the proper and safe conditioning and disposal of old waste still in storage. The study focused on the management of radioactive waste containing plutonium from research activities. Activities that generated plutonium-containing waste have been identified as well as the treatment, storage, and in certain cases, dumping at sea of the waste produced. Sea dumping of radioactive waste was limited to low-level waste and occurred in Swedish territorial waters as well as in the Atlantic. The last dumping occurred at the end of the 1960’s. Since 1971 sea dumping is prohibited in Sweden.
Early activities that generated most of the spent fuel and radioactive waste in Sweden were:
- The research reactor R1 (the first research reactor, 1954-1970),
- The Studsvik site (a research institute established 1958 for the Swedish nuclear programme, with research reactors in operation 1958-2005), and
- The Ågesta district heating nuclear power reactor (the first power reactor in
Sweden, in operation 1964-1974). Historical wastes are often varying with regards to categorization, measurements accuracy and conditioning. Such wastes are connected to the early research and development of the Swedish nuclear programme. These wastes are with very few exceptions managed at the Studsvik facilities, situated 100 km south of Stockholm, outside Nyköping. The treatment and conditioning of these wastes have been managed on a case-by case basis and the regulatory authority has opted to have early in-sight in these projects and to handle them, both their regulation and control, on a case-by-case basis. The final waste packages, however, must fit into the available waste streams of the Swedish disposal programme and, to the extent possible, fulfill the general requirements of the regulations.
The option of a nuclear weapons programme
As early as in August 1945, Sweden decided to evaluate the then new situation regarding atomic weapons. The main aim of the research was to find out how Sweden could best protect itself against a nuclear weapon attack. However, from the outset there was an interest in investigating the possibilities of manufacturing nuclear weapons. In 1968, the Swedish government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, thus ending the discussions on a Swedish nuclear weapons programme.
Reprocessing
Swedish policy was originally based on the assumption that reprocessing and plutonium recycling would form attractive and desirable elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. However, the construction of a reprocessing plant in Sweden was not envisaged. As commercial nuclear power plants were built in the early 70’s,
Section A – IntroductIon
arrangements were made therefore to send the spent nuclear fuel abroad for reprocessing.
During the late 1970’s attitudes changed, and reprocessing was, for various reasons (including non-proliferation aspects), not considered an acceptable method for the management of spent nuclear fuel. The current policy regarding the management of spent nuclear fuel was established in the late 1970’s, and aims at direct disposal without reprocessing.
In 1969 the Swedish nuclear power company, OKG, signed a contract with the United Kingdom. Atomic Energy Agency, which was later taken over by The British Nuclear Fuel Limited (BNFL), for the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel from OKG in Windscale (later Sellafield). In all 140 tons of fuel was shipped to Sellafield between 1972 and 1982. The fuel was reprocessed in 1997 and resulted in 136 tons of uranium and 833 kilograms of plutonium. OKG plans to manufacture and use the recovered plutonium in about 80 MOX-fuel elements.
Between 1978 and 1982 an agreement was made between the Swedish Nuclear Fuel Supply Company (SKBF, later renamed SKB) and Compagnie Générale des Matières Nucléaires (COGEMA) regarding the reprocessing of 672 tons of spent nuclear fuel from the Barsebäck, Ringhals and Forsmark NPPs.
A total of 55 tons was shipped to La Hague before the contracts were cancelled. The fuel was then exchanged for 24 tons of used MOX-fuel from Germany. The exchange meant that Sweden did not have to build a disposal facility for vitrified waste and Germany did not have to build a disposal facility for used MOX-fuel. The used MOX-fuel from Germany is now stored in the Clab facility.
The 1973 Committee on Radioactive Waste (The AKA-committee)
In 1973 the Government appointed a committee (the Committee on Radioactive Waste) to investigate the problem of handling high-level waste from nuclear power plants. The scope of the investigation was later extended to cover essentially all aspects of the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle. The report from the committee was submitted in 1976 and defines in essence the Swedish national strategy for management and disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste. The main findings of the committee were:
- Reprocessing of spent fuel was recommended, with disposal of glass or ceramic solidification of the high-level waste in bedrock, but that further studies should be carried out to clarify the conditions for a non-reprocessing scheme, i.e. direct disposal in bedrock.
- Responsibilities of licensees should be more clearly defined in the regulatory framework
- A research- and development programme should be established, subject to regulatory approval
- A financing system to cover costs for treatment, transport and disposal as well as research and development should be established
- A central storage facility for spent fuel should be established.
- A central disposal facility for low- and medium level radioactive waste should be established.
Section A – IntroductIon
A.5.2 development of a national Programme
A.5.2.1 Fundamental principles
Principles for the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste have evolved over the years and have been discussed by the Swedish parliament. The allocation of responsibilities is reflected in the Swedish legislation, and is further described in section E.2. The principles can be summarised:
1. The expenses for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste are to be covered by revenues from the production of energy that has resulted in these expenses.
2. The reactor owners are to safely dispose of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste.
3. The state has the ultimate responsibility for spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. The long-term responsibility for the handling and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste should rest with the state. After a disposal facility has been closed, a requirement should be established to ensure that some kind of responsibility for and supervision of the disposal facility can be made and maintained for a considerable time. A government authority could assume responsibility for a closed disposal facility.
4. Each country is to be responsible for the spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste generated in that country. The disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste from nuclear activities in another country may not occur in Sweden other than in an exceptional case.
A.5.2.2 Legal & regulatory framework – an overview
The management of spent fuel and nuclear waste is regulated by a series of statutory provisions, of which the three main legislative instruments are:
- The Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3), which defines the licensing requirements for the construction and operation of nuclear facilities and for handling or using nuclear materials (including radioactive waste).
- The Radiation Protection Act (1988:220), which defines the licensing requirements for radiation protection and for radiological work.
- The Act on Financial Measures for the Management of Residual Products from Nuclear Activities (2006:647) which deals with the main financial aspects, and defines the responsibilities pertaining to the management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.
These are the basic principles for the structure of the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities. They are also contained in the Act (2006:647) on Financial Measures for the Management of Residual Products from Nuclear Activities.
Under the Act on Nuclear Activities the holder of a licence to operate a nuclear reactor is primarily responsible for the safe handling and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste produced by the reactor. In addition the holder is responsible - under the Radiation Protection Act - to take all measures and precautions necessary to prevent or counteract injury to human health and the environment by radiation.
Section A – IntroductIon
The Act on the Financial Measures for the Management of Residual Products from Nuclear Activities is an essential part of the Swedish nuclear waste management system since it lays down the principles for the financing of expenses for decommissioning and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste.
The Environmental Code (1998:808) is also of importance, in particular for the siting and construction of new facilities since amongst other things it regulates the environmental impact statement that must accompany a licence application. Any new nuclear facility must be licensed according to both the Act on Nuclear Activities and the Environmental Code. In both cases the Government grants the licence on the basis of recommendations and reviews of the competent authority.
Parliament
Government
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority
(SSM)
Regulatory review and supervision
Licensees
The National Council
for Nuclear Waste
Ministry of the
Environment
Acts
§
Ordinances
§
Regula-
tions
§
Figure A1: Legal & regulatory framework - organizational structure
A.5.2.3 Licensing system basic principles
On important element in the legal and regulatory framework is the clearly defined step wise licensing process for nuclear facilities. Each decision to grant a license/ authorization to move from one phase to the next is founded on the regulatory review of an application from the implementer, based on an appropriate collection of arguments and evidence to justify the decision.
The safety analysis report (SAR) is central in the overall process. The SAR should provide an overall view of how the safety of the facility is arranged in order to protect human health and the environment against nuclear accidents. The report shall reflect the facility as built, analyzed and verified, as well as show how the requirements on its design, function, organization and activities are met. A preliminary safety report shall be complied before a facility may be constructed. The safety report shall be updated before trial operation of the facility may be started. The safety report shall be supplemented before the facility is subsequently taken into operation. The safety report shall subsequently be kept up-to-date.
In addition, and as appropriate, SSM examines the organizational, human and
Section A – IntroductIon
Nuclear Legislative And Regulatory Framework - Licensing Process
GOVERNMENT
REGULATOR
IMPLEMENTER
TIMELINE
Licence
- Construct - Possess - Operate
De-licensing
Exemption from
responsibilities
AS BUILT , ANALYSED AND VERIFIED
TO BE KEPT UP-TO DATE
Application
- Construct - Possess - Operate
Application Excemption
from
Responsibilies
Application
Construct.
Application
Operation
Application
Operation
Application
Decomm. &
Dismantl.
SAR
Authorisation
Construction
Authorisation
Trial Operation
Authorisation
Routine Operation
Authorisation
Decommis-
sioning
Authorisation
Continued Operation
PSR
(Periodic Safety Review)
Prel. SAR
Renewed
SAR
Supplemented
SAR
2
3
4
5
1
Figure A2: Licensing system basic principles
1. Government license to construct, possess and operate (including decom missioning)
The license covers the lifecycle of the facility until the licensee is exempted
from responsibilities as regards the facility/site. General obligations as regards management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste remains until disposal facilities are sealed and closed. Review activities according to the Act on Nuclear Activities focus on feasibility to establish the activities and the facility at the proposed site. A parallel licensing process according to the Environmental Code focuses on permissibility and the site selection process.
2. Regulatory authorization to start construction
The authorization is based on a regulatory review of the preliminary safety
analysis report (PSAR). Review activities focus on that the preliminary design is compatible with legal and regulatory requirements and according to license conditions.
3. Regulatory authorization to start trial operation
The authorization is based on a regulatory review of a renewed SAR. Review administrative capacity to cary out works to the extent and the quality required as well as preliminary plans for decommissioning of the facility.
The step wise licensing process is schematically illustrated in figure A2 and summarized below.
Section A – IntroductIon
activities focus on that the facility as built is in compliance with legal and regulatory requirements and according to license conditions.
4. Regulatory authorization to start routine operation
The authorization is based on a regulatory review of a supplemented SAR
taking into account the experience gained from trial operation. Review activities focus on experiences from the trial operation period and that the operation of the facility is in compliance with the operational Limits and Conditions (OLC) and according to license conditions.
5. Periodic Safety Review (at least every ten years)
The authorization is based on a regulatory review an integrated analysis and
overall assessment of the safety of the facility, concerning the way in which the facility at the time of analysis complies with the valid safety requirements as well as whether the necessary conditions exist to operate the facility in a safe manner until the next review occasion.
6. Regulatory authorization to start decommissioning
The authorization is based on a regulatory review of that the decommissio-
ning plan has been properly supplemented and incorporated into the facility’s safety report.
7. Exemption from responsibilities (for the facility) by the Government
The regulatory review focuses on verifying that the licensee has carried out
all duties according to the legal and regulatory requirements and according license conditions. General responsibilities for management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste remains until all spent fuel and waste is disposed of and disposal facilities are sealed and closed.
Section A – IntroductIon
A.5.2.4 Basic requirements and general obligations
Another important element in the legal and regulatory framework is the general obligations in the Act on Nuclear Activities, requiring licence-holders for nuclear activities to ensure the safe handling and disposal of nuclear waste arising from the activities or nuclear material arising therein that is not reused. As regards spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste, the licensee for a nuclear power reactor shall – in co-operation with the other holders of a licence for the operation of nuclear power reactors – establish and carry out a research and development (R&D) programme for the safe handling and disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste (see also A.5.2.5)
As regards costs for management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste, the licensee for a nuclear power reactor is – in co-operation with the other holders of a licence for the operation of nuclear power reactors – responsible for paying the costs for management and disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste (see also A.5.2.6).
The licensee responsibilities are schematically illustrated in figure A3 and summarized below.
Figure A3: Licensee basic requirements and general obligations
Licensee is responsible for safe construction, operation and decommissioning –
facility perspective
Licensees are also responsible for general obligations as regards management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste – management perspective, i.e.
- NPP licensees must in co-operation develop and implement management and disposal solutions for spent fuel and nuclear waste.
- NPP licensees must in co-operation carry out cost estimates and invest money in
Government controlled funds to cover future costs for dismantling of facilities as well as management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste.
Licensee
Basic requirements safety of operations
Licensee
General Obligations Safe Management and Disposal of SF&RW
NPP Licensees In Cooperation
Funding Of Costs For Management and Disposal of SF&RW
NPP Licensees In Cooperation
NPP Licensee Treatment, Storage
Facility Licensee
Disposal Facility
Licensee
Transport Licensee
Transport Licensee
m/s Sigyn
Nuclear power plant
Section A – IntroductIon
A.5.2.5 The research, development and demonstration programme (RD&D)
In the mid-1970’s the Parliament promulgated the ”Conditional Act”, which required a government permit to load nuclear fuel into a new reactor. A permit could be issued if the utility presented either an agreement for reprocessing of the spent fuel, or a plan for the completely safe disposal of the high radioactive waste. This meant that direct disposal of the spent fuel could be accepted.
As a result of the ”Conditional Act” the nuclear industry initiated a joint project on nuclear fuel safety (KBS). This included a wide-ranging programme of geological site surveys for the purpose of identifying suitable bedrock sites for the disposal of highly radioactive waste. The first summary report of the KBS project (KBS-l) was published in 1977. This described a method for the disposal of highactivity reprocessed vitrified waste. The report formed the basis for the subsequent permission (in 1979-1980) to load fuel into a number of reactors. A second summary report (KBS-2) dealing with the disposal of spent non-reprocessed nuclear fuel was issued in 1978. The work initiated by KBS continued on a long-term basis, and a completely revised version of the second report (KBS-3) was published in 1983.
The formal requirement for a RD&D-programme to be submitted for regulatory evaluation was established in 1984 when the Act on Nuclear Activities was promulgated. The Act requires a programme of comprehensive research and development and whatever other measures are needed to manage and dispose of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste in a safe manner and to decommission and dismantle the nuclear power plants, with focus on activities to be carried out within the next six years. Since 1986 the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB) has produced nine RD&D programmes with KBS-3 as the main alternative for the disposal of spent fuel. The most recent programme was published in 2010. One of the main goals with the programme was fulfilled when a license application for a permit to build a disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel was submitted to the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) and the Environmental Court on March 16th 2011. SKB is applying for permits to establish a spent nuclear fuel disposal facility in Forsmark and to establish an encapsulation plant in Oskarshamn. The RD&D programme continues in order to further investigate parameters relevant for a spent fuel disposal system. Decommissioning of nuclear facilities, extension and future operation of SFR and planning, development and research on a future disposal facility for long-lived radioactive waste (SFL) are also reasons to continue the RD&D programme.
Section A – IntroductIon
A.5.2.6 The financing system to cover the costs for management and disposal
General
During the 1970’s the nuclear power utilities established their own internal funds for future waste management expenses. These funds were transferred to a new financing system, under regulatory supervision, established in 1981 when the Swedish Parliament passed the Act on the Financing of Future Expenses for Spent Nuclear Fuel etc. Since 1981 the legislation has been revised a number of times, and various changes have been implemented. However, the basic principles have remained the same. The most recent commission of inquiry
1
on the financing sys-
tem submitted its report to the Government in December 2004. As a result of the inquiry the Act (1992:1537) as well as the Ordinance (1981:671) on the Financing of Future Expenses on Spent Nuclear Fuel etc. was replaced by the Act (2006:647) and the Ordinance (2008:715) on Financial Measures for the Management of Residual Products from Nuclear Activities.
The main changes to the legislation are:
- A licensee has to submit cost estimates every three years. Previously the cost estimates had to be submitted by reactor owners on an annual basis.
- Also licensees other than licensees of nuclear power reactor must pay fees to the Nuclear Waste Fund.
- The licensee of a nuclear power reactor shall base costs estimates on 40 years of operation with a minimum remaining operating time of 6 years (previously the cost estimates were based on 25 years of operation).
- The licensee of nuclear facilities other than nuclear power reactors shall base cost estimates and the buildup of adequate financial resources on the expected remaining period of operation.
- Also the licensee of nuclear facilities other than nuclear power reactors shall provide a guarantee to cover the discrepancy between funded means and estimated costs.
- Extended liability for the nuclear industry. If there is insufficient money in the funds, the nuclear industry will still be liable.
The primary purpose of the Swedish financing system is to secure the financing of the licensees’ costs to manage and dispose of the spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste, decommission and dismantle the nuclear facilities and to carry out the needed research and development activities, but also to minimise the State’s risk of being forced to bear the costs which is considered to be the licensee’s liability.
Payments to the Fund
The licensee of a nuclear facility which generate or has generated residual products must pay a nuclear waste fee, to cover the licensee’s share of the total costs.
1
As a consequence of the energy policy decision in 1997, which indicated that 2010 is no longer the final year for operation of Swedish nuclear power plants, a Governmental committee was appointed to review possible improvements to the financing system.
Section A – IntroductIon
For licensees, other than a licensee for a nuclear power reactor, it is possible to allow exemption to the obligation to pay a nuclear waste fee if the licensee provides a guarantee to cover its costs. The licensee of a nuclear power reactor must pay a nuclear waste fee per delivered kilowatt-hour of electricity generated from nuclear power. The fees are paid to the Nuclear Waste Fund. SKB makes the annual cost estimates for all nuclear power utilities that form the basis for the regulatory authorities’ review as well as the basis for calculating the fee.
The average fee is currently SEK 0.01 per kilowatt-hour (2010-2011) and is based on the assumption that each reactor will generate electricity for 40 years but with a minimum remaining operating time of 6 years.
Regulatory control
The regulatory authority appointed by the Government reviews the nuclear power utilities’ cost estimates as well as the size of the guarantees that nuclear power utilities must make available. After its review, the authority submits a proposal for the size of the fees, and of the size of the guarantees required, to the Government. Based on this proposal, the Government sets the fees and guarantees. The fees are set for a three year period and are individual for each utility.
The management of the Nuclear Waste Fund is the responsibility of a separate government agency, the Nuclear Waste Fund. The Swedish National Debt Office administrates and manages the guarantees.
Current cost estimates
The estimated total future cost, from 2012 onwards is approximately SEK 92 billion (equivalent to approx. €9,7 billion). The sum of the future expenses and of those already accrued on various nuclear waste projects, are approximately SEK 115 billion (equivalent to approx. €12,1 billion).
To date, the Nuclear Waste Fund has covered the expenses for:
- The Central Interim Storage for Spent Nuclear Fuel (Clab);
- the transport system, i.e., the ship Sigyn, containers, special trucks, etc;
- the Canister Laboratory, the Äspö Hard Rock Laboratory, the Bentonite Laboratory; and
- SKB’s research and development costs, including siting activities.
The Nuclear Waste Fund will eventually cover expenses for:
- the encapsulation of spent nuclear fuel;
- the repositories for spent nuclear fuel and long-lived low and intermediate level waste;
- the decommissioning and dismantling of nuclear power plants;
- the disposal facility for decommissioning waste;
- continuing research and development work; and
- the expenses for regulatory control and supervision after closure of the reactors.
Costs for the management of operational waste are paid for directly by the nuclear power utilities. The disposal facility for radioactive operational waste (SFR) has therefore been paid for by the nuclear power utilities and not by the Fund.
Section A – IntroductIon
Disbursements from the Fund
The licensees are entitled to disbursements, on a continuous basis, for expenses which they have already incurred for measures to achieve the decommissioning, handling and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste, including the research needed for these activities.
Municipalities where there are site investigations of the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, or where a facility for such a disposal facility is planned or being built, are entitled to compensation from the Nuclear Waste Fund for their information to the public. Disbursements may be determined to no more than 5 million per municipality and twelve-month period.
Also non-profit-making organisations are entitled to financial support, with a total amount of SEK 3 million per calendar year and limited to SEK 2,5 million per organisation.
The regulatory authority decides on the disbursement of funds to the nuclear licensees, the municipalities and the non-profit-making organisations.
Figure A4: Flow of funds in the financing system as regards nuclear power utilities.
A.5.2.7 Costs for waste from past practices
As of 1989, a special fee has been levied on the nuclear power utilities according to a special law, the Act (1988:1597) on Financing of Certain Radioactive Waste etc. (the Studsvik Act). This fee is intended to cover expenses for the management of nuclear waste from older experimental facilities, in particular the facilities at Studsvik, the Ågesta reactor and the uranium mine in Ranstad, and for decommissioning and dismantling these facilities.
According to current cost estimates, SEK 1.8 billion (equivalent to approx. € 120 million) will be needed up to the year 2045 to meet these expenses. The special fee is the same for all operating nuclear power utilities, currently SEK 0.003 per kilowatt-hour, and is reassessed annually based on a proposal by SSM. These assets are administered together with the Nuclear Waste Fund.
Nuclear power
companies
Nuclear Waste
Fund
Agency costs
etc.
SKB
Government sets fees based on SSM’s recommendation
SSM approves reimbursement from the Fund
Research and development
Central interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel
Final repository
Transportation
Encapsulation plant
Decommissioning
Section A – IntroductIon
In conjunction with the decision by the Swedish Parliament on new legislation for the financing of the license-holders general obligation according to the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities, the Parliament also decided that the Studsvik Act should be cancelled by December 31, 2009. During the reassessment of the fee level in 2008 it became evident that remaining year of payments into the fund would not be sufficient to cover estimated costs. Therefore the Government decided to prolong the time period for contributions to the fund according to the Studsvik Act to January 1, 2012.
In 2009 the Government commissioned SSM to investigate future costs, uncertainties and responsibilities, and to evaluate in-depth the problems and financial risks that may arise if the Studsvik Act (1988:1597) was to expire on 1 January 2012. The mission also included, if the SSM found it appropriate, to propose constitutional amendments.
SSM submitted its report to Government in March 2010. The SSM assessment resulted in the conclusion that the combined impacts of the uncertainties, that have been identified, are expected to lead to a future need of funds higher than indicated in the current cost estimates. Furthermore, if the contributions to the fund according to the Studsvik Act would cease, the economic risk of the state would increase. The assessment of SSM is that the Studsvik Act should remain in force until further notice. If payments under this Act are to cease, the quality of the cost estimates must improve significantly.
The Government submitted a Bill (2010/2011: 126) to the Parliament in April 2011 containing a proposal to extend the obligation to pay the Studsvik fee to December 31, 2017. In June 2011 the Parliament approved the government bill and the reformed legislation will enter into force on 1 January 2012.
Figure A5: Flow of funds according to the Studsvik Act.
Nuclear power
companies
Nuclear Waste
Fund
Reimbursemententitled licensee*
Parliament sets fee after recommendation from the Government. SSM notifies the Government if the fee amount needs to be changed
SSM approves reimbursement from the Fund
Management and final disposal of nuclear fuel
Management and disposal of nuclear waste, other nuclear materials and other radioactive waste
Remediation of land following nuclear activities
Decommissioning
*Refers to licensees for facilities covered by the Studsvik Act. At present these are AB SVAFO, Studsvik Nuclear AB, Vattenfall AB (50% of the Ågesta CHP plant), Ranstad Industricentrum AB and Uppsala University.
Section A – IntroductIon
A.5.3 Supplementary national planning for non-nuclear fuel
cycle wastes
The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority
2
was assigned by the government to
compile an integrated account for all spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste generated both within and outside the nuclear fuel cycle, to identify and propose any improvement to the management and disposal activities. The assignment was reported back to the Government 30 June 2009.
The report confirms that management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste (i.e. radioactive waste from the nuclear fuel cycle) is satisfactory. No specific action is needed in addition to already existing practices according to existing legal and regulatory framework, i.e. the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities, the Act (2006:647) and the Ordinance (2008:715) on Financial Measures for the Management of Residual Products from Nuclear Activities and the Act (1988:1597) on Financing of Certain Radioactive Waste etc. (the Studsvik Act).
In order to improve the situation, the report proposes actions within the following areas:
- Interim storage and disposal of radioactive waste for radioactive waste generated outside the nuclear fuel cycle
- Action plans for radioactive material (outside the nuclear fuel cycle) which unintentionally ends up adrift without regulatory control
- Clarification of responsibilities in the legislation
- Preservation of information as regards waste disposal facilities The report
3
can be downloaded from SSM’s web site
4
.
2
The assignment was given to the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority (SSI) in 2008 and taken over by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) when established.
3
Swedish national plan for the management of all radioactive waste, SSM Report 2009:29e
4
www.ssm.se
Section A – IntroductIon
A.6 The management system for spent nuclear fuel
and nuclear waste
A.6.1 Generation of spent fuel and radioactive waste
Spent fuel in Sweden emanates mainly from four commercial nuclear power plants, one material testing reactor and one research reactor (see figure A6). The radioactive waste originates from the nuclear power industry as well as medical use, industry, research and consumer products. Past research activities have also generated some waste, which are either stored or have already been disposed of.
Under Swedish law, the holder of a licence to operate a nuclear facility is primarily responsible for the safe handling and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, as well as decommissioning and dismantling of the facility. The four utilities operating nuclear power reactors in Sweden have formed a special company, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co. (SKB), to assist them in executing their responsibilities. Thus, SKB is responsible for all handling, transportation and storage of spent fuel and radioactive waste outside the nuclear power plants.
Furthermore, the company is responsible for the planning and construction of all facilities required for the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive wastes, and for such research and development work as is necessitated by the provision of such facilities (R&D programmes).These R&D programmes have to be reported to the Government, or an authority designated by the Government, and reviewed by the authorities every third year. The programme should include a comprehensive description of the measures taken to ensure safe handling and disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste. SKB is further responsible for co-ordination and investigations regarding the costs associated with nuclear waste and future decommissioning.
Boiling Water Reactor (ASEA Atom)
Pressurized Water Reactor (Westinghouse)
Other facilities
Ringhals 1 887 MW 1976 Ringhals 2 900 MW 1975 Ringhals 3 1 105 MW 1981 Ringhals 4 981 MW 1983
Ringhals NPP
Ringhals AB
Capacity In operation since
Forsmark NPP
Forsmark Kraftgrupp AB
Final repository for radioactive operational waste
SFR
Swedish Nuclear Fuel Waste Management Co (SKB)
Nuclear fuel factory
Westinghouse
Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB
Facilities for fuel and materials testing, waste manegement and storage
Studsvik
Studsvik Nuclear AB, AB SVAFO
Capacity In operation since
Oskarshamns NPP
OKG AB
Capacity In operation since
Barsebäck NPP
Barsebäck Kraft AB
CLAB
Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co (SKB)
Capacity In operation
Central interim storage facility for spent fuel
Nuclear Facilities in Sweden
sgb/ info
Ranstad
Ranstad Mineral AB
Uranium recovery facility
Barsebäck 1 615 MW 1975-1999
Barsebäck 2 615 MW 1977-2005
Forsmark 1 1 022 MW 1980 Forsmark 2 1 035 MW 1981 Forsmark 3 1 229 MW 1985
Oskarshamn 1 492 MW 1972 Oskarshamn 2 661 MW 1975 Oskarshamn 3 1 450 MW 1985
Ågesta district heating nuclear reactor
Ågesta
Vattenfall AB
Figure A6: Nuclear facilities in Sweden.
Section A – IntroductIon
A.6.2 System overview
Sweden has today 10 nuclear power reactors in operation at three sites giving rise to nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel. In addition nuclear waste is produced at the Studsvik site (closed research reactor, hot-cell and waste treatment facilities) and, to a limited extent, at Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB’s fuel fabrication plant.
In total the Swedish nuclear power programme will generate approximately 20 000 m
3
spent fuel, 60 000 m
3
low and intermediate level waste (LILW), and
150 000 m
3
decommissioning waste (based on 50-years operation of the reactors in
Ringhals and Forsmark and 60 years operation for the reactors in Oskarshamn). The typical total annual production of LILW at the nuclear facilities is 1 000-1 500 m
3
.
Spent nuclear fuel is transported to an interim storage facility (Clab). Radioactive operational waste from nuclear reactors, medical and research institutions and industrial radioactive waste is disposed of in an underground disposal facility in crystalline bedrock (SFR).
All transportation of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste is by sea, since all the nuclear facilities are situated on the coast. The transportation system has been in operation since 1982 and consists of the ship M/S Sigyn, transport casks and containers, and terminal vehicles for loading and unloading. M/S Sigyn will be replaced with a new ship in 2013.
Facilities that remain to be realised are an encapsulation plant for spent fuel and repositories for spent fuel, long-lived low and intermediate level waste, and for decommissioning waste. SKB:s R&D programmes are focused on these matters.
4 3
If SFR is closed before SFL, short-lived waste follows the dashed line to SFL. Interim storage of long-lived waste takes place today at the NPPs, in Clab and at Studsvik. Interim storage of long-lived waste may also occur in SFR. There are near-surface repositories at the nuclear power plants in Forsmark, Oskarshamn and Ringhals. There is also a similar near-surface repository at Studsvik, to which some waste from industry, research and medical care is sent. Possible alternative for very low-level decommmissioning waste. A decision has not yet been made on this.
2 1
Near-surface repository for very low-level operational waste
Near-surface repository for very low-level decommissioning waste
3
1
Clab and encapsulation plant (Clink)
Industry, research and medical care
Interim storage facility
Nuclear power plant
Long-lived
Short-lived Short-lived
Long-lived
Short-lived Long-lived
Operation Decommissioning
Decommissioning
Operation
Final repository for long-lived waste – SFL
Final repository for short-lived radioactive waste – SFR
Cleared waste
Fuel
Spent Fuel Repository
m/s Sigyn
Figure A7: Management system for spent fuel and nuclear waste as presented in RD&D-programme 2010.
Section A – IntroductIon
A.6.2.1 Existing Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Practices
Management practices at the NPP sites
Spent nuclear fuel from the nuclear power reactors is temporarily stored in waterfilled fuel pools for at least nine months, before being transported to the central interim storage for spent nuclear fuel (Clab), where it will be stored for at least another 30 years before being encapsulated and deposited in a disposal facility.
The central interim storage for spent fuel, Clab
The spent nuclear fuel from all Swedish nuclear power reactors is stored in a central interim storage (Clab) situated adjacent to the Oskarshamn nuclear power plant. The facility consists of two parts, one building above ground for unloading spent fuel assemblies from transport casks, and one underground part for storage with a rock cover of about 25-30 meters. The storage part consists of two caverns approximately 120 metres long, each containing five storage pools. Construction started in 1980 and the facility was taken into operation in 1985 with a storage capacity of 5 000 tonnes of spent fuel. The current total storage capacity is approximately 8 000 tonnes of spent fuel, and 5 222 tonnes were being stored at the end of 2010.
The facility is schematically illustrated in figure A8. Principal data as well as information on inventories are found in section D.1.2.3.
Figure A8: The Clab facility.
Forsmark/SFR
Oskarshamn
Ringhals
Barsebäck
Clab
32 m
Clab
1
Clab
2
Personnel: Cost of construction: Fuel storage: Pool temperature: Receiving capacity: Annual operating cost:
100 full-time positions
approx. SEK 1,700 million
4,200 tonnes
approx. 36°C under normal conditions
300 tonnes/year
approx. SEK 100 million
Facts Clab 1
Graphic: Mats Jerndahl
An encapsulation plant where the spent fuel can be encapsulated before deposited in a final repository for spent nuclear fuel will according to the plans be built in direct adjacent to Clab.
Encapsulation plant
In the unloading pool the fuel assemblies are lifted out and placed in a storage canister.
Clab
– Central interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel
Spent nuclear fuel needs to spend between 30 and 40 years in interim storage. The fuel is stored in deep water-filled pools about 30 meters below the ground surface. The water provides radiation shielding and cooling.
Clab 2 increase the capacity from
5,000 to 8,000 tonnes.
Source: SKB
Section A – IntroductIon
A.6.2.2 Existing Radioactive Waste Management Practices
Management practices at the nuclear sites
Most of the LILW are conditioned (solidified, compacted, etc.) at the point of origin, i.e. at the reactor sites. Some wastes are sent to Studsvik’s waste treatment facilities for incineration or melting.
Disposal facility for radioactive operational waste, SFR
SFR is designed for the disposal of short-lived low and intermediate level radioactive waste from the Swedish nuclear power plants Clab, and for similar waste from other industry, research and medical usage. SFR is situated approximately 140 kilometers north of Stockholm, close to the Forsmark nuclear power plant. Approximately 25 people work at the facility.
SFR consists of four rock caverns and a silo. The facility is situated in crystalline bedrock, approximately 50 m below the seabed at a depth of 5 m. Construction started in 1983 and it was taken into operation in 1988. The total capacity is 63 000 m
3
and
33 871 m
3
had been used by 31 De-
cember, 2010.
The facility is schematically illustrated in figure A9. Principal data as well as information on inventories are found in section D.1.4.3.
Handling in this vault is done by a remote-controlled overhead crane.
50 m
1
2
3
160 m
1
Bentonite clay
SFR –
Final repository for radioactive operational waste
Operational waste from nuclear power plants and similar waste from the industrial, health care and research sectors have a low or intermediate level of radioactivity and are stored in SFR. The waste is packaged in metal or concrete containers and stored at a depth of 50-140 metres in rock vaults that are kept under surveillance.
Facts SFR
Start of operation: Disposal capacity: Receiving capacity: Personnel: Cost of construction: Cost of operation:
1988
63,000 m
3
1,000–2,000
m
3
/year
20
SEK 740 million approx. SEK 40
million/year
Rock vault, divided into pits, for inter-mediate level waste. As the pits are filled, concrete lids are placed on them.
Intermediate level waste in concrete containers.
Low level waste in ordinary freight containers.
Most of the radioactive substances are in the silo. Mainly it is replaced filters which collect the radioactive substances in the reactor water. All handling in the silo is automated and remote- controlled.
The silo
The vaults
Forsmark
Ringhals
Barsebäck
Oskars- hamn
Graphic: Mats Jerndahl
Source: SKB
SFR
Figure A9: The SFR facility
Section A – IntroductIon
SKB is planning an extension of SFR in order to dispose of additional operational waste and waste from future decommissioning of nuclear power plants. SKB intends to submit a license application in 2013 and operation is planned to commence in 2020.
Figure A10: Planned extension of SFR (blue parts). The final design of the extension is not yet established.
Shallow land burials
The nuclear power plants at Ringhals, Forsmark and Oskarshamn as well as the Studsvik site have shallow land burials for solid short-lived low-level waste (<300 kBq/kg). Each burial is licensed for a total activity of 100 - 200 GBq (the highest level according to the legislation is 10 TBq, of which a maximum of 10 GBq may consist of alpha-active substances).
Clearance
Material may be cleared for unrestricted use or for disposal as conventional nonradioactive waste. For example in 2004 approximately 600 tonnes were cleared for disposal at municipal landfills. In addition 764 tonnes of melted metal (<500 Bq/kg) were cleared for recycling in 2010.
Section A – IntroductIon
A.6.3 Planned facilities and siting
A.6.3.1 General
Four major facilities remain to be designed, sited, constructed and licensed; a plant for the encapsulation of spent nuclear fuel, a disposal facility for spent fuel, a disposal facility for long-lived low and intermediate level waste, and a disposal facility for waste from decommissioning and dismantling the nuclear power plants.
A.6.3.2 The Spent Nuclear Fuel Programme
The main alternative for disposal of spent fuel, KBS-3, involves emplacement of fuel elements in copper canisters (corrosion resistance) with cast iron inserts (mechanical strength). The canisters will be embedded in bentonite clay (protection against corrosion and rock movements, prevent water penetration and leakage of radioactive substances) in individual deposition holes at a depth of about 400-700 m in the bedrock (maintains the technical barriers over long time, isolates the spent fuel from human beings and the environment).
Cladding tube
Fuel pellet of Uranium dioxide
Bentonite clay
Crystalline bedrock
Spent nuclear fuel
Copper canister with cast iron insert
Surface portion of final repository
500 m
Underground portion of final repository
Figure A11: The reference method KBS-3 for disposal of spent nuclear fuel.
SKB’s planning for the future management of spent nuclear fuel, from interim storage in Clab via encapsulation to disposal, takes place within the framework of SKB’s Nuclear Fuel Programme. The programme includes licensing, design, construction and commissioning of the encapsulation plant and the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel.
On March 16, 2011, SKB’s applications for a permit to build a disposal facility system were submitted to the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) and the Environmental Court in Stockholm. The company is applying for a permit to build a nuclear fuel disposal facility in Forsmark and an encapsulation plant in Oskarshamn. SKB also has to apply for a new permit for the Interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel (Clab) in accordance with Sweden’s Environmental Code.
Section A – IntroductIon
1
3
8
4
10
9
To final repository
Shipping hall.
Elevator.
Fuel in storage canisters standing in storage pools is taken to connecting pool in encapsulation plant.
Handling cell.
Canister handling machine.
Canister is taken to measurement and decontamination inspection, after which canister is placed in transport cask for shipment.
Station for sealing of insert.
Insert is sealed and canister is provided with lid.
Terminal building.
Temporary storage of canister.
Storage pools Handling hall and pools.
Welding station.
Friction stir welding of lid to canister.
Station for nondestructive testing.
Inspection of weld before and after machining.
Station for machining.
Machining of canister.
Transfer of fuel to transfer canisters.
Drying and transfer of fuel to copper canister.
Clab
Encapsulation plant
Encapsulation plant for spent nuclear fuel
The encapsulation plant will be built directly adjacent to Clab. Prior to operation the facilities will be interconnected to a single unit, called Clink. Their operation will then be integrated. Figure A12 illustrates the handling sequence for the fuel, from the storage pools in Clab via encapsulation to delivery of the filled and sealed canister.
An application under the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities for a licence to build the encapsulation plant and a licence to own and operate it as an integrated facility with Clab was submitted in 2006. Supplements were promised in the application and in 2007, after the initial review, SKB received a number of demands for supplementary information. SKB has responded to these demands, and a supplement was submitted in 2009.
The time schedule for encapsulation of the spent nuclear fuel has been developed by SKB, and the following sequence of events is proposed (see also figure A13):
2010-2016 Examination of application including review of SSM and Envi ronmental court, government decision and finalisation of PSAR 2016-2025 Construction and commissioning 2024 Submission of application for trial operation 2025-2026 Trial operation 2026 Submission of application for operation 2027 Operation
Figure A12: The encapsulation process for spent nuclear fuel.
Section A – IntroductIon
Disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel
In the early 1990’s SKB initiated a programme for siting a spent nuclear fuel disposal facility. SKB’s time schedule for performed and coming activities for the disposal of the spent nuclear fuel is (see also figure A7): 2005-2009 Site investigations at two sites: Laxemar (Oskarshamn munici- pality) and Forsmark (Östhammar municipality). June 2009 SKB selected Forsmark as the site for a disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel 2011 SKB submitted license applications for siting and construction of the facility 2011-2015 Examination of application including review of SSM and Envi ronmental court, government decision and finalization of PSAR 2015-2025 Construction and commissioning 2024 Submission of application for trial operation 2025-2026 Trial operation 2026 Submission of application for operation 2027 Operation
Figure A13: Time table for establishment of the spent fuel disposal facility and Clink.
Construction
Start of construction
Interconnection
Clab and Inka
Start
integrated testing
2022
2025 2026
2023
2021
2024
2017 2018
2016
2019
2013 2014
2011 2012
2015
2020
2027 2027
2022
2025 2026
2023
2021
2024
2017 2018
2016
2019
2013 2014
2011 2012
2015
2020
Other buildings Entrance and geology Shafts and rock handling Infrastructure, establishment Preparations, operations area
Ramp
Central area
Integrated testing Other shafts Deposition area – first part
Deposition area – continued buildout Skip shaft
Milestones
Milestones
Clink
Under ground Buildings Above ground
Nuclear Fuel Repository
Main phases, Nuclear Fuel Programme
Licensing
Operation
Commissioning
Start integrated
testing
Start of construction deposition area
Start of
construction central area
Start of operation
Start of operation
Start of construction
accesses
Clab, Alterations
Inka, Rock excavation works
Inka, Building
Inka, Installations
Clink, Finishing
Integrated testing
Facilities/activities
Section A – IntroductIon
Research and demonstration facilities
The Äspö Hard Rock Laboratory
The Äspö Hard Rock Laboratory (HRL), which was built during the period 1990– 1995, is situated on Äspö north of the Oskarshamn Nuclear Power Plant. The underground laboratory consists of a tunnel from the Simpevarp Peninsula, where the Oskarshamn nuclear power plant is located, to the southern part of Äspö. On Äspö the main tunnel descends in two spiral turns to a depth of 460 metres. The various experiments are conducted in niches in the short tunnels that branch out from the main tunnel. An illustration of the HRL is shown in Figure A14.
The laboratory is used to investigate how the barriers in the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel (canister, buffer, backfill, closure and rock) prevent the radionuclides in the fuel from reaching the ground surface.
Figure A14: The Äspö Hard Rock Laboratory.
Section A – IntroductIon
The Canister Laboratory
The Canister Laboratory, situated in the harbour area at Oskarshamn, was built during the period 1996–1998. One of the shipyard’s old welding halls has been converted for use in the development of the sealing technology for copper canisters. It is mainly equipment for welding of copper lids and bottoms and for nondestructive testing of the welds and the different parts of the canister that is developed there. But equipment and systems for handling spent nuclear fuel and canisters are also tested and developed in the laboratory. The facility will also be used for training of personnel in preparation for the commissioning of the encapsulation line in Clink. The Canister Laboratory is therefore planned to be in use until encapsulation of the spent nuclear fuel commences. There are stations in the Canister Laboratory for testing different welding techniques and different methods for nondestructive testing. The goal is to develop methods that meet the stipulated quality requirements and have sufficiently high reliability to be used in Clink. The most important items of equipment in the laboratory are a friction welder, an electron beam welder, and equipment for radiographic and ultrasonic testing.
Figure A15: The Canister Laboratory´s equipment for development of friction stir welding.
The Bentonite Laboratory
SKB has been conducting research and development in the Bentonite Laboratory in Oskarshamn since 2007. The facility is situated adjacent to the Äspö HRL and supplements the experiments being conducted there. In the Bentonite Laboratory the properties of the bentonite is tested by, for example, simulating water conditions in a controlled manner. Here SKB is also developing methods for backfilling the disposal facility’s tunnels and building plugs to seal the deposition tunnels.
Figure A16: Stacking tests performed at the Bentonite Laboratory on Äspö.
Section A – IntroductIon
A.6.3.3 The Low- and Intermediate Level Waste (LILW) Programme
Disposal facility for short-lived low and intermediate level decommissioning waste (SFR)
SKB plans to dispose of waste from the future decommissioning of the nuclear power plants in an extension to SFR. The planned extension entails an increase of the facility’s storage capacity by an estimated 140,000 m
3
from today’s capacity of
63 000 m
3
. SKB intends to submit a license application in 2013 and operation is planned to commence in 2020.
Disposal facility for long-lived low and intermediate level waste (SFL)
According to current plans, a license application to build a disposal facility for long-lived low and intermediate level waste (SFL) will be submitted in 2030 and operation is planned to commence in 2045. The origin of this waste is primarily research, industry, medical applications, core-components and certain internal components from nuclear power reactors. The waste is currently stored at Studsvik, the nuclear power plants and Clab. The volume of SFL will be relatively small compared to SKB’s other disposal facilities. The total storage volume is estimated to 10 000m
3
.
Dry interim storage of long-lived waste
Earlier plans of interim storage in BFA (rock cavern for waste) of long-lived low- and intermediate-level waste from all nuclear power plants have changed. Instead, SKB is investigating the possibility to establish an interim storage of long-lived waste in the extended SFR. A decision regarding interim storage in SFR will be taken before the design of the extension has been established. A new waste container, called ATB 1T, will be developed in order to transport the long-lived low- and intermediate level waste. Delivery of the container is expected in 2015.
Main milestones for the LILW-programme
2013 Application for extension of SFR to accommodate decommissioning waste 2013 Concept study for SFL to be finalized 2017 Start of construction works for extension of SFR 2020 Start of operation extended SFR 2035 Start of construction works to establish SFL 2045 Start of operation of SFL
Section A – IntroductIon
Figure A17: Time table for the LILW programme.
2010 2017 2018 2016 2019 2013 2014 2011 2012 2015 202 2 2021 202 0
2010 2017 2018 2016 2019 2013 2014 2011 2012 2015 2022 2021 2020 2023 202 42 025 2050 2045 2060 2065 2075 2070 2055 2040 2035 2030
2050
2045 2060 2065 2075 2070 2055
2040
2035
2030
2023 2024 2025
C onstruc tion
phas e
Detailed design
Design, application documents
Licensing and produc tion
of transpor t casks
Operation in existing plan t Routine operation ex tended SFR
Tr ial
operation
Existing interim storage in Clab and at nuclear power plants
Clink
O3
F1, F2 , F3, O1, O2, R3, R4
R1, R2
Studsvik ’s research reac tors B1, B2, Ågest a
Design, application
documents and detailed design
Sa fe ty assessmen t
Interim storage in SFR
Final disposal, operational and decommissioning waste (SFR)
Final disposal, long-liv ed wast e
Interim storage , long-liv ed wast e
Applications , notifications and repo rt s
Impor tant milestones
Dec ommissioning acivities
Application trial
operation of
ex tended SFR
LIL W programme
RD&D 2010 ASAR SFR RD&D 2013
Application routine operation SFR
Tr ial operation
ex tended
SFR
Star t
construc tion
SFR
Sa fe ty
assessment
SFL
Site
selec tion
SFL
C oncept stud y
SFL
Site
in vestigation
SFR
Unit-specific
decommissioning
studies
Application licensing transpor
t cask
Application ex
tended SFR
Routine operation ex
tended
SFR
Application SFL
Sa fe ty
assessmen t
SFL
RD&D 2016
Pe riodical continued extension
Site in vestigations C onstruc tion phase
and trial operation Operation
Sa fe ty
assessmen t
SFR
Operation
SFL
Star t of
construc tion
SFL
Clab Ce ntral interim storage facili ty f or spent nuclear fuel
Clink Facility f or central interim storage and encapsulation
of spent nuclear fuel
RD&D Research, dev elopment and demonstration
ASAR As-operated Sa fe ty A nalysis Repo rt
SFL Final repositor y f or low- and
intermediate-lev el long-liv ed wast e
SFR Final repositor y f or radioac ti ve operational wast e
B1 Barsebäck 1
B2 Barsebäck 2 F1 Forsmark 1
F2 Forsmark 2
F3 Forsmark 3
O1 Osk arshamn 1
O2 Osk arshamn 2
O3 Osk arshamn 3
R1 Ringhals 1
R2 Ringhals 2
R3 Ringhals 3
R4 Ringhals 4
Section A – IntroductIon
A.7 Swedish participation in international activities
to enhance safety and radiation protection
A.7.1 the regulatory authority
The international nuclear safety cooperation is substantial; SSM is involved in about 150 international groups. The majority of groups are related to nuclear safety and radiation protection issues. The cooperation takes place within the frameworks of IAEA, OECD/NEA and EU, but also in connection with the international conventions ratified by Sweden and in non-governmental organizations such as the Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA), Heads of European Radiation Control Authorities (HERCA), and the International Nuclear Regulators’ Association (INRA).
In addition to multilateral collaboration, SSM has bilateral agreements with nine countries to exchange information and to cooperate on agreed issues (e.g. nuclear safety, emergency preparedness, occupational exposure, environmental radiological protection and radioactive waste management). These are Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Lithuania Ukraine, Russia, South Africa, and USA. Additionally Sweden has special agreements with the Nordic Countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway) regarding emergency preparedness and information exchange on the technical design of nuclear facilities.
SSM contributed significantly to WENRA’s benchmarking project which made a systematic comparison of national reactor safety requirements and their implementation against jointly agreed reference levels
5
. SSM participates actively in ENSREG (European Nuclear Safety Regulators’ Group), an expert body of senior officials from national regulatory or nuclear safety authorities from all 27 EU member states. Through ENSREG and its working groups SSM has been active in the preparations for the directives on establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations (2009/71/EURATOM) and a Community framework for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste (2011/70/EURATOM). SSM was active in the work of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP); both chair and secretary were until recently from Sweden. SSM contributes to the work performed within the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) and The Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) conventions for reduction of releases of radioactive substances from nuclear facilities. SSM takes active part in the development of new international safety standards for protection against harmful effects of ionising radiation. This work has been performed directly (Euratom BSS Directive) and via NEA and IAEA (International BSS). Apart from the regulatory issues, SSM is engaged in research projects, mostly within the co-operation of the EU research programme, NEA and IAEA. Sweden is active in networks for research and cooperation in radiobiology, radioecology and biological dosimetry. The SSM is involved in many international expert missions; for example as experts in IAEA review service teams.
5
Report by the WENRA Reactor Harmonisation Working Group, January 2006 and WENRA Reactor Safety Reference Levels, January 2008 are available at: www.wenra.org.
Section A – IntroductIon
SSM constantly prioritise its international engagement and work due to limited staff resources. A classification system of the different international work has been introduced and a policy for international work has been developed as part of the SSM integrated, process-based management system.
A.7.2 SSM’s international support programmes
Swedish authorities have since 1992 been engaged in providing assistance to states of the former Soviet Union in the area of nuclear safety and security as well as radiation protection. Since 2008, this work is carried out by the Swedish radiation Safety Authority, SSM, The aims of the bilateral assistance are:
- to improve reactor safety and minimise the risk of a nuclear accident with uncontrolled radioactive releases at the facilities in question;
- to improve conditions so that radioactive waste, including spent nuclear fuel, shall be handled and stored in a manner that is acceptable from the point of view of safety and radiation protection, regarding personnel, the public and environment;
- to impede the mismanagement of nuclear and radioactive materials and to strengthen the non-proliferation measures and institutions
- to improve the national preparedness and awareness as concern radiation protection for people and the environment.
- to strengthen the legislation and exercising of authority in connection with nuclear facilities and handling of radioactive waste; and
- to contribute to the development and strengthening of the countries’ authorities and organisations within the national emergency preparedness and to establish co-operation in the event of an emergency situation in the Baltic region.
Currently the cooperation partners for Sweden are: Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Earlier on, Sweden has had similar cooperation programmes with Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Eastonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In 2010, the funding allocated by the Swedish Government for these purposes amounted to 7 million Euro.
A.7.3 SKB
In being the responsible entity for all handling, transportation and storage of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive wastes outside the Swedish nuclear power plants, SKB gives international co-operation high priority, and works together with corresponding organizations in i.e. Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom and USA.
The main aim for SKB’s international activities is to follow the research and development work conducted in other countries and to participate in international projects within the field of nuclear waste management. Furthermore, the international work provides perspective to the domestic programme and contributes to maintaining state-of-the art competence in relevant scientific areas. SKB actively participates in several IAEA, EU and OECD/NEA committees and working groups. SKB is also engaged in a large number of research projects within these international organizations. SKB also runs the Secretariat of the “Implementing Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste Technology Platform (IGD-TP)
Section A – IntroductIon
in which eleven waste management organizations co-operate. SKB is currently participating in the 7th Framework Programme and has actively proposed areas for future research and development in the 8th Framework Programme.
The cooperation with Posiva in Finland is the most extensive and comprises projects in the fields of disposal facility technology, site investigation and encapsulation techniques. One important example of SKB’s international research co-operation is the Äspö Hard Rock Laboratory, where organizations from i.e. Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, Canada and the Czech Republic are (or have been) carrying out joint studies.
Section B – PolicieS and PracticeS
B.1 Article 32.1: REPORTING
1. In accordance with the provisions of Article 30, each Contracting Party shall submit a national report to each review meeting of Contracting Parties. This report shall address the measures taken to implement each of the obligations of the Convention. For each Contracting Party the report shall also address its: (i) spent fuel management policy; (ii) spent fuel management practices; (iii) radioactive waste management policy; (iv) radioactive waste management practices 	(v)	criteria	used	to	define	and	categorize	radioactive	waste.
The present report constitutes the fourth Swedish report issued in compliance with Article 32.
B.1.1 Spent fuel management policy
The Swedish spent fuel policy is not explicitly expressed in single document. The rationales for the management system for spent fuel and nuclear waste are based on basic principles that have been derived from extensive discussions in the Swedish parliament.
Thus, the national policy and strategy for the management of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste has been expressed and supported by the parliament by means of four basic principles:
1. The expenses for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste are to be covered by revenues from the production of energy that has resulted in these expenses.
2. The reactor owners are to safely dispose of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste.
3. The state has the ultimate responsibility for spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. The long-term responsibility for the handling and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste should rest with the state. After a repository has been closed, a requirement should be established to ensure that some kind of responsibility for and supervision of the repository can be made and maintained for a considerable time. A government authority could assume responsibility for a closed repository.
4. Each country is to be responsible for the spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste generated in that country. The disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste from nuclear activities in another country may not occur in Sweden other than in an exceptional case.
Another basic prerequisite as regards spent fuel management is that reprocessing will not take place. Thus, spent nuclear fuel is in practice considered as, and treated	as,	waste,	although	it	is	not	legally	defined	as	waste	until	disposed	of	in	a	repository.
Section B – PolicieS and PracticeS
B.1.2 Spent fuel management practices
At the nuclear power plants, the spent nuclear fuel is stored in the fuel pools for about a year before it is transported to the central interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel (Clab). The safety and security measures taken at the NPPs do not differentiate between spent or partially spent fuel. The process of loading spent fuel into transport containers (weight: 80 tonnes, thickness: 32 cm of steel, length: 6.15 m, diameter: 1.95 m, capacity: 17 BWR-elements or 7 PWR-elements) is closely monitored and carefully performed in order to guarantee a contamination-free surface of the container. Special procedures are rigorously followed to achieve the desired quality control. Spent nuclear fuel from the Forsmark NPP and the Ringhals NPP (and previously the Barsebäck NPP), is transported with specially designed transport vehicles to the site harbors and shipped to the central storage for spent nuclear fuel in Oskarshamn. Spent nuclear fuel from the Oskarshamn NPP is transported directly to Clab by means of specially designed transport vehicles.
SSM supervises the management of spent nuclear fuel at the NPPs during the ordinary inspections of safety and security. These procedures fall under the general management of safety. The issues of contamination of spent nuclear fuel containers, however, were/are the responsibility of radiation protection and transport safety.
The capacity of the interim storage for spent nuclear fuel (Clab) was increased in	2008	and	the	storage	capacity	is	now	sufficient	to	provide	for	storage	of	all	 spent fuel to be produced in Swedish NPP’s, i.e. 50-years operation of the reactors in Ringhals and Forsmark and 60 years operation for the reactors in Oskarshamn.
According to current plans, fuel elements after a storage period in Clab of about 30-40 years will be transported to the spent nuclear fuel disposal facility. Prior to this they will be placed in a cast iron insert in a copper canister. In the disposal facility they will be surrounded by a buffer of bentonite clay, and deposited in individual vertical bore holes in crystalline bedrock at a depth of 400-700 meters.
The siting process for the disposal facility ended in June 2009, as described in the introduction in section A, when the board of SKB decided to choose Forsmark as the site for the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel. In March 2011 SKB submitted a license application for siting and construction of the disposal facility, which is expected to commence operation in 2025.
B.1.3 radioactive waste management policy
As is the case for management of spent fuel, the Swedish spent fuel policy is not explicitly expressed in single document. The Swedish Parliament has on several occasions declared that Sweden supports and will follow the principle of each country’s responsibility to take care of and dispose of radioactive waste produced within the country. Disposal, as well as interim storage, of foreign radioactive waste in Sweden is prohibited.
Section B – PolicieS and PracticeS
B.1.4 radioactive waste management practices
Very low level short-lived waste (VLLW) may be:
- disposed of in shallow land burials that are licensed according to the Act on
Nuclear Activities; or
- subject	to	clearance	according	to	the	regulatory	authority’s	requirements	and	 decisions, and either
- released	for	unrestricted	use;
- disposed	of	in	municipal	landfills;	or
- incinerated	using	specific	furnaces	(only	applicable	on	contaminated	oil).
Short-lived	LILW	is	treated	and	packaged	according	to	a	standardized	system	with	 predefined	waste	type	descriptions	(WTD)	and	disposed	of	in	the	disposal	facility	 for operational waste (SFR), in rock caverns in crystalline bedrock. WTD’s are subject	to	approval	by	the	regulatory	authority.	The	disposal	facility	consists	of	 five	different	caverns,	and	wastes	are	directed	to	different	parts	of	the	disposal	 facility depending on, e.g. the activity content and chemical characteristics.
Long-lived LILW will be disposed of in a disposal facility in rock caverns in crystalline bedrock. Until the disposal facility has been constructed the long-lived waste will be stored either at the NPP, at the Studsvik site or in storage pools in the interim storage for spent nuclear fuel (Clab). However, SKB investigates the possibility to establish an interim storage of long-lived low- and intermediate level waste in the extended SFR. A decision regarding interim storage in SFR will be taken before the design of the extension has been established.
Waste arising outside of the nuclear fuel cycle may – when needed and if appropriate – be disposed in disposal facilities for nuclear fuel cycle wastes.
B.1.5 criteria to define and categorize radioactive waste
B.1.5.1 Definitions
ThedefinitionofnuclearwasteaccordingtotheAct(1984:3)onNuclearActivities is:
- spent	nuclear	fuel	that	has	been	placed	in	a	disposal	facility,
- a	radioactive	substance	formed	in	a	nuclear	plant	and	which	has	not	been	produced or removed from the plant to be used for education or research, or for medical, agricultural or commercial purposes,
- materials,	or	other	items,	that	have	belonged	to	a	nuclear	plant	and	become	 contaminated with radioactivity, and are no longer to be used in that plant, or
- radioactive	parts	of	a	nuclear	plant	that	is	being	decommissioned.
In the Radiation Protection Act (1988:220) the term ”radioactive waste” is used. The term includes radioactive waste from nuclear activities, as well as from nonnuclear activities (medical use, use of sealed sources, research institutions, consumerproducts,etc).ThelegaldefinitionsarediscussedfurtherinsectionE.2.1,and section D, in which the disposal routes for different waste streams are presented.
Section B – PolicieS and PracticeS
B.1.5.2 Categorisation
There	is	no	legally	defined	waste	classification	system	in	Sweden	for	nuclear	or	 radioactive waste. There are, however, established waste acceptance criteria for different disposal routes of nuclear and radioactive waste. These disposal routes differ between activities within the nuclear fuel cycle and outside the nuclear fuel cycle depending both on the different types of material being handled and also on which of the different routes that have been established by taking repositories into operation. For the established disposal routes, including clearance, waste acceptance criteria have been set up, expressed as dose rate limits and activity concentration.
Criteria for waste being disposed as very low-level waste (VLLW) at shallow land burials are given in section D.1.4.4.
Criteria for low and intermediate level waste being disposed in the repository for radioactive operational waste (SFR), are given in section D.1.4.3. A separate permit is needed for each category of waste before disposal is allowed. The permit is	based	on	a	waste	type	description	(WTD)	comprising	detailed	specifications	on	 waste treatment, composition and conditioning, etc. Furthermore, for each subsystem, such as the different rock caverns of the SFR facility, dose rate criteria have been	established.	In	addition,	total	dose	and/or	nuclide	specific	activity	limits	have	 also been established for the different disposal facilities as a whole or for each section of the facility.
Thus, a tailor-made management system for production and disposal of waste packages	has	been	developed.	Waste	categorization	is	strictly	operational	and	depends on the origin of the waste and of the disposal facilities. Waste packages are produced	according	to	detailed	specifications	in	the	WTD’s.	These	are	developed	 in close co-operation between the waste producer (the NPPs) and the repository licensee (SKB). Treatment and conditioning at the NPPs, is governed by the management	systems	at	the	NPPs	and	subject	to	the	general	regulations	and	requirements for quality assurance. This is also the case for handling and disposal at SFR. All documentation concerning a single waste package is documented locally in databases at the producers. Basic information concerning a package has to be transferred to a waste database at the repository before a waste package may be transported to SFR. The system checks the incoming information to make sure criteria from	the	WTD’s	are	fulfilled,	and	that	the	package	is	suitable	for	emplacing	in	the	 predestined part of the repository. After transportation to SFR all documentation is transferred to the database in order to store the information for the time needed.
It is of course possible to classify waste according to any standard based on this procedure since each available or planned disposal option corresponds to different	classes	of,	e.g.	the	IAEA	classification	standards.
Section C – SCope of AppliCAtion
C.1 Article 3: SCOPE OF APPLICATION
- This	Convention	shall	apply	to	the	safety	of	spent	fuel	management	when	the	spent	fuel	results	from	the	operation	of	civilian	 nuclear	reactors.	Spent	fuel	held	at	reprocessing	facilities	as	 part	of	a	reprocessing	activity	is	not	covered	in	the	scope	of	this	 Convention	unless	the	Contracting	Party	declares	reprocessing	 to	be	part	of	spent	fuel	management.
- This	Convention	shall	also	apply	to	the	safety	of	radioactive	 waste	management	when	the	radioactive	waste	results	from	 civilian	applications.	However,	this	Convention	shall	not	apply	 to	waste	that	contains	only	naturally	occurring	radioactive	materials	and	that	does	not	originate	from	the	nuclear	fuel	cycle,	 unless	it	constitutes	a	disused	sealed	source	or	it	is	declared	as	 radioactive	waste	for	the	purposes	of	this	Convention	by	the	 Contracting	Party.
- This	Convention	shall	not	apply	to	the	safety	of	management	of	 spent	fuel	or	radioactive	waste	within	military	or	defence	programmes,	unless	declared	as	spent	fuel	or	radioactive	waste	for	 the	purposes	of	this	Convention	by	the	Contracting	Party.	However,	this	Convention	shall	apply	to	the	safety	of	management	 of	spent	fuel	and	radioactive	waste	from	military	or	defence	 programmes	if	and	when	such	materials	are	transferred	permanently	to	and	managed	within	exclusively	civilian	programmes.
C.1.1 Reprocessing and military or defence programmes
Reprocessing	is	not	part	of	the	nuclear	fuel	cycle	in	Sweden.	There	is	no	reprocessing	facility	in	Sweden	and	spent	fuel	from	nuclear	power	reactors	is	not	sent	for	 reprocessing	in	other	countries.	Reprocessing	agreements	were	made	with	United	 Kingdom	Atomic	Energy	Agency	(now	the	British	Nuclear	Fuel	Limited,	BNFL)	 in	1969	and	Compagnie	Générale	des	Matières	Nucléaires	(COGEMA)	for	reprocessing	spent	nuclear	fuel	from	civilian	nuclear	power	plants.	Only	a	small	 number	of	fuel	elements	were	in	fact	shipped	for	reprocessing	and	the	agreements	 were	terminated	in	the	early	1980’s.	These	past	practices	are	also	discussed	in	 Section	A.5.1.
Sweden	terminated	all	research	activities	related	to	military	or	defence	programmes	in	1970,	and	all	radioactive	residues	from	activities	involving	nuclear	technology	are	since	then	part	of	the	civilian	sector.	Radioactive	waste	from	research	 activities	related	to	military	or	defence	programmes,	before	1970,	has	been	permanently	transferred	to	the	management	programme	for	civilian	radioactive	waste.	 These	past	practices	are	also	discussed	in	Section	A.5.1. Sweden	declares	all	spent	fuel	and	all	radioactive	waste	originating	from	the	nuclear	fuel	cycle	for	the	purpose	of	the	Joint	Convention,	pursuant	to	Article	3,	 paragraph	1	and	3.
Section C – SCope of AppliCAtion
C.1.2 naturally occurring radioactive materials
Sweden	does	not	declare	waste	that	contains	only	naturally	occurring	radioactive	 material	and	that	does	not	originate	from	the	nuclear	fuel	cycle	as	radioactive	 waste	for	the	purpose	of	the	Joint	Convention,	pursuant	to	Article	3,	paragraph	2.	
Section D – InventorIeS anD LIStS
D.1 Article 32.2: REPORTING
2. This report shall also include: (i) a list of the spent fuel management facilities subject to this Convention, their location, main purpose and essential features; (ii) an inventory of spent fuel that is subject to this Convention and that is being held in storage and of that which has been disposed of. This inventory shall contain a description of the material and, if available, give information on its mass and its total activity; (iii) a list of the radioactive waste management facilities subject to this Convention, their location, main purpose and essential features; (iv) an inventory of radioactive waste that is subject to this Convention that: (a) is being held in storage at radioactive waste management and nuclear fuel cycle facilities; (b) has been disposed of; or (c) has resulted from past practices. This inventory shall contain a description of the material and other appropriate information available, such as volume or mass, activity and specific radionuclides; (v) a list of nuclear facilities in the process of being decommissioned and the status of decommissioning activities at those facilities.
D.1.1 Management of spent nuclear fuel
Most spent nuclear fuel in Sweden emanates from commercial nuclear power plants at the Barsebäck (which was finally shut down 31 May 2005), Forsmark, Oskarshamn and Ringhals sites. Small amounts of spent nuclear fuel originate from the research reactors in Studsvik (which were finally shut down 15 June 2005). In addition, some spent nuclear fuel from the decommissioned research reactor R1 and from the closed Ågesta reactor must be managed.
Spent nuclear fuel from the NPPs is temporarily stored in fuel pools, before being transported to the central interim storage for spent nuclear fuel (Clab), where it will be stored for at least another 30 years before being encapsulated and deposited in a disposal facility. Spent nuclear fuel elements from the closed research reactors R2 and R2-0 in Studsvik have been exported to the United States.
All spent fuel from the Ågesta district heating power reactor has been transferred to Clab. Spent fuel from the R1 research reactor consists of rods of metallic uranium enclosed in an aluminum alloy casing. This type of fuel is not suitable for disposal in accordance with the KBS-3 method. It has since the closure of the R1 reactor been temporarily stored at the Studsvik site. During 2007 the intact parts of the fuel was separated from corroded parts, in the form of powder and lumps, and transported to the United Kingdom. The intact parts were reprocessed in 2008. The fissile material from the reprocessing of the R1-fuel are planned to be manufactu-
Section D – InventorIeS anD LIStS
52 red to MOX-fuel and the other remaining waste from the reprocessing have been sent back to Sweden in 2009. The waste is temporarily stored at the Studsvik site before transport to disposal facility.
The corroded parts of the R1-fuel are still temporarily stored at the Studsvik site before transport to disposal facility. Since it was discovered that the corroded parts might contain metal, the material has been trickled and split up into different fractions, resulting in 23 steel cans. The cans with the smallest fraction (less that 1 mm) were later repacked into three steel canisters. No spent nuclear fuel is currently disposed of in Sweden.
D.1.2 Spent nuclear fuel facilities and inventories
D.1.2.1 Interim storage at the nuclear power plants
Each NPP unit has a fuel pool, close to the reactor vessel, in which spent fuel is stored temporarily for at least nine months before being transported to Clab. The fuel pools constitute integrated parts of the reactor facilities, and are for the purpose of the Joint Convention not considered to be separate spent fuel management facilities. The amount of spent fuel stored in pools at the nuclear power stations as of 2010-12-31 is presented below. The pool capacity listed corresponds to the storage capacity dedicated for spent fuel. The pools also have space for the plundered reactor core, fresh fuel, scrap and boxes.
Table D1: Inventory of spent fuel in NPP pools.
Fuel pool at NPP Pool capacity Spent nuclear fuel stored 2010-12-31
(no of fuel (no of assemblies) (tonnes*)
assembly positions)
Oskarshamn 1
908
366
55
Oskarshamn 2
1022
271
44
Oskarshamn 3
1040
328
58
Forsmark 1
614
402
67
Forsmark 2
493
367
61
Forsmark 3
340
262
44
Ringhals 1
1426
283
49
Ringhals 2
432
114
52
Ringhals 3
381
195
90
Ringhals 4
364
165
76
*uranium weight
Section D – InventorIeS anD LIStS
D.1.2.2 Spent nuclear fuel facilities and inventories at Studsvik
As described above, remaining waste from the reprocessing of the intact parts of the R1-fuel is temporarily stored on site at Studsvik before transport to disposal facility. The corroded parts of the R1 fuel are temporarily stored on site before transport to disposal facility.
Table D2: Spent fuel from the research reactor R1 temporarily stored in Studsvik.
D.1.2.3 The central interim storage for spent nuclear fuel, Clab
Spent fuel assemblies will, as mentioned above, be stored at the Clab facility for at least 30 years. The main reason is to let the heat generation decay by about 90 %, before encapsulation and disposal. Other highly radioactive components such as control rods from reactors are also stored in Clab awaiting disposal.
After being removed from the cask in an unloading pool, the spent fuel assemblies are transferred to storage canisters for subsequent transport and storage. A water-filled elevator cage takes the storage canister down to the storage section where it is placed in a predetermined position in a storage pool. Thus, unloading and all subsequent handling of spent fuel assemblies are performed under water using hydraulic machines. Approximately 100 people work at the facility, a third of them with the day-to-day operation and the others with radiation protection, chemical sampling, maintenance and repairs. At the turn of the year 2006/2007 the license holder for Clab, SKB, took over the operation of the Clab facility, which earlier was handled by OKG.
The water, which circulates in a closed system, acts both as coolant and as an effective radiation shield, and no additional radiation protection equipment is needed. The water is circulated through filters to keep it clean before being returned to the pools. The heat is removed in heat exchangers, cooled by seawater, in an intermediate cooling system. There are back-ups for all safety systems, and an emergency diesel-powered generator. Vital parts of the monitoring and control systems can be powered by a battery back-up system. The storage pools are designed to withstand seismic loads, and also for extreme temperature loads in case the cooling systems should fail.
The central interim storage for spent nuclear fuel, Clab is shown in figure A8. Principal data and inventories are listed below.
Spent nuclear fuel in storage 2010-12-31 origin no of assemblies
kg*
R1** 12+3*** 82,3****
*uranium weight **The corroded parts of the R1 fuel ***12 steel cans and 3 steel canisters ****Consists mostly of uranium dioxide (uo2)
Section D – InventorIeS anD LIStS
Table D3: Principal data for Clab
Table D4: Inventory of spent fuel stored in Clab 2010-12-31.
Principial data for Clab
Owner and license holder: Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co (SKB)
Operation and maintenance:
SKB
Start of construction:
1980
Start of operation:
1985
Number of staff: Approximately 100
Storage capacity: 8 000 tonnes of uranium Receiving capacity: 300 tonnes uranium per year
Number of storage pools: 8 + 2 in reserve Pool temperature (normal conditions): Maximum 36°C
Cooling capacity:
8.5 MW
Specification Spent nuclear fuel stored 2010-12-31 (no of assemblies) (tonnes)
BWR fuel
23 230
3 937
PWR fuel
2 877
1 240
Fuel from Ågesta district heating nuclear power reactor
222
20,2
Fuel from Studsvik
19
2,5
German MOX-fuel (exchanged for Swedish fuel reprocessed in France)
217
22,5
Total
26 565
5 222
Storage capacity
8 000
Section D – InventorIeS anD LIStS
D.1.3 management of radioactive waste nuclear power plants
Waste management at the NPP sites is fully integrated into the operations at each site. Fulfillment of the requirements in SSM’s general regulation is accomplished and verified through regulatory review and inspection activities at the nuclear power plants, as reported in the Swedish reports under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Temporary storage of radioactive waste at the nuclear power plant sites is in practice an integrated part of the site.
Waste with very low activity (VLLW) is disposed of in shallow land burials on site, except for Barsebäck. VLLW from Barsebäck is disposed of in SFR.
Short-lived low and intermediate level waste (LILW) from the nuclear power plants consists of ion exchange resins from filters, metal scrap, pipes, valves, pumps, and tools and protective clothes. The waste is classified and handled initially on site, in preparation for disposal. The purpose of the waste handling at the power plants is to reduce the volume, to solidify wet waste in concrete or bitumen, and to pack the waste in suitable packages. Four types of standard packages are used, as well as standard ISO containers (see figure D1). Waste packages are stored temporarily in a buffer storage on site before being transported to the disposal facility for operational waste, SFR.
Figure D1: Standard packages for short-lived LILW used in Sweden.
Section D – InventorIeS anD LIStS
56 The waste is treated differently at the different nuclear power plants. The table below describes methods and packages for operational waste produced at the nuclear power plants.
Table D5: Waste treatment methods at the NPPs (no more operational waste is currently produced at the Barsebäck site after the closure of the plant).
D.1.4 radioactive waste facilities and inventories
D.1.4.1 Radioactive waste treatment facilities and inventories
At the OKG site, the interim storage for low and intermediate level waste is built in a rock cavern. At the other nuclear power plants sites, there are special buildings for interim storage of conditioned operational waste located on the nuclear plant site. Safety reports exist for all facilities where radioactive waste is handled and stored. The safety reports describe the facility and the waste handling activities, the content of radioactive substances, supervising activities and include a safety analysis. As waste packages from the NPP sites are transported to SFR on a regular basis it is not relevant for the purpose of the Joint Convention to present a list of the inventories for the interim storage at the sites.
Type of waste
Ringhals
Barsebäck Oskarshamn
Forsmark
Ion exchange resins Solidified in concrete, packed in concrete moduls and steel moulds.
Solidified in concrete and packed in steel drums.
Dewatered and packed in concrete tanks.
Solidified in bitumen and packed in steel moulds.
Dewatered and packed in concrete tanks.
Solidified in concrete and packed in concrete drums.
Dewatered and packed in concrete tanks.
Solidified in concrete, packed in concrete moulds.
Metal scrap and residues
Sludges
Casted in concrete and packed in concrete moulds.
Packed in standard ISO containers.
Packed in steel moulds.
Packed in standard ISO containers.
Casted in concrete and packed in concrete moulds.
Packed in standard ISO containers.
Section D – InventorIeS anD LIStS
D.1.4.2 Radioactive waste management facilities at Studsvik
Hot cell laboratory, HCL
The Hot Cell Laboratory, built in the late 1950’s, is primarily used to investigate irradiated nuclear fuel, although it is also used for studies of other types of irradiated materials. In addition, the laboratory is used for the conditioning, treatment and encapsulation of spent fuel fragments in packages suitable for interim storage in other facilities. The Laboratory has seven cells with thick concrete walls, and lead windows, to protect the personnel from ionising radiation. All waste is removed from the laboratory after conditioning.
The incineration facility, HA
The facility is used for incineration of solid low-level waste (LLW) from NPPs, hospitals, research institutions, and from facilities in Studsvik. The activities comprise management, radiological measurement and final conditioning of the waste. Ashes are stabilized in concrete for disposal or, if the waste comes from overseas, returned to the origin for further management. The current license permits the treatment of 600 tons of combustible waste annually.
The melting facility, SMA
The melting facility in Studsvik is used for volume reduction of contaminated metal. After melting and radiological measurement, the material may be exempted from regulatory control or returned to the source for further management. The current license permits the treatment of 5 000 tons of metal annually.
Treatment facility for intermediate waste, HM
The facility is used for the treatment of intermediate solid and liquid waste from other facilities in Studsvik. Treatment of solid waste comprises sorting, volume reduction (compaction), packing and conditioning by means of stabilization with concrete. Treatment of liquid waste comprises sedimentation and solidification by means of stabilization with concrete.
Interim storage for low and intermediate waste, AM
The AM facility was constructed in the 1980s for the interim storage of conditioned waste from other treatment facilities from the Studsvik site. The storage is constructed in a cavern in crystalline bedrock with a rock cover of at least 20 meters. The rock mass is grouted with concrete, the walls are reinforced by means of rendering concrete, and special arrangements have been made to drain the rock.
Section D – InventorIeS anD LIStS
58 The storage facility is dimensioned to receive waste until about the year 2045. The storage area is divided into two parts; one part is used for waste that requires shielding and the other is used for waste for which shielding is not necessary. The shielded part of the AM storage has a capacity of about 4 000 m
3
, corresponding to 1632
moulds and 1020 four-drum unit trays, the unshielded part has a capacity of about 1120 m
3
, corresponding to 660 moulds and 264 four-drum unit trays. A further 1
000 drums can be deposited in others parts of the storage. The waste is conditioned and packed in special containers before being positioned in the storage. The ventilation and drainage systems are monitored for any radioactive substances. The following types of waste originating from the Studsvik facilities are currently being stored at AM:
- operational waste from the research reactor R2 and the tests that were performed in the reactor,
- irradiated and contaminated material from the production of isotopes,
- irradiated and contaminated material from the fuel testing laboratory, and
- start sources from an old research reactor and- operational waste from the waste handling facilities.
Externally produced types of waste currently being stored at AM are:
- rest products from incinerated waste from nuclear power plants, hospitals and industry,
- rest products from the use of isotopes in industry and hospitals,
- decommissioning waste from old nuclear facilities and
- waste from treatment of steam generators from Ringhals
Table D6: Inventory of disposed radioactive waste in AM 2010-12-31.
Storage facility for solid intermediate waste, AT
The facility, which was built for the purpose of the temporary storage of intermediate and high level solid waste from the reactor R2, is 44 meters long, 9 meters wide and comprises a concrete slab with circular and rectangular storage positions. The walls and roof are constructed of sheet metal on a steel structure. The facility is heated by means of air conditioning and the outgoing air is filtered. The facility is nowadays used for temporary storage and for various project activities.
The storage facility, FA
This facility, which contains three water pools, was built in 1965 for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel from the Ågesta reactor. As all fuel from Ågesta has been transferred to Clab the facility may be used for other purposes such as storage of spent fuel from other reactors, or for storage of other radioactive materials.
The facility comprises a main building and an extension. The main activities are carried out in the main building. There are three pools which can be used for
Number of packages Volume (m 3 )* Mass (tonnes)* Activity (Bq)
3 854
2 168
3 795
8,63*1015
*including packaging
Section D – InventorIeS anD LIStS
loading/unloading of transport casks, two of the pools are equipped with storage racks for the storage of spent fuel assemblies and other radioactive material.
The storage pools are built in reinforced concrete and lined with stainless steel. They have a depth of 8.2 m, and a diameter of 3.8 m. The basement contains service areas and equipment for management of the piping and water systems. The ventilation and drainage systems are monitored for any radioactive substances. The extension comprises a three-storey building. The basement contains rooms for secondary service systems; the ground level contains the entrance section and dressing rooms; and the attic contains air condition and ventilation installations systems.
Storage facility for radioactive waste, AU
The AU facility is an interim storage for conditioned long-lived, low level, waste and is a simple, non-heated, building made of concrete and steel. The AU storage facility contains drums with historical waste consisting of scrap metal embedded in concrete. During the 1990’s the waste was reconditioned. X-ray examination of all the waste and scrap metal drums are currently being performed. This includes the about 5 500 drums that previously were stored in the facility, together with the drums that has been stored outside the facility (in containers, AT and AM). The examination started in 2009 and will be finished in 2011. Installation of a mobile pallet system started in 2011. The system shall be able to hold all the waste and scrap metal drums (about 7200).
The waste will be disposed of in the disposal facility for other long-lived waste. No more new waste will be stored in the AU building.
Treatment facilities for radioactive non-nuclear waste, FR0-A and R0-A
Disused sealed sources and radioactive waste from medical use, research and industry are mainly managed in the two facilities FR0-A and R0-A. In R0-A ionizing smoke alarms are dismantled in R0-A, whereas all other disused sealed sources and radioactive waste are treated in FR0-A. Depending on activities, dose rate, material, etc, treatment comprise sorting, volume reduction, packing and conditioning. Some of the disused sealed sources and radioactive waste may also be treated in the facilities HA, SMA or HM.
Monitoring at Studsvik facilities
Whenever there is risk for airborne emissions, ventilation and/or exhaust systems are monitored for any radioactive substances. Likewise, to avoid contamination from waste water, common drainage systems are monitored for any radioactive substances before the water is released to the recipient.
D.1.4.3 Disposal facility for short-lived low- and intermediate
level waste (SFR)
General information
The capacity of SFR is approximately 63 000 m
3
, and 33 871 m
3
of waste had been
disposed of by 2010-12-31. In the safety assessment the total radioactivity of this waste is assumed to be 1E16 Bq.
The disposal facility is designed to isolate the waste from the biosphere in
Section D – InventorIeS anD LIStS
60 order to avoid harmful consequences to man and the environment both during operation and after closure. This is accomplished by emplacement in rock under the seabed, and by the technical barriers surrounding the waste. SFR consists of the Silo, the rock vault for intermediate level waste (BMA), two rock vaults for concrete tanks (1BTF, 2BTF) and the rock vault for low level waste (BLA). The storage vaults are located in the bedrock, approximately 60 m below the seabed, 1 km from the shore. The underground part of the disposal facility is accessed through two tunnels.
The Silo
The main part of the radioactivity in the waste designated for SFR is intended for disposal in the Silo. This waste comes from many different waste streams, but the most important one comprises ion exchange resins from the nuclear power plants in a concrete or bitumen matrix. Other waste like metal components of different origins is also disposed of in the Silo. The amount of organic material is kept to a minimum. The maximum surface dose rate permitted on a package is 500 mSv/h. All handling of waste packages is performed using remote control equipment. The dominant nuclides are Co-60 and Cs-137.
The Silo consists of a cylindrical concrete construction with shafts of different sizes for waste packages. The concrete cylinder is approximately 50 m high, with a diameter of approximately 30 m, and the largest shafts measure 2.5 m by 2.5 m. The waste packages are placed in the shafts, normally in layers of four moulds or 16 drums. The spaces between the waste packages are gradually back-filled with porous concrete. The walls of the Silo are made of 0.8 m thick reinforced concrete. In between the walls and the surrounding rock there is a bentonite backfill, on average 1.2 m thick. The 1 m thick concrete floor at the bottom of the Silo is placed on a layer of 90/10 sand/bentonite mixture.
According to present plans a 1 m thick concrete lid will cover the top of the Silo. The lid will after closure be covered with a thin layer of sand, a 1.5 m thick layer of sand/bentonite mixture (90/10) and the remaining space will be filled with sand, gravel or sand stabilized with cement.
The rock vault for intermediate level waste (BMA)
The radioactivity in the waste that is disposed of in BMA is generally lower than in the waste in the Silo. The waste in BMA comes from many different waste streams. The most important one is ion-exchange resins from the nuclear power plants. Other waste such as metal components of various origins as well as contaminated rubbish is also disposed of in BMA.
The maximum dose rate permitted on packages is 100 mSv/h, and the radionuclide content is fairly low. BMA has been designed to handle approximately 6% of the radionuclides in SFR. The dominant nuclides are Co-60 and Cs-137. The waste packages are of the same type as in the Silo, i.e. moulds and drums.
The rock vault is approximately 160 m long, 19.5 m wide with a height of 16.5 m. Inside the cavern a concrete construction has been raised such that the vault is divided into 15 compartments. The waste, moulds and drums, are placed in the compartments using remote controlled equipment. The waste is piled on top of the concrete floor in such a way that the concrete moulds act as support for prefabricated concrete slabs, put in position as soon as the compartments are filled. It is also possible to back-fill the void between the
Section D – InventorIeS anD LIStS
waste packages in a compartment. Finally a layer of concrete will be cast on top of the lid. Between the concrete structure and the rock wall there is a 2 m wide space, which will be filled with sand before closure. The space above the concrete structure may be left unfilled, but could also be backfilled. Plugs will be placed in the two entrances to the vault when the disposal facility is closed.
The rock vaults for concrete tanks (BTF)
In SFR there are two rock vaults for concrete tanks, 1BTF and 2BTF. The waste in 1BTF mainly consists of drums containing ash and concrete tanks containing ionexchange resins and filter parts, whereas the waste in 2BTF consists of only the latter. Moreover, some large components of metal e.g. steam separators or reactor vessel lids may be disposed of in the caverns. The maximum dose rate permitted on packages is 10 mSv/h. The radionuclide content is fairly low, and the dominant nuclides are Co-60 and Cs-137. The rock vaults are approximately 160 m long, 14.8 m wide with a height of 9.5 m. The concrete tanks, each 10 m
3
in volume, are piled in two levels with four tanks in
each row. A concrete radiation protection lid is placed on top of the pile. The space between the different tanks is backfilled with concrete, and the space between the tanks and the rock wall will be filled with, for example, sand stabilized with cement.
The rock vault for low level waste (BLA)
The waste that is disposed of in BLA - short-lived waste - is mainly low level scrap metal (iron/steel, aluminum); cellulose (e.g. wood, textile, paper), other organic materials (e.g. plastics, cables) and other waste such as insulation (e.g. rock wool) packed in standard steel containers. The maximum dose rate permitted on the surface of the waste packages is 2 mSv/h. The radionuclide levels are low, and the dominant nuclide is Co-60. Some of the waste inside the containers is placed in steel drums and others in bales.
The rock vault cavern is approximately 160 m long, 15 m wide with a height of 12.5 m. The cavern is very simple in design, basically there is only a concrete floor on which containers are placed. During the operational phase a ceiling has been placed above the waste in order to minimize water dripping onto the waste. This inner roof will be dismantled before the disposal facility is closed. The containers are piled three high in rows of two. Most of the containers are half height allowing six to a pile. No backfilling is planned. The SFR facility is shown in figure A9. Principal data and inventories are listed below.
Section D – InventorIeS anD LIStS
Table D7: Principal data for SFR
Table D8: Inventories of disposed radioactive waste in SFR 2010-12-31.
Principal data for SFR
Owner and license holder: Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co (SKB) Operation and maintenance: SKB Start of construction: 1983 Start of operation: 1988 Number of staff: Approximately 25 Storage capacity: 63 000 m3Silo Short lived LILW, max dose rate 500 mSv/h BMA Short lived LILW, max dose rate 100 mSv/h 1 BTF Short lived LILW, max dose rate 10 mSv/h 2 BTF Short lived LILW, max dose rate 10 mSv/h BLA Short lived LILW, max dose rate 2 mSv/h Disposal capacity 6 000 m3/year Current disposal rate 1 000 – 1 500 m3/year
Waste disposed of in SFR 2010-12-31 Storage section Volume (m 3 ) Activity (Bq) *
Silo 5 265
5,1E14
BMA 9 087
2,6E14
1 BTF
2 309
2,1E12
2 BTF including steam separators**
7 010
1,5E13
BLA 10
5,5E11
SFR total
33 871
7,9E14
* Activity values per 2009-12-31 ** 18 packages
Section D – InventorIeS anD LIStS
Figure D2: Activity content in SFR. The numbers are for the situation in 2009-12-31.
D.1.4.4 Shallow land burial
The nuclear power plants at Ringhals, Forsmark and Oskarshamn as well as the Studsvik site have shallow land burial facilities for very low-level waste. When licensing the shallow land burial facilities, the main criterion is that the releases of radionuclides from the facilities shall not contribute significantly to the releases from the already existing nuclear facilities at the site. Therefore, the total activity content is limited to 100–1100 GBq per facility. The highest level according to the legislation is 10 TBq, of which a maximum of 10 GBq may consist of alpha-active substances. Waste is disposed of in campaigns at 3–5 year intervals, and the facilities are closed in between the campaigns.
The design and layout of the shallow land burial facilities differs but all facilities have a top sealing layer to reduce the infiltration of water. The design of the top sealing layer differs between the different facilities; both bentonite liners, plastic membranes and massive layers of glacial clay have been used, as well as mixed designs. The closed burial facilities are finally covered with a protective layer of e.g. soil, approximately 1 metre thick. At the newer installations in Ringhals and Oskarshamn a geological barrier has been installed down-gradient of the disposal facility. At the repositories in Forsmark and Studsvik a natural or seminatural geological barrier reduces leakages to the environment. There are monitoring programmes for sampling leachate water, e.g. with respect to radionuclides.
1,00E+08 1,00E+09 1,00E+10 1,00E+11 1,00E+12 1,00E+13 1,00E+14 1,00E+15 Bq
Ag108m
Am241
Am242m
Am243
Ba133
C14 org
C14 oorg
Cd113m
Cl36
Cm243 Cm244
Co60
Cs134 Cs135 Cs137
Eu152 Eu154 Eu155
Fe55
H3
Ho166m
I129
Mo93
Nb93m
Nb94
Ni59 Ni63
Pd107
Pm147
Pu238 Pu239 Pu240 Pu241 Ru106 Sb125
Se79
Sm151
Sr90
Tc99
U235 U238
Zr93
Section D – InventorIeS anD LIStS
64 The waste disposed of at the three nuclear power plants consists of low-level ion exchange resins, piping, tools, isolation material, protective clothes and rubbish such as plastics, paper and cables. The predominant nuclides are Co-60, Cs-137 and Ni-63. At the shallow land burial in Studsvik also waste from the decommissioning of various old nuclear installations and operational waste from the Studsvik facilities has been disposed of, dominated by the following nuclides: Co-60, Cs-137, H-3, Eu-152 and Eu-154.
Figure D4: The shallow land burial at OKG. Figure D3: Principle section of shallow land burial at OKG.
Protective layer
Drainage layer
Drainage material
Bentonite and
plastic liner
Infiltration bed
Drainage material
Bentonite liner
Section D – InventorIeS anD LIStS
In the older licenses the total activity concentration was limited to 300 kBq/kg for radionuclides with a half-life longer than 5 years. When the license conditions for the shallow land burial facilities in Forsmark, Ringhals and Oskarshamn were renewed, nuclide specific acceptance criteria was established.
The Regulations on the Protection of Human Health and the Environment in connection with Final Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Nuclear Waste (SSMFS 2008:37) does not include shallow land burial facilities for low-level nuclear waste. There are, however, plans to issue regulations specifically for shallow land burial facilities. The regulations will be applicable to siting, design and operation issues that can influence both the short- and long-term performance of the facility.
Table D9: Inventories of disposed waste in shallow land burials.
In addition to the above mentioned limits the following applies to the shallow land burials. For Ringhals a maximum of 2 GBq Sr-90, 900 GBq Ni-63 and 100 GBq of other beta emitters with a half life longer than 5 years (e.g. C-14, Ni-59 and Cl-36) is allowed.
D.1.4.5 Waste from fuel fabrication
Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB operates a factory for the fabrication of nuclear fuel in Västerås (approximately 100 km west of Stockholm), which has been manufacturing fuel since the mid-1960s. The annual production is approximately 400 tonnes of UO
2
fuel for PWR and BWR, mostly for foreign customers.
The manufacturing process generates some slightly uranium contaminated waste in the form of sludge, filters, protective clothing, etc. Westinghouse disposes of small amounts of waste with very low uranium content, typically filters, at municipal landfills as permitted by the regulatory authority. Most of the uranium in the waste is however first extracted through special recovery processes in the Västerås plant. Also, new processes are currently being developed together with partners such as Studsvik, to further decrease the amount of uranium in the waste. A minor part of the remaining waste can be considered for a future storage in a disposal facility.
License conditions Waste disposed of 2010-12-31
Licence Volume Max activity/max Mass Volume Activity/alpha
period (m 3 ) alpha activity (GBq) (ton) (m 3 )
(GBq)
Site
Forsmark
2 040 17 000 200/0.2
3 415 5 231 35/0.0004
Oskarshamn
2 075 10 000 200/0.2
3 768 7 346 38/0.0028 *
Ringhals
2 030 10 000 1100/0.1
3 640 5 942 181/0.046 ***
Studsvik (SVAFO) 2 010 1 540 ** 100/0.1
1 151 1 140 39/0.055 *
* Valid 2004-12-31 ** The license for further disposition has not been renewed by SSM. The license volume can therefore not be used to its full extension. *** Valid 2008-08-19
Section D – InventorIeS anD LIStS
D.1.5 nuclear facilities under decommissioning
D.1.5.1 Experiences from past decommissioning activities
Sweden has limited experience from decommissioning of nuclear facilities. It is limited to the decommissioning of the R1 research reactor and laboratories in Stockholm as well as some smaller test facilities and laboratories in Studsvik. The most relevant decommissioned facilities are listed below.
The research reactor R1, which was in operation between 1954 and 1970, was situated in a rock cavern in central Stockholm and was used for research and isotope production. The reactor was decommissioned between 1981 and 1983, and the site was released for unrestricted use in 1985. Virtually all waste was shipped to Studsvik. Exceptions were electric motors, handrails, stairways, etc, from non- classified areas that were released for unrestricted use. All waste and salvageable material produced at R1 was measured and registered. The measurements were nuclide-specific and were done using a gamma-ray spectrometer. The graphite from the reflector was packed in steel boxes and is temporary stored in the storage facility AM at Studsvik.
The research reactor R0, a ”zero power” reactor in Studsvik, was a low power reactor, which was in operation between 1959 and 1968. The normal operational power was about 1 W, and the maximum power was 50 W. The reactor vessel was transferred to R2 (another reactor in Studsvik) for alternate usage. Some parts could not be decontaminated and were packed and stored in Studsvik. The concrete elements from the radiation shield were disposed of in a refuse disposal facility in Studsvik, since no activity could be measured.
The KRITZ-reactor was an experimental reactor in Studsvik with a maximum power of 100 W, used between 1969 and 1975. The reactor vessel was equipped with a radiation protection shield of lead. The lead protection could, after measurements, be released from regulatory control and was sold. The reactor vessel could also be released, except for an inner tank with induced activity, which was packed and stored at the Studsvik site.
The Alfa-laboratory in Studsvik was mainly used for studies on steel used in pressure vessels and on irradiated fuel cladding material. The work in the laboratory started in the beginning of the 1960’s and the laboratory was in operation for about 25 years. The laboratory contained seven ventilated hot cells built of lead bricks. After decontamination some of the lead bricks and other components could be released from regulatory control, others were packed in special packages for interim storage. The building was released for unrestricted use in 1985.
The Van de Graaff laboratory in Studsvik was used for neutron physics experiments between 1962 and 1989. The building was not classified as a nuclear facility but later it was found to be contaminated with tritium. An extensive measuring program was performed to identify the contaminated material and surfaces. After decontamination the building was released from regulatory control and demolished in 1999. Three drums and one steel box with tritium contaminated waste are now stored in the interim storage AM in Studsvik. Non-radioactive waste, classified as hazardous, was separated and transported to SAKAB, a company managing non-radioactive hazardous waste.
The central active laboratory (ACL) in Studsvik was built between 1959 and 1963 with the purpose to be used as a research facility for reprocessing spent fuel. The activities in the laboratory ended in 1997, and involved for example research
Section D – InventorIeS anD LIStS
on plutonium enriched fuel, plutonium analyses, material testing and test fabrication of rods with MOX-fuel. Cleaning and decontamination work was started after an extensive measurement program. The building was released for unrestricted use in the beginning of 2006. The demolition work was carried out during 2006.
A general observation concerning the above activities is that - despite the lack of regulations regarding decommissioning - the activities were performed without any accidents, due to the knowledge about regulations on transport and handling, and experience from radiological work of the people involved.
D.1.5.2 Nuclear facilities currently under decommissioning
The nuclear power units Barsebäck 1 and Barsebäck 2, which were closed in November 1999 and in May 2005, respectively, were the first commercial nuclear power units to be permanently taken out of operation in Sweden. The Government decided that the reactors should be shut down as part of the policy to phase out nuclear power in Sweden. All spent fuel has been transferred to the central interim storage for spent fuel (Clab). Already before the units were shut down the regulatory authorities increased their control and review activities at the site to ensure that there would be no decline in the safety work. An overall decommissioning plan for the units has been submitted to, and approved of, by the regulatory authorities. A revised version is under way and is planned to be submitted during 2012. The decommissioning work has commenced to a certain degree. After the spent fuel was transported to Clab the units went into service operation on 1 December 2006, i.e. only the most necessary systems are running, such as ventilation, monitoring of activity etc. Some equipment has also been disposed of. According to current plans, large scale dismantling and demolishing work will begin not sooner than 2020.
The Ågesta district heating nuclear power reactor (heavy water) was operated between 1964 and 1974 supplying parts of the Stockholm suburb Farsta with heated water. The reactor is now shut down in such a manner that it is not possible to start it up again. The fuel from the reactor has been transferred to Clab for interim storage. The heavy water has been removed and two, out of four, steam generators have been dismantled, but otherwise the facility is more or less intact. Detailed planning for its decommissioning is underway and is being closely monitored by the regulatory bodies.
The tank and silo facility (TS) in Studsvik was constructed at an early stage, with the purpose of storing liquid and semi-liquid radioactive waste. The silo part of TS is subject for decontamination, release of material for unrestricted use and, later, dismantling. The tank part of TS will remain and is used for interim storage of intermediate-level liquid waste (category 3).
The research reactors R2 and R2-0 in Studsvik were finally shut down 15 June 2005. The regulatory body have closely followed the developments at the site. Part of the spent nuclear fuel from the reactors was returned to the United States in 2007. The remaining part of the fuel was returned to the United States in 2008. The reactor building and reactor pool has since June 2005 been emptied on some of the loose equipment. Dismantling of fixed equipment has not yet begun. By a government decision, AB SVAFO obtained the nuclear license for R2 and R2-0 which earlier belonged to Studsvik Nuclear AB. The license was granted on 16 December 2010 and the transfer of the reactor facility is now completed. AB SVAFO will now be responsible for the further decommissioning work.
This page is intentionally left blank
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
E.1 Article 18: IMPLEMENTING MEASURES
Each Contracting Party shall take, within the framework of its national law, the legislative, regulatory and administrative measures and other steps necessary for implementing its obligations under this Convention.
The legislative, regulatory and other measures to fulfill the obligations of the Joint Convention are discussed in this report.
1. Each Contracting Party shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to govern the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management.
2. This legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for: (i) the establishment of applicable national safety requirements and regulations for radiation safety; (ii) a system of licensing of spent fuel and radioactive waste management activities; (iii) a system of prohibition of the operation of a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility without a licence; (iv) a system of appropriate institutional control, regulatory inspection and documentation and reporting; (v) the enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of the licences; (vi) a clear allocation of responsibilities of the bodies involved in the different steps of spent fuel and of radioactive waste management.
3. When considering whether to regulate radioactive materials as radioactive waste, Contracting Parties shall take due account of the objectives of this Convention.
Summary of developments since the last national report
- SSM has reissued former SKI and SSI regulations in its Code of Statutes, SSMFS.
- On January 1 2011 the previous ban on constructing new reactors was removed through amendments to the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities and the Environmental Code. The ten (10) current reactors in Sweden may be replaced with new, provided that they are erected on the same site as the existing.
- The SSM has updated the regulatory requirements on the content and use of
Safety Analysis Reports (SAR) in the Regulations concerning Safety in Nuclear Facilities (SSMFS 2008:1).
E.2 Article 19: LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
- A Committee of Inquiry on merging the provisions of the Act on Nuclear
Activities and the radiation Protection Act (1988:220) has submitted its final report to the Government (SOU 2011:18). Harmonization with the provisions of the Environmental code is suggested. The report is presently subject to referral consultation with the SSM and other relevant stakeholders. Potential changes of the legal framework, in response to the Committee’s proposals, can at the earliest be decided 2013/2014.
- By a new Ordinance on Supervision under the Environmental Code SSM became on Mars 31 2011 the supervisory authority for matters relating to radiation safety under the Code.
This section is divided into three parts. The first part (E.2.1) presents basic prerequisites for the legal and regulatory framework. The second apart (E.2.2) contains basic information concerning definitions within the Swedish legislative system, and presents an overview of the relevant acts. The third part (E.2.3) describes the implementation of the requirements in the regulatory review activities. Special emphasis is placed on the licensing system, prohibition, institutional control, regulatory inspection, documentation and reporting, enforcement of regulations and terms of a licence, and a description on the allocation of responsibilities of the bodies involved.
E.2.1 Basic prerequisites for the legal & regulatory framework
E.2.1.1 Fundamental principles for the management of spent fuel and
radioactive waste
The rationales for the management system for spent fuel and radioactive waste are established on basic principles that have been derived from extensive discussions in the Swedish parliament during the 80’s and 90’s. The Swedish parliament has supported four basic principles for the management of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste (bill 1980/81:90, Appendix 1, p. 319, bill 1983/84:60, p. 38, bill 1997/98:145, p. 381, bill 1992/93:98, p. 29 as well as the final reports of the Standing Committee on Industry and Trade, 1988/89:NU31 and 1989/90:NU24):
1. The expenses for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste are to be covered by revenues from the production of energy that has resulted in these expenses.
2. The reactor owners are to safely dispose of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste.
3. The state has the ultimate responsibility for spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. The long-term responsibility for the handling and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste should rest with the state. After a disposal facility has been closed, a requirement should be established to ensure that some kind of responsibility for and supervision of the disposal facility can be made and maintained for a considerable time. A government authority could assume responsibility for a closed disposal facility.
4. Each country is to be responsible for the spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
generated in that country. The disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste from nuclear activities in another country may not occur in Sweden other than in an exceptional case.
These are the basic principles for the structure of the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities. They are also contained in the Act (2006:647) on Financial Measures for the Management of Residual Products from Nuclear Activities.
The first principle has been wholly incorporated into the Financing Act. The second principle has been regulated in 10-12 §§ of the Act on Nuclear Activities. Regarding the third principle, the Government has in a statement accepted by the Parliament, noted that it is in the very nature that the State has ultimate responsibility for operations, as it is regulated in the Act on Nuclear Activities, also in the very long term. The fourth principle is expressed in 5 a §, second paragraph, of the Act on Nuclear Activities.
Another basic prerequisite for the actual management of spent fuel is that reprocessing will not take place. Thus, spent nuclear fuel is in practice considered as, and treated as, waste, although it is not legally defined as waste until disposed of in a disposal facility.
E.2.1.2 Nuclear and radioactive waste
In the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities, radioactive waste produced by nuclear activities is defined as ”nuclear waste”. The precise definition according to the act is presented in the next section. In the Radiation Protection Act (1988:220) the term ”radioactive waste” is used. The term includes radioactive waste from nuclear activities as well as from nonnuclear activities (medical use, use of sealed sources, research institutions, consumer products, etc.).
E.2.2 Legislative framework
The framework of Sweden’s legislation in the field of waste management, nuclear safety and radiation protection, is to be found in five Acts with associated Ordinances:
- the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities;
- the Radiation Protection Act (1988:220);
- the Environmental Code (1998:808);
- the Act (2006:647) on Financial Measures for the Management of Residual
Products from Nuclear Activities; and
- parts of the Act (2000:1064) on the Control of Dual- use Items and Technical
Assistance.
E.2.2.1 The Act on Nuclear activities
The Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities is the basic law regulating nuclear safety. It contains basic provisions concerning safety in connection with nuclear activities, and applies to the handling of nuclear material and nuclear waste as well as to the operation of nuclear plants.
The Swedish Parliament has on several occasions declared that Sweden supports and will follow the principle of each country’s responsibility to take care of and dispose of spent fuel and radioactive waste produced within the country.
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
72 Disposal, as well as interim storage, of foreign spent fuel and nuclear waste in Sweden is prohibited. A special licence may however be granted by the Government in special cases, to allow for very small amounts of foreign spent fuel or radioactive waste to be disposed of in Sweden, provided that it does not hinder the R&D-programme regarding safe disposal of spent fuel in Sweden. The Act does not contain provisions concerning radiation protection. This is regulated in a separate act, the Radiation Protection Act (see section E.2.2.2). As far as nuclear activities are concerned, the Radiation Protection Act and the Act on Nuclear Activities should be applied in parallel and in close association with each other.
Definitions
The handling, transport or other dealings with nuclear waste are defined as nuclear activity. The precise definition of nuclear waste is:
- spent nuclear fuel that has been placed in a disposal facility
- radioactive material that has been generated in a nuclear facility and that has not been produced or taken from the facility to be used for educational or research purposes or for medical, agricultural engineering or commercial purposes
- material or other item that has belonged to a nuclear facility and become contaminated by radioactivity and which shall no longer be used in such facility, and
- radioactive parts of a nuclear facility that is being decommissioned.
Basic requirements on safety
Nuclear activities shall be conducted so as to meet safety requirements and fulfil the obligations pursuant to Sweden’s agreements for the purpose of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and unauthorised dealing with nuclear material and spent nuclear fuel.
Safety in nuclear activities shall be maintained by taking all measures required to prevent errors in or defective functioning of equipment, to prevent incorrect handling or any other circumstances that may result in a radiological accident, and to prevent unlawful dealings with nuclear material or nuclear waste. The Government or the authority appointed by the Government may issue more detailed provisions concerning these matters. As mentioned above SSM is mandated to impose detailed regulations.
Licensing
In principle, all activities with nuclear material or nuclear waste constitute nuclear activity for which a licence is required. However, nuclear waste and nuclear material with a very low level of radiation can be released from regulatory control.
General obligations of licensees and licence conditions
The licence-holder for nuclear activities shall be responsible for ensuring that all measures are taken needed for:
- maintaining safety, with reference to the nature of the activities and the conditions under which they are conducted;
- ensuring the safe handling and disposal of nuclear waste arising from the activities or nuclear material arising therein that is not reused; and
- the safe decommissioning and dismantling of plants in which nuclear activities are no longer to be conducted.
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
The holder of a licence for a nuclear activity has to ensure that all measures are taken, that are needed to maintain safety. These general requirements are supplemented by more detailed regulations issued by the SSM (see below) and if needed license conditions that the authority may issue in individual cases. The licensing conditions are imposed when a licence is issued. Licensing conditions can also be imposed during the period of validity of a licence.
Environmental impact assessment and general rules of consideration
Licensing of nuclear activities requires that an EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) is submitted in connection with the application. Closer regulations on how the EIA should be carried out and what it should contain is given in the Environmental Code. In addition, the applicant must also show compliance with the general rules of consideration in the Environmental Code (see section E.2.2.4).
Safe management and disposal of nuclear waste
The holder of a licence for nuclear activities is responsible for the management and disposal of the waste produced and for decommissioning. The holder of a licence for the operation of a nuclear power reactor shall – in co-operation with the other holders of a licence for the operation of nuclear power reactors – establish and carry out a R&D-programme for the safe handling and disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste. Every third year the programme shall be submitted to the SSM for evaluation. An important step in the evaluation process is that the program is sent for comments to a large number of stakeholders, such as other government organisations, municipalities, environmental organisations, research institutions and universities.
After the review SSM forwards the R&D-programme to the Government. The Government decides if the program can be approved or not. In connection with the decision, the Government may issue conditions about the content of the future R&D-programme.
Supervision
Compliance with the Act on Nuclear Activities and of conditions or regulations imposed pursuant to the Act is supervised by a regulatory body assigned by the Government. That body is SSM. A licence-holder shall if SSM requires it:
- submit all information and documentation necessary to perform the supervision; and
- provide access to a nuclear installation, or site for nuclear activities, investigations and taking of samples to the extent necessary to exercise
SSM may decide on any measures, conditions and prohibitions necessary in individual cases to implement the Act on Nuclear Activities, or regulations or conditions issued as a consequence of the Act.
Inspections
See section E.2.3.3
Documentation and reporting
See section E.2.3.3
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
Revocation and prohibition
A licence to conduct nuclear activities may be revoked by the authority issuing the permit if:
- conditions have not been complied with in some essential respect;
- the licensee has not fulfilled its obligations concerning research and development work on waste management and decommissioning, and there are very specific reasons from the viewpoint of safety to revoke the licence; or
- there are any other very specific reasons for revocation, from the viewpoint of safety.
This means that a revocation of a licence may be decided in cases of severe misconduct by the operator or otherwise for exceptional safety reasons. If the licence to operate a nuclear power plant is revoked, the licence holder remains responsible for waste management and decommissioning.
Sanctions
The Act on Nuclear Activities also contains provisions for safeguards, sanctions, etc. Anyone who conducts nuclear activities without a licence, or disregards conditions or regulations shall be sentenced to pay a fine, or to imprisonment for a maximum of two years. If the crime is intentional and aggravated, he shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum of six months and a maximum of four years. Liability shall not be adjudged if responsibility for the offence may be assigned under the Penal Code or the Act on Penalties for Smuggling (2000:1225) or if the crime is trivial.
Regulations on civil liability for radiological damage are contained in the Atomic Liability Act (1968:45). The act is largely based on the contents of the Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability from 1960 and the Brussels Supplementary Convention from 1963, which Sweden has acceded.
Public insight
It is considered very important to give the public insight into and information on nuclear activities. In municipalities where major nuclear facilities are located (power reactors, research reactors, and facilities for manufacturing, handling, storage or disposal of nuclear material or nuclear waste) it is particularly important that the residents are given correct and reliable information. For this purpose socalled local safety boards have been established in the municipalities of Kävlinge (Barsebäck NPP), Oskarshamn (Oskarshamn NPP), Nyköping (Studsvik research facility), Varberg (Ringhals NPP) and Östhammar (Forsmark NPP).
The licence-holder for a major nuclear plant is required to give the local safety board insight into the safety and radiation protection work at the plant. The licence-holder shall, at the request of the board:
- give the board information of the facts available and allow the board to study relevant documents; and
- give the board access to plants and sites.
The function of the boards is to obtain insight into safety and radiation protection matters and to inform the public about these. It is therefore important to point out that the board is not supposed to impose requirements on or to prescribe safety-
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
enhancing or other measures for nuclear plants. These functions rest exclusively with the regulatory authorities.
The Ordinance ( 1984:14 ) on Nuclear Activities
The Ordinance contains detailed provisions on such matters as definitions, applications for licences, reviewing, evaluations and inspections. The Ordinance also specifies that the regulatory authority assigned by the Government (SSM) is authorised to issue permits for transportation of nuclear materials and nuclear waste. The authority is in addition authorised to impose licence conditions and to issue general regulations concerning measures to maintain the safety of nuclear activities.
E.2.2.2 The Radiation Protection Act
The framework for all radiation protection is defined in the Radiation Protection Act (1988:220) and in the Radiation Protection Ordinance (1988:293). The present Act and the Ordinance entered into force in 1988. The purpose of the Act is to protect people, animals and the environment against the harmful effects of radiation. Persons engaged in activities involving radiation are obliged to take the requisite precautionary measures. They are also responsible for the proper handling and disposal of the radioactive waste produced, which includes covering the costs associated with both the handling and disposal of the waste.
Definitions
The Act applies to all activities involving radiation and these are defined to include all activities involving radioactive substances or technical devices capable of generating radiation. Consequently the Act applies to radiation from nuclear activities and to harmful radiation, ionising as well as non-ionising, from any other source (medical, industrial, research, consumer products and NORM). As far as nuclear installations are concerned, the Act and the Act on Nuclear Activities are applied in close association with each other. The Government or the responsible authority may, in so far it does not conflict with the purpose of the act, prescribe exemptions or certain provisions concerning radioactive substances or technical devises capable of generating radiation.
Basic requirements on radiation protection
The radiation protection in Sweden is based on the International Radiation Protection Commission’s (ICRP) internationally recognised principles. These are:
- Justification
No activity is to be introduced until it has been shown to provide greater advantages than disadvantages to society. The basic principle of justification with regard to the management of nuclear and non-nuclear radioactive waste can not be questioned at this stage. The waste has been generated as a result of previous decisions.
- Optimisation
All radiation doses to individuals, the number of exposed individuals as well as
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
76 the probability of receiving doses must be kept as low as reasonably achievable, taking into account economic and social factors. This is often called the ALARA principle (As Low As Reasonably Achievable)
- Dose limitation
The individual exposure to radiation (dose) must not exceed the established limits for the particular circumstances. The dose limit or dose constraint can be seen as a limit for optimization; thus, the individual doses must not exceed the established limits, even if the collective dose would be reduced as a result.
The Government or the authority assigned by the Government may also issue further regulations as required for protection against, or control of, radiation in the respects specified in the Act.
Licensing
According to the Radiation Protection Act a licence is required for the following.
- The manufacture, import, transport, sale, transfer, leasing, acquisition, possession, use, depositing or recycling of radioactive substances.
- The manufacture, import, sale, transfer, leasing, acquisition, possession, use, installation or maintenance of a technical device capable of and intended for emitting ionising radiation, or a part of such a device that is of substantial importance from the viewpoint of radiation protection.
- The manufacture, import, sale, transfer, leasing, acquisition, possession, use, installation or maintenance of technical devices, other than those referred to in the previous sub-clause, and which are capable of generating ionising radiation and for which the Government or the authority appointed by the Government has prescribed a licence requirement.
- The export of radioactive substances if a licence is not granted according to the
Act (2000:1064) on the Control of Dual-use Items and Technical Assistance.
A licence according to the Radiation Protection Act is not required for activities licensed according to the Act on Nuclear Activities.
General obligations of licensees and licence conditions
Any person who conducts activities involving radiation shall, according to the nature of the activities and the conditions under which they are conducted:
- take the measures and precautions necessary to prevent or counteract injury to people and animals and damage to the environment;
- supervise and maintain the radiation protection at the site, on the premises and in other areas where radiation occurs; and
- maintain the technical devices and the measuring and radiation protection equipment used in the activities correctly.
The provision implies that all measures should be taken to improve radiation protection; it is not sufficient only to follow regulations or conditions issued by the responsible authority.
The Government or the authority assigned by the Government may also issue any further regulations required for protection against, or control of, radiation in the respects specified in the act.
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
When a licence is, or has been, issued according to the Radiation Protection Act the responsible authority may impose conditions needed for radiological protection. Such conditions can also be imposed on activities licensed within the legal frame of the Act on Nuclear Activities.
Environmental impact assessment
The Government or an authority appointed by the Government may, in licensing cases, prescribe that the implementer prepares an EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) before consent is given. Such an EIA shall be made in accordance with the rules in the Environmental Code (see section E.2.2.4).
Supervision
The Government assigns a regulatory body to supervise compliance with the Radiation Protection Act and licences and conditions issued in accordance with the Act. This body is the SSM. The SSM may decide on all measures necessary and all conditions and prohibitions required in individual cases to implement the Act, or regulations or conditions issued as a consequence of the Act.
At the request of the SSM, anyone who conducts activities involving radiation shall submit the information and provide the documents required for its supervision. SSM should also be given access to the installation or site where the activities are conducted, for investigations and sampling, to the extent required for its supervision.
Inspections
See section E.2.3.3
Documentation and reporting
See section E.2.3.3
Revocation and prohibition
A licence under the Radiation Protection Act may be revoked if regulations or conditions imposed pursuant to the Act have been violated in a significant respect or there are otherwise very strong reasons for revocation. Furthermore the Government, or the authority appointed by the Government, may issue prohibitions against e.g. the manufacture, sale, acquisition, possession or use of materials containing radioactive substances.
Sanctions
The Government and the responsible authority decide upon matters regarding licences under the Radiation Protection Act. A licence under this Act may be revoked if specific regulations or conditions have not been complied with in any significant respect, or if there are other very specific reasons.
Liability under the Act is not adjudged if responsibility for the offence may be assigned under the Penal Code or the Act on penalties for Smuggling (2000:1225). Nor is liability adjudged in the instance of a minor offence to be a trivial case. The police authority shall provide the necessary assistance for supervision.
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
Public information about radiation protection
One of the authority’s missions is to inform the society about radiation protection issues. An education centre was established in 2004, which teaches courses in the area of radiation protection.
The Ordinance ( 1988:293 ) on Radiation Protection
The Ordinance contains detailed provisions pursuant to authorisation under the Radiation Protection Act. It stipulates that the regulatory authority assigned by the Government may issue regulations regarding further provisions concerning general obligations, radioactive waste and prohibitions against activities with certain materials, etc.
The Ordinance on Radiation Protection also stipulates that certain provisions in the Act do not apply to very low-level radioactive materials and technical equipment emitting only low-level radiation (exemption). The regulatory authority may also issue regulations concerning the release of very low- level radioactive material.
E.2.2.3 SSM Regulations on Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection
With reference to its legal mandate, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM), issues legally binding safety and radiation protection regulations for nuclear facilities in its Code of Statutes SSMFS. SSM has reissued all earlier regulations previously issued by SKI and SSI in the SSMFS series. In the following, regulations with relevance to the safety and radiation protection at nuclear installations, as defined by the Convention, are addressed.
In addition, general advice on the interpretation of most of the safety regulations is issued. The general advice is not legally binding per se. Measures should be taken according to the general advice or, alternatively, methods justified to be equal from the safety point of view should be implemented. The regulations and the general advice, listed below, all entered into force on February 1, 2009.
SSM’s regulations also implement binding EU legislation and international obligations. In preparing SSM’s regulations, IAEA safety standards, international recommendations, industrial standards and norms, and the rule-making of other Swedish authorities are considered. The SSM regulations are issued according to an established management procedure which stipulates technical and legal reviews of the draft. In accordance with governmental rules, a review of the final draft by authorities, licensees, various stakeholders, and industrial and environmental organizations is performed.
Regulations and General Advice Concerning Safety in Certain Nuclear Facilities (SSMFS 2008:1)
These general regulations is primarily written to apply to nuclear power reactors but is applicable in a graded way on all licensed nuclear facilities, no matter size or type of facility, i.e. research or materials testing reactors, fuel fabrication plants, facilities for handling and storage of spent nuclear fuel and facilities for handling, storage or disposal of nuclear waste.
The regulations aim at specifying measures needed for preventing and mitigating radiological accidents, preventing illegal handling of nuclear material and nuclear
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
waste and for conducting an efficient supervision. The regulations cover the following areas:
- Application of multiple barriers and defence-in-depth
- Handling of detected deficiencies in barriers and the defence-in-depth
- Organisation, management and control of safety significant activities
- Actions and resources for maintaining and development of safety
- Physical protection and emergency preparedness
- Basic design principles
- Assessment, review and reporting of safety
- Operations of the facility
- On-site management of nuclear materials and waste
- Reporting to SSM of deficiencies, incidents and accidents
- Documentation and archiving of safety documentation
- Final closure and decommissioning
General recommendations on the interpretation of the requirements are issued for most of the requirements.
Regulations concerning Safety in connection with the Disposal of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Waste (SSMFS 2008:21)
These regulations, in force since 2002, contain specific requirements on design, construction, safety analysis and safety report for disposal facilities, in view of the period after closure of the facility. For the period before closure, the general safety regulations (SSMFS 2008:1) apply.
The regulations, concerning the long-term safety for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste, cover specifically:
- Qualitative requirements on the barrier system.
- Scenario definitions and classifications.
- Time scales for the safety assessment (as long as barrier functions are needed to isolate and/or to retard dispersion of radionuclides, but for at least 10 000 years).
- Topics to be covered in the safety report.
Regulations on exemption from the requirement on approval of contractors (SSMFS 2008:7)
The general rule is that a licensee cannot contract out an activity included in the nuclear licence without a permit by the Government or the SSM. For certain activities the permit procedure can be replaced by a notification to the regulatory body. SSM is to specify the prerequisites for such exemptions.
The regulations list activities that can be contracted out without a permit, e.g. building and construction work, decommissioning work, maintenance and inspection work, training, qualified expert tasks that cannot reasonably be done with own staff, and archiving of safety documentation. It is pointed out that the exempted activities shall only be parts of what has to be done under the licence and not all or major parts. Furthermore, exempted activities can not include security measures and activities for storage and disposal of nuclear material or waste.
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
Regulations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities (SSMFS 2008:12)
These regulations contain requirements on organisation of physical protection, clearance of staff, tasks for the security staff, central alarm station, perimeter protection, protection of buildings, protection of compartments vital for safety, access control for persons and vehicles, protection of control rooms, communication equipment, search for illegal items, handling of information about the physical protection and IT-security. Design details about the physical protection shall be reported in a secret attachment to the SAR of the facility.
Regulations and General Advice on the handling of Ashes Contaminated by Caesium-137 (SSMFS 2008:16)
These regulations are applicable for the production of energy by forest bio fuels in incineration facilities that produce a yearly volume of 30 tons of ashes or more. The regulations contain precautionary provisions regarding the handling of ashes for different options, such as returning the ashes to the forests for nutrition, spreading the ashes on agricultural and grazing lands for nutrition, reusing the ashes as road- or landfill and for the design of the waste disposal site if the ashes are deposited.
Regulations on the Planning Before and During Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities (SSMFS 2008:19)
These regulations contain provisions concerning decommissioning planning and other administrative measures, e.g. documentation before and during decommissioning and reporting to the regulatory authority at different stages of a facility’s life cycle.
Regulations on the Handling of Radioactive Waste and Nuclear Waste at Nuclear Facilities (SSMFS 2008:22)
These regulations contain provisions on predisposal management, e.g. on planning and quality assurance of radioactive waste management, on documentation and registration of radioactive wastes, and also for reporting to the SSM.
Regulations on the Protection of Human Health and the Environment from Discharges of Radioactive Substances from certain Nuclear Facilities (SSMFS 2008:23)
These regulations contain provisions for releases of radioactive substances from nuclear facilities during normal operation, based on optimization of radiation protection and shall be achieved by using the best available technique (BAT). The optimization of radiation protection shall include all facilities located within the same geographically delimited area. The effective dose to an individual in the critical group of one year of releases of radioactive substances to air and water from all facilities located in the same geographically delimited area shall not exceed 0.1 millisievert (mSv).
Regulations on Radiation Protection Manager at Nuclear Plants (SSMFS 2008:24)
According to these regulations a licence holder shall appoint a radiation protection manager at the facility in order to implement and look after radiation protection conditions issued by the authorities.
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
Regulations on Radiation Protection of Workers Exposed to Ionising Radiation at Nuclear Plants (SSMFS 2008:26)
These regulations contain provisions on limitation of exposures as far as reasonably achievable, social and economic factors taken into account. For this purpose the licence-holder shall ensure that goals and needed actions for control are established and documented and that needed resources are available.
Regulations and General Advice on the Protection of Human Health and the Environment in connection with the Final Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Nuclear Waste (SSMFS 2008:37)
These regulations apply to disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. They are not applicable for low-level nuclear waste landfills. The basic requirement is that human health and the environment shall be protected from detrimental effects of ionising radiation, during operation as well as after closure. Another important requirement is that impacts on human health and the environment outside Sweden’s borders may not be more severe than those accepted in Sweden. The regulations contain provisions on e.g. BAT and optimization, risk criterion and most exposed group, time periods for the risk analysis and, compliance demonstration for different time periods.
Regulations on Filing at Nuclear Plants (SSMFS 2008:38)
These regulations apply to the filing of documentation that is drawn up or received in connection with the operation of nuclear plants. Certain documentation has to be filed. If the practice ceases, the archives shall be transferred to the National Archives of Sweden.
Regulations on Clearance of Goods and Oil from Nuclear Facilities (SSMFS 2008:39)
These regulations contain provisions for clearance of contaminated goods and oil for unrestricted use or for disposal as conventional non-radioactive waste.
Regulations on Basic Provisions for the Protection of Workers and the Public in Connection with Work with Ionising Radiation (SSMFS 2008:51)
These regulations are general and apply to the exposure of workers and the public in both planned and emergency exposure situations. They are based on European provisions in the EU BSS
1
. They contain fundamental requirements on the licensee/operator for justification of the activities, optimisation of the radiation protection and limitation of individual doses (dose limits). They address the categorisation of workers and work places; stipulate Swedish dose limits for workers (including apprentices) and the public, and address the required information and protection of pregnant or breast-feeding women. The regulations address dose-limitation in connection with emergency exposure situations. They provide rules for measurements and registration of individual radiation doses and how these should be reported to the national dose register.
1
Council Directive 96/29/Euratom of 13 May 1996, laying down basic safety standards for the health protection of the general public and workers against the dangers of ionising radiation [O. J. L-159 of 29.06.1996].
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
82 They contain provisions on medical surveillance, classification and medical records of workers as well as on rules for the accreditation of laboratories for individual dose monitoring and performance requirements of individual dose meters. The regulations refer to the European technical recommendations for monitoring individuals exposed to external radiation (EUR 14852 EN, 1994).
Regulations on Outside Workers at Work with Ionising Radiation (SSMFS 2008:52)
These regulations apply to outside workers of category A, working within controlled areas in Sweden and when Swedish workers of category A perform similar tasks in other countries. The regulations put obligations on both the licensee (e.g. operator of a nuclear facility) and the outside workers undertaking. The regulations contain provisions on procedures to be followed by SSM for issuing individual radiological monitoring documents to outside workers in accordance with the EU Directive (90/641/Euratom).
Regulations on Radioactive Waste Not Associated with Nuclear Energy (SSMFS 2010:2)
These regulations apply to the handling of solid and liquid wastes from medical care, laboratories and science.
E.2.2.4 The Environmental Code
The objective of the Environmental Code is to promote a sustainable development and thereby ensure a healthy environment for current and future generations. The Code includes general provisions on environmental protection. The Code is nuclear activities and activities involving radiation and shall be applied in parallel with the Act on Nuclear Activities and the Radiation Protection Act. The Code is supplemented by a number of ordinances, which are laid down by the Government.
Definitions
In the Code environmentally hazardous activities are defined as:
- the discharge of wastewater, solid matter or gas from land, buildings or structures onto land or into water areas or groundwater;
- any use of land, buildings or structures that entails a risk detrimental to human health or the environment due to discharges or emissions other than those referred to in above bullet or to pollution of land, air, water areas or groundwater; or
- any use of land, buildings or structures that may be detrimental to the surroundings due to noise, vibration, light, ionising or non-ionising radiation or similar impacts.
General rules of consideration
The general rules of consideration assert some important principles that the implementer has to comply with, e.g.:
- The knowledge-principle means that the implementer must possess the knowledge that is necessary regarding the nature and scope of the activity to protect human health and the environment against damage or detriment.
- The precautionary and the BAT principles mean that the implementer shall put
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
into practice protective measures, comply with restrictions, and take any other precautions that are necessary in order to prevent, hinder or combat damage, or detriment to human health, or the environment as a result of the activity. For the same reason, the best available technology shall be used in connection with professional activities
- The most suitable site-principle means that activities for which land or water areas are used, a suitable site shall be selected taking into account the goals of the Environmental Code. Sites for activities shall always be chosen in such a way as to make it possible to achieve their purpose with a minimum of damage or detriment to human health and the environment.
- The after-treatment liability-principle means that everyone who has pursued an activity that causes damage or is detrimental to the environment shall be responsible, for restoring it to the extent deemed reasonable. The person who is liable for after-treatment shall carry out, or pay for, any after-treatment measures necessary. The general rules of consideration operate as a preventive tool, and to the principle that the risks of environmental impact should be borne by the polluter and not by the environment.
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
The Swedish EIA legislation is in accordance with the Council Directive 85/337/ EEC of 27 June 1985, amended by Council Directive 97/11/EC of 3 March and by Directive 2003/35/EC of 26 May 2003, on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment. An EIA shall be submitted together with an application for a permit for environmentally hazardous activities. An EIA shall also be submitted at the prospect of the decommissioning of nuclear facilities.
The purpose of an EIA is to establish and describe the direct and indirect impacts of a planned activity, or measure, on people, animals, plants, land, water, the air, the climate, the landscape and the cultural environment, on the management of land, water and the physical environment in general, and on the management of materials, raw materials and energy. Another purpose is to enable an overall assessment to be made of this impact on human health and the environment.
An environmental impact statement shall contain the following information:
- a description of the activity or measure including details of its location, design and scope;
- a description of the measures being planned with a view to avoiding, mitigating or remedying adverse effects, for example action to prevent the activity or measure leading to an infringement of an environmental quality standard;
- the information that is needed to establish and assess the main impact on human health, the environment and management of land, water and other resources that the activity or measure is likely to have;
- a description of possible alternative sites and alternative designs, together with a statement of the reasons why a specific alternative was chosen and a description of the consequences if the activity or measure is not implemented; and
- a non-technical summary of the information.
Local consultation
In the EIA process the implementer shall consult the county administrative board at an early stage. They shall also consult private individuals who are likely to be
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
84 affected by the planned activity, and must do so in good time and to an appropriate extent before submitting an application for a permit and preparing the environmental impact statement. Prior to consultation, the implementer shall submit information about the location, extent, and nature of the planned activity and its anticipated environmental impact to the county administrative board and to any private individuals affected.
If the county administrative board decides that the activity or measure is likely to have a significant environmental impact, an environmental impact assessment procedure shall be performed. In such a procedure the person who intends to undertake the activity or measure shall consult the other government agencies, the municipalities, the citizens and the organisations that are likely to be affected. The consultation shall relate to the location, scope, design and environmental impact of the activity or measure and the content and structure of the environmental impact statement.
Consultation with other countries
If an activity is likely to have a significant environmental impact in another country, the responsible authority as designated by the Government shall inform the responsible authority in that country about the planned activity. This is to give the country concerned and the citizens who are affected the opportunity to take part in a consultation procedure concerning the application and the environmental impact assessment. Such information shall also be supplied when another country that is likely to be exposed to a significant environmental impact so requests.
Licensing and licensing conditions
According to the Environmental Code, a permit is required for environmentally hazardous activities. The Government has in the Ordinance (1998:899) on Environmentally Hazardous Activities and Health Protection stipulated that facilities for the treatment, storage or disposal of spent fuel, nuclear waste or radioactive waste need a permit. A permit is also needed for the decommissioning of nuclear reactors.
The Environmental Court is the first instance for the hearing of cases concerning such activities. In addition the Government has to consider the permissibility of nuclear activities, e.g. the disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
The Environmental Court’s judgement when granting a permit for an activity may include provisions concerning supervision, inspections and checks, safety and technical design of the activity and conditions that are necessary to prevent or limit any harmful or other detrimental impact.
Supervision
The purpose of supervision shall be to ensure compliance with the objectives of this Code and rules issued in pursuance thereof. For this purpose the supervisory authority shall supervise compliance with the provisions of the Environmental Code and rules, judgements and other decisions issued in pursuance thereof and take any measures that are necessary to ensure that faults are corrected. The SSM supervise radiation safety issues under the Code.
Sanctions
The supervisory authority may issue any injunctions and prohibitions that are necessary in individual cases to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Environmental Code and rules, judgements and other decisions issued in pursuance thereof.
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
E.2.2.5 The Act ( 2006:647 ) on Financial Measures for the Management
of Residual Products from Nuclear Activities
The Swedish Parliament has decided on a revised legislation for the financing of the license-holders general obligation according to the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities. The Act (1992:1537) on the Financing of Future Expenses on Spent Nuclear Fuel etc. is replaced since January 1 2008 by the Act (2006:647) on Financial Measures for the Management of Residual Products from Nuclear Activities. The general obligations stated in the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities are applicable on all nuclear activities that require a license and the reasoning behind the new Financing Act is that all licensees should secure the financing of these obligations. The primary purpose of the Swedish financing system is to secure the financing of the licensees’ costs to handle and dispose the residual products, decommission and dismantle the nuclear facilities and to carry out the needed research and development activities, but also to minimise the State’s risk of being forced to bear the costs which is considered to be the licensee’s liability. The revised legislation is in essential parts the same for all licensees and is binding until the obligations stated in the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities have been fulfilled or exemption from them has been granted.
Definitions
The definitions of nuclear facility, nuclear reactor, nuclear material and nuclear waste are those according to the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities. For the purpose of the act:
Residual product is defined as:
- nuclear materials that will not be used again
- nuclear waste which is not operational waste
Nuclear waste fee is defined as the fee for:
- the licensees costs for safe handling and disposal of residual products,
- the licensees costs for safe decommissioning and dismantling of nuclear facilities,
- the licensees costs for research and development needed for these activities,
- the State’s costs for research and development needed to review these measures,
- the State’s costs for administration of funded means and review of measures taken according to the financing act,
- the State’s costs for supervision of safe decommissioning and dismantling of nuclear facilities,
- the State’s costs for review of issues relating to disposal ,and surveillance and control of a disposal,
- the licensees, States’ and municipalities costs for information to the public concerning handling and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste,
- the costs for economical support to non-profit-making organisations for efforts in connection to the siting of facilities for handling and disposal of spent nuclear fuel.
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
Obligation to pay the nuclear waste fee and provide guarantees
The licensee of a nuclear facility which generate or has generated residual products shall pay a nuclear waste fee. The fee shall cover the licensee’s share of the total costs. The licensee of a nuclear power reactor must pay a nuclear waste fee. For other licensees there is a possibility to allow exemption to the obligation to pay a nuclear waste fee if the licensee provides a guarantee to cover its costs. In addition to the obligation to pay a nuclear waste fee, the licensees shall also provide guarantees. The purpose of the guarantees is to ensure adequate reserves for future financing if funded means should be proven inadequate. The obligation to pay the nuclear waste fee and provide guarantees will end when the licensee have accomplished its obligations according to the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities or been given deliverance from them.
Administration of funds
The fees are collected in a fund, the Nuclear Waste Fund. The Nuclear Waste Fund is an external and governmentally controlled and administered fund.
The financial risk of the State
If it is needed, to serve the purpose of this Act, the financial risk of the State shall be established.
Obligation to pay a risk fee
If a financial risk has been established a risk fee may, in addition to the obligation to pay the nuclear waste fee, be imposed on the licensee. The risk fee shall not be set higher than what is necessary to protect the State from its financial risk.
Usage of funds and guarantees
The accumulated funds shall be used solely to reimburse for the costs which the nuclear waste fee is intended to cover. If the Nuclear Waste Fund is proven inadequate the guarantees shall be used to cover the costs. If Fund assets remain for a fee-liable licensee after all costs relating to that specific licensee have been paid, the excess of funds shall be paid back to the licensee or the payer.
Supervision
A licensee is obligated to submit cost estimates and other information which might be required to fulfill the purpose of the financing act.
Sanctions
A licensee who intentionally or with grave negligence disregards its obligations by submitting incorrect information will be ordered to pay a fine, unless the action is punishable under the Penal Code.
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
The Ordinance ( 2008:715 ) on Financial Measures for the Management of Residual Products from Nuclear Activities
Cost estimates
The legislation requires the licensees to submit, every three years, estimates of all future costs for management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste, and decommissioning. The licensee of a nuclear power reactor shall base their costs estimates on 40 years of operation with a minimum remaining operating time of 6 years. The licensee of a nuclear facility other than a nuclear power reactor shall base their cost estimates on the expected remaining period of operation.
The cost estimates are submitted to SSM where they are reviewed. SSM shall for each of the reactor licensees prepares a proposal of the nuclear waste fee the reactor licensee shall pay the following three calendar years.
SSM shall prepare the proposal:
- based on the cost estimates,
- taking into account the total added cost
2
, and
- so that all expected costs, after taking into account what has already been paid, is expected to be covered by the fees that the reactor licensee will pay during the remaining operating period of the reactor.
SSM may order a license holder, if there are special reasons, to submit a cost estimate earlier than within three years or to submit an additional cost estimate. If a supplementary cost estimate has been submitted or if there are special reasons for doing so, the SSM may propose nuclear waste fees for a period of less than three years. For licensees of a nuclear facility other than a reactor the SSM may decide on nuclear waste fees for a period of less than three years.
Guarantees
In addition to pay a fee on nuclear energy generation to the Nuclear Waste Fund the nuclear power reactor licensees must provide two forms of guarantees. One guarantee shall cover the discrepancy between funded means and estimated costs. The other type of guarantee shall cover unforeseen contingencies and be available until all reactors have been decommissioned and all nuclear waste has been disposed of in a disposal facility. This guarantee will be used if expenses for future costs become higher than expected, if these expenses have to be met earlier than expected, or if the actual amount in the fund is lower than estimated. Also the licensee of nuclear facilities other than nuclear power reactors shall provide a guarantee to cover the discrepancy between accumulated funds and estimated costs.
Management of fees
The assets in the Nuclear Waste Fund shall be managed to ensure a good return and satisfactory liquidity. The Nuclear Waste Fund’s assets shall be deposited in an interest-bearing account at the National Debt Office, in treasury bills issued by the state or in covered bonds. The return on the fund’s assets shall be added to the capital.
2
The added costs are the cost of the State, municipalities and non-profit organisations.
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
Risk assessment and risk fee
The Swedish National Debt Office shall every three years establish the State’s credit risk for the provided guarantees. The National Debt Office may decide that a licensee of a nuclear power reactor shall pay a risk fee corresponding to the State’s credit risk if the credit rating of the provided guarantees is assessed to be below the recommended level. The risk fee shall be paid to the Swedish National Debt Office.
Disbursements to licensees
The licensees are entitled to disbursements, on a continuous basis, for expenses which they have already incurred for measures to achieve the decommissioning, handling and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste, including the research needed for these activities. The remainder of the funds is accumulated for future needs. The financial resources should only be used for the purpose they have been established and managed.
Disbursement to municipalities
Municipalities where there are site investigations of the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, or where a facility for such a disposal facility is planned or being built, are entitled to compensation from the Nuclear Waste Fund for their information to the public. Disbursements may be determined to no more than 5 million per municipality and twelve-month period. Currently the municipalities of Östhammar and Oskarshamn are receiving disbursements from the Nuclear Waste Fund
Disbursement to non-profit-making organisations
According to the Government’s bill (2003/04:116) the issue of disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste is one of the most complex issues in our time where science and technology meets social science and humanistic issues. The bill concludes that the complexity of the issue requires comprehensive evaluation as a basis for future decisions involving all stakeholders in the society. In 2004 the Parliament therefore approved new regulations in the Financing Act, which made it possible for non- profit-making organisations to apply for financing.
To get financing the non-profit-making organisations must have at least 1000 members, a democratically elected board and a charter of the association, which is decided by the associations’ assembly. Support may be provided with a total amount of 3 million SEK per calendar year and with a maximum of SEK 2.5 million per organisation and calendar year.
The non-profit-making organizations are entitled to financial support from the Nuclear Waste Fund until 12 months after the Environmental Impact Assessment has been announced by the Environmental Court.
Supervision of the overall system
The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority reviews the cost estimates according to the Act (2006:647) on Financial Measures for the Management of Residual Products from Nuclear Activities. The Government sets the fees and guarantees for the licensees of nuclear power reactors. The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority sets fees and guarantees for the licensees of nuclear facilities other than nuclear power reactors.
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
The Swedish Nuclear Waste Fund (former known as the Board of the Swedish Nuclear Waste Fund) administrates and manages the collected fees.
The Swedish National Debt Office administrates and manages the guarantees. The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority decides on the disbursement of funds to the nuclear licensees, the municipalities and the non-profit-making organisations. However, certain minor amounts are decided by the Government. Furthermore, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority is responsible to control that the nuclear utilities have made their payments to the Fund and also to audit the disbursements.
E.2.2.6 The Act ( 1988:1597 ) on Financing of Certain Radioactive Waste
etc. (the Studsvik Act)
As of 1989, a special fee has been levied on the nuclear power utilities according to a special law, the Act (1988:1597) on Financing of Certain Radioactive Waste etc. This fee is intended to cover expenses for the management of nuclear waste from older experimental facilities.
In conjunction with the decision by the Swedish Parliament on new legislation for the financing of the license-holders general obligation according to the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities, the Parliament also decided that the Studsvik Act should be cancelled by December 31, 2009. During the reassessment of the fee level in 2008 it became evident that remaining year of payments into the fund would not be sufficient to cover estimated costs. Therefor the Government decided to prolong the time period for contributions to the fund according to the Studsvik Act to January 1, 2012.
In 2009 the Government commissioned SSM to investigate future costs, uncertainties and responsibilities, and to evaluate in-depth the problems and financial risks that may arise if the Studsvik Act (1988:1597) was to expire on 1 January 2012. The mission also included, if the SSM found it appropriate, to propose constitutional amendments.
SSM submitted its report to Government in March 2010. The SSM assessment resulted in the conclusion that the combined impacts of the uncertainties, that have been identified, are expected to lead to a future need of funds higher than indicated in the current cost estimates. Furthermore, if the contributions to the fund according to the Studsvik Act would cease, the economic risk of the state would increase. The assessment of SSM is that the Studsvik Act should remain in force until further notice. If payments under this Act are to cease, the quality of the cost estimates must improve significantly.
In June 2011 the Parliament approved a Government Bill (2010/2011:126) containing a proposal to extend the obligation to pay fees under the Studsvik Act until December 31, 2017. The reformed legislation will enter into force on 1 January 2012.
Obligation to pay a fee according to the Studsvik Act
A fee shall be paid to the State as a contribution to costs of the following measures:
- decontamination and decommissioning of the research reactors R2 and R2-0 in Studsvik and associated buildings,
- decontamination and decommissioning of the district heating nuclear power reactor in Ågesta,
- decontamination and decommissioning of the central active laboratory (ACL
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
& ACF), hot cell laboratory (HCL), van der Graaf laboratory, incinerator facility (HA), treatment facility for intermediate level waste (HM), storage facility (FA), storage facility for intermediate level waste (rock cavity) (AM), dry storage facility for solid intermediate waste (AT), facility for liquid waste treatment (TS), waste storage facility (AU), waste storage facility (UF), waste storage facility (AS 1-4), waste storage facility (UA) and evaporation facility (ID)
- management and disposal of nuclear waste, nuclear and other radioactive waste which has been generated by 30 June 1991 as a result of nuclear activities or stored at the nuclear facilities referred to above,
- management and disposal of nuclear fuel from research reactor R1 in Stockholm and district heating nuclear power reactor in Ågesta and the fuel elements from research reactor R2 in Studsvik on 30 June 1991, there were adjacent to the reactor,
- restoration of the plant in Ranstad a result of past conducted nuclear activities, and
- radiation protection measures which by law is necessary as a result of the activities referred to above.
Licensee who operates a nuclear reactor is liable to pay a fee according to the Studsvik Act. The fee is 0.003 SEK per kWh of electricity generated by nuclear power. The fees are collected in a fund, the Studsvik Fund. The Nuclear Waste Fund administers the Studsvik Fund and the fund is managed together with the funds accumulated according to the Financing Act.
Cost estimates
An entity who is licensed under the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities to the activities governed by this law - or with the consent of SSM other entity - shall submit an estimate of the costs. The estimated costs shall include both an estimate of the costs of all the measures that can be considered to be necessary, and a breakdown of the costs of the action to be taken within the next three years. The cost estimate shall be updated annually and submitted to SSM annually.
Disbursements
Fee paid under this Act may only be used to reimburse costs for activities listed. The remainder of the funds is accumulated for future needs. The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority decides on the disbursement of funds. If there are any excess of funds as the last activity is completed, the surplus Studsvik fees in the Fund go to the state.
Supervision and Sanctions
The licensee of a nuclear power reactor and the licensee obligated to estimates costs shall at the request of SSM provide the information and the documents necessary for SSMs activities under this Act.
A licensee who intentionally or negligently provides incorrect information or otherwise act contrary to their obligations will be ordered to pay a fine, unless the act is punishable under the Penal Code.
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
E.2.2.7 Other Relevant Acts
The Act ( 2000:1064 ) on the Control of Dual-use Items and Technical assistance
The export of nuclear material and equipment is governed by the Act on the Control of Export of Dual- use Products and Technical Assistance, as well as by Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items. (See also information under Article 27, Section I.1.1)
The Civil Protection Act ( 2003:778 )
The Civil Protection Act contains provisions as to how the community rescue services shall be organised and operated. According to the act, the County Administrative Board is responsible for the rescue operations in cases where the public needs protection from a radioactive release from a nuclear installation or in cases where such release seems imminent. The Act also stipulates that a rescue commander with a specified competence, with far-reaching authority, is to be engaged for all rescue operations. In addition the Act requires the owner of hazardous installations to take measures necessary to minimise any harm to the public or environment if an accident were to occur in the installation.
The Civil Protection Ordinance (2003:779) contains general provisions concerning emergency planning. The County Administrative Board is obliged to make a radiological emergency response plan. The Swedish Rescue Services is responsible, at the national level, for the co-ordination and supervision of the preparedness for the rescue services response to radioactive release. The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority decides on necessary measures for the nuclear installations.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act ( 1977:1160 )
The Occupational Safety and Health Act contain requirements about the work environment and provisions on protection from accidents caused by technical equipment, dangerous materials or other work conditions. The Act also contains detailed rules concerning responsibility and authority with respect to occupational safety issues.
The Act on Transportation of Hazardous goods (206:263)
The Act concerning the Transportation of Hazardous goods and the Ordinance (2006:311) on the Transportation of Hazardous goods contains provisions in order to prevent, hinder and limit the damage caused by transport of dangerous goods.
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
E 2.3 national Safety Requirements and Regulations
This section describes the legislative and regulatory system that has been established in Sweden comprising a system for licensing, the possibility to revoke a licence, prohibit activities, institutional control, regulatory inspection, documentation and reporting, enforcement of regulations, the terms of a licence and the clear allocation of responsibilities of the bodies involved.
E.2.3.1 Licensing
This section describes the licensing system for the treatment and disposal of spent fuel, radioactive waste, very low radioactive waste and non-nuclear radioactive waste. In this context the system of release is also mentioned.
Facilities for the management and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste
General
The licensing is issued in accordance to several acts with different purposes and involves a number of authorities. A general permissibility consideration has to be made as to whether to grant a permit for the activity or not. Furthermore the activity shall be approved according to aspects of radiation safety, and the protection of human health and the environment. Finally licensing conditions are set up according to the various acts by the responsible authorities.
An important instrument during the licensing process is the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Early consultation with private individuals likely to be affected, and with government agencies, the municipalities, and the organisations concerned, is emphasised in the Swedish EIA legislation. The consultations shall relate to the location, scope, design and the environmental impact of the activity and to the content and structure of the environmental impact statement (EIS). If an activity or measure is likely to have a significant environmental impact in another country, the responsible authority designated by the Government shall inform the responsible authority in that country about the planned activity or measure and give the country concerned and the citizens who are affected the opportunity to take part in a consultation procedure concerning the application and the environmental impact assessment.
Permissibility
According to the Environmental Code (1998:808) the Government shall consider the permissibility of certain activities such as interim storage or the disposal of spent fuel or waste. An environmental impact statement shall be submitted for the permissibility assessment. The Environmental Court reviews an application on permissibility, which thereafter is handed over to the Government for the final consideration.
According to the Environmental Code the Government may decide on the permissibility only if the concerned Municipality Council agrees that the activities may be located in the municipality (municipal veto). But without prejudice to the municipal approval the Government may permit an activity that involves interim storage or disposal of spent fuel or waste, if the activity is of the utmost importance with regard to the national interest. However, this shall not apply where another site is considered to be more appropriate for the activity, or if an appropriate site has been designated for the activity in another municipality that is likely to approve the activity.
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
Licensing approval
If the Government grants permissibility according, licensing approval has to be issued for the nuclear activity according to the Act on Nuclear Activities and the environmentally hazardous activity according to the Environmental Code. The Government (or the authority appointed by the Government) grants a licence. in accordance with the Act on Nuclear Activities. The application is reviewed by the regulatory authority assigned by the Government and thereafter handed over for the Government’s decision. A permit under the Radiation Protection Act is not required for activities covered by the Act. Finally the Environmental Court grants the licence on environmentally hazardous activities according to the Environmental Code.
Coordination
prepares and submits an application for a licence under the Nuclear Activities Act for the final repository and an application for a permit under the Environmental Code for the final repository system
SKB
- processes the application under the Environmental Code and holds a main hearing
- assesses the application under the Environmental Code (results in a statement of comment)
The Environmental Court
processes the licence application under the Nuclear Activities Act for the final repository and the encapsulation plant/Clab and submits its statement to the Government
SSM
prepares a detailed development plan under the Planning and Building Act
The municipality
grants a licence under the Nuclear Activities Act for the final repository and the encapsulation plant/Clab
declares the final repository system permissible under the Environmental Code
The Government
the municipal council adopts the detailed development plan for land use
Municipality
- holds a new main hearing (if necessary)
- grants a permit and issues conditions under the Environmental Code
The Environmental Court
issue conditions under the Nuclear Activities Act and the Radiation Protection Act in stages
SSM
grants a building permit
The municipality
applies for a building permit
SKB
initiates planning on the part of the municipality
SKB
the municipal council supports or rejects the activities
Municipality
prepares and submits an application for a licence under the Nuclear Activities Act for the encapsulation plant and Clab
SKB
Figure E1: Licensing procedure for the KBS-3 system as presented in RD&D-programme 2007.
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
Shallow land burials
General
Shallow land burial for very low-level radioactive waste from nuclear activities, is used in Sweden (the highest accepted level according to the legislation is 10 TBq, of which a maximum of 10 GBq may consist of alpha-active substances). The licensing procedures for such a disposal facility differ from the disposal for spent fuel, in so much as there is no need for a Governmental permissibility consideration: it is sufficient with approval from the responsible authorities.
Licensing approvals
In the Act on Nuclear Activities shallow land burial for very low-level radioactive waste is defined as nuclear activity and consequently has to be licensed according to that act. The regulatory authority assigned by the Government grants licences for shallow land burials according to the Act on Nuclear Activities. Furthermore, a shallow land burial is defined as an environmentally hazardous activity and has to be approved in accordance to the Environmental Code by the Environmental Court.
Licensing conditions
Licensing conditions can be issued under the Act on Nuclear Activities, the Radiation Protection Act and the Environmental Code. This means that the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority and the Environmental Court can issue the conditions necessary from specific aspects concerning nuclear safety, radiation protection and environmental protection respectively. The conditions could be issued in connection with such approvals or during the period of validity of the permits.
Radioactive waste from medical use, research and industry
For radioactive waste from medical use, research and industry a licence is required according to the Radiation Protection Act and the Environmental Code.
Release
Release of nuclear materials or nuclear waste must be in accordance with the Act on Nuclear Activities as well as with the Radiation Protection Act, and approved by the regulatory authority. Material may be cleared for unrestricted use, or for disposal as conventional non-radioactive waste. A licence according to the Environmental Code, as is applicable for non-radioactive waste, may be needed if material that has been ”cleared” is to be disposed of as non-radioactive waste.
E.2.3.2 Prohibition
It is prohibited to carry out nuclear activities or activities involving radiation without a permit. Any person who deliberately, or through negligence, operates an activity without the necessary permits shall be fined or sentenced to not more than two years imprisonment. The same penalty (for unauthorised environmental activity) applies according to the Environmental Code.
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
E.2.3.3 Institutional control, regulatory inspection and documentation
and reporting
Institutional control
According to regulations on radiation protection
3
the licence-holder shall conduct
environmental monitoring. All discharges from facilities for storage or disposal of radioactive waste shall be monitored by a nuclide specific measuring programme. The dose to any individual in the critical group shall not exceed 0.1 mSv/y. The regulations are applicable to facilities in operation, but will be amended in due time to deal with the period following closure of a disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.
The regulatory authority has also issued conditions regarding institutional control of existing shallow land disposal facilities. The regulations stipulate that institutional control shall continue until the radioactivity no longer is a ”significant” hazard to public health and the environment. The municipalities’ detailed development plans are also of importance, by providing conditions concerning the use of the land. All nuclear facilities, including shallow land disposals are within areas where detailed development plans have been established.
Regulatory inspection
In accordance with legal authorisation and the mandate defined by the Government
4
, the regulatory authority conduct regular inspections and assess-
ments of the Swedish nuclear facilities to ascertain compliance with regulations and licence conditions.
The supervision of the compliance with the Act on Nuclear Activities and the Radiation Protection Act, as well as conditions or regulations imposed under the acts, is executed by the regulatory authority assigned by the Government, which is SSM. SSM also fulfils supervision of the compliance with the Environmental Code and conditions or regulations imposed by the Code for questions concerning radiation safety. For other areas covered by the Code the County Administrative Board conduct supervision.
On request the implementer shall submit to the authority information and provide the documentation required for its supervision. The authority shall also be given access to the installation or site where the activities are conducted, for investigations and sampling, to the extent required for supervision (see also sections E.2.2.1 and E.2.2.2).
3
Regulations on the Protection of Human Health and the Environment from Discharges of Radioactive Substances from certain Nuclear Facilities (SSMFS 2008:23)
4
Ordinance ( 2008:715 ) on Financial Measures for the Management of Residual Products from Nuclear Activities.
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
SSM practices
SSM has since the authority was established developed its supervision methods in several projects. A first phase was completed at the end of 2009. Policies for inspections and new routines, as part of the general SSM management system, were gradually established during 2009. In a second phase, which started during 2010, harmonization between procedures in different supervision areas, as well as further development of the supervision procedures will take place. The following list exemplifies (not complete) relevant documents from the SSM management system:
1. Supervision policy 2010-08-24
2. To inspect 2009-09-21
3. To conduct minor inspections 2009-09-21
4. Access rules to facility’s under the authority’s supervision 2009-05-19
5. Integrated safety assessments 2009-12-11
6. Sanctions related to the SSM supervision and control 2009-05-25
7. To control nuclear power plant environmental 2010-01-14 monitoring programme
The following describes the SSM supervision practice (for nuclear installations) during 2008 and 2009, after the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority was established.
In total 17 areas are defined for which the corresponding requirements are found in regulations, licensing conditions and to some extent in regulatory decisions. The ambition is to successively cover these areas in a basic inspection programme and to document the inspection findings. Moreover, the same 17 areas are used in the annual assessments of the licensees (SSM integrated safety assessments, see below) as well as in the periodic, 10-year safety reviews. Like this, the SSM is able to maintain a systematic picture of the safety situation and to monitor the development. When new assessments start, already performed and documented assessments of the areas can be consulted and any emerging picture be consolidated. The idea is to use the regulatory information and knowledge in a more efficient way. In order to further guide inspections and safety assessments there is also a sub-structure in each of the 17 areas. The used areas are:
1. Design and construction of facilities, including modifications
2. Organisation, management and control of the nuclear activity
3. Competence and staffing of the nuclear activity
4. Operations, including handling of deficiencies in barriers and the defence-in-depth
5. Core and fuel issues and criticality issues
6. Emergency preparedness
7. Maintenance, including materials- and control issues with special consideration of degradation due to ageing
8. Primary and independent safety review, including the quality of notifications to SSM
9. Investigation of events, experience feedback and external reporting 10. Physical protection 11. Safety analyses and safety analysis report 12. Safety programme
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
13. Archiving, handling of plant documentation 14. Management of nuclear material and radioactive waste 15. Nuclear non-proliferation, exports control and transport safety 16. On-site radiation protection 17. Radiation protection of general public and the environment
As a result of assessments within these areas, safety conclusions can be drawn in terms of the integrity of the physical barriers and the functioning of the five levels of the defence-in-depth. In the regulations SSMFS 2008:1 the areas 1-15 are found in the general advice section (section 4, 4 §) on periodic reviews of the nuclear safety. The licensees are encouraged to analyze and report on their activities according to these areas. The added areas 16 and 17 cover issues regulated by the Radiation Protection Act (SFS 1988:220).
Documentation and reporting
According to the annual letters of appropriation, government decisions, acts and ordinances, regulatory authorities are required to submit the following reports concerning regulatory activities to the Government on a regular basis:
- In an Annual Activity Report, the authority is required to summarise results, effects and costs of the regulatory activities, in accordance with general regulations issued by the Government and the Swedish National Audit Office for such annual reports issued by all government authorities.
- An annual Report on the Status of Safety and Radiation Protection at the Swedish nuclear power plants. The central interim storage for spent nuclear fuel (Clab) and the disposal facility for operational waste (SFR) are included in the report. The report summarises important findings and conclusions from operational experience and regulatory inspections and reviews, both with regard to the technical safety status of the plants and the quality of the safety work at the plants, as well as on occupational and environmental doses and other radiological data.
- At least once in every ten years, licensees are required to perform a periodic safety review (PSR), i.e. an integrated analysis and assessment of the safety of a facility. The periodic safety reviews are submitted to the regulatory authority, which makes a comprehensive review and assessment of the submitted review and its references, which is documented in a review report. In the case of nuclear power reactors, the report is submitted to the Government.
- Every three years, the regulatory authority is required to submit a Review
Report on the Nuclear Industry Research, Development and Demonstration Programme on Disposal of Spent Fuel and Nuclear Waste and the Dismantling and Decommissioning of Nuclear Installations (the SKB RD&D-programme), to the Government. In addition to the findings, conclusions and recommendations as to the purposefulness and quality of the programme, the review report also proposes conditions for the future conduct of the SKB RD&Dprogramme that the Government may wish to prescribe in accordance with the Act on Nuclear Activities.
- Every three years, the regulatory authority appointed by the Government is required to submit a proposal for the nuclear waste fees to be paid by the licensees of nuclear power reactors to cover the costs for the disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste and the dismantling and decommissioning of nuclear
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
installations. The regulatory authority also includes a review report on the cost estimates provided by the licensees.
- The regulatory authority assigned by the Government shall on an annual basis report to the Government on the licences granted concerning export, import or the transit of nuclear waste and the erection, possession or operation of shallow land burial sites.
- The regulatory authority, also issues reports to a number of organisations, such as UNSCEAR, OECD, IAEA, etc. on a regular basis, in agreement with international conventions. The major part of that reporting is within the environmental radiation protection area but some parts also consider occupational radiation protection.
In addition to the above-mentioned reports, the regulatory authority also issues periodic reports to inform the public of major activities.
The regulatory authority also issues reports where R&D results and important regulatory assessments are published. All reports published by the regulatory authority are open to the media and the public.
E.2.3.4 Enforcement of regulations and terms of licences
The authorities have extensive legal regulatory and enforcement power. As described in section E.2.3.2 concerning prohibition, a licence may be revoked for activities that do not fulfil the obligations set out in the legislation. If there is an on-going licensed activity that does not comply with regulations or terms of the licence, the supervisory authorities may issue any injunctions and prohibitions required in the specific case to ensure compliance. Injunctions or prohibitions under the Acts may carry contingent fines.
If a person fails to carry out a measure incumbent upon him under the Acts, Ordinances, regulations or conditions issued pursuant to the Acts, or under the supervisory authority’s injunction, the authority may arrange for the measure to be taken at his expense.
E.2.3.5 Clear allocations of responsibilities of the bodies involved
The Swedish legal framework allocates a clear division of responsibilities between the bodies involved. As already mentioned, the producer of spent fuel and radioactive waste has the responsibility to safely handle and dispose of the waste produced. All necessary measures and precautions should be taken by the waste producer. The authorities independently supervise, regulate and review existing or planned activities with spent fuel and radioactive waste.
The ultimate responsibility for ensuring the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste rests with the State. According to a Government statement, the ultimate responsibility of the State ”is a matter of course” and does not need to be implemented in the legislation.
E.2.4 Conclusion
Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 19.
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
E.3 Article 20: REGULATORY BODY
1. Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate a regulatory body entrusted with the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework referred to in Article 19, and provided with adequate authority, competence and financial and human resources to fulfil its assigned responsibilities.
2. Each Contracting Party, in accordance with its legislative and regulatory framework, shall take the appropriate steps to ensure the effective independence of the regulatory functions from other functions where organizations are involved in both spent fuel or radioactive waste management and in their regulation
Summary of developments since the last national report
- The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) was formed in July 2008 in a merger between the Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) and the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority (SSI).
- The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) was formed in January 2009 in a merger between the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (KBM) and the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRV).
- SSM competence needs were investigated and reported to the Government in
March 2011.
- Increase in SSM staff since 2009 with about 10 % (274 as compared to 246).
E.3.1 Regulatory bodies and their mandates
E.3.1.1 General
The legal basis for the regulatory activities in Sweden is given in a number of legal documents of various types: laws, governmental ordinances, annual government letters of appropriation, and specific governmental decisions, including specific licensing decisions. Through government ordinances and specific decisions, the Government delegates to the regulatory body specific parts of the legal authority given to the Government by the Parliament through legislation.
The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) is a central administrative authority under the auspices of the Ministry of the Environment. SSM is the regulatory body in Sweden authorized to supervise spent fuel management and radioactive waste management according to the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities (SFS 1984:3) and the Radiation Protection Act (SFS 1988:220). According to the Swedish constitution, the administrative authorities are quite independent within the legislation and statutes given by the Government. An individual minister cannot interfere in a specific case handled by an administrative authority.
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
100 The Government ministries are small units, by comparison with ministries in most other countries. Their main responsibilities are: (1) Preparing the Government’s bills to Parliament on budget appropriations and laws; (2) Issuing laws and regulations and general rules for the administrative authorities; (3) International relations; (4) Appointment of higher officials in the administration; and (5) Certain appeals from individuals which are addressed to the Government. The Cabinet of ministers as a whole is responsible for all governmental decisions. Although in practice a large number of routine matters are decided upon by individual ministers, and only formally confirmed by the Government, the principle of collective responsibility is reflected in all forms of governmental work. The Director General of the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority is appointed by the Government, normally for a period of six years. As all Swedish authorities, the SSM issues an annual activity report to the Government summarizing major results, effects, revenues and costs. The Government carries out follow-up work and evaluates the agency’s operations based on this report. In addition, the SSM submits an annual report to the Government on the status and management of nuclear safety and radiation protection at the Swedish nuclear plants. The report summarizes major findings and conclusions on operational experience, regulatory inspections and reviews: technical safety status, radiation protection work, environmental impact, waste management, emergency preparedness as well as organizational matters, safety culture, physical protection and safeguards. The requirements on SSM and other Swedish authorities for openness and provision of information services to the public, politicians and media are very high. Swedish official documents are public unless a decision is made to classify them according to the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act (SFS 2009:400). The reasons for secrecy could be those of national security, international relations, commercial relations, or the individual right to privacy. No-one needs to justify a wish to see a public document or to reveal her/his identity to have access to a document.
E.3.1.2 The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM)
SSM was established on July 1, 2008, and is the national regulatory authority responsibility within the areas of nuclear safety, radiation protection and nuclear non-proliferation.
The SSM missions and tasks are defined in the Ordinance (SFS 2008:452) with instruction for the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority and in the annual letter of appropriation. The Ordinance declares that SSM is the administrative authority for protection of people and the environment against harmful effects of ionising and non-ionising radiation, for issues on nuclear safety including physical protection in nuclear technology activities as well as in other activities involving radiation, and for issues regarding non-proliferation.
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
SSM shall actively and preventively work for high levels of nuclear safety and radiation protection in the society and through its activities act to: (1) Prevent radiological accidents and ensure safe operations and safe waste ma-
nagement at the nuclear facilities; (2) Minimize risks and optimise the effects of radiation in medical applications; (3) Minimize radiation risks in the use of products and services, or which arise as
a by-product in the use of products and services; (4) Minimize the risks with exposure to naturally occurring radiation; and (5) Contribute to an enhanced level of nuclear safety and radiation protection,
internationally.
SSM shall ensure that regulations and work routines are cost-effective and uncomplicated for citizens and enterprises to apply/understand.
SSM shall handle financial issues connected with the management of radioactive wastes from nuclear activities. The Authority shall inform the Nuclear Waste Fund about the size of payments and disbursements from the fund, planned or forecasted, by each reactor operator or other relevant licensee, and of SSM’s own activities regarding financing issues, so that the Nuclear Waste Fund can fulfil its tasks
5
. SSM is in charge of the Swedish metrology institute for ionising
radiation. SSM shall operate a national dose register and, as appropriate, issue
national individual dose passports.
SSM shall furthermore:
- Carry out Swedish obligations according to conventions, EU-ordinances/directives, and other binding agreements (e.g. contact point, report drafting, and to be the national competent authority);
- Supervise that nuclear material and equipment is used as declared and in agreement with international commitments;
- Carry out international cooperation work with national and multinational organisations;
- Follow and contribute to the progress of international standards and recommendations;
- Coordinate activities needed to prevent, identify and detect nuclear or radiological events. The SSM shall organise and lead the national organisation for expert advice to authorities involved in, or leading, rescue operations;
- Contribute to the national competence development within the authority’s field of activities;
- Provide data for radiation protection assessments and maintain the competence to predict and manage evolving issues; and
- Ensure public insight into all the authority’s activities.
The SSM publishes reports to inform interested parties and stakeholders. The SSM website is used for information on current events and authority decisions. In the SSM report series, R&D-reports and central regulatory assessments are published.
5
The Nuclear Waste Fund is a government authority which manages the fees paid by the power companies and the owners of other nuclear facilities in Sweden.
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
102 All reports issued by SSM can be ordered. Most of them are available for download from the SSM website. Since June 2010 SSM issues the periodical “Strålsäkert” (Radiation Safe). SSM maintains a function on duty “around the clock” to respond to incidents and other urgent matters. In case of severe events, the emergency staff will be mobilised. SSM also has one employee available for press contacts and IT support during outside office hours. The annual appropriation letter focuses on short-term-issues and funding of the Authority activities. In the appropriation letter for the fiscal year 2011, from December 2010, SSM was for example given the assignment to:
- At latest February 1, 2011 report on how a licensing procedure of new Swedish nuclear power reactors could be formed; in line with the Governments intent to create the requisites for controlled generational shifts of the Swedish nuclear power.
- Identify and report, before April 30, 2011, current safety and radiation safety issues which could be of importance during 2011-2014 when Sweden is a member of the IAEA Board of Governors.
- Report on the level of safety at the Swedish nuclear power plants latest
31 May 2011.
The SSM work can be divided into supervision of the safety and radiation protection work connected with ionising and non-ionising radiation. For ionising radiation, the main regulatory areas are: the use of nuclear technology and power production, the medical sector with therapy and diagnostics, the use of radiation sources and x-ray equipment in industry, the public use of sources and devices in commodities, the use of detectors and scanning equipment for security reasons, the management of radioactive waste, the exposure of ionising radiation from naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM). In this report the focus is on the supervision of the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste as defined by the Joint Convention.
Figure E2: displays the present organisation of SSM. The international development cooperation work is managed by the Secretariat for International Co-operation and Development reporting to the deputy DG and head of DG staff.
With regards to the supervision of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management, the tasks subject to this report are to a large extent carried out by the Department of Radioactive Materials. However this work is co-ordinated with the activities of the Department of Nuclear Power Plant Safety (safety issues, human factors expertise, and supervision of operating nuclear power plants) and the Department of Radiation protection (radioactive waste and disused sources from non-nuclear facilities and emergency preparedness and response).
The Director General is exclusively responsible for the authority activities and reports directly to the Government. The authority has an advisory council with a maximum of ten members which are appointed by the Government. Those are usually members of the parliament, agency officials or independent experts. The functions of the council are to advise the Director General and to ensure public transparency (insight) in the authority’s activities but it has no decision-making powers.
The Delegation for Financial Issues Connected with the Management of Rest
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
Products from Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activitiess as SSM’s advisory body in suggesting the fees, and the basis for calculating the fees, to the Nuclear Waste Fund. SSM also proposes the sizes of the supplementary guarantees the utilities must have available. The delegation is led by the Director General and has at most eight other members appointed by the Government which represent other authorities and independent institutions with relevant competence.
SSM also has permanent advisory committees on reactor safety, radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel management, and research and development, as well as in other fields such as UV, EM fields, and the use of ionising radiation in oncology.
E.3.1.3 The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
On January 1, 2009 the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) was formed, merging three earlier central authorities with emergency preparedness, and civil defence responsibilities. The task of the MSB is to enhance and support societal capacities for preparedness for and prevention of emergencies and crisis. The MSB coordinates emergency preparedness funding, off-site emergency work, and oversees the planning of the regional County Administrative Boards. MSB also evaluates on- and off-site emergency exercises and initiates educational efforts.
Figure E2: SSM organisation
Director General
Finance
Communication
Operation and Radiation Protection
Operation and Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities
Medical Exposures
Secretariat for International Co-operation and Development
Disposal of Radioactive Waste
System Assessment
Control and Protection
Emergency Preparedness and Response
Man Technology Organisation
Financial Control
Environmental Assessment
Radiation Protection
Organisational chart 2011
Occupational Practices and Work Activities
Nuclear Non-proliferation
Reactor Technology and Structural Integrity
Human Resources
Nuclear Power Plant Safety
Radioactive Materials
DG Staff
Legal Services
Administration
Research and Inter national Co-operation
IT
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
E.3.1.4 The Swedish Work Environment Authority
The Swedish Work Environment Authority (AV) was established in 2001. The AV’s paramount objective is to reduce the risks of ill-health and accidents in the workplace and to improve the work environment in a holistic perspective, i.e. from the physical, mental and organisational viewpoints. The AV is tasked with for example ensuring compliance with work environment legislation.
E.3.1.5 The Swedish National Council for Nuclear Waste
The Swedish National Council for Nuclear Waste was established in 1985, and is an independent committee attached to the Ministry of the Environment. The Council’s mandate is to study issues relating to nuclear waste, the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, and to advise the Government and certain authorities on these issues. The Government has authorised the Minister of the Environment to appoint the chairman and up to ten other members. The budget of the Council is decided by the Government and The Council activities are financed through the Nuclear Waste Fund. Members of the Council are independent experts within different areas of importance for the disposal of radioactive waste, not only in technology and science, but also in areas such as ethics and social sciences.
According to its latest Government instructions from April 8, 2009 (Dir.2009:31) the Council shall:
- Assess the research and development programme of the Swedish Nuclear
Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB), license applications and other reports of relevance to the disposal of nuclear waste;
- At latest 9 months after that SKB, according to the 12 Section of the Act on Nuclear Activities (SFS 1984:3), has reported on its R&D-programme, the Council shall present an independent assessment of the research and development activities, and other measures which are presented in the R&D- programme. The Council shall also follow the activities carried out in the area of decommissioning and dismantling of nuclear facilities;
- The Council shall during the month of February report on its activities during the preceding year and give its independent assessment of the situation within the nuclear waste management area.
- The Council shall investigate and illuminate important issues within the nuclear waste management area, inter alia by seminars and public hearings, and create the prerequisites for creating as good foundation as possible for its advice to the Government;
- The Council shall follow the development of other countries disposal programs for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive nuclear waste. The Council should also follow, and when necessary participate in, the work of international organisations as regarding disposal of radioactive nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel.
E.3.1.6 The County Administrative Boards
The County Administrative Boards exercise supervision according to the Civil Protection Act (SFS 2003:778) and Ordinance (SFS 2003:789), responsible for
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
planning and implementing rescue operations in cases where the public needs protection from a radioactive release from a nuclear installation or in cases where such release seems imminent.
E.3.2 the Swedish Radiation Safety authority – human and financial resources
E.3.2.1 Human resources and management system
SSM at the end of 2010 had a staff of 274 persons, an increase with 10 % from 2009. The average age is 47 years and 44 % are women. Of the staff, 24 % were younger than 40 years, 31% between 41 and 50 years, and 44 % older than 50 years. About 15 % of the SSM employees will retire (65 years) within 5 years but some opt to work until the age of 67. Ten persons were older than 65 years at the end of 2010.
During 2010, 42 persons were employed (20 women and 22 men). The staff turnover rate during 2010 was 4 % or 3 % if retirements are excluded. SSM works with a long-term plan for its competence needs and this work will continue during 2011. In March 2011 SSM reported to the Government on the competence situation in the disciplines of importance to the authority; taking into account both the internal and the national needs.
The “steering and supportive sections” of SSM totally accounts for about 45 persons. This includes the DG staff (with legal services), the communication unit, the administrative unit (including human resources unit), the finance unit, and the unit for IT issues.
The educational background of SSM staff in April 2011 is shown in Table E1:
Education Percentage
Post graduate degree
20
Bachelor/master 63 Secondary high school 15
Other 2 Total 100
Table E1: Educational background of the SSM staff
Compared with many other authorities, the SSM staff has on average a rather high educational level. This is a result of the many specialist areas covered by the authority, and to some extent the fact that there is no technical support organisation (TSO) in Sweden to support the regulatory body with specialist knowledge.
Comparing internationally, the number of regulatory staff in Sweden is small for the size of the nuclear programme. Many staff members are typically involved in several tasks, such as inspections, regulatory reviews and approval tasks, revision of regulations, handling research contracts, and participation in public information activities, each activity requiring his or her expertise. When comparing the sizes of staff between different countries, it is however important not only to count the staff members per reactor, but also to consider the types of legal obligations put on the licensees and the different oversight practices.
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
Since a couple of years SSM experiences a high workload depending on the safety modernizations of the Swedish reactors, upgrading of the physical protection of the plants, as well as applications to up-rate the power levels of several reactors. This makes it important to implement a good long-term planning and to develop the necessary assessment and administrative tools to deal with the tasks without overloading the staff. Such planning is being carried out. Special procedures were developed for review of the power up-rate applications and the authority presently re-examines its processes for reviews and assessments.
SSM performs internal staff training, organized by the human resources unit. During 2010 about 1700 days – nearly 6 days per employee - were used for such competence development. During spring 2009 a development program for the management group was finished. The program has contributed to a common view of the authority’s tasks and objectives and an increased understanding of the manager position. A new long-term development program for managers has started; it was extended over 2010 and the goal is to strengthen abilities to lead, influence and work towards common objectives.
The SSM has launched a development program on leadership where 10 motivated and suitable co-workers, selected from 55 applicants, will be given the opportunity to prepare for a management career. The education and development program, from September 2010 until May 2011, will in total consist of 25 days or about 15 % of the candidates total working hours.
Introductory training is mandatory for new employees as well as emergency preparedness training for the emergency staff, among those all inspectors. Except for this, the training programme is tailored to meet specific needs in relations to the competence profile of each position. Newly hired personnel vary in knowledge and experience – from those having a solid knowledge about the nuclear power and radioactive waste to those who come directly from the technical high school/ university. Annual dialogues are held between respective manager and staff to assess training and educational needs.
Courses are given on internal processes of the management system, the legal framework for regulatory activities, IT and security routines, project management, inspection methodology, nuclear technology, nuclear power plant- and systems courses, and media training.
About 80 common educational events took place during 2010. Apart from the introductory courses, the following was covered: the use of new administrative tools, communication with media, environment aspects, inspection- and supervision methodology and work environment issues.
The process-based, integrated SSM management system
SSM has a management system which is certified on the issues of environment, quality management and work environment management in accordance with the ISO standards ISO 14001, 9001 and the Swedish Work Environment Authority regulations AFS 2001:1. The management system is integrated and process based. During 2010, the system was supplemented with a section on Information Security following ISO standard 27001. Internal and external revisions are performed yearly.
Before SSM was established, structure and layout of processes and the complementing documents of the regulatory body were extensively discussed. Also, at the beginning, the priority was on overall structure, description of the main processes and the main policy and instructions. The system is still under deve-
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
lopment. The process map follows an iterative cycle from left to right: Planning process, Implementation process and the Follow-up process. Various support processes and the handling of affairs (diary and archiving) are held together under the name Supporting processes.
Figure E3: The SSM management system process scheme
Scope of management system
The management system encompasses:
- Over-arching description of the management system
- Mission, shared vision and tasks of the regulatory body
- The management control of the regulatory body (including policy for quality, environment, working environment and information security)
- The authority’s main processes for planning, implementation and follow- up as well as supporting processes
- The organisation, tasks and duties (rules of procedure, decision-making and preparation schemes)
- Analyses (environmental scanning, working environment risk analysis, activities, security protection, information security etc. and environmen- tal aspects) and plans of action
- Description and assessment of external interested parties
- External requirements (Ordinance (2008:452) with instructions for
SSM, annual Government letters of appropriation, Acts, etc.)
- Environmental inquiry and environmental action plan
- Procedures for document control
- Internal established steering documents
- Accounting documents
- Program and plans for internal and external reviews
Implementation process
Planning process Follow-up process
Handling matters and documents
Personnel, work environment and competence
Accounting
IT and Internal Services
Communication Legal Affairs and Purchasing
Develop Regulations
Secure Knowledge and Competence
Intergrated Safety Assessments
External Assignments Licensing Reviews Supervision Emergency Preparedness Communicate and Influence Co-operation and Development
Maintain Preparedness
Investigate, Analyse and Assess
Support Processes
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
- Methods for measuring the impact and effect of each process
- Competence management and education plans
- IT based support displaying processes, supporting documents and rela- tion between processes
- IT based activity management system for planning and follow-up (SINUS
Implementation of audits
SSM ensures that annual internal and external audits of the authority’s activities are carried out, in addition to audits of the Swedish National Audit Office. The SSM management system should account for internal and external requirements; the latter such as those of ISO-standards, statutes and legal provisions, e.g. work environment management and information security.
SSM follows a plan of internal auditing for the period 2009-2011. The objective of these internal audits are to follow-up the activities of the Authority on all levels, to check compliance with external and internal requirements, to investigate how the “common values” are integrated in the practical work, and to check if the management system is effective and adapted to its purposes. The internal auditors are appointed by the DG and put together in suitable audit teams; considering experience, competence and audit objectives.
External audits are carried out two times every year. The auditors control how SSM follows the requirements of ISO 9001, ISO 14001, the Swedish Work Environment Authority regulations AFS 2001, and other relevant requirements. The external auditors are accredited by Swedish Board for Accreditation and Con-
formity Assessment, an authority under the Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Enterprise, & Energy and Communications.
In February 2012, on request by the Swedish Government, the IAEA will conduct a full-scope IRRS mission in Sweden. A preparatory self-assessment was carried out in the beginning of 2011.
New system for document management
In January 2010 it was decided that SSM should acquire a new document management system to the authority (largely following ISO 15489). The implementation is gradual during a 3-year period and started during 2010 with project work, education of the staff and implementation of some parts. The diary part was introduced in the beginning of 2011. The objective of the new system is to allow for effective handling of documents and applications. External contacts should be able to fully use Internet and e-mail for their dialogue with SSM. A careful scan of the legal requirements (archiving, freedom of the press, public information, secrecy, confidentiality etc.) was performed. The possibility to use electronic signature (procedures for establishing a legal validity of signed documents sent by Internet or e-mail) will be studied.
E.3.2.2 Financial resources
The regulatory activities of SSM are financed over the state budget. The costs are largely recovered from the licensees as fees covering the regulatory activities and the related research. The sizes of the fees are annually proposed by SSM but decided by the Government. Activities connected to the licensing of nuclear waste disposal facilities and the financing of the nuclear waste management system are fun-
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
ded through the waste management fund. The budgets for 2009, 2010 and 2011, except for the funding of the separately financed international cooperation and development work performed by the Secretariat for International Co-operation and Development, are shown in Table E2. In addition, some extra resources (at most a few million per year) are fees for reviewing special applications or licensing work, paid directly to the Authority.
Table E2: Budget of SSM in kSEK - 1 SEK is about 0.1 Euro
Regulatory research
The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) decided on its research plan for 2011-2013. Based on what is stated about research in the Ordinance (SFS 2008:452) with instruction for the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, the main purposes for SSM research is to:
- Maintain and develop the competence of importance for radiation protection and nuclear safety work.
- Ensure that SSM has the knowledge and tools needed to carry out effective regulatory and supervisory activities.
SSM supports basic and applied research and also development of methods and processes (usually not products). However for development work the intention is that the developed method or process should be used solely by the authority, in support of the authority work. One aspect is the clear separation between research and authority support. The latter is not in the interest of the broader society and must be put out to tender.
In order to contribute to national competence and research capacity, SSM and the nuclear industry support the Swedish Centre of Technology within a long-term contract (2008-2013). SSM finances three higher research posts in radiation biology, radioecology and dosimetry until 2013. The University of Stockholm formed the Centre for Radiation Protection Research to co-ordinate Swedish resources in the area.
Nuclear safety research is performed within bilateral agreements with Finland but also within NKS (Nordic Nuclear Safety Research) in two programme areas, Reactor safety and Emergency preparedness. The latter area actually includes waste management research.
To fulfil research needs, SSM contracts universities and consulting companies. A dominating share goes to research organizations in Sweden. However,
Budget Item
2009 2010 2011 Funding source
Nuclear safety, emergency preparedness, 214,350 233,400 230,450 Mainly fees radiation protection (including administration) Scientific research and development work 90,000 96,000 79,000 Mainly fees Disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste 6,000 28,200 70,000 Waste management fund Historical wastes etc. 2,700 2,000 2,000 Tax funded Crisis management629,000 27,000 25,000 Tax funded Total (kSEK) 342,050 386,600 404,450
6
These funds are received via the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
110 since national resources are limited, SSM actively participates in international research. SSM cooperates on research conducted by EU and OECD/NEA and takes part in a large number of projects.
In order to maintain continuity in knowledge and competence in connection with the assessment and examination of the deep geological disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, SSM has financed suitable research and development work within areas such as canister corrosion, biosphere processes, buffer and refilling, geosphere processes, spent fuel andsafety assessment methodology. Such measures has led to that the SSM is well prepared for a trustworthy examination and assessment of the new waste management facilities the licensees plan to build, commission and operate.
In addition SSM has had research projects connected to decommissioning, e.g. applied studies on actual costs and methodologies for decommissioning and dismantling of nuclear facilities.
The research budget SSM allocated to research related to spent fuel and radioactive waste management 2010 is shown in Table 3.
Research area Expenditures 2010 (kSEK)
Biosphere processes
2 503
Buffer and refilling
3 613
Canister
2 369
Decommissioning
1 249
Geosphere processes
3 632
Safety assessment methodology
2 716
Spent fuel nuclide chemistry
1 697
Total (kSEK)
17 779
Table E3: Breakdown of the 2010 research budget allocated for research related to spent fuel and radioactive waste management at SSM in kSEK - 1 SEK is about 0.1 Euro
The support to a doctoral candidate position within nuclear chemistry at Chalmers University of Technology continues with the purpose to strengthen the national competence about how nuclear fuel reacts in the disposal facility environment. Within the research area of rock mechanical modeling, SSM gives support to the U.S. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. In 2010 two long term research projects were initiated at Stockholm University in the areas of glaciation and radioecology-environmental risk assessment and one research project was initiated at the University of Gothenburg in the area of buffer erosion-colloid chemistry.
During 2010 the SSM continued its preparation for assessing the SKB licence application for a deep geological disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel which was submitted to the authority in March 2011. Issues for assessment of long-term safety have been assembled and a preliminary assessment plan for Clab and the planned encapsulation facility were established. During 2010 SSM, through a number of expert meetings, followed the development within the different relevant technical
Section E – LEgiSLativE and REguLatoRy SyStEm
areas. To exchange experience and information in connection with preparations, formal assessment, and supervision of the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, a cooperation with the Finnish Nuclear and Radiation Safety Authority, STUK, started.
E.3.3 independence of the regulatory function
The de jure and de facto independence from political pressure and promotional interests are well provided for in Sweden. The laws governing SSM concentrate solely on nuclear safety, radiation protection (also security, physical protection, and non-proliferation, but outside of the scope addressed in this convention). SSM reports to the Ministry of Environment, which is not involved in the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy. These issues are handled by the Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications. An individual minister cannot interfere with the decision making of a governmental agency according to fundamental Swedish law. This is a matter for the Government, in plenum.
E.3.5 Conclusion
Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 20.
This page is intentionally left blank
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
1. Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of spent fuel or radioactive waste management rests with the holder of the relevant licence and shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that each such licence holder meets its responsibility.
2. If there is no such licence holder or other responsible party, the responsibility rests with the Contracting Party which has jurisdiction over the spent fuel or over the radioactive waste.
F.1.1 regulatory requirements
F.1.1.1 The prime responsibility
According to the Act on Nuclear Activities a party that holds a licence for nuclear activities shall be responsible for ensuring that all the necessary measures are taken for:
- maintaining	safety,	taking	into	account	the	nature	of	the	operation	and	the	 circumstances in which it is conducted,
- safe	management	and	disposal	of	nuclear	waste	generated	by	the	operation	or	 nuclear material derived from the operation that is not reused, and
- safe	 decommissioning	 and	 dismantling	 of	 facilities	 in	 which	 the	 operation	 shall be discontinued until such date that all operations at the facilities have ceased and all nuclear material and nuclear waste have been placed in a disposal facility that has been sealed permanently.
According to the Radiation Protection Act, parties conducting activities involving radiation shall, while taking into account the nature of the activity and the conditions under which it is conducted
- take	the	measures	and	precautions	necessary	to	prevent	or	counteract	injury	to	 people and animals and damage to the environment,
- supervise	and	maintain	the	radiation	protection	at	the	site,	on	the	premises	and	 in other areas where radiation occurs, and
- properly	maintain	technical	devices	and	monitoring	and	radiation	protection	 equipment used in the activity. In the Governmental Bills to the acts it is also underlined that the licensee shall not only take measures to maintain safety and radiation protection but also measures to	improve	these	protective	measures	where	this	is	justified.
The SSM Regulations on Safety in Nuclear Facilities (SSMFS 2008:1) specify the responsibility of the licensee through a number of functional requirements on safety management, design and construction, safety analysis and review, operations, nuclear materials-/waste management and documentation /archiving. In addition it is clearly pointed out in these regulations that safety shall be monitored and followed	up	by	the	licensee	on	a	routine	basis,	deviations	identified	and	corrected	so	
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
114 that safety is maintained and further developed according to valid objectives and strategies.
The required continuously preventive safety work includes reassessments, analysis of events in the own and other facilities, analysis of relevant new safety standards and practices and research results. Any reasonable measure useful for safety shall be taken as a result of this proactive and continuous safety work and be documented in a safety programme that shall be updated annually.
The basic safety documentation (SAR including Operational Limits and Conditions, plans for emergency response and physical protection) must be formally approved	by	SSM.	Plant	and	organizational	modifications	and	changes	in	the	safety	documentation	are	to	be	notified	and	SSM	can,	if	needed,	impose	additional	 conditions and requirements. All other issues are handled under the licensee selfinspection. SSM examines how this liability is managed.
According to the SSM Regulations on Basic Provisions for the Protection of Workers and the Public in Connection with Work with Ionizing Radiation (SSMFS 2008:51) anyone who conducts activities with ionizing radiation shall ensure that the	practice	is	justified	by	which	is	meant	that	the	use	of	radiation	gives	a	benefit	 that exceeds the estimated health detriment caused by the radiation. The radiation protection measures shall be optimized and by which is meant that human exposures are as low as reasonably achievable, social and economic factors taken into account and no dose limit in these regulations is exceeded. These basic radiation protection principles also apply for waste management and disposal as regulated in SSM Regulations on the Protection of Human Health and the Environment in connection with the Final Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Nuclear Waste (SSMFS 2008:37).
The optimization and use of the best available technique also apply to discharges to the environment during the normal operation of nuclear facilities. This is regulated in Regulations on Protection of Human Health and the Environment in connection with Discharges of Radioactive Substances from certain Nuclear Facilities (SSMFS 2008:23)
The SSM shall ensure that regulations and used procedures are cost effective and useful for individuals as well as companies. They must be written and designed so that the regulatory body does not take over the prime responsibility for safety and radiation protection. The supervision that SSM carries out shall control that the licensees operates the activity in a safe way and with the maintenance of radiation protection.
F.1.1.2 The ultimate responsibility
The State has an overall responsibility for activities regulated in the Act on Nuclear Activities. However, this ultimate responsibility has not explicitly expressed inthelegislation,butthroughGovernmentstatements.Therefore,clarificationof the State responsibility has therefore been considered necessary in the legislation.
F.1.2 Measures taken by the license holder
SKB is the licensee for Clab, situated at the Oskarshamn site, and SFR, situated at the Forsmark site. The operation of Clab and SFR was previously contracted out to OKG and FKA respectively. SKB took over the operation of Clab in January 2007
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
and the operation of SFR in July 2009. The takeover is a natural step in SKB´s development, where the emphasis in the activities is gradually shifting from research and development to operation of nuclear facilities. The experience gained from the construction and operation of Clab and SFR is important in the planning of the future facilities.
Spent fuel and waste management at the nuclear power plants, such as waste packaging, waste minimization and interim storage at the sites are the responsibility of the nuclear power companies. Inspection of on-site management of radioactive waste is carried out by SSM inspectors. The production and storage of radioactive waste at the plants is reported annually to SSM and to the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB). The Nuclear power companies have given SKB responsibility for managing the nuclear waste from the time the waste leaves the nuclear power plants. SKB therefore closely follow the predisposal management activities performed at the nuclear power plants sites.
F.1.3 regulatory control
SSM takes a number of regulatory actions to make sure that licensees give adequate priority to safety and radiation protection. Examples are the following:
- Inspections,	major	and	minor	inspections	targeted	to	assess	safety	and	radiation protection issues. The inspections, as well as other types of regulatory supervision, can have a wide scope. Examples are inspections of the licensee safety programmes, management of organisational changes, management of safety review, management and assessment of incidents (conservative decision	making)	as	well	as	in-depth	focus	on	specific	issues	and	control.
- Reviews	of	different	documents,	including	safety	analysis	reports,	instructions, licence applications etc.
- Investigations	in	connections	with	events	(SSM	has	a	special	methodology,	
RASK, for rapid response inspections) and assessments of event reports.
- The	 integrated	 safety	 assessments	 (se	 section	 E.2.2.3)	 provide	 an	 updated	 comprehensive regulatory assessment of the safety of the facility. A management meeting follows each SSM integrated safety assessment.
- Regular	top	management	meetings	with	the	licensees.	The	Director	General	of	
SSM and the department directors meet with the management group of each nuclear power plant and other major facilities at least once a year to discuss current issues and safety priorities. There are also annual meetings with the corporate executives of the utilities.
- SSM	follows	the	licensees	work	with	safety	culture	issues	mainly	through	 minor inspections. The role of SSM in this context is to ensure that the licensees have proactive safety management. SSM expects the licensees to create and maintain a strong safety culture. One important part of this, of great interest for SSM, is that the licensees react in a timely manner to indications of deficiencies	in	their	safety	culture.	If	such	deficiencies	are	not	corrected,	the	 ability	of	the	operating	organisation	to	handle	difficult	situations	and	maintain	 safety will deteriorate.
F.1.4 Conclusion
Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 21.
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure
that: (i) qualified	staff	are	available	as	needed	for	safety-related	activities	
during the operating lifetime of a spent fuel and a radioactive waste management facility; 	(ii)	adequate	financial	resources	are	available	to	support	the	safety	
of facilities for spent fuel and radioactive waste management during their operating lifetime and for decommissioning; (iii)		financial	provision	is	made	which	will	enable	the	appropriate	
institutional controls and monitoring arrangements to be continued for the period deemed necessary following the closure of a disposal facility.
F.2.1 regulatory requirements
F.2.1.1 Qualified staff during the operation lifetime
The general safety regulations concerning safety in nuclear facilities (SSMFS 2008:1)	are	specific	about	the	staffing	of	the	nuclear	facilities.	Long	term	planning	 is required of the licensees in order to ensure that they have enough staff with sufficient	competence	for	all	safety-related	tasks.	A	systematic	approach	should	be	 used	for	the	definition	of	the	different	competences	needed,	planning	and	evaluation of all safety related training. It is also a requirement that there is a balance between the use of in-house personnel and contractors for safety related tasks. The competence necessary for ordering, managing and evaluation of the results of contracted work should always exist within the organisation of a nuclear installation.
The	regulations	also	contain	provisions	that	the	staff	must	be	fit	for	their	duties. This implies medical requirements and tests for drugs, etc. Such provisions have	not	been	issued	previously.	How	the	licensee	manages	the	fitness	for	duty	 issues has, however, been followed through inspections.
F.2.1.2 Adequate human and financial resources
During operation and decommissioning
It is clear from the Swedish Act on Nuclear Activities that in order to obtain a licence, economical resources must be committed in order to manage the safety obligations mentioned in chapter 10 of the Act. Every presumptive licensee must be assessed in this respect during the licensing procedure.
Provisionforfinancialresourcesduringdecommissioningisprovidedbymeans of investments in government controlled funds. Licensees of nuclear facilities must pay a fee to the Nuclear Waste Fund, according to the Act (2006:647) on
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
Financial Measures for the Management of Residual Products from Nuclear Activities	as	described	in	section	E.2.2.5.	This	is	to	ensure	the	financing	of	decommissioning, handling and disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste, including the research needed for these activities.
The disposal facility for radioactive operational waste (SFR) has been paid for directly by the nuclear power utilities and not by the Fund. Operational waste is not covered by the Act on Financial Measures for the Management of Residual Products from Nuclear Activities but is instead paid for by the nuclear power utilities at the time the waste is produced. However, disposal in SFR of operational waste from Clab is paid for through the Nuclear Waste Fund, since all of Clab’s operationsarefinancedbythisFund.
Provisions for institutional control and monitoring after closure
As described in chapter F.6.1.1 the holder of a licence for nuclear activities shall be responsible for ensuring that all measures are taken that are needed for the safe decommissioning and dismantling of plants in which nuclear activities are no longer to be conducted. Institutional control and monitoring is not foreseen in the Swedish management system for spent fuel and radioactive waste. It follows that a licensee may be exempted from their responsibilities when decommissioning and dismantling	has	taken	place	and	financial	provisions	for	institutional	control	and	 monitoring after closure are not required.
The State has an overall responsibility for activities regulated in the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities as described in section F.1.1.2. It follows that if the need for institutional control and monitoring were to arise in the future, the State would be responsible for the arrangements and costs.
F.2.2 Measures taken by the license holders
F.2.2.1 Qualified staff during the operation lifetime
In the near future new facilities will be built and put into operation. Therefore SKB needs to ensure and broaden the competence concerning the operation of nuclear facilities. An important step in that direction was taken when SKB took over the operation of Clab in January 2007 and the operation of SFR in July 2009, which was previously contracted out to OKG and FKA, respectively (see also sub-section F.2.1.2).
F.2.2.1 Adequate human and financial resources
As described in the introduction, the nuclear power utilities have formed a jointly owned company, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB),	to	fulfill	their	obligations	regarding	nuclear	waste	management.	SKB	is	 assigned by the nuclear utilities to make their cost estimates that form the basis for calculating the nuclear waste fee that the licensees of nuclear power plants must pay to the Nuclear Waste Fund.
The NPP licensees also make two forms of guarantees available to the government in the event that the Nuclear Waste Fund should prove to be inadequate. The two types of guarantees serve different purposes (see section E.2.2.5).
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
F.2.3 regulatory control
Qualified staff during operation
The compliance with the requirements on competence assurance was inspected a few years ago at all nuclear power plants. The regulatory authority continued to follow up on these inspections and has now concluded that the required systematic approaches	are	in	place	at	all	nuclear	power	plants	to	assure	long	term	staffing	and	 competence of operations staff.
At	the	time,	both	Clab	and	SFR	benefited	from	these	improvements	as	the	 management systems for operation those facilities were fully integrated with the management systems for the operation of the nuclear power plants at OKG and FKA respectively.
Before SKB was allowed to take over operation of Clab in January 2007, the regulatory authority reviewed and approved the organisational change. The implementation of the operation organisation for Clab was a considerable change to the SKB organisation. A key issue in this respect was the establishment of a safety review function, as required by the general regulations (SSMFS 2008:1). Beside the new area of responsibility within the SKB organisation the number of SKB staff increased from about 220 to 300 in total.
Adequate financial resources
The regulatory authority assigned by the Government, SSM, reviews the licensees cost estimates according to the Act on Financial Measures for the Management of Residual Products from Nuclear Activities. Furthermore, SSM reviews the size of theguaranteethatthelicenseesmustmakeavailabletoensurethatthefinancing system will be able to meet future needs. After its review of the nuclear power utilities’ cost estimates, SSM submits a proposal for the size of the fees, and the size of the guarantees required, to the Government. Based on this proposal, the Government sets the fees and guarantees. For licensees of nuclear facilities other than nuclear power reactors, SSM sets the fees and guarantees for the following three years after reviewing cost estimates submitted by the licensee.
F.2.4 Conclusion
Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 22.
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
F.3 Article 23: QUALITY ASSURANCE
Each Contracting Party shall take the necessary steps to ensure that appropriate quality assurance programmes concerning the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management are established and implemented.
F.3.1 regulatory requirements
The general safety regulations SSMFS 2008:1 (chapter 2, 8 §) require that nuclear activities: design and construction, operation and decommissioning, shall be managed, controlled, assessed and developed through a management system so designed that requirements on safety will are met. The management system including the needed routines and procedures shall be kept up to date and be documented. This view on quality and safety to be integrated with other business concerns into an integrated management system is in line with the recently issued IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-3, The Management System for Facilities and Activities.
It is further required in regulations that the application of the management system,	its	efficiency	and	effectiveness,	shall	be	systematically	and	periodically	 audited by a function having an independent position in relation to the activities being audited. An established audit programme shall exist at the plant.
In the general recommendations to the regulations it is made clear that the management system should cover all nuclear activities at the plant. Furthermore, it should be clear from the management system how to audit contractors and vendors, and how to keep results from these audits up to date.
The	internal	audit	function	should	have	a	sufficiently	strong	and	independent	 position in the organisation and report to the highest manager of the plant. The audits should have continuity and auditors have a good knowledge about activities being audited.
Audit intervals should take into account the importance for safety of the different activities and special needs that can arise. Normally all audit areas should be covered every four years as a minimum.
The auditing activity itself and the management function of the plant should also periodically be audited.
F.3.2 Measures taken by the license holder
Quality programmes – NPP
In Sweden the general description of the quality and management system is normally regarded as the plant’s most important document, as it gives an overview of the requirements and the way in which the organization is supposed to work in order to meet these demands. The documents are to be kept available for everyone in the plant organization, and also for others who are affected by the information in the documents, for instance contractors, consultants and the regulatory autho-
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
120 rities. All documents in the quality and management system are under controlled revision,	regularly	or	when	needed,	in	order	to	reflect	the	actual	situation	at	the	 plant at all times.
Development of quality assurance programmes at the Swedish NPPs began during the late 1970’s. These programmes have since been developed continuously over the years, and have, of course, been affected by regulations and expectations from the regulatory body and business associates. In the beginning, the quality manuals of the NPPs were limited to descriptions of routines in a number of functional areas, but they lacked clear statements of the objectives and requirements. During the 1990s there was considerable development of the concept, and the quality assurance programmes of the Swedish NPPs are today integrated in the total management system of every plant.
The main principles are the same for the quality and management systems of the Swedish	NPPs,	with	documents	on	three	levels.	The	first	level	(top-level)	documents are issued by the plant director. Included in these are typically a vision to strive after, a business idea which outlines the mission of the facility, objectives for different areas and strategies to accomplish the objectives. Objectives typically exist for:
- nuclear	safety,
- occupational	safety,
- economic	results,
- confidence	from	society,
- environmental	impact,	and
- personnel	responsibility
A comprehensive description of the organization with responsibilities for functions and processes, division of responsibility and management principles are also included in the top-level documents. Furthermore, there are policies, conditions and directives for the main activity processes at the plant. In the conditions all the legal requirements are included, as well as the plant owners’ requirements and additions. Finally the top-level documents include directives to all departments and staff units at the power plant.
The second level documents of the management system contain commitments from the responsible managers on how to work with the tasks delegated by the plant director in the top-level documents. These replies are given as objectives, directives, process descriptions and instructions for the different areas of responsibility.
The	third	level	documents	include	instructions	for	specific	activities	and	tasks	 included	in	the	different	areas	of	responsibility	as	defined	by	the	second	level	 documents.
In addition to the three levels of documents, there can also be various types of administrative handbooks.
The	purpose	of	the	quality	and	management	system	is	to	achieve	a	unified	 and consistent control system for all plant activities based on clear policies and measurable objectives. There should be complete traceability from policy to work instruction. The standard ISO 9001:2000 for quality management systems, lead to more emphasis on processes and attempts to implement process-orientation in the organisation and daily work.
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
Quality programmes – SKB
The management system of SKB consists of a number of steering documents divided on overall company level (blue part) and an operational level (beige part). Below	is	an	explanation	of	the	hierarchy	and	definitions	of	policy,	guideline,	routine and instruction.
Quality system implementation and quality audit programmes
Every Swedish NPP and SKB has developed a quality audit programme, which is used to monitor how well the quality system is implemented and applied in the organization	on	different	levels,	as	well	as	the	efficiency	of	the	system	to	ensure	 quality and safety. Being responsible for the long-term safety of SFR, SKB also reviews	all	NPP	companies	with	regard	to	fulfillment	of	regulatory	requirements	 concerning waste generation and conditioning.
Quality audits of suppliers
According to the requirements on quality assurance in the general regulations SSMFS 2008:1, all purchases of goods and services which might have an effect, directly or indirectly, on the protection and safety of the environment or personnel, shall be made from suppliers that through quality audits, or in other ways, have shown that they can comply with quality requirements.
The ambition of the licensees is not limited to these demands, but also includes suppliers of goods and services, where malfunctioning might cause considerable consequences for the operation. A review of a supplier includes not only a quality audit, but also a technical and commercial evaluation of the equipment or services offered. Since 1998 a review of the supplier’s environmental management system is included in the review. These aspects will, however, not be covered in this report. The purpose of a quality audit of a potential supplier is not only to evaluate whether the supplier has implemented and uses a documented quality system, but also to evaluate the supplier’s capability of providing the correct and expected quality. Quality audits are typically performed by teams of 1-4 auditors. The audit team shall be led by a person with documented knowledge and experience in the QA area and with the quality norms. The team leader shall have experience from participation in several quality audits. The team shall comprise one or more persons
SKB Management System
Policy = SKB:s policy is the top steering document in the management system
and explains the ambitions and the overall focus for the whole organisation.
Guideline = Steering document with explanations and details on SKB:s policy
and overall frames for the work within specific areas.
Routine = Steering document including requirements,
responsibility, authorithy and explanations on how to perform tasks.
Instruction = Steering document which in detail explains
how to perform certain task. An instruction is always coupled to a routine.
Policy
Guidelines
Routines and Instructions
Routines and Instructions
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
122 with competence or experience from the product or service to be reviewed. Thus, there is no formal licensing of audit team leaders and team members for Swedish nuclear facilities.
A quality audit results in a report, which must be accepted by the company reviewed,	before	being	presented	to	the	purchasing	organization.	If	deficiencies	are	 revealed during the audit, the organization under review is requested to describe what	measures	will	be	taken	to	correct	the	deficiencies,	in	order	to	be	accepted	as	a	 supplier of products or services to the organization. In certain cases a follow-up visit of the audited company is required to verify that the company has taken the actions.
Approved quality audits accomplished by any of the other Swedish NPPs are normally considered comparable with a plant’s own quality audits and, consequently,	audit	duplications	of	a	given	supplier	can	be	avoided.	Simplified	quality	 audits or evaluation of previous experience of a supplier are sometimes acceptable, when purchasing goods and services dedicated for use in the lower quality classes.
F.3.3 regulatory control
SSM’s own quality system has included guidance for SSM-staff when reviewing the licensees’ quality systems. Usually the quality system itself has not been the only target for SSM’s review and inspections. Appropriate aspects of the application of quality assurance are included in all SSM regulatory inspections. Thus during inspections, routines and instructions are studied, as well as how they are enforced in practice in order to control safety-related activities.
SSM has also made assessments of quality assurance processes when reviewing	large	modification	plans,	for	example	the	recent	extension	of	Clab.	The	licensees’ plans for quality audits and the reports from the audits that have been performed have also been subject to review by SSM.
In	general	SSM	has	been	satisfied	with	the	implementation	of	quality	assurance. The development of the integrated approach to quality and management systems has taken several years and considerable effort. In some cases implementation	has	not	been	well	prepared,	and	has	been	slowed	down	due	to	insufficient	staff	 resources, or lack of support from all organizational levels. Organizational changes have also affected the implementation work, and made revisions necessary.
The regulatory experience shows the necessity of having a living quality audit programme at the plants, and using the audits to develop quality and safety. This means that the audits should not only investigate compliance with the documented routines,	but	also	the	suitability	and	the	efficiency	of	the	routines	in	line	with	the	 concept of a learning organization.
F.3.4 Conclusion
Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 23.
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that during the operating lifetime of a spent fuel or radioactiv waste management facility: (i) the radiation exposure of the workers and the public caused by the facility shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken into account; (ii) no individual shall be exposed, in normal situations, to radia tion doses which exceed national prescriptions for dose limi tation which have due regard to internationally endorsed standards on radiation protection; and (iii) measures are taken to prevent unplanned and uncontrolled releases of radioactive materials into the environment.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate steps to ensure that discharges shall be limited: (i) to keep exposure to radiation as low as reasonably achiev able, economic and social factors being taken into account; and (ii) so that no individual shall be exposed, in normal situations, to radiation doses which exceed national prescriptions for dose limitation which have due regard to internation ally endorsed standards on radiation protection.
3. Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate steps to ensure that during the operating lifetime of a regulated nuclear facility, in the event that an unplanned or uncontrolled release of radioactive materials into the environment occurs, appropriate corrective measures are implemented to control the release and mitigate its effects.
F.4.1 regulatory requirements
In order to regulate, and create a basis for effective supervision of, radiation protection at nuclear facilities, including those for management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, basic radiation protection requirements are laid down in a number of SSM regulations.
F.4.1.1 Regulatory requirements on occupational radiation protection
The Swedish occupational radiation protection requirements aimed at the nuclear facilities are similar to those of other EU Member States since they follow the binding requirements of the Council Directive 96/29/Euratom of 13 May 1996, laying down basic safety standards for the health protection of the general public and workers against the dangers of ionising radiation. The principal provisions as re-
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
124 gards occupational radiation protection are found in the SSM regulations SSMFS 2008:24, SSMFS 2008:26, SSMFS 2008:51, and SSMFS 2008:52, accounted for in section E.2.2.3. The most important provisions in the context of the Joint Convention	are	briefly	summarized	below.	
General Requirements and dose limits
Anyone who conducts an activity with ionising radiation shall ensure: 1.	 Justification:	The	activity	is	justified	by	which	means	that	the	use	of	radiation	
gives	a	benefit	to	individuals	and	to	the	society	that	exceeds	the	estimated	 health detriment caused by radiation.
2. Optimisation: The radiation protection measures are optimised by which is meant that exposures, and the probability and magnitude of potential exposures, are as low as reasonably achievable, economic and societal factors taken into account.
3. Dose limitation: The activity is carried out in such a way that no radiation dose limits are exceeded.
Optimisation
Anyone who conducts a practice with ionising radiation shall ensure that the radiation protection measures are optimised, and that no radiation dose limit is exceeded. The licensee shall ensure that documented goals and actions for the optimisation work are established and that the necessary resources are available in order to perform the actions and work towards the established goals.
Dose limits for workers
The limit for a worker regarding effective dose is 50 mSv in a calendar year, with the	additional	constraint	that	the	integrated	effective	dose	over	five	consecutive	 years must not exceed 100 mSv. The equivalent dose limit to the lens of the eye and to skin, hands and feet is 150 mSv and 500 mSv in a year, respectively. Lower limits apply for apprentices and special rights for rearrangements at work apply to breast-feeding and pregnant woman. Additional requirements ensure that the dose to a foetus does not exceed 1 mSv for the remaining period of a pregnancy. Data on intakes an individual radia-tion doses are kept in the national dose register. Dose records are saved until a person has reached 75 years, and at least until 30 years after work with ionising radiation has stopped.
Medical examination
A	worker	must	each	year	arrange	for	a	new	doctor’s	certificate	as	proof	of	that	he/ she	is	fit	for	service.	At	least	every	third	year	this	must	be	based	on	a	full	medical	 examination by a doctor.
Supervised and controlled areas
Zoning of the workplace and a division into supervised and controlled areas is required. Areas shall be marked and radiological information given (dose rates, sources, contamination levels, entrance restrictions, etc.).
If there is a risk for spread of contamination or the annual effective dose could exceed	six	mSv,	the	workplace	shall	be	classified	as	a	controlled	area.	The	access is then more restricted, protective clothing and personal protection equipment could	be	mandatory,	specific	information/education	is	required,	and	a	personal	do-
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
simeter shall be worn. Within a controlled area, premises shall be specially marked and admittance restricted (locked with special keys) if the risk of receiving an annual effective dose of more than 50 mSv is non-negligible.
Visitors
Visitors are allowed if guided by designated persons and a strict, pre-arranged visit plan is followed. No high-dose areas may be visited.
Information and education
All personnel, permanent staff and contractors, shall be informed about radiation risks and have proper education prior to work within a controlled area. The training shall be adjusted to the scope and type of the work to be performed and to the existing radiological working environment.
Site-specific instructions, radiation protection expert
The	licence	holder	shall	ensure	that	site	specific	instructions	for	radiation	protection are established. The licensee shall also appoint a radiation protection expert. This	person	shall	be	approved	by	SSM	and	have	sufficient	competence	in	matters	 related to radiation protection to be able to promote active radiation protection work and to check on the implementation of the radiation protection legislation.
Instruments and equipment
All instruments used for radiation protection and the control of radiation doses shall be calibrated and undergo regular functional checks.
Policy in the event of fuel failures
A documented policy with a strategy for avoiding fuel failures and how to manage fuel failures if they occur is mandatory. The aim is to minimize the negative radiological impact on radiation doses to workers and the public.
Reporting
Annual reports describing the radiation protection work, the progress and evaluation of the optimisation work, and experience from the outages are required. In the case of an accident or events that led or could have led to contamination spread or high doses, rapid communication to the regulatory body is required. Various other reports are required. The radiation protection expert keeps track of the timely and accurate reporting.
F.4.1.2 Regulatory requirements on environmental radiation protection
The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority’s regulations (SSMFS 2008:23) concerning the protection of human health and the environment from discharges of radioactive substances from certain nuclear facilities apply to nuclear facilities under normal operations as described in section E.2.2.3. The most important provisions are described in the following.
Public dose limits, dose constraints and critical group
The effective dose limit for members of the public is 1 mSv per year. A dose constraint for the discharges of radioactive substances to water and air (authorized
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
126 releases) is set to 0.1 mSv per year and site. The dose constraint is subject to comparison with the calculated dose to the most exposed individual (critical group). The dose models used are approved by the SSM.
The 0.1 mSv dose constraint is compared with the sum of a) the effective dose from the annual external exposure, and b) the committed effective dose resulting from a yearly discharge. A 50-year integration time is used for the committed effective dose. If the calculated sum dose exceeds 0.01 mSv per year, realistic calculations of the individual radiation doses, using measured dispersion data, food habits etc., shall be made for the most affected area.
Discharge limits
The discharge limit is achieved through the restriction of the radiation dose to the critical	group.	There	are	no	legal	nuclide-specific	discharge	limits	in	Sweden.
Optimisation and Best Available Technology
Limitation of releases shall be based on optimisation of radiation protection and with the use of the Best Available Technology (BAT).
Release monitoring
The release of radioactive substances shall be measured. All non-monitored releases shall be investigated and an upper boundary for possible undetectable leakage to air and water from each facility shall be set.
Releases via the main stacks of nuclear power reactors shall be controlled by continuous	nuclide-specific	measurements	of	volatile	radioactive	substances	such	 as noble gases, continuous collection of samples of iodine and particle-bound radioactive substances, as well as measurements of carbon-14 and tritium.
Discharges of radionuclides to water shall be controlled through measurements of representative samples from each release pathway. The analyses shall cover	 nuclide-specific	 measurements	 of	 gamma	 and	 alpha-emitting	 radioactive	 substances as well as, where relevant, strontium-90 and tritium.
Controls and testing
The	function	and	efficiency	of	measurement	equipment	and	release	limiting	systems shall be checked periodically and whenever there are any indications of malfunctions.
Environmental monitoring
Environmental monitoring in the areas surrounding nuclear facilities shall be performed according to monitoring programmes determined by SSM. The programmes specify the type and sampling frequency, sample treatment, radio-nuclides to consider, reporting etc. The Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management performs sampling at and outside the facilities. Samples are analysed by the nuclear facilities or by external laboratories which have adequate quality assurance systems. To verify compliance, SSM performs inspections and takes random subsamples for control measurements at SSM or at other independent laboratories.
Reporting
The nuclear reactor licensees report annually to SSM adopted or planned measures to	limit	radioactive	releases	with	the	aim	of	achieving	their	specified	target	values.	
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
If established reference values are exceeded, the planned measures to achieve the reference values shall be reported.
Releases of radioactive substances to the air and water as well as results from environmental monitoring shall be reported twice a year to SSM. Events that lead to an increase in releases of radioactive substances from a nuclear facility shall be reported to SSM as soon as possible, together with a description of the actions taken to reduce the releases.
F.4.2 radiation impact of spent nuclear fuel or radioactive waste management facilities
F.4.2.1 Occupational radiation doses
In general both individual and collective doses from radioactive waste handling at nuclear power plants are low compared to doses from normal operation, and maintenance and service work performed at outages. Nevertheless it is important that the working methods are carefully planned and in compliance with the existing regulatory requirements (see Section F.4.1.1), to make sure that occupational radiation protection is optimized.
In this section, examples of occupational doses received at spent fuel and radioactive waste management facilities are presented. Personnel that work with radioactive waste at the nuclear power plants are exposed to annual doses in the order of a few mSv. The annual collective doses at the nuclear power plants to this category of workers are normally in the order of 10-20 mmanSv.
At the central interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel (Clab), doses are obtained from the normal operation with receiving, unloading and cleaning the transport containers. In addition, maintenance and service of Clab’s internal lift and handling equipment, and the water cleaning system give radiation doses. The work doses to	the	personnel	at	Clab	reported	between	1998	and	2010	are	shown	in	figure	F1.
No open radiation sources are handled at the disposal facility for low and intermediate level waste (SFR) and all radioactive waste is conditioned. Thus, the doses to the personnel originate only from external radiation. Contamination of transport casks and waste packages has never occurred to the extent that any airborne radioactivity has been measured or reported. There are some variations depending upon whether waste packages have been covered with cement during the year or not. The yearly doses to the personnel at SFR are very low, so low that they are barely measurable.
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
mmanSv
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
128 Studsvik operates several facilities for treatment of radioactive waste. For 2010 Studsvik reported an annual collective dose of 0.51 manSv and an average individual effective dose of 3.1 mSv. For staff that works with waste management at Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB fuel factory annual individual doses are below 1 mSv.
F.4.2.2 Radiation doses from releases of radioactive substances
Figure F2 displays the estimated effective dose (in microsievert) to the representative person (“critical group”) from the releases of radioactive substances at the major Swedish nuclear facilities for the years 2005-2010. The resulting estimated effective doses are less than 1 % of the stipulated dose constraint of 0.1 mSv at all the Swedish sites.
Figure F2: Estimated radiation doses in microsievert (µSv) to the “representative person” from releases of radioactive substances at Swedish nuclear facilities in the period 2005-2010
Through the installation of new abatement systems and successive clean-up of primary systems the releases at the power plants have generally decreased during the last decade. The somewhat larger releases at Ringhals are due to the contribution from carbon-14 from the PWR reactors.
From the available release data it is not possible to single out releases from the radioactive waste management at the NPPs. The releases of radioactive substances from Clab, SFR and Ranstad Mineral are very small. From the closed and partially dismantled Ågesta reactor (PHWR) small amounts of tritium is released through the drainage of the rock chamber where the shutdown reactor is situated.
Ringhals Oskarshamn Forsmark Studsvik Barsebäck
0,60
0,50
0,40
0,30
0,20
0,10
0,00
Nuclear Facility
Effective dose/microsievert
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
F.4.3 regulatory control
See section E.2.2.3 for SSM control and inspections
F.4.4 Conclusion
Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 24.
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
F.5 Article 25: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
1. Each Contracting Party shall ensure that before and during operation of a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility there are appropriate on-site and, if necessary, off-site emergency plans. Such emergency plans should be tested at an appropriate frequency.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps for the preparation and testing of emergency plans for its territory insofar as it is likely to be affected in the event of a radiological emergency at a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility in the vicinity of its territory.
Summary of developments since the last national report
- The	realization	of	a	single	authority,	SSM,	led	to	the	merger	of	the	emergency	 preparedness responsibilities of the two former authorities. A new crisis organisation was developed at SSM and regulatory supervision of the emergency planning at the facilities was strengthened. SSM’s regulations on emergency planning and preparedness entered into force on July 1, 2008.
- The	Swedish	Emergency	Management	Agency	(KBM)	and	the	Swedish	Rescue Services Agency (SRV) were merged into a new agency, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) in 2009. The task of the MSB is to enhance and support the societal capacities for preparedness for and prevention of emergencies and crises.
- A	national	web-based	information	system	is	used	for	information	exchange	 during all types of crises. The Swedish gamma monitoring system was replaced and modernized during 2008 - 2010.
- At	all	NPP’s	the	organisation	has	been	strengthened	to	ensure	that	key	persons	 are available at an early stage during an unusual event. A third alarm level has been introduced to be used when extra support is needed during events of a lower	class	than	those	classified	as	increased	preparedness.
- As	 a	 follow-up	 to	 the	 TEPCO	 Fukushima	 Dai-ichi	 NPP	 nuclear	 accident,	
SSM, on May 25 2011, decided that the NPP licensees and SKB shall redo the safety assessments for the NPPs and for the interim storage for spent nuclear fuel at Clab at Oskarshamn.
F.5.1 regulatory requirements
The emergency plans for the three operating nuclear power plants and the industry facilities at Studsvik include all the installations for spent fuel and radioactive waste management at these facilities. SKB has an emergency plan for the Clab interim storage for spent nuclear fuel. There is no formal requirement for an emergency plan at SFR; however a rescue organisation exists nevertheless. Westinghouse Sweden Electric AB operates the fuel fabrication facility in Västerås which also has an emergency plan.
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
Requirements on on-site emergency activities and plans for the nuclear facilities are included in several legally binding documents:
- The Civil Protection Act (SFS 2003:778) regarding protection against accidents with serious potential consequences for human health and the environment,
- The	Civil	Protection	Ordinance	(SFS	2003:789)	regarding	protection	against	 accidents with serious potential consequences for human health and the environment,
- SSM	regulations	(SSMFS	2008:1)	concerning	safety	in	nuclear	facilities,	and
- SSM	regulations	(SSMFS	2008:15)	concerning	emergency	preparedness	at	 certain nuclear facilities.
The overarching objective of the Civil Protection Act (2003:778) is the civil protection for the whole country – with consideration given to local conditions – for life, health, property and the environment against all types of incident, accident, emergency, crisis and disaster. The Act requires preventive measures and emergency preparedness to be arranged by the owner or operator of a facility with dangerousactivities.TheActfurtherdefinestheresponsibilitiesfortheindividual, the local communities, and the state in cases of serious accidents, including radiological accidents. The Act contains provisions as to how the community rescue services shall be organized and operated and also stipulates that a rescue commanderwithaspecifiedcompetence,withfar-reachingauthority,istobeengaged for all rescue operations. According to the Act, the County Administrative Board is responsible for the rescue operations in cases where the public needs protection from a radioactive release from a nuclear installation or in cases where such release seems imminent.
The Civil Protection Ordinance (2003:779) contains general provisions concerningemergencyplanningandismorespecificaboutreportingobligations,information to the public, and the responsibility of the county authority for planning and implementing public protective measures, contents of the off-site emergency plan, competence requirements on rescue managers and inner emergency planning and monitoring zones around the major nuclear facilities. The County Administrative Board is obliged to make a radiological emergency response plan. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency is responsible, at the national level, for the coordination and supervision of the preparedness for the rescue services response to radioactive release. SSM decides on necessary measures for and supervises the nuclear installations.
The SSM-regulations SSMFS 2008:1 require the licensee, in case of emergencies, to take prompt actions in order to:
- classify	the	event	according	to	the	alarm	criteria,
- alert	the	facility’s	emergency	preparedness	organisation,
- assess	the	risk	for	and	size	of	possible	releases	and	time	related	aspects,
- return	the	facility	to	a	safe	and	stable	state,	and
- inform	the	responsible	authorities.
The actions shall be documented in an emergency preparedness plan which is subject to safety review by the licensee and must be approved by SSM. The plan shall be	kept	up	to	date	and	validated	through	regular	exercises.	SSM	shall	be	notified	
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
132 of changes in the plan. The licensee has to assign staff, provide suitable facilities, technical systems, tools and protective equipment needed to solve the emergency preparedness tasks. The emergency planning should include all design basis accidents, as well as beyond design basis events, including severe events, and combinations	of	events,	such	as	fire	or	sabotage	in	connection	with	a	radiological	accident. The SSM regulations SSMFS 2008:15 on emergency planning and preparedness have a radiation protection perspective. They are mainly based on the IAEA Safety Standards GS-R-2: Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency and include requirements on:
- Emergency	planning	including	alarm	criteria	and	alarming
- Emergency	rooms/premises/facilities	and	assembly	places
- Training	and	exercises
- Iodine	prophylaxis
- Personal	protective	equipment
- Evacuation	plan
- Contacts	with	SSM
- Radiation	monitoring
- Emergency	ventilation
- Collection	of	meteorological	data Depending on the radiological hazard potential at the facility, the requirements regarding radiation monitoring, emergency ventilation, and collection of meteorological data differ.
F.5.2 national monitoring and measuring
The Crisis Management Co-ordination Secretariat was established in March 2008 within	the	Government	Offices	of	Sweden	to	strengthen	the	crisis	management	 and communication capability. The responsibilities include policy intelligence and situation reporting, crisis management and crisis communications, analysis, and being	a	central	contact	point	at	the	Government	Offices.	
Nearly all accidents and crisis situations are handled by appointed central or regional authorities who, with their allocated resources, manage these situations. However, if a national crisis with the potential to affect many citizens with (coupled) large, cross-sector negative economic, environmental or other detrimental societal effects occurs, it will require decisions and actions by the Government. The Secretariat gathers information, assesses the situation, and recommends Government	actions.	The	Prime	Minister’s	Office,	with	the	support	of	the	Crisis	 Management Secretariat, shall ensure that the necessary cooperation within the Government	Offices	and	with	the	relevant	authorities	is	rapidly	established.
On January 1, 2009 the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) was formed, merging three earlier central authorities with emergency preparedness and civil defence responsibilities. MSB co-ordinates emergency preparedness funding and work, and oversees the planning of the regional County Administrative Boards. MSB, together with other concerned authorities, started a long-term work to strengthen the national nuclear emergency preparedness planning and response work.	The	focus	is,	as	earlier	suggested	by	the	Swedish	National	Audit	Office,	 on ensuring needed economical means, improving the quality of risk and threat analysis, improving supervision of necessary training and education, further deve-
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
loping procedures for follow-up and experience feed-back, and ensuring due consideration of long-term and post-accident effects in the emergency preparedness planning and work.
SSM is taking part in the national planning and development process. Some actual results of these efforts are an enhanced national emergency response centre and a countrywide measurement, sampling and analysis expert organisation for radiological and nuclear accidents and events.
The two national alarm levels for nuclear emergencies: 1) Increased preparedness and 2) General emergency were complemented by a third, lower level alarm. This alarm level is to be used when the normal organisation needs extra support during	unusual	events	that	are	of	a	lower	class	than	those	classified	as	Increased	 preparedness.
Two of the nuclear power sites have installed “rapid-reach” computerised systems for alarming the on-site organizations. These systems automatically dial predetermined numbers. The emergency staffs of each nuclear power plant are included	in	the	general	systems	used	at	the	plants	for	staffing,	competence	analysis,	 training and annual competence assessment.
During recent years, in connection with other development and refurbishment works, the owners of the facilities have improved their emergency facilities.
Relevant meteorological data from the power plants, the sites for the operation of spent fuel or radioactive waste management facilities and for the fuel processing facility are now electronically transferred directly into SSM’s dispersion modelling database, enabling improved dispersion calculations to be performed.
To	improve	the	flow	of	external	information	between	all	responsible	parties	 involved in a nuclear accident, a new web-based system for national crisis information management has been introduced. The system aims at exchanging information and decisions taken in the event of an emergency, and is used nationally for all types of emergencies through the national agency MSB. The system has been used in exercises and improvements are made after evaluations. Currently, applications to improve system security are being investigated.
In	order	to	make	the	first	information	transfer	faster	and	more	accurate	between the affected plant and the off-site authorities, a standard electronic format has been recently developed. This format is now in regular use during incidents and exercises.
F.5.3 national monitoring
Sweden has acquired a new, modern gamma monitoring network which presently has 28 permanent gamma stations spread around the country designed to provide warning and rapid information on radiation levels. Each station records the radiation level continually and if the integrated 24-h radiation dose differs by more than 10	%,	the	officer	on	duty	at	SSM	will	be	alerted.	A	fixed	alarm	level	is	currently	 set at 500 nanosieverts per hour (500 nSv/h) but the alarm level can be changed according to prevailing conditions.
Sweden	also	has	six	sensitive	permanent	air	filter	stations	which	sample	the	 air continuously and can reveal the type of plant from which radioactive releases originate. The system is sensitive enough to measure activity levels in the order of tens of microBq/m
3
(about 100 atoms per cubic meter) and is therefore also used
for environmental monitoring, e.g., for measuring the caesium-137 released from the combustion of biomass.
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
The gamma monitoring system is supplemented by radiation level data collected	by	the	environmental	and	health	care	offices	of	the	local	authorities	at	permanent measurement points every seventh month in the municipalities, providing a background measurement base (sensitivity of 20-30 nSv/hour). The results of the measurements after deposition can be compared with these reference measurements which have been registered at 2 – 4 measurement points in each municipality. These data are collected from the municipalities by the county administrative board which compiles and transmits the readings to a national database. The Swedish municipal measurement system provides a base and is a system for quickly mapping the country in the event of radioactive fallout, and allows for detecting even small increases in radiation level at the reference points.
The Geological Survey of Sweden and the county police force are contracted for the use of aircraft and helicopters for airborne measurements of radiation. More detailed measurements are made to serve as a basis for decisions concerning, for example, declaring pasture land free of contamination for grazing.
SSM has agreements with laboratories around Sweden mostly at universities, under the terms of which they maintain a state of preparedness for making measurements and analyses and providing expert advice. SSM has also an agreement with the voluntary organizations of the Armed Forces, e.g. the Women’s Voluntary Defence Service, the Women’s Motor Transport Corps, and the Women’s Auxiliary	Veterinary	Corps,	for	collecting	needed	field	samples.
F.5.4 Medical emergency preparedness
The county administrative board is responsible for medical disaster preparedness. Injured persons are cared and treated
- through	qualified	medical	care	in	the	injury	area,	or
- in	hospitals	or	at	medical	health	centres. At the major national hospitals, like Karolinska hospital in Stockholm, more advanced treatment and care can be arranged. Cooperation and sharing of resources also exists between the European hospitals in case of major accidents.
If there is an accident involving nuclear technology, the emergency organisation within SSM is activated. In the next alarm chain, the Swedish National Board of Health (SoS) is activated along with the Nuclear and Radiological Medical Expert Group (NR-MEG) appointed by the SoS. Several other authorities are also activated at the same time, depending on the scenario. Medical doctors from the medical areas haematology, oncology, radiology, and catastrophe medicine are represented within NR-MEG. The group has an on-call operation and is available for giving advice,	also	in	connection	with	minor	incidents,	by	contact	through	the	officer	on	 duty at the SoS. In case of a large accident, the group is summoned to the national emergency centre at SSM and is provided with information on radiation levels, meteorological conditions, etc. With the information available NR-MEG performs a medical risk judgement and delivers the information and suggestions for measures primarily directed to the medical doctor in charge at the county administrative board’s rescue work management group. NR-MEG advises and informs the treating medical doctors and the medical care centres in the county.
To facilitate medical emergency preparedness in Sweden, SoS has established a Centre for Radiation Medicine, located at the Karolinska Institute in Stockholm. Among the tasks of this centre it has to contribute with health care information,
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
education, and advice and carry out research activities in areas related to medical effects of ionizing radiation. A close collaboration has been established with SSM and various other national and international bodies.
F.5.5 exercises
A number of emergency preparedness exercises of various sizes are conducted annually in Sweden. These vary in complexity from simple tests of alarm systems to full-scale exercises. Periodical tests of the alerting systems between the power plants and the authorities are performed during each year.
Every second year a “total” exercise is performed at one of the three nuclear power sites to check the plans and the capability of the on-site and off-site organizations. The full-scale exercises are designed to enable evaluation of command at the regional level, national inter-agency cooperation, and public information. The full-scale exercises are often also used for testing international communications.
The respective county authority where the plant is located has the responsibility for planning these exercises, often with the assistance of the national agency MSB, which is also responsible for the evaluation and follow-up analyses. SSM participates in the planning and evaluation. Usually 15 - 30 organizations participate in these exercises, including the regulatory bodies and the government. In addition, a number of more limited on-site functional exercises are conducted at	all	the	Swedish	plants	every	year.	Specific	plans	exist	for	these	exercises.	Exercised functions are for instance accident management, communication within the emergency preparedness organisation, environmental monitoring and sampling, assessment of core damage and source terms and assessment of total environmental consequences of a scenario. The rescue forces are exercised regularly, as well	as	first	aid	and	emergency	maintenance.	SSM	frequently	participates	in	such	 exercises both as observer, in its supervisory role, or to exercise the authorities’ own emergency staff.
Other exercise scenarios have included physical protection events such as sabotage, armed intrusion, and the taking of hostages in order to exercise coordination between the special police forces and other actors. In the spring of 2011 a large national exercise, SAMÖ-KKÖ, was performed based on a loss-of-cooling accident and partial core melt at Oskarshamn NPP. It involved authorities and rescue	organisations	at	central,	regional	and	local	level.	The	first	phase,	lasting	 for 48 hours, involved 3-shifts for the participating staffs, while the latter phase of 5-6 weeks was carried out by having the participating organisations solving problems, giving advice and suggesting countermeasures based on a radiological situation with wide-spread contamination resulting from the initial accident and its release of radioactive substances. During the latter phase of the national exercise, the March 11 nuclear accident at TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP in Japan activated and engaged the central Swedish national emergency organisation for several weeks to follow.
Sweden has a long tradition of participating in international emergency preparedness exercises. This allows for testing of aspects related to bilateral and international	agreements	on	early	notification	and	information	exchange.	Sweden	regularly participates in the IAEA Convention Exercises (CONVEX) and the OECD/ NEA International Nuclear Emergency Exercises (INEX) and yearly ECURIE exercises.
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
F.5.6 Measures taken to inform neighbouring States
Sweden	has	ratified	the	International	Convention	on	Early	Notification	and	the	 Convention	on	Assistance	in	the	Case	of	a	Nuclear	Accident.	An	official	national point of contact has been established, available 24 hours all days. Sweden has bilateral agreements with Denmark, Norway, Finland, Germany, Ukraine and Russia	regarding	early	notification	and	exchange	of	information	in	the	event	of	an	 incident or accident at a Swedish nuclear power plant or abroad. An agreement at the authority level also exists with Lithuania. Sweden uses the ECURIE information system for information exchange within the European Union and the ENAC/ Emercon system for information exchange between the IAEA member states.
The Nordic authorities involved in radiological emergency planning have agreed to exchange data on a routine basis from the automatic gamma monitoring stations	in	the	respective	countries.	The	five	Nordic	countries	Denmark,	Finland,	 Iceland, Norway and Sweden have compiled a Nordic Manual describing communication and information routines between the countries for an extensive list of scenarios,	which	has	been	agreed	upon	by	these	five	countries.
F.5.7 nuclear accidents abroad
As demonstrated by the Chernobyl accident 1986, Sweden can be affected by a nuclear accident abroad. Although the foreseeable consequences are such that the use of iodine tablets, sheltering or relocation of people due to fall-out is not likely in Sweden, the impact on agriculture, animal breeding, forestry, hunting, recreation,	and	private	house-hold	activities	(fishing,	picking	mushrooms,	game	hunting,	 vegetable gardening, etc.) and on the environment can be substantial due to the uptake and concentration of radioactive substances in plants, animals and human food-chains.
The responsibility of SSM and other authorities to distribute information is strengthened in this situation. The local county administrative boards that are affected still have the responsibility to inform and take any protective action in their region according to the earlier mentioned legislation. During the national exercise South Wind in 2008 the responsibilities of national and regional authorities were tested. Ambiguities in allotment of rolls and responsibilities were analysed.
The Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute, SMHI, performs transport and deposition simulations regularly using the program MATCH (a 3-dimensional “off-line” Eulerian atmospheric transport code) and the actual weather. A hypothetical standard release of radioactive substances from the Swedish and some of the nuclear reactors in operation in other countries around the Baltic Sea is tracked by this computer code and the calculations are updated every sixth hour using actual weather. The transport, spread, and concentration of the simulated, released radio-nuclides are displayed.
Furthermore, the MATCH-trajectory simulations are also available for tracing the	 source	 regions	 for	 recorded	 measurements	 at	 specific	 measurement	 points.	 For a few selected places in Sweden, such backward direction trajectories can be followed for the last 72 hours. Although the nuclear accident at the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP did not have radiological consequences in Sweden, the Swedish emergency organisation was activated and worked around the clock for three weeks analysing and evaluating the situation in order to give advice to the Swedish Embassy and Swedish citizens in Japan.
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
F.5.8 new developments in emergency preparedness
The County Administration Boards in the counties that have nuclear plants and the national authorities MSB and SSM have established an action plan including a variety of projects aimed at enhancing a coordinated emergency planning and response for nuclear power plant accidents and incidents. These projects are ongoing and have different completion dates, the latest being in 2012. These projects aim	at	mitigating	identified	needs	in	the	organisation	of	education	and	exercises,	 coordinating communication, coordinating national and regional measurement and analysis teams, further developments in and coordinating of sanitation procedures and creating a national information strategy.
SSM has supported further developments in Sweden’s dispersion modelling capabilities in cooperation with the SMHI and the Swedish Defence Research Agency. The resolution of the dispersion prognosis has been enhanced by using higher resolution weather forecasts. A code for urban dispersion modelling has been	developed	with	special	emphasis	on	wind	field	modelling	in	urban	environments. This can be applied locally to the topography at the Swedish plants. SSM is currently compiling high resolution topographical data sets for all the Swedish nuclear	installations	thereby	enabling	better	estimates	of	the	near	field	dispersion.	 This is further enhanced by the new feature of local weather data at each plant being sent electronically directly to the database for the dispersion modelling in real time.
The merging of SSI and SKI into a single regulatory authority, SSM, has resulted in a more effective thorough supervision of the nuclear installations in Sweden.
On May 25 2011, as follow-up to the nuclear accident at the TEPCO Fukushima	Dai-ichi	NPP	and	in	accordance	to	the	EU	“stress	tests”	specifications,	 SSM decided that the licensees of the nuclear power plants and SKB, as licensee of Clab, shall re-evaluate their safety analyses for their facilities regarding station	black-outs,	loss-of-cooling	etc.	as	a	result	of	severe	winds,	flooding	or	other	 natural phenomena. Furthermore, regardless of the initiating events, the capacity and the capability of the emergency organisation and the effectiveness of technical equipment and planned countermeasures to handle an emergency in a situation with destroyed infrastructure, loss of external power and severe contamination in the surrounding area shall be evaluated. The results of analyses and safety evaluations,	and	identified	measures	to	further	improve	the	emergency	preparedness	or	 the ability of the facility to handle severe accident scenarios should be reported to SSM before October 31, 2011.
F.5.9 regulatory control
After the implementation of the SSI regulations concerning emergency preparedness at certain nuclear facilities in 2006, a series of inspections was carried out in 2007 and 2008 at all of the nuclear facilities that were covered by the regulations to insure implementation had been properly carried out. The conclusion was that the licensees complied with the requirements of the regulations. At all sites, however,	aspects	for	further	improvements	were	identified	and	SSM	has	continued	to	 follow	up	these	findings	during	2008	-	2011.
The merging in July of 2008 of SSI and SKI into a single authority, SSM, has provided the conditions for a more clear and consistent picture of the requirements that came from the combined regulations of the two earlier authorities. Supervision of emergency preparedness regulations is now concentrated to one national
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
138 coordinating authority and the main responsibility for the supervision is organised within one section at that authority, which also provides a basis for a clearer supervisory role at the authority. The various relevant competences within the authority that are needed for the supervisory work are available and can be more effectively integrated in the supervision work than was possible earlier. This has led to more effective developments in the supervisory work as well as an increased number of inspections in a year.
One development which began during 2009 and is currently progressing concerns a review of the regulations (SSMFS 2008:15) and (SSMFS 2008:1) which came from the earlier SSI and SKI, respectively, with the intention to combine and harmonize all aspects of regulating emergency preparedness at the licensees, and to use the earlier experiences from the implementation of the regulations to revise the regulations with the expected result of clearer and stronger requirements on the nuclear installations.
F.5.10 Conclusion
Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 25.
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
F.6 Article 26: DECOMMISSIONING
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure the safety of decommissioning of a nuclear facility. Such steps shall ensure that:
	 (i)	qualified	staff	and	adequate	financial	resources	are	available; (ii) the provisions of Article 24 with respect to operational radiation
protection, discharges and unplanned and uncontrolled releases are applied; (iii) the provisions of Article 25 with respect to emergency pre-
paredness are applied; and (iv) records of information important to decommissioning are kept.
F.6.1 regulatory requirements
According to the Environmental Code prior permission is needed for decommissioning and dismantling. As described in Section E.2.2.4 the applicant has to show compliance with a number of principles, e.g. the knowledge principle, the precautionary and BAT principles, and the after-treatment liability principle.
F.6.1.1 Nuclear safety
According to the Act on Nuclear Activities (SFS 1984:3), the license-holder for nuclear activities shall be responsible for ensuring that all measures are taken needed for:
- maintaining	safety,	taking	into	account	the	nature	of	the	operation	and	the	 circumstances in which it is conducted,
- safe	management	and	disposal	of	nuclear	waste	generated	by	the	operation	or	 nuclear material derived from the operation that is not reused, and
- safe	 decommissioning	 and	 dismantling	 of	 facilities	 in	 which	 the	 operation	 shall be discontinued until such date that all operations at the facilities have ceased and all nuclear material and nuclear waste have been placed in a disposal facility that has been sealed permanently.
It follows from the third paragraph that a license-holder is not exempted from responsibilities according to the act until decommissioning and dismantling has taken place. The general regulations SSMFS 2008:1 contains a chapter on decommissioning with requirements on:
- A	preliminary	plan	for	the	future	decommissioning	of	the	facility	to	be	compiled as before construction of a facility.
- An	integrated	analysis	and	assessment	of	how	safety	is	going	to	be	maintained	 during the time remaining until closure, to be done as soon as a decision has been	taken	on	final	shutdown	of	a	facility.
- The	 decommissioning	 plan	 to	 be	 supplemented	 and	 incorporated	 into	 the	 facility’s safety report before the dismantling of the facility may be initiated.
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
140 The plan shall include measures, which must be implemented to ensure the safe containment of the generated nuclear waste. Thus, the general obligations in the regulations SSMFS 2008:1 and several other regulations (see section F.6.1.2) are applicable for the decommissioning and dismantling activities, regarding:
- the	availability	of	qualified	staff	and	financial	resources	(as	accounted	for	in	 section F.2);
- the	application	of	provisions	with	respect	to	operational	radiation	protection,	 discharges and unplanned and uncontrolled releases (as accounted for in section F.4);
- the	application	of	provisions	with	respect	to	emergency	preparedness	(as	accounted for in section F.5); and
- the	keeping	of	records	of	information	important	to	decommissioning.
F.6.1.2 Radiation protection
Most of the regulations on radiation protection that are applicable at nuclear facilities are also valid during decommissioning (see section F.4).
The	regulations	SSMFS	2008:38	requires	filing	of	documentation	at	nuclear	 facilities. The licence-holder shall keep archives where documentation related to radiation	protection	aspects	of	a	practice	shall	be	filed.	If	the	practice	ceases	the	 archives shall be handed over to the National Archives of Sweden or Regional Archives. Detailed requirements on keeping a register for the radioactive waste and nuclear waste at nuclear facilities are given in SSMFS 2008:22. The register shall e.g. contain information on the origin of the waste and the amount and nuclide specific	content	of	the	waste.
Planning of radiation protection issues before and during the decommissioning of nuclear plants is regulated in SSMFS 2008:19. The regulations put requirements on	planning,	both	during	operation	and	after	final	shutdown.	The	main	purpose	of	 the regulations is to ensure that worker doses and releases of radioactivity to the environment during decommissioning are in accordance with ALARA principles and	within	specified	limits,	by	requiring	adequate	planning	of	the	decommissioning	 activities in advance. The contents of the regulations are described below.
Area of application
The regulations SSMFS 2008:19 are intended to be applicable to all nuclear facilities, except permanent installations in repositories for radioactive wastes (such parts that will remain after closure).
Definitions
The term ”decommissioning” is used to describe all actions taken by the licenceholder	after	final	shutdown	in	order	to	reduce	the	amount	of	radioactive	substances	 in the land and building structures to levels that permit release of the site and any buildings left behind.
The term ”release of site” is used to describe a decision by the SSM that, from a radiation protection point of view, there are no further restrictions on the use of land and any remaining buildings.
The	term	”finally	shutdown	facility”	is	used	to	describe	a	facility	in	which	the	 main operations have ceased with no intention to resuming them.
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
New or reconstructed facilities
It is required that radiation protection issues of the future decommissioning shall be considered during construction of a new nuclear facility or when an existing facility is reconstructed.
Decommissioning plans
For nuclear facilities in operation, the main requirement of the regulations is that the licence-holder shall have a preliminary plan for future decommissioning of the facility. The plan shall be kept up-to-date and reviewed in connection with changes in the facility. The regulations do not prescribe how or when decommissioning shall be performed. Instead, the regulations demand that the licence-holder investigates different possible options in order to make an optimised choice.
Finally shut down facility
When	a	facility	has	been	finally	shut	down,	the	regulations	require	that	the	licenceholder present an overall description of the foreseen decommissioning, covering methods, time-scales and project goals. The description shall be submitted to SSM within	one	year	of	the	final	shutdown,	together	with	an	overall	description	of	the	 radiological consequences of the chosen decommissioning option. The description shall cover probable radiation doses to personnel and releases of radioactive substances to the environment, activities that can lead to unplanned events, and the expected	amounts	and	flow	of	radioactive	material.
Dismantling and demolition after final shutdown
The regulations require that the licence-holder shall submit an overall description of the work to the SSM at least four months before dismantling is initiated. The description shall essentially be a detailed plan of the foreseen activities, covering the same issues as the pre-planning. SSM will review the plan and, if required, impose additional radiation protection conditions on the work.
Basis for site release
After decommissioning, the licence-holder should prove that the site could be released from regulatory control. Therefore the regulations require that the licenceholder shall document relevant information during decommissioning. The documentation shall contain results from measurements and calculations, as well as information	 concerning	 decisions	 and	 actions	 taken	 that	 have	 influence	 on	 the	 distribution and the amount of remaining radioactive substances.
Further guidance need to be developed concerning radiological criteria and for free release of a site.
F.6.2 Measures taken by the license holders
The nuclear power companies are responsible for decommissioning of the nuclear power plants. SKB has been assigned the task of conducting general decommissioning studies in order to ensure that that overall necessary competence exists and that cost calculations are carried out according to requirements. SKB and the nuclear power companies participates in various international decommissioning studies undertaken by international organizations, and also by direct contact with various decommissioning projects that may be of value for planning activities in Sweden.
Management of decommissioning waste is coordinated through SKB and
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
142 SKB has also been tasked with the future disposal of decommissioning waste. For division	of	responsibility	see	figure	F3. A method for dry interim storage of core components has since earlier been developed, along with a database system for record keeping. The existing BFA storage facility on the Simpevarp Peninsula, as well as storage facilities at Ringhals and Forsmark power plants and at the Studsvik site are used for interim storage of core components and other long lived waste.
Commercial power plants
As basis for the cost estimates (see section E.2.2.5) cost calculations have been made for two reference NPPs, Oskarshamn 3 (BWR) and Ringhals 2 (PWR) and then transferred to the other NPPs. The cost estimates have during 2010 been updated with the results from more recent decommissioning studies of Barsebäck 1 and	Barsebäck	2,	which	were	finalised	during	2008.
Preliminary decommissioning plans have been developed for all the Swedish nuclear power plants during 2005 and 2006.
The nuclear power reactors Barsebäck 1 and Barsebäck 2 has been adapted to shut down operation. A decommissioning plan for both units has been submitted to, and approved of, by the regulatory authorities. All nuclear fuel has been removed and transported to Clab for interim storage. System decontamination has been carried out for both reactors and dismantling is planned to start in 2020. Dismantling waste management and transportation will be carried out as an industrial process where low radiation doses are prioritized. Clearance measures will only be	carried	out	when	a	significant	advantage	can	be	seen	in	an	ALARA	perspective.
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
Figure F3: Division of responsibility during decommissioning
Responsibility for transportation and management
Limit of responsibility, facilities
Cleared material/waste
Clab
Nuclear power
reactor
Interim storage
facility at NPP
Interim storage
facility, SKB
SFL
SFR
Public
recycling/landfilling
Conditioning, Decontamination
Near-surface repository at NPP
Short-lived waste, licensee who owns or operates a nuclear power reactor Long-lived waste, licensee who owns or operates a nuclear power reactor Short-lived waste, SKB Long-lived waste, SKB
Licensee who owns or operates a nuclear power reactor
SKB
Owner of public recycled material
Section F – Other general SaFety prOviSiOnS
Research facilities
There are a number of facilities at the Studsvik site that are in the process of being decommissioned and/or dismantled. Plans for the decommissioning and dismantling of those facilities have, before actual decommissioning activities started, been prepared by the license-holders and submitted to SSM for evaluation and approval, according to requirements in the general regulations. The status of the facilities under decommissioning is accounted for in section D.1.5.
SKB facilities
For Clink a preliminary decommissioning plans have been written which conforms to the requirement of the regulatory authorities. SKB plans to prepare a decommissioning study of Clink focusing on waste volumes and radioactivity content, during 2011 as a basis for extension of SFR.
Planning for an extension of SFR began during 2007. The extension will give opportunity for disposal of decommissioning waste from primarily Barsebäck, and be ready for operation by 2020. Investigations of the bedrock have been performed. Work with a preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) and an environmental impact statement (EIS) is ongoing. According to the plans, the construction application will be submitted to the regulatory authorities in 2013. SKB has written	a	simplified	account	of	how	decommissioning	for	SFR	is	planned	to	be	carried	 out. This is due to that the above ground facilities can be regarded as conventional buildings.
A preliminary decommissioning plan have been written for the spent fuel disposal facility and was included in the application under the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities for disposal of spent fuel and under the Environmental Code for the KBS-3 system.
Investigation of different concepts for the disposal facility for long-lived low- and intermediate waste (SFL) was started 2011. A safety evaluation of at least two different concepts is planned for 2013. SFL is not expected to start operation until 2045. No decommissioning plans have yet been written for SFL.
F.6.3 regulatory control
Regulatory control is conducted by means of the regulatory review and approval of plans for decommissioning and dismantling, both according to regulations (requirements on information and on safety assessments), the Environmental Code (applications for licenses and environmental impact assessments) and the Act on Nuclear Activities (R&D-programme presented by the NPP operators every third year), complemented by inspection activities at the sites, as necessary.
F.6.4 Conclusion
Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 26.
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
G.1 Article 4: GENERAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure
that at all stages of spent fuel management, individuals, society and the environment are adequately protected against radiological hazards. In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to: (i) ensure that criticality and removal of residual heat generated
during spent fuel management are adequately addressed; (ii) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste associated with
spent fuel management is kept to the minimum practicable, consistent with the type of fuel cycle policy adopted; (iii) take into account interdependencies among the different steps in
spent fuel management; (iv) provide for effective protection of individuals, society and the
environment, by applying at the national level suitable protective methods as approved by the regulatory body, in the framework of its national legislation which has due regard to internationally endorsed criteria and standards; (v) take into account the biological, chemical and other hazards
that may be associated with spent fuel management; (vi) strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably predictable im-
pacts on future generations greater than those permitted for the current generation; (vi) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations.
G.1.1 Regulatory requirements
G.1.1.1 The general obligations of license-holders
As accounted for in section E.2.2.1, the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities (1984:3) requires that the holder of a licence for the operation of a nuclear power reactor shall – in co-operation with the other holders of a licence for the operation of nuclear power reactors – establish and carry out an R&D-programme for the safe handling and disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste. Every third year the programme shall be submitted to the Government, or an authority assigned by the Government, for evaluation.
Also, as accounted for in section E.2.2.5, the Financing Act (2006:647) requires the licensees to submit, every three years, estimates of all future costs for management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste, and decommissioning. The licensee of a nuclear power reactor shall base costs estimates on 40 years of operation with a minimum remaining operating time of 6 years. The licensee of nuclear facilities other than nuclear power reactors shall base cost estimates and the buildup of adequate financial resources on the expected remaining period of operation.
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
G.1.1.2 Basic provisions and license obligations
Basic safety provisions are stipulated in the Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3). The requirements are further clarified in the general safety regulations SSM 2008:1. In the regulations it is stated that, in order to ensure adequate protection at all stages of spent fuel management, the licensee shall:
1. establish documented guidelines for how safety shall be maintained at the
facility as well as ensure that the personnel performing duties which are important to safety are well acquainted with the guidelines;
2. ensure that the activities carried out at the facility are controlled and develo-
ped with the support of a quality system which covers those activities which are of importance for safety;
3. ensure that decisions on safety-related issues are preceded by adequate in-
vestigation and consultation so that the issues are comprehensively examined;
4. ensure that adequate personnel is available with the necessary competence
and suitability on all respects needed for those tasks which are of importance for safety as well as ensure that this is documented;
5. ensure that responsibilities and authority are defined and documented with
respect to personnel carrying out work which is important to safety;
6. ensure that the personnel is provided with the necessary conditions to work in
a safe manner;
7. ensure that experience from the facility’s own and from similar activities is
continuously utilised and communicated to the personnel concerned; and
8. ensure that safety, through these and other measures, is maintained and conti-
nuously developed.
In the Radiation Protection Act (1988:220) it is stipulated that radioactive waste shall be handled and disposed of in a manner that is satisfactory from a radiation protection point of view.
There are also regulations on the protection of human health and the environment in connection with the final management of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste (SSMFS 2008:37). The purpose of these regulations is to limit the harmful effects on human health and the environment in connection with the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste.
In addition there are requirements concerning the long-term safety of a disposal facility in the regulations SSMFS 2008:21. According to the regulations, the safety assessment for a disposal facility should also comprise features, events and processes that can lead to the dispersion of radioactive substances after closure.
G.1.1.3 Criticality and removal of residual heat
The general safety regulations (SSSM 2008:1) state that radiological accidents shall be prevented by the design, construction, operation, monitoring and maintenance of a facility. It follows that a criticality analysis as well as an analysis of heat generation and removal of residual heat must be included in the safety report supporting the licence application for any nuclear facility.
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
G.1.1.4 Interdependencies among the different steps in spent fuel management;
The fact that the licence-holders are responsible for the handling and disposal of the spent nuclear they generate provides an incentive to consider all steps from generation to disposal. Detailed requirements are stipulated in SSM’s general regulations SSMFS 2008:1. Measures for the safe on-site handling and storage of spent fuel shall be analysed and verified, and included in the safety report of the facility. The safety report shall also include measures, which need to be taken on-site to prepare for the safe subsequent transportation, storage or disposal of spent fuel.
G.1.1.5 Protection of individuals, society and the environment
General radiation protection provisions are described in section F.4.1. Radiation protection of the public and the environment in connection with spent fuel management is specifically addressed in SSM regulations 2008:37 and 2008:21, see also E.2.2.3). In summary it is required that:
- a disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel shall be designed so that the annual risk of harmful effects after closure does not exceed 10E-6 for a representative individual in the group exposed to the greatest risk;
- disposal of spent nuclear fuel shall be implemented so that biodiversity and the sustainable use of biological resources are protected, and
- human health and the environment shall be protected during the operation of a nuclear facility as well as in the future.
G.1.1.6 Biological, chemical and other hazards
An Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) must be submitted together with an application for a licence according to the Act on Nuclear Activities and the Radiation Protection Act, as accounted for in section E.2. It is stated in the general considerations in the Environmental Code that due consideration shall be taken to possible effects from chemical, biological and other hazards. It follows that chemical, biological and other hazards during the operation of a nuclear facility must be addressed in the EIS.
Post-closure safety for a disposal facility is specifically addressed in SSMFS 2008:21.
G.1.1.7 Strive to avoid actions that impose impacts on future generations
One purpose of SSMFS 2008:22 is to limit the harmful effects of radiation from the waste today and in the future. In SSMFS 2008:23 it is also stated that human health and the environment shall be protected from the harmful effects of ionising radiation during the operation of a nuclear facility as well as in the future. SSMFS 2008:37 has general requirements stipulating that human health and the environment shall be protected from detrimental effects of ionising radiation, during the time when various stages of the final management of spent nuclear fuel or nuclear waste are being implemented as well as in the future. All these regulations strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably predictable impacts on future generations greater than those permitted for the current generation.
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
G.1.1.8 Aim to avoid imposing burdens in future generations
As described in section E.2 the practices for the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste are governed by principles adopted by the Swedish Parliament. The first governing principle reads ”The expenses for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste are to be covered by revenues from the production of energy that has resulted in these expenses.” The second principle reads”The reactor owners are to safely dispose of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste.”
The key words (underlined) imply that burden on future generations should be avoided, especially with regard to the fundamental aspects of safety and costs. The key words also imply that action should be taken without postponement, i.e. the generation that has benefited from the nuclear power generation should also deal with the management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Also, the holder of a licence to operate a nuclear facility is primarily responsible for the safe handling and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, as well as decommissioning and dismantling the facility.
G.1.2 Measures taken by the license holders
G.1.2.1 The general obligations of license-holders
Cost calculations
Cost calculations have since the beginning of the 1980’s been submitted by the license-holders of a nuclear reactor, in cooperation with the other holders of a license for the operation of nuclear power reactors, on an annual basis.SKB submitted in January 2011 the most recent cost calculations under the Act (2006:647) on Financial Measures for the Management of Residual Products from Nuclear Activities.
RD&D Programme 2010
The nuclear industry, through its co-owned company SKB, has performed research on final disposal of radioactive waste since the mid-1970’s. The formal requirement for a R&D-programme to be submitted for regulatory evaluation was established in 1984 when the Act on Nuclear Activities was promulgated. During the 1990s the research was intensified with extensive feasibility studies (in eight municipalities). In 2001-2002 two municipalities approved further investigations. The initial site investigations were concluded by the end of 2007 and the results reported in preliminary site descriptions. In June 2009 the board of SKB decided to choose Forsmark as site for the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel. In March 2011, SKB’s applications for a permit to build a disposal facility system were submitted to the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) and the Environmental Court in Stockholm. Since 1986 SKB has produced nine R&D programmes with KBS-3 as the main alternative for the disposal of spent fuel. SKB submitted in September 2010 the ninth RD&D-programme to the Government.
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
G.1.2.2 Basic provisions and license obligations
Measures taken by the licensees regarding general safety requirements are to be found in sections G.3.2, G.4.2, G.5.2 and G.6.2.
Central storage for spent nuclear fuel (Clab)
The most important spent fuel facility in Sweden is the interim storage for spent nuclear fuel (Clab) located at the OKG site. SKB is the licensee for Clab. SKB took over the operation of Clab, previously contracted out to OKG, in January 2007. SKB has implemented the requirements in the general regulations SSMFS 2008:1 in its operating organization. The organizational structure of SKB as well as the management system has been amended to reflect this change.
Clab has been in operation since 1985. Prior to the introduction of the general regulations the requirement for a periodic safety review (PSR) was a condition in the NPP licenses. In the general regulations SSMFS 2008:1, the requirement for periodic safety reviews is now mandatory for all nuclear facilities.
The fuel storage pools in Clab were expected to be completely filled early 2004. Therefore in 1996 SKB initiated a project to increase the storage capacity from 5 000 to 8 000 tons of fuel by excavating a new rock cavern to provide additional storage pools.
The construction of the new storage pools (Clab 2) was completed during 2004. SKB submitted an application for a license to take the pools in operation in December 2004, supported by an updated safety report. The regulatory authority requested amendments to the updated safety report and SKB submitted a new revision of the report in 2005.
In the beginning of 2006 problems with movement joints in a transport channel between the existing and the newly built storage pools were encountered. No storage was permitted in Clab 2 until the problem was solved. SKB developed a new technical solution for the movement joints which was agreed by the regulatory body in April 2007. Rebuilding work of the transport channel was carried out and Clab 2 was taken in operation 2008-01-01 after an affirmative regulatory decision based in e.g. regulatory approval of a renewed safety analysis report (SAR) for the extended facility.
Spent fuel from the research reactor R1 in Studsvik
During 2007 the intact parts of the R1-fuel (see chapter D.1.1) was separated from corroded parts, in the form of powder and lumps, and transported to the United Kingdom. The intact parts were reprocessed in 2008. The fissile material from the reprocessing of the R1-fuel are planned to be manufactured to MOX-fuel and the other remaining waste from the reprocessing have been sent back to Sweden in 2009. The waste is temporarily stored at the Studsvik site before transport to disposal facility.
The corroded parts of the R1-fuel are still temporarily stored at the Studsvik site before transport to the disposal facility.
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
G.1.3 Regulatory control
G.1.3.1 The general obligations of license-holders
Nuclear waste fees and guarantees for 2010 and 2011
SSM reviewed the cost calculations and submitted a statement with suggestion for the size of fees and guarantees to the Government in October, 2009. The Government decided in December 2009 on the size of fees and guarantees for 2010 and 2011. SSM is currently reviewing the most recently submitted cost calculations to determine and suggest to the Government the size of fees and guarantees for 2012 through 2014.
Evaluation of the RD&D Programme 2010
SKB submitted in September 2010 the RD&D-programme 2010. The regulatory authorities have evaluated the programme and submitted a statement to the Government. The main conclusions from the regulatory review were:
- The account for the ongoing site investigations and other preparatory work to support a license application for the extension of the disposal facility for shortlived low- and inter mediate level waste could have been more detailed. SSM therefore recommended the Government to require SKB to conduct consultations with SSM, in order to be appropriately informed about the regulatory requirements on contents and quality of the collection of arguments and evidence (“Safety Case”) in support of the application, planned to be submitted in 2013.
- SKB should, in close cooperation with the nuclear power reactor operators, further detail and develop the planning for decommissioning of the reactors as well as the assessments of different categories of waste expected to be generated during decommissioning.
- SKB should in the next RD&D-programme to be submitted in 2013, further develop detailed planning for the establishment of a disposal facility for longlived low- and intermediate level waste.
G.1.3.2 Basic provisions and license obligations
Regulatory control of measures taken by the licensees regarding general safety requirements are to be found in G.3.3, G.4.3, G.5.3 and G.6.3. The licence application for Clab included a criticality analysis as well as an analysis of heat generation. A re-assessment of both the criticality analyses and heat generation was performed and submitted 1997 in the application to extend the facility as well as in the application to start operation of the extended facility.
The regulatory authority monitored the extension works at Clab closely and approved the start of operation of the Clab2 in December 2007 and the extended part of the facility was taken in operation in the beginning of January 2008. The authorization includes the condition that SKB shall carry out the prepared inspection programme and that the results shall be documented and reported. The inspection programme includes monitoring of pool temperatures, pool movements and dose loads.
G.1.4 Conclusion
Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 4.
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
G.2 Article 5: EXISTING FACILITIES
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to review the safety of any spent fuel management facility existing at the time the Convention enters into force for that Contracting Party and to ensure that, if necessary, all reasonably practicable improvements are made to upgrade the safety of such a facility.
By the time the Joint Convention entered into force for Sweden the situation as regards safety of spent fuel management facilities was satisfactory.
The elements of the Joint Convention are since long implemented as requirements in the legal and regulatory framework and implemented in the management of spent fuel. Dedicated inspection and review activities carried out in the early 2000’s confirmed that the licensee’s activities were in conformance with the legal and regulatory requirements. This conclusion has been reaffirmed during subsequent inspection and review activities.
Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 5
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
G.3 Article 6: SITING OF PROPOSED FACILITIES
1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that procedures are established and implemented for a proposed spent fuel management facility: (i) to evaluate all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of such a facility during its operating lifetime; (ii) to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a facility on individuals, society and the environment; (iii) to make information on the safety of such a facility available to members of the public; (iv) to consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity of such a facility, insofar as they are likely to be affected by that facility, and provide them, upon their request, with general data relating to the facility to enable them to evaluate the likely safety impact of the facility upon their territory.
2. In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that such facilities shall not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting Parties by being sited in accordance with the general safety requirements of Article 4.
G.3.1 Regulatory requirements
G.3.1.1 Assessment of safety and environmental impact
According to the Act on Nuclear Activities a licence is required to construct, possess and operate any nuclear facility. A licence application must contain an EIA. The procedures for carrying out the EIA, as well as its contents, are specified in the Environmental Code (see section E.2.2.4). The licensing procedure is described in section E.2.3.1. The EIA must contain the following elements:
- A description of the activity or measure with details of its location, design and scope.
- A description of the measures being planned with a view to avoiding, mitigating or remedying adverse effects.
- The information needed to establish and assess the main impacts on human health, the environment and management of land, water and other resources that the activity or measure is likely to have.
- A description of possible alternative sites and alternative designs, together with a statement of the reasons why a specific alternative was chosen and a description of the consequences if the activity or measure is not implemented.
- A non-technical summary of the information.
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
In addition to the EIA the preliminary safety report for a proposed spent fuel management facility is of key importance for licence application. Requirements on the content of the safety report are given in the general regulations concerning safety in certain nuclear facilities (SSMFS 2008:1), and include for example:
- A description of how the site and its surroundings, from the standpoint of safety, can affect the facility.
- A description of the design basis, including the requirements that have determined the design and construction of the facility. Descriptions of facilities for the handling of spent fuel or nuclear waste shall contain requirements that are determined by the description of safety in the particular disposal facility after closure.
- A description of measures taken to ensure adequate protection of workers, the public and the environment from radiation, as required by the Radiation Protection Act and regulations promulgated according to that act.
As described in section E.2.2.1 the operators of nuclear power plants must jointly perform a comprehensive R&D-programme for the safe management of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. The purpose of this programme is to demonstrate that timely actions are taken to evaluate the safety and impacts of proposed facilities and that all relevant site-related factors are studied. The programme must be submitted every third year for regulatory review.
G.3.1.2 Public information and involvement
There are several procedures that serve the purpose to involve the public in the siting of new spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste facilities. As mentioned above, an EIA must be performed for any new nuclear facility. Swedish legislation emphasizes the role of the public and other stakeholders in the EIA. The developer must initiate early (long before a licence application is submitted) consultations with those parties that might be affected by a new facility.
Parties that must be consulted include:
- municipalities that may host the facility;
- regulatory authorities, primarily SSM and County Administrative Boards;
- national environmental organisations;
- local interest groups; and
- affected individuals, e.g. those living close to a proposed location.
The County Administration Boards have an important function besides participating in the consultations. They are requested to assist the developer in identifying stakeholders and to facilitate consultations and an exchange of information.
Furthermore, the circulation of the nuclear power plants’ joint R&D programme for comments provides a broad range of concerned parties with information regarding new facilities as well as a possibility to state opinions.
According to the Act (1992:1537) and Ordinance (1981:671) on the Financing of Future Expenses for Spent Nuclear Fuel etc., the municipalities that might host a spent nuclear fuel or nuclear waste facility, including a disposal facility, are reimbursed for their own information to the public. Municipalities have been reimbursed for their information activities since the mid-1990s. Currently the mu-
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
154 nicipalities of Östhammar and Oskarshamn are receiving reimbursement. In 2004 the Parliament approved a new regulation in the Financing Act, which made it possible for non-profit-making organisations to apply for financing. Non-profit-making organizations are entitled to financial support from the Nuclear Waste Fund until 12 months after the Environmental Impact Assessment has been announced by the Environmental Court (for details see section E.2.2.5). Decisions concerning reimbursement to municipalities and non-profit organisations are made by SSM.
G.3.1.3 Consulting contracting parties
The Environmental Code specifies that if another country is likely to be affected, the responsible authority as designated by the Government shall inform the competent authority in that country about the planned activity. The country concerned, and the citizens, who may be affected, should be given the opportunity to take part in the consultation procedure. The Government has designated the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency to be responsible for this task. Such information shall also be supplied when another country, which is likely to be exposed to a significant environmental impact, so requests.
G.3.2 Measures taken by the license holders
G.3.2.1 General
All planned spent fuel and nuclear waste facilities, including repositories, will be sited, constructed and operated by SKB. The supporting RD&D-programme is also run by SKB. The following activities are currently carried out by SKB:
- The RD&D-programme has been reported every third year since 1986. The most recent RD&D report was submitted in 2010.
- Consultations and an EIA for the planned encapsulation facility (Clink) and the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel began formally in 2002, but in practice started in the mid-1990’s. The consultations were concluded in May 2010.
G.3.2.2 Site selection for the spent fuel disposal facility
A big challenge for SKB has been selecting a site for disposal. The Environmental Code states that “in the case of an activity or measure for whose purposes a land or water area is used, a site shall be chosen that is suitable in order to achieve the purpose with a minimum of damage and detriment to human health and the environment”
The prospects for achieving the purpose of disposal are dependent on the properties of the bedrock. The fundamental requirement on the site that is chosen is therefore that there is rock at the site that can satisfy the safety requirements. In order for the site to be available and the project to be feasible, there must also be acceptance in the concerned municipality and among nearby residents. These basic requirements have guided SKB’s siting work. In order to find the most suitable site, SKB has conducted general siting studies (general and regional compilations and analyses), feasibility studies (comprehensive compilations and analyses of siting prospects at the municipal level) and site investigations (comprehensive investigations of bedrock and biosphere on selected sites).
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
In various RD&D decisions, the Government has made declarations on the need for background material for site selection. In a decision in May of 1995, the Government stated that future applications for a licence to build a disposal facility should contain material that shows that site-specific feasibility studies have been conducted at between 5 and 10 sites in the country and that site investigations have been conducted at at least two sites. The statement has been repeated with partly varying formulations in several Government decisions concerning SKB’s RD&D programmes. SKB conducted feasibility studies in eight municipalities between 1993 and 2000: Storuman, Malå, Östhammar, Nyköping, Oskarshamn, Tierp, Älvkarleby and Hultsfred. After municipal referendums in 1995 and 1997, the municipal councils in Storuman and Malå said no to continued investigations in their respective municipalities. At the end of 2000, SKB presented its conclusions from the feasibility studies of the different sites and a programme for continued site investigations. Both geological and industrial prospects as well as environmental and societal aspects were evaluated. Eight siting alternatives were judged to be sufficiently promising to warrant further studies. SKB also drew the conclusion that the KBS-3 method was well-developed and ready to move into an implementation phase. The Government’s decision on RD&D-K* in November 2001 was unequivocal: “The Government judges that the company should use the KBS-3 method as a planning premise for the upcoming site investigations.”
SKB made a selection and wanted to conduct site investigations in three areas situated in the municipalities of Östhammar, Oskarshamn and Tierp. SKB also wanted to conduct additional evaluations of an area in Nyköping Municipality, but the municipal council in Nyköping decided in May 2001 not to participate any longer in SKB’s siting process. Tierp Municipality withdrew in 2002 and was thereby no longer a candidate site. In Östhammar and Oskarshamn, clear majorities of each municipal council spoke in favour of the proposed site investigations. In 2002, after the decisions and agreements with these two municipalities, SKB commenced site investigations in the Forsmark area in Östhammar Municipality and in an area in Oskarshamn Municipality that included the Simpevarp Peninsula and the Laxemar area. The investigations could gradually be concentrated on a smaller area in Forsmark and on the Laxemar area west of Simpevarp. In the field investigations SKB has conducted in these areas, great resources have been devoted to collecting the data on the properties of the bedrock, the soil layers and the ecosystems that are needed to analyse the prospects for a safe disposal facility. Obtaining the necessary knowledge of the properties of the rock has required drilling boreholes to and below disposal facility depth on a large scale. In June 2009, with the support of these investigations, SKB made its selection of a site for a future disposal facility: Forsmark in Östhammar Municipality.
The site was selected after a systematic evaluation and comparison of the two final alternatives, Forsmark and Laxemar. The prospects for post-closure safety were paramount in the evaluations. The advantages of Forsmark in relation to Laxemar when it comes to the prospects of achieving a disposal facility that satisfies the safety requirements are clear. The main reason is that there are few water conducting fractures in the rock at disposal facility depth, which means that the
* The Governments decision on RD&D-programme 1998 included requirements on SKB to submit supplementary material, which was denominated RD&D-K.
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
156 groundwater flow through the disposal facility is greatly limited. This provides great advantages for the long-term performance of the copper canister and the bentonite clay. The dry and fracture-poor rock at disposal facility level in Forsmark also offers advantages for construction and operation.
The EIS shows that the activity in the disposal facility will not give rise to unacceptable damage and detriment for human health and the environment. This means that the siting at Forsmark satisfies the requirements of the Environmental Code.
G.3.3 Regulatory control
SSM reviews SKB’s R&D programme and circulates it for comments to a number of concerned organisations (e.g. universities, government agencies, NGOs and municipalities that might host a spent nuclear fuel facility). When the review is completed the R&D programme together with SSM’s recommendations are sent to the Government for its decision.
SSM have regular consultations with SKB regarding progress in the siting of the planned facilities.
SSM is consulted regarding the EIA. The concerned County Administrative Boards are also consulted regarding the EIA and thus exercise some regulatory control, however not in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection.
It should be emphasised that SKB:s decision to choose Forsmark as the location for a future spent fuel disposal facility is an internal SKB decision.
The selection of Forsmark will not be final until the Government approves SKB:s application in its entirety, i.e. both the choice of site and the chosen method to be implemented at the chosen site.
G.3.4 Conclusion
Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 6.
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
(i) the design and construction of a spent fuel management facil-
ity provide for suitable measures to limit possible radiological impacts on individuals, society and the environment, including those from discharges or uncontrolled releases; (ii) at the design stage, conceptual plans and, as necessary, techni-
cal provisions for the decommissioning of a spent fuel management facility are taken into account; (iii) the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of
a spent fuel management facility are supported by experience, testing or analysis.
G.4.1 Regulatory requirements
The general safety regulations SSMFS 2008:1, apply to the operation of all types of nuclear installations, including facilities for the treatment, storage and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste. The basic provisions regarding safety assessment and review and can be summarised in the following points.
G.4.1.1 measures to limit radiological impact
The requirements for limiting the possible radiological impact on individuals, society and the environment, including those from discharges or uncontrolled releases, are founded upon the basic provisions stipulated in 4§ first paragraph in the Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3). This is clarified further in the revised general safety regulations (SSMFS 2008:1) in which it is stated that nuclear accidents shall be prevented through a basic facility-specific design that shall incorporate multiple barriers as well as a facility-specific defence-in-depth system.
Defence-in-depth shall be achieved by ensuring that:
- the design, construction, operation, monitoring and maintenance of a facility is such that abnormal events, incidents and accidents are prevented;
- multiple devices and measures exist to protect the integrity of the barriers and, if the integrity should be breached, to mitigate the ensuing consequences; and
- any release of radioactive substances, which may still occur as a result of abnormal events, incidents and accidents, is prevented or, if this is not possible, controlled and mitigated through devices and prepared measures.
G.4.1.2 Conceptual plans and provisions for decommissioning
The Act on Nuclear Activities states that the holder of a licence for nuclear activities is responsible for ensuring that all necessary measures are taken to ensure the
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
158 safe handling and disposal of nuclear waste, or nuclear material that is not reused, as well as the safe decommissioning and the dismantling of facilities.
Chapter 9 of the general regulations concerning safety in nuclear installations (SSMFS 2008:1) contains requirements on decommissioning plan and a specific operational safety assessment to be carried out as soon as a decision has been taken on final closure of a disposal facility.
The regulations on Planning before and during decommissioning of nuclear facilities (SSMFS 2008:19) comprises requirements for decommissioning with respect to documentation, alternative actions and waste management with regards to radiation protection (see section E.2.2.2).
G.4.1.3 Technology provisions for closure of repositories
The general regulations concerning safety in nuclear installations (SSMFS 2008:1) stipulate that analyses of conditions that are of importance for the safety of a facility shall be carried out before a facility is constructed and taken into operation. This is further specified in the regulations concerning safety in connection with the disposal of nuclear material and nuclear waste (SSMFS 2008:21) where it is stipulated that for repositories, the safety assessments shall also comprise features, events and processes that can lead to the dispersion of radioactive substances after closure. Such safety analyses shall be made before the commencement of disposal facility construction, disposal facility operation and disposal facility closure.
G.4.1.4 Technology supported by experience
The general regulations concerning safety in nuclear installations (SSMFS 2008:1) specify requirements regarding design and construction. It is stated that the design of the facility, with adaptation to the specific conditions of each facility, shall:
- be able to withstand component and system failures;
- have reliability and operational stability;
- be able to withstand such events or conditions which can affect the safety function of the barriers or defence-in-depth; and
- have maintainability, controllability and testability of inherent parts as long as these parts are used for their intended purposes.
Additional requirements related to design and construction are:
- The design principles and design solutions shall be tested under conditions corresponding to those that can occur during the intended application in a facility. If this is not possible or reasonable, they must have been subjected to the necessary testing or evaluation related to safety.
- The design solutions shall be adapted to the personnel’s ability to manage the facility, in a safe manner, under normal conditions as well as during abnormal events, incidents and accidents that might occur.
- Building components, devices, components and systems shall be designed, manufactured, installed, controlled and tested in accordance with requirements that are adapted for their importance for safety.
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
G.4.2 Measures taken by the license holders
G.4.2.1 Suitable measures to limit radiological impact
The safety philosophy applied in the design of all Swedish nuclear facilities is based on the principles of defence-in-depth and of multiple barriers to prevent the release of radioactive material to the environment. They are all designed to fulfil the intention of the requirements in the General Design Criteria. The foundation of the safety principle on the defence in depth is emphasised and made clearer through the implementation of that principle in the general regulations SSMFS 2008:1.
G.4.2.2 Conceptual plans and provisions for decommissioning
Decommissioning studies have been developed by SKB, as part of the basis for the cost calculations (see section E.2.2.5). The final closure of Barsebäck 2 has caused the management of Barsebäck to initiate a more detailed study on the decommissioning of the site. A decommissioning plan for Barsebäck 1 and Barsebäck 2 has been submitted to, and approved of, by the regulatory authorities.
G.4.2.3 Technology supported by experience
General
The principle of proven technology is broadly accepted and implemented in the design and construction procedures for the Swedish nuclear facilities. The use of properly environmentally qualified equipment ensures functioning of safetyrelated systems and components under emergency conditions. A comprehensive programme for environmental qualification has been carried out.
Both the Canister laboratory and the Äspö laboratory have been used for several years in developing technologies for encapsulation and disposal of spent fuel. The experience from experiments and tests in these laboratories is and will be used when the encapsulation plant and the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel are designed and constructed.
No major new steps are envisaged in addition to the previous programme, although research and development continues. In the modernisation work, the specification of all new installations is carefully checked with respect to environmental requirements.
Deliver Control Model for Technical development
Technology development for the encapsulation plant and the spent fuel disposal facility are carried out using the SKB delivery control model. This model has four different phases in where experience and testing gradually increases.
Concept phase: The purpose of the concept phase is to specify the require-
ments on the subsystem or the component, make a broad evaluation of conceivable solutions and propose one or more technical solutions to proceed with in the next phase. This entails that a reference design (or several alternative reference designs) is established for the subsystem, that it has been shown how this (these) reference design(s) can be verified against the design premises defined for the concept phase, and that a feasible way to production and an inspection programme has been found.
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
Design phase: The purpose of the design phase is to produce a design of the
subsystem or component, to verify that it satisfies the requirements, and to formulate proposals for production, inspection and maintenance of the subsystem or component. The design phase may be iterative since it may turn out that the proposed solution does not satisfy the requirements, cannot be produced, or cannot be inspected in an efficient manner. As a rule, the design phase consists of two stages: initial system design and final detailed design.
Implementation phase: The purpose of the implementation phase is to build
up production and inspection systems. This phase also includes the documentation, including any licensing, that is needed for operation of the subsystem or component. The goal of the implementation phase is that the system or component is run-in and ready to be handed over to operation.
Administration phase: The administration phase begins when the system or
component has been put into operation. The goal of this phase is to make use of operating experience in a structured way as a basis for possible modifications of both the production apparatus and the product. If and when it is warranted, a change case or project is initiated.
Work methodology during construction
The construction of the encapsulation plant and the spent fuel disposal facility is divided into two processes
- Safety Assessment
- Construction
The processes with constituent components and interrelationships are illustrated in Figure G1. The activities aimed at producing an updated safety analysis report for an application for trial operation are gathered within the main process Safety Assessment. The starting point is the site description that was prepared after completed site investigation and the safety assessment SR-Site. Regular cross-checks and possible updatings will then be made with the guidance of information produced by the main process Construction as a result of, for example, the detailed characterization that is done. Safety evaluations may be needed, e.g. prior to a new construction stage, in order to check that the planned design and execution meet design premises with respect to long-term safety.
Conversely, Safety Assessment can provide guidance in the form of requirements and restrictions that must be complied with in order for construction to result in a safe disposal facility. All activities needed for the facility to be constructed are gathered within the main process “Construction”. Solid boxes in Figure G1 show the components included during the construction phase. The intention is to apply the same processes during the operating phase, with the addition of components indicated by dashed boxes in the figure. Activity during the construction phase consists of investigations including monitoring, modelling, design with predictions for construction, and production in the form of rock excavation, installation etc. Additional activities during the commissioning phase are facility documentation and organizational preparations for operation. The methodology for the main process Construction according to Figure G1 mainly applies to the hard rock facilities and consists of rock construction in accordance with the Observational Method.
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
Figure G1: The main processes Safety Assessment and Construction, with constituent components, work flows and important relationships. Dashed components are added when the disposal facility is put into operation
This method is suitable because the exact rock conditions where the facility parts are to be built cannot be fully determined in advance. A tool is therefore needed to gather information from investigations and actual inspections as well as experience from the construction works. This information must then be interpreted so that it can be translated, via design and construction predictions, into adaptation of the construction technology or the design of the facilities. The purpose of the Observational Method is to systematize this iterative mode of working. This makes heavy demands on smoothly functioning information and work flows, but also on an ability to interpret and understand the information so that the right measures can be adopted. In daily application, this may mean for example that rock support and sealing measures can be planned with the support of the latest information obtained from the rock excavation works. In the longer term, the same principle is used for stepwise build-out of the facility, where the detailed planning of each stage is based on the latest information from investigations and experience from previous stages.
Production (rock works and
installations)
Predictions Safety assessment
Safety evaluations
Facility Facility documentation
Safety
analysis report
Information
(incl. site description)
Control (requirements
and restrictions)
Safety assessment
Construction
Investigations
and monitoring
Design
Modelling
Site description
Deposition, backfilling
and closure
Deposited
canisters
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
The mutual control between the main processes can also be handled to some extent within the application of the Observational Method. If the information warrants far-reaching changes that entail revisions of site descriptions and safety assessments, however, this must be handled at higher decision-making levels.
G.4.2.4 The application for the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel
In March 2011 SKB applied for a permit to build a disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel and the encapsulation plant where the fuel will be encapsulated before being transported to the disposal facility. Construction of nuclear facilities require permits in accordance with the Swedish Environmental Code and the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities. Both laws require that SKB reports the planned operations. The Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities states that this report must address radiation protection and short and long-term nuclear safety. The Environmental Code specifically requires a description of the potential impact of the planned operations on human beings and the environment. The Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities requires an equivalent impact assessment.
Structure
The motions for the application according to the Environmental Code are for the municipality in Oskarshamn to store nuclear fuel and nuclear waste up to 8000 tonnes in Clab and to in adjacent to Clab build and operate a plant for encapsulation of spent nuclear fuel up to 200 canisters per year.
For the municipality of Östhammar (Forsmark) the motions are to build and operate a facility for disposal for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, all in accordance to the application. The motions for the application according to the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities are in Forsmark to build, possess and operate a facility of disposal of spent nuclear fuel. In the facility possess, manage, transport, finally dispose of and in other aspects manage in one specified material, all in accordance with the application. Since, the motion of the applications are different the supporting documents contain parts that are identical and others parts that differs, se figure G2.
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
Figure G2: A presentation of the ingoing document for the license applications.
Environmental Code – Application Structure
The application consists of a top document. In which the case is summarized and the claims are accounted for. The top document is supported by eleven underlying documents wherein seven are the same as for the license application according to the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities.
- Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
- General Rules for Consideration
- Site Selection Process
- Selection of Disposal Method
- Safety Report Summary
- SR-Drift (Operational safety)
- SR-Site (Post-Closure safety)
- Technical Description
- Environmental Control Program
- List of Stakeholders, Land Ownership
- Preliminary Safety Report (PSAR) for Clink
The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIS) and its purpose are described in more
detail below. In short the EIS document constitutes the basis for the decision in the permit probation and contains a joint assessment of the affects of the KBS-3 system on human health and the environment
The General Rules of Consideration presents and motivates how SKB is going to
meet the requirements of the general rules of requirements in accordance to the Environmental Code for Clab, the encapsulation plant, the disposal facility facility and the disposal facility of spent nuclear fuel.
Submitted 2006/2009
Clink Missiv
Inka 2006
and Clink 2009
16 binders
- Technical Description
- Environmental Control Program
- List of Stakeholders, Land Ownership
- PSAR Clink
- Site Selection Process
- Selection of Disposal Method
- Safety Report Summary
- SR-Drift (Operations)
- SR-Site (Post-Closure Safety)
- Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
- General Rules of Consideration
Application according to the
Environmental Code
Submitted 2011
approx 6500 pages/approx 4300 pages
Submitted 2011
approx 2800 pages/approx 600 pages
Application under the Nuclear Activities Act
- Plan for Decommissioning
- Management and Organization – Site investigation stage
- Management and Organization – Construction stage
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
The Site Selection Process document describes and motivates the site selection and
is supported by an underlying report consisting of a comparative analysis of safety related site characteristics (Forsmark vs. Oskarshamn).
The Selection of Disposal Method document presents the background and SKB’s
motives for selecting the KBS-3 method for handling the disposal of spent nuclear fuel.
The Safety Report Summary is supported by two underlying documents;
- The	SR-Drift	(Operational	Safety) document is a preliminary safety report which
main purpose is to describe how SKB is planning to meet the requirements (Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities and Radiation Protection Act) for safety and radiation protection during operation in the facility for disposal of spent nuclear fuel.
- The	 SR-Site	 (Post-Closure	 Safety) document is a preliminary safety report
which main purpose is to describe how SKB is planning to meet the requirements (Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities and Radiation Protection Act) regarding long-term safety and radiation protection for the disposal facility. The report is presented in more detail below.
The Technical Description describes the activities and facilities during construc-
tion and operation. In particularly the activities/facilities that will impact the environment. In the Environmental control program SKB presents the plan for surveillance and control of environmental unfriendly activities.
The	List	of	Stakeholders,	Land	Ownership presents whom SKB believes are the sta-
keholders in the water-case* as well as confirm that SKB has the land ownership over the area of water within the real estates where SKB will conduct water activities.
The Preliminary Safety Report (PSAR) for Clink will clarify the structure of the
integrated safety report for Clab and the encapsulation facility (Clink).
Act ( 1984:3 ) on Nuclear Activities – Application Structure
The application consists of a top document in which the case is summarized and the claims are accounted for. The top document is supported by ten underlying documents. The first seven documents listed below are the same as for the license application according to the Environmental Code, see explanation of the documents above.
- Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
- General Rules for Consideration
- Site Selection Process
- Selection of Disposal Method
- Safety Report Summary
- SR-Drift (Operational safety)
- SR-Site (Post-closure safety)
- Plan for Decommissioning
- Management and Organization – Site investigation stage
- Management and Organization – Construction stage
* In addition to requirements for licenses under the Act on Nuclear activities and the environmental Code, SKB:s activities must also be subject to licensing according to use of, or impact on, water resources.
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
The Preliminary plan for Decommissioning document describes how SKB is plan-
ning to meet the requirements for decommissioning of the facility.
The	Management	and	Organization	–	Site	Investigation	Stage document describes
how SKB organised, managed and controlled the site investigations.
The	Management	and	Organization	–	Construction	Stage document it is described
how SKB is planning to organise, manage and control the construction and operational phase of the disposal facility facility.
Structure of the EIS document
The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is drawn up in consultation with authorities, municipalities, organisations, the general public and individuals who will be affected. The consultations regarding the disposal facility and the encapsulation facility for the spent nuclear fuel were initiated in 2002 and concluded in May 2010.
The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) includes interim storage, encapsulation and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and the facilities that are planned for this purpose (Clab, encapsulation plant and disposal facility). SKB has developed an EIS that will be submitted with the applications according to both the Environmental Code and the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities.
The EIS document describes the planned activities, the conditions on the sites in question and the implications and consequences that may occur to the environment and human health. Furthermore, measures to prevent, remedy or reduce the consequences that may arise are described.
The examination in accordance the Environmental Code should also consider the follow-on activities that are needed, such as transport to and from the plants and water activities. These are described in the EIS. Examples of activities that are not included in the EIS are mining of copper and iron for the manufacture of canisters, canister production and mining of bentonite. The EIS is structured according to below:
- Background
- Site features
- Clab (Interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel)
- Clink (Clab and encapsulation plant as an integrated unit)
- Disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel
- Zero alternative
- Combined consequences of the entire system
The Background chapters describe the background, purpose and the method chosen for disposal of spent nuclear fuel and provide a description of possible alternative sites and alternative designs. Furthermore it describes how SKB has carried out the consultations under the Environmental Code.
Chapter Site features describe the conditions at the places where SKB is applying to locate the encapsulation plant and the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel.
The Clab and Clink chapters describe facility design, activities and their impact and consequences on human beings and the environment as well as the alternative locations that were considered.
The chapter Disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel describe facility design,
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
166 activities and their impact and consequences on human beings and the environment, including the long-term safety and alternative locations.
The Zero alternative chapter describe the consequences if the activity or measures are not implemented, that is if the encapsulation plant and the disposal facility are not built.
The Combined consequences of the entire system chapter gives a comprehensive of the consequences and measures for the entire system for storage, encapsulation and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. It also compares the applied activities and locations with alternatives and with the zero alternative. The cumulative effects, due to existing and anticipated activities, are described for each site.
Structure of the long-term safety assessment (SR-Site)
The purpose of the licence application is to present all the material required to obtain a licence to build, operate and possess a disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel at Forsmark. The long-term safety assessment SR-Site forms a vital part of the licence application. The main purposes of the SR-Site are:
- To investigate whether the KBS-3 method has the potential of fulfilling regulatory safety criteria for long-term safety at the Forsmark site, with the host rock conditions emerging from the surface based site investigations;
- To provide feedback to design development, to SKB’s R&D programme, to detailed site investigations and to future safety assessment projects.
The safety case is essentially documented in the main report of the safety assessment SR-Site and its supporting documents.
The SR-Can report (2006) was a preparation for SR-Site and had essentially the same structure. SR-Can was jointly reviewed by SKI and SSI (now merged to SSM) aided by three international review teams and additional external experts. The SR-Site project was initiated in April 2007 and the comments from the review of the SR-Can report were the basis for the continuing development of the report.
The structure and contents of SR-Site is adapted to regulatory requirements in
Main references
FEP report
Fuel and canister process report
Buffer, backfill
and sealing process report
Geosphere process report
Climate
report
FHA report
Model summary
report
Data report
Additional references
SR-Site Main report
Radionuclide
transport
report
Biosphere synthesis
report
Six Production
reports
Figure G3: The structure of the SR-Site documentation.
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
Sweden. SR-Site and its supporting documents (see figure G3) cover the elements of a long-term safety assessment.
The SR-Site Main report consists of three volumes (total of about 1000 p.), 16 main references, and around 75 additional references produced within the project. Central references for SR-Site are also the Site Descriptive Model, Disposal Facility engineering and Layout reports.
The structure of SR-Site main report is consistent with the SR-Can report. However, there is a new chapter 14 concerning additional analyses. In this chapter, a number of additional analyses, required to complete the safety assessment, are carried out and presented. These comprise a sensitivity analyses of the outcome of the scenario analyses, analyses required to demonstrate optimisation and use of best available technique, verification that FEPs omitted in earlier parts of the assessment are negligible in light of the completed scenario and risk analysis, analyses supporting risk discussion for the initial 1,000 years, e.g. “what if”-cases to illustrate barrier functions during early times, a brief account of the time period beyond one million years, natural analogues, and analyses of additional cases to illustrate barrier functions.
Site selection
SKB selected the Forsmark site for a disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel in June 2009. The selection was based on evaluations of 5 years of surface based site investigations at Forsmark (municipality of Östhammar) and Laxemar (municipality of Oskarshamn) during 2002-2007, which were the final stage of 15 years of siting.
The site selection was made by SKB in order to focus the remaining work for the licence application that remains to be reviewed with the licence application. SKB analyses showed that Forsmark had clear advantages with respect to long-term safety; essentially a considerably lower frequency of water-conducting fractures at disposal facility depth.
The review process – Environmental Code and Nuclear Act
According to the Environmental Code facilities in a coherent system with the aim to store or dispose spent nuclear fuel or nuclear waste the hearings can be held in an Environmental Court where one of the planned or existing facilities are going to be situated or already are situated. The applications will be submitted to the Environmental Court and to the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority.
The Environmental Court will prepare the case and review it according with the Environmental Code and they will hold a main hearing. They will then give a ruling to the Swedish Government. The Government gives an operation permissible which the municipalities of Östhammar and Oskarshamn will accept or reject. The municipalities have their veto. If accepted, the Environmental Court will hold a new hearing. Thereafter, the Court will grant permits and stipulate conditions pursuant to the Environmental Code.
The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority will prepare the case in accordance with the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities and the Government will give a permit. The Government gives the permit to the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority that will stipulate the conditions.
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
G.4.3 Regulatory control
During the licensing process the PSAR, SAR and OLC documents are reviewed by the regulatory authority, to ensure compliance with fundamental safety principles and criteria. A prerequisite for obtaining a licence is that the regulatory review concludes that the facility is designed according to the provisions in the general regulations (SSM 2008:1).
G.4.4 Conclusion
Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 7.
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
(i) before construction of a spent fuel management facility, a
systematic safety assessment and an environmental assessment appropriate to the hazard presented by the facility and covering its operating lifetime shall be carried out; (ii) before the operation of a spent fuel management facility, updated
and detailed versions of the safety assessment and of the environmental assessment shall be prepared when deemed necessary to complement the assessments referred to in paragraph (i).
G.5.1 Regulatory requirements
G.5.1.1 Assessment of safety
Requirements on safety assessment, safety review and reporting are listed in the revised general safety regulations (SSMFS 2008:1). Many of these requirements are not new but were posed earlier as licensing conditions for facilities licensed before the regulations came into force. Some of the requirements are, however, more comprehensive compared to earlier conditions, and some are new. The legally binding requirements regarding safety assessments are summarised in the following points:
- A comprehensive safety analysis shall be performed before a facility is constructed and before it is taken into operation. The analysis shall subsequently be kept up-to-date. The analysis shall be based on a systematic inventory of events, event sequences and conditions, which can lead to a radiological accident.
- A preliminary safety report shall be prepared before a facility may be constructed. The safety report shall be updated before trial operation of the facility may be started. The safety reports shall contain information as specified in the regulations The safety report shall be supplemented before the facility is taken into routine operation. The safety report shall subsequently be kept up-to-date. The safety reports shall be reviewed, evaluated and approved by the regulatory authority as required.
The general safety regulations SSMFS 2008:1, apply to the operation of all types of nuclear installations, including facilities for treatment, storage and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste. The basic provisions regarding safety assessment and review and can be summarised in the following points:
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
Safety Analysis
Analyses of conditions that are of importance for the safety of a facility shall be carried out before a facility is constructed and taken into operation. The analyses shall subsequently be kept up-to-date. The safety analyses shall be based on a systematic inventory of such events, event sequences and conditions that could lead to a radiological accident.
Safety Report
A preliminary safety report shall be prepared before a facility may be constructed. The safety report shall be updated before trial operation of the facility may be started. The safety report shall be supplemented before the facility is taken into routine operation. The safety report shall subsequently be kept up-to-date. The content of the safety report is specified in the regulations. Before the facility may be constructed and taken into operation, the safety report shall be evaluated and approved by SSM. The safety report shall subsequently be kept up-to-date. In the updating of the regulations it has been clarified that the safety report (SAR) shall reflect the plant as built, analysed and verified and show how the valid safety requirements are met. Plant modifications shall be assessed against conditions described in the SAR. It has further been clarified that all plant structures, systems and components of importance for the defence-in-depth shall be described in the SAR, not only the safety systems. New safety standards and practices, which have been assessed by the licensee and found applicable, shall be documented and inserted into the SAR as soon as corresponding modifications or other plant measures have been taken. A few additional requirements on the contents of the SAR have also been added.
Safety Review
A safety review shall determine or check that the applicable safety related aspects of a specific issue have been taken into account and that SSMFS 2008:1 appropriate safety-related requirements with respect to the design, function, organisation and activities of a facility are met. The review shall be carried out systematically and shall be documented. A safety review shall be performed within those parts of the organisation responsible for the specific issues (”primary review”). A second safety review shall be performed by a safety review function appointed for this purpose and that has an independent position relative those parts of the organisation responsible for the specific issues (”secondary review”).
Safety Programme
After it is taken into operation, the safety of a facility shall be continuously analysed and assessed in a systematic manner. Any need for improvement regarding safety measures, engineering or organisational issues, which arise as a result of such analyses and assessments, shall be documented in a safety programme. The safety programme shall be updated on an annual basis.
Periodic Safety Review of Facilities
At least once every ten years, a new, integrated analysis and assessment of the safety of a facility shall be performed. The analyses and assessments, as well as the measures proposed on the basis of these shall be documented and submitted to SSM. In the most recent update of the general regulations, the requirements on Periodic Safety Review (PSR) have been made more stringent in order to use
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
these reviews for assessment of time limited licensing conditions. This means that the Swedish approach to PSR becomes more in line with the European approach, where PSR is often used in the re-licensing of the nuclear power facilities.
Modifications
A safety review shall be performed for engineering or organisational modifications to a facility, which can affect the conditions specified in the safety report as well as essential modifications to the report. Before the modifications may be included in the report, SSM shall be notified and the Inspectorate can decide that additional or other requirements or conditions shall apply with respect to the modifications.
Post Closure Safety
Additional requirements concerning the long-term safety of a disposal facility are stipulated in the regulations concerning safety in connection with he disposal of nuclear material and nuclear waste (SSMFS 2008:21) as well as Regulations and General Advice on the Protection of Human Health and the Environment in connection with the Final Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Nuclear Waste (SSMFS 2008:37). According to the regulations, the safety assessment for a disposal facility shall also comprise features, events and processes that can lead to the dispersion of radioactive substances after closure. Such safety assessments shall be made before disposal facility construction, before operation and before closure. The safety assessment shall cover as long a time as barrier functions are required, but at least ten thousand years.
G.5.1.2 Environmental assessment
The Act on Nuclear activities also states that an EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) shall be made in all licensing cases, and that the Environmental Code regulates the way the EIA shall be carried out as well as the contents of the documentation. Requirements on environmental assessment are laid down in the Environmental Code (1998:808) as described in Section E.2.2.4. The purpose of an EIA is to establish and describe the direct and indirect impacts of a planned activity or measure as listed below. An environmental impact statement shall contain the following information:
- a description of the activity or measure with details of its location, design and scope;
- a description of the measures being planned with a view to avoiding, mitigating or remedying adverse effects, for example action to prevent the activity or measure leading to an infringement of an environmental quality standard;
- the information that is needed to establish and assess the major impact on human health, the environment and the management of land, water and other resources that the activity or measure is likely to have;
- a description of possible alternative sites and alternative designs, together with a statement of the reasons why a specific alternative was chosen as well as a description of the consequences if the activity or measure is not implemented; and
- a non-technical summary of the information.
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
G.5.1.3 The licensing procedure
Three different permits/licences are required for a nuclear facility: a permit under the Environmental Code (1998:808) a licence under the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities (1984:3), and a building permit under the Planning and Building Act (2010:900). Licensing under the Environmental Code and the Act on Nuclear
Activities occur in parallel. The applications under both laws must include an environmental impact statement (EIS) prepared according to the rules in Chapter 6 of the Environmental Code. The same EIS is thus used in both applications. Separate EISs are prepared for the encapsulation plant and the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel.
According to Chapter 17 of the Environmental Code, the Government shall, after preparation by the Environmental Court, examine the permissibility of the activity. After SSM’s preparation of the matter, the Government shall also examine permit applications under the Act on Nuclear Activities. If the Government finds that the construction and operation of the facility is permissible according to the Environmental Code and grants a permit/licence under the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities, it remains for the Environmental Court to grant a permit/ licence and stipulate conditions in accordance with the Environmental Code.
G.5.2 Measures taken by the license holders
General
In March 2011 SKB applied for the permits needed for the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel in accordance with the Swedish Act on Nuclear Activities. The SR-Site report is a main component in SKB’s licence application to construct and operate a disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel at Forsmark. Its role in the application is to demonstrate long-term safety for the disposal facility.
Purpose
The main purposes of the safety assessment project SR-Site are:
- To assess the safety, as defined in applicable Swedish regulations, of the proposed KBS-3 disposal facility at Forsmark.
- To provide feedback to design development, to SKB’s RD&D- programme, to detailed site investigations and to future safety assessment projects.
An important step leading up to the present report was the preparation of the SR-Can safety assessment report, published in November 2006. The SR-Can report was reviewed by the Swedish safety authorities aided by a group of international experts, and the outcome of the review has been taken into account in the SR-Site assessment.
Summary of results
The central conclusion of the safety assessment SR-Site is that a KBS-3 disposal facility that fulfils long-term safety requirements can be built at the Forsmark site. This conclusion is reached because the favourable properties of the Forsmark site ensure the required long-term durability of the barriers of the KBS-3 disposal
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
facility. In particular, the copper canisters with their cast iron inserts have been demonstrated to provide a sufficient resistance to the mechanical and chemical loads to which they may be subjected in the disposal facility environment.
The conclusion is underpinned by:
- The reliance of the KBS-3 disposal facility on i) a geological environment that exhibits long-term stability with respect to properties of importance for longterm safety, i.e. mechanical stability, low groundwater flow rates at disposal facility depth and the absence of high concentrations of detrimental components in the groundwater, and ii) the choice of naturally occurring materials (copper and bentonite clay) for the engineered barriers that are sufficiently durable in the disposal facility environment to provide the barrier longevity required for safety.
- The understanding, through decades of research at SKB and in international collaboration, of the phenomena that affect long-term safety, resulting in a mature knowledge base for the safety assessment.
- The understanding of the characteristics of the site through several years of surface-based investigations of the conditions at depth and of scientific interpretation of the data emerging from the investigations, resulting in a mature model of the site, adequate for use in the safety assessment.
- The detailed specifications of the engineered parts of the disposal facility and the demonstration of how components fulfilling the specifications are to be produced in a quality assured manner, thereby providing a quality assured initial state for the safety assessment.
The detailed analyses demonstrate that canister failures in a one million year perspective are rare. Even with a number of pessimistic assumptions regarding detrimental phenomena affecting the buffer and the canister, they would be sufficiently rare that their cautiously modeled
Future development of the disposal facility programme
The design and safety evaluation of a disposal facility concept for geological disposal like the KBS-3 system is developed in steps, where a safety evaluation in one step provides feedback to the development of the disposal facility design. The developed design is then evaluated in a subsequent safety assessment, which provides refined feedback to the further development of the design, etc. Likewise, the understanding of natural processes of importance to long-term safety is developed in a R&D programme and the emerging findings are evaluated in an iterative interaction with safety assessment projects. Another important aspect of this iterative nature of the development is the external reviewing, by authorities and international experts, of the safety assessments.
SKB has conducted research and development of the KBS-3 system for three decades and both the disposal facility design and the scientific knowledge is mature, as manifested by the facts that no major design changes have occurred in recent years and that the identified set of processes of importance for long-term safety is stable, as is the knowledge about the processes.
SKB has established a technically feasible reference design and layout of the KBS-3 disposal facility and showed that this conforms to the established design premises, see below, but technical development will continue. Detailed designs
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
174 adapted to an industrialised process designed to fulfil specific requirements on quality, cost and efficiency need still be developed. The layout needs to be adapted to the local conditions found when constructing the disposal facility at depth. These, potentially more optimal solutions, should result in at least the same level of safety as the current reference design being assessed in SR-Site. Since SR-Site is an important basis for a critical decision point in the disposal facility programme, it is essential to demonstrate i) that the essential safety related features of the design are mature and ii) that there is at least one available and adequate option for parts of the system that are more peripheral in terms of contributing to safety.
Another characteristic of the present situation is that the well-established parts of the design are specified in detail; the feedback to design development from the safety assessment preceding SR-Site (the SR-Can assessment) is given in the form of detailed design premises, that have served as input to specifications of the reference design and facilitated the evaluation of the appropriateness of the design with respect to long-term safety.
Measures taken for environmental impact statement (EIS) are described in section H.3.2.
G.5.3 Regulatory control
The safety case as a basis for licensing and nuclear supervision.
The safety level to be attained and maintained by the licensee of a nuclear facility is defined in the licensing process.
The licence to build, possess and operate the facility is granted by the Government. This government licensing decision is applied for and granted early in the design process. These licence conditions requires that a preliminary safety report (PSAR) be submitted and approved by the regulatory body before major construction activities are started. A renewed safety report (SAR) and operational limits and conditions (OLC) should also be submitted and approved by the regulatory body before trial operation commences and a supplemented SAR should be submitted and approved by the regulatory body before routine operation commences . For a disposal facility, the safety assessment should comprise features, events and processes that can lead to the dispersion of radioactive substances after closure, as described in section H.5.1.1. Such a safety assessment shall be made before disposal facility construction, and before operation and before closure.
The PSAR, SAR and OLC documents are reviewed by the regulatory authorities, to ensure compliance with fundamental safety principles and criteria. Based on this licensing procedure, and on approval by the regulatory authorities, the SAR and OLC documents becomes the legally binding documents regulating technical configuration and operating limits and conditions, often referred to as ”the safety case”. This ”safety case” may be regarded as defining the minimum safety level that the licensee is legally committed to maintain as a condition for a permit to operate the facility. Hence, the safety case also provides the basis for regulatory supervision.
Additional licence conditions can be prescribed by the regulatory authority over time, based on national and international operating experience and new research results.
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
Preliminary long term safety analysis for a spent fuel disposal facility (SR-Can)
The regulatory authorities reviewed the SKB safety assessment SR-Can. This review is considered as part of the then ongoing consultations between SKB and the regulators, with the objective of providing guidance to SKB about expectations on the long term safety report (SR-Site) that SKB is to submit as support for the license application for a spent nuclear fuel disposal facility.
It should be noted that site suitability issues, formal compliance evaluation or other issues linked to the consideration of a license have not been addressed in this review. The authorities’ review is mainly based on peer reviews by international experts organised within three groups focussing on safety assessment methodology, the representation of the engineered barrier system in the safety assessment, and the handling of site specific information, respectively.
Moreover, independent modeling activities, detailed expert reviews as well as a review of quality assurance issues provided additional input to the authorities’ review. The main findings of the review are:
- SKB’s safety assessment methodology is overall in accordance with applicable regulations, but part of the methodology needs to be further developed for the licence application.
- SKB’s quality assurance of SR-Can is not sufficient for a licence application.
- The knowledge base needs to be strengthened for a few critical processes, such as buffer erosion, with potentially large impact on the calculated risk
- The link between assumed initial properties of disposal facility components and quality routines of manufacturing, testing and operation need to be strengthened before the licence application.
- There is a need for a more elaborate reporting on the potential for early releases from the disposal facility.
G.5.4 Conclusion
Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 8
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
G.6 Article 9: OPERATION OF FACILITIES
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure
that:
(i) the licence to operate a spent fuel management facility is based
upon appropriate assessments as specified in Article 8 and is conditional on the completion of a commissioning programme demonstrating that the facility, as constructed, is consistent with design and safety requirements; (ii) operational limits and conditions derived from tests, operational
experience and the assessments, as specified in Article 8, are defined and revised as necessary; (iii) operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection and testing of
a spent fuel management facility are conducted in accordance with established procedures; (iv) engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields
are available throughout the operating lifetime of a spent fuel management facility; (v) incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner
by the holder of the licence to the regulatory body; (vi) programmes to collect and analyse relevant operating experi-
ence are established and that the results are acted upon, where appropriate; (vii) decommissioning plans for a spent fuel management facility are
prepared and updated, as necessary, using information obtained during the operating lifetime of that facility, and are reviewed by the regulatory body.
G.6.1 Regulatory requirements
The general regulations concerning safety in nuclear installations (SSMFS 2008:1) contain legally binding requirements relevant for all the obligations of Article 16. These requirements are summarised below.
G.6.1.1 Initial authorisation
As mentioned in section H.5, a preliminary comprehensive safety report is required before the construction of a spent nuclear facility. A complete safety report, which also takes into account the results from commissioning tests, is required before the facility is taken into operation.
G.6.1.2 Operational limits and conditions(OLC’s)
Documented up-to-date Operational Limits and Conditions (OLCs) are required
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
containing the necessary operational limits and conditions, as further specified in a separate appendix to the regulations. The OLCs shall together with the operating procedures ensure that the conditions postulated in the safety report are maintained during the operation of the facility. The OLC’s shall be subjected to a twofold safety review by the licensee and submitted to the regulatory authority for approval. The licensee shall notify regulatory authority about any changes, after they have been subjected to a two-fold safety review.
G.6.1.3 Established procedures
Suitable, verified and documented procedures are required for all operational states including accidents. The procedures for operability verification and procedures used in other operational states than normal operation shall be subjected to a twofold safety review by the licensee. Procedures for maintenance important for safety are also covered by the requirement. Maintenance programmes shall be documented. Inspection and testing of mechanical components shall be carried out according to qualified methods and verified procedures.
G.6.1.4 Engineering and technical support
The licensee shall ensure that adequate personnel is available with the necessary competence and suitability needed for those tasks which are important for safety, and also ensure that this is documented. A long-term staffing plan is required. The use of contractors as opposed to own personnel should be carefully considered in order to develop and maintain adequate in-house competence. The necessary competence should always exist in-house for ordering, managing and evaluating the results of work carried out by contractors of importance for safety.
G.6.1.5 Reporting of incidents in a timely manner
The general regulations concerning safety in nuclear installations (SSMFS 2008:1) contains one chapter about reporting requirements and an annex specifying these requirements for various types of events. The following is a brief summary:
- Reporting without delay: emergency alarm events and events and conditions in category 1 (see below).
- Reporting within 16 hours: INES events at level 2 or higher.
- Reporting within 7 days: a comprehensive investigation report about alarm events or events and conditions in category 1.
- Reporting within 30 days: a comprehensive investigation report of events and conditions in category 2.
In addition, there are requirements on daily reporting of the operational state, and the occurrence of any abnormal events or disturbances, and requirements on a comprehensive annual report summarising all experience important for the safety of the plant. Specifications are given about the contents of the different reports and further interpretation of the reporting requirements is given in the general recommendations.
In one of the basic paragraphs of SSMFS 2008:1, requirements are given on
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
178 actions to be taken by the licensee in cases of deficiencies in barriers or in the defence-in-depth system. These actions include first assessment, adjustment of the operational state, implementation of necessary measures, performance of safety reviews and reporting to SSM. A graded approach is allowed here.
In appendix 1 of the regulations, events and conditions are specified which require different responses, depending on the category of events they belong to. Three categories are defined:
Category 1
Severe deficiency observed in one or more barriers or in the defence-in-depth system, as well as a founded suspicion that safety is severely threatened. (In these cases the facility must be brought to a safe state without delay).
Category 2
Deficiency observed in one barrier or in the defence-in-depth system, which is less severe than that which is referred to in category 1, as well as a founded suspicion that safety is threatened. (In these cases the facility is allowed to continue operation under certain limitations and controls).
Category 3
Temporary deficiency in the defence-in-depth system, which arises when such an event or condition is corrected and which, without measures could lead to a more severe condition, and which is documented in the Technical Specifications. In all three cases, corrective measures shall be subject to a twofold safety review by the licensee. The results of these reviews shall be submitted to SSM. Regarding category 3 events, there is no requirement to make a specific report to SSM. It is sufficient to make a compilation of these events in the annual report.
G.6.1.6 Programmes to collect and analyse operating experience
The licensee shall ensure that experience from its own facilities and from similar activities in other relevant facilities is continuously analysed, used and communicated to the personnel concerned (SSMFS 2008:1). It is further required that all events and conditions which are detected and which are important to safety are investigated in a systematic manner, in order to determine sequences and causes, as well as to establish the measures needed in order to restore the safety margins and to prevent recurrence.
The results of the investigations shall be disseminated within the organisation and shall contribute to the development of safety at the facility. In accordance with SSMFS 2008:1 it is the responsibility of the licensee, as long as the disposal facility is in operation, to continuously keep informed of the conditions of importance to the assessment of disposal facility safety, also after closure. G.6.1.7 Decommissioning plans The general regulations concerning safety in nuclear installations (SSMFS 2008:1) a chapter on decommissioning has been added with requirements on:
- A preliminary plan for the future decommissioning of the facility to be compiled as before construction of a facility.
- The decommissioning plan to be supplemented and incorporated into the facility’s safety report before the dismantling of the facility may be initiated
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
- A decommissioning plan and a specific operational safety assessment to be done as soon as a decision has been taken on final closure of a facility. The plan should include measures, which must be implemented to ensure the safe containment of the generated nuclear waste.
G.6.2 Measures taken by the license holders
The general safety regulations (SSMFS 2008:1) contain legally binding requirements relevant for all obligations of Article 9. These requirements are summarized below.
G.6.2.1 Initial authorisation
No spent nuclear facility has been commissioned since 1985 when the central interim storage for spent fuel (Clab) was taken into operation. The application procedure for the extension works to increase the storage capacity from 5 000 to 8 000 tons of uranium, was the first time the modernized legislative and regulatory system was implemented.
Although neither the Environmental Code, the SSM regulations 2008:1 and 2008:21, nor the Radiation Protection Act had been issued at the time for the application, the formal procedure to initiate the project was run according to procedures later established by the issuance of those documents, as described in sections E.2 (Legislative and regulatory framework), E.3 (Regulatory Body) and G.3 (Siting of proposed facilities).
The siting processes for the encapsulation plant, and the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, were initiated in accordance with the procedures outlined in this document. The procedure is described in detail in section G.3.2.
G.6.2.2 Operational limits and conditions(OLC’s)
The operational limits and conditions for nuclear facilities are described in the operational limits and conditions (OLC), a document, which is considered to be one of the cornerstones in the governing and regulation of the operation of the Swedish nuclear activities. Every OLC is facility-specific and is approved by SSM as part of the licensing conditions.
The original OLC for each facility is derived from the safety analyses in the SAR, in which the behavior of the facility is described. Correction and updating takes place, when new and better knowledge is available, either from research, tests or operational experience. Suggestions for changes in OLC are reviewed carefully from the safety point of view at different levels in the operating organization and are finally approved by the regulatory body, before they are included in the document.
The fact that OLC is reviewed and revised regularly has contributed to making it a living document. It is also part of the quality and management system and used frequently in particular by the operations staff. An essential part of OLC is the general clause that says that ”...should any doubt appear about the interpretation of the text, the general purpose of OLC shall be guiding. This means that the facility in all indefinite situations shall be maintained or brought respectively to a safe state.” Other parts of OLC are the descriptive background to the document. The background description is important for preserving and transferred to new staff the knowledge and experience of those who participated in the original production of
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
180 OLC. Modified and maintained equipment must pass an operability test, to verify that the equipment fulfills specified operational requirements before being accepted for continuous operation.
G.6.2.3 Established procedures
All activities that directly affect the operation of the facility are governed by procedures of different kinds covering normal operation, emergency operation and functional tests. Maintenance activities according to an approved maintenance programme are also to a great extent accomplished according to procedures, however, not always as detailed as the operating procedures, in which activities are described in sequences step by step. Signing off the completion of steps carried out in the procedures is mandatory in most cases, in order to confirm the completion and facilitate verification.
The development of procedures follows specified directives, which include the reviewing of the documents, normally, by more than one person other than the author, before being approved by the operations manager or someone else at the corresponding level. The same applies for revising procedures. Revising procedures is to be carried out continuously, in particular maintenance procedures, when new experience is obtained. Emergency procedures have been developed in order to deal with anticipated operational events.
G.6.2.4 Engineering and technical support
The principles for staffing are reported in section F.2 (Human and financial resources). Competence that might not be completely available within the own organisation at all plants is for instance expertise and resources for materials and chemistry assessments, radiation shielding and environmental consequence calculations, expertise and resources for software for safety applications and also process control and measurement techniques. In particular the IT functions have normally been outsourced, but are still available on-site. The intention is always to have the ordering competence within the operating organisation, and the capability of evaluating the results of analyses, calculations, etc. performed by consultants.
G.6.2.5 Reporting of incidents in a timely manner
Incidents significant to safety are reported according to the non-routine reporting requirements in the technical specifications (see section G.6.1.5) Two types of licensee event reports (LER) exist. The more severe one, called abnormal event, requires the facility to inform SSM within an hour. A final report shall be submitted within ten days from the time of the event and the analysis of the event and appropriate measures to prevent recurrence shall be approved by SSM. Only a very limited number of events of this category have occurred at the Swedish facilities over the years. These events are typically also of such a dignity as to warrant reporting in accordance with the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES).
The other type of LER, called RO (Reportable Occurrence), is used for less severe events. This type of event is mentioned in the daily report, which is sent to the regulatory bodies, followed up by a preliminary report within seven days and
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
a final report within 30 days. The reports are reviewed at different levels within the operating organization and approved by the operations or production manager before submittal.
The front of the standardized report form describes the event in general: identification number, title, reference to OLC, date of discovery and length of time until corrective actions were completed, conditions at the time of occurrence, system consequences, a contact person at the plant and activities affected by the event. On the reverse side of the document a description of the event is given. The following titles are used:
- event course and operational consequence;
- safety significance;
- direct and root causes;
- planned/decided measures; and
- lessons learned by the event
If the description of the event is extensive additional pages may be attached to the form. Reports are also required in accordance with OLC when the permitted levels of activity release from the facility are exceeded, or in the event of unusually high radiation exposure to individuals. These types of non-routine reporting are primarily directed towards SSM.
G.6.2.6 Programmes to collect and analyse operating experience
The objective of the analysis and feedback programme concerning operating experience is to learn from their own and others’ experience and thus prevent recurrences of events, particularly those that might affect the safety of the facility. The operating experience feed-back process consists of a wide variety of activities within the plant organization as well as externally.
G.6.2.7 Decommissioning plans
Decommissioning of a nuclear facility shall be described in a plan in which the degree of detail in the account increases as the time for decommissioning approaches. A preliminary decommissioning plan shall be supplemented and kept up-to-date as long as the facility is in operation and shall be presented to SSM every ten years. The preliminary decommissioning plans contains, among other things, a facility description, a plan for the decommissioning activities, plans for management and disposal of radioactive waste and cost estimates. Before dismantling operation may commence, the decommissioning plan must be incorporated in the safety analysis report for the facility.
All licensees for the for the Swedish NPP`s , with the exception of Barsebäck, are in the process of updating their decommissioning plans. An overall decommissioning plan for the units in Barsebäck has been submitted to, and approved of, by the regulatory authorities. A revised version is under way and is planned to be submitted during 2012. SKB is the licensee for Clab and will likewise be the licensee for the integrated facility called Clink when the addition containing the planned encapsulation plant is finished. The decommissioning plan for Clink is preliminary and conforms to the
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
182 requirements made by the regulatory authorities on SKB for the coming licensing of the addition containing the encapsulation plant. A preliminary decommissioning plan has been prepared for the Spent Fuel Disposal facility and will be included in the applications under the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities for disposal of spent nuclear fuel and under the Environmental Code for the KBS-3 system.
G.6.3 Regulatory control
G.6.3.1 Initial authorisation
The regulatory control is achieved through the procedures described in sections E.2.3.1 (Licensing) and E.2.3.3 (Institutional control, regulatory inspection and reporting).
G.6.3.2 Operational limits and conditions
SSM reviews applications for changes in OLC, and for exemptions from OLC. Based on the application and information provided by the licensees, and the associated safety analyses, assessments are made about how the proposed changes or exemptions contribute to the risk profile of the facility.
G.6.3.3 Procedures
Operational and maintenance procedures are normally not reviewed by SSM. Only in connection with event investigations would SSM ask for a procedure to be submitted for review. In the frame of quality assurance inspections or review of quality audits made by the licensees (see section F.3) have SSM looked into the routines used for updating procedures.
G.6.3.4 Engineering and technical support
SSM has not so far specifically inspected the engineering and technical support available at the facilities. In connection with other inspections and reviews, the staffing situation has occasionally been commented upon.
G.6.3.5 Incident reporting
Licensee event reports are reviewed upon arrival by the responsible site inspector, who asks the facility for clarification if necessary. As a routine all LERs are screened once a week by a standing group of inspectors and specialists in order to assess the event, the analysis and the measures taken by the licensees. If there has been any regulatory concerns the issue is brought up at a management meeting and a decision made about any further measures to be taken by SSM.
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
G.6.3.6 Experience feedback analysis
The regulatory control is achieved through the procedures described in section E.2.3.3 (Institutional control, regulatory inspection and reporting). The experience feed back programme is followed- up by the regulator in connection with event investigations and in connection with other inspections and reviews.
G.6.3.7 Decommissioning plans
The decommissioning plans (see section H.6.1.8) must be submitted to SSM for approval before the decommissioning and dismantling activities may be started.
G.6.4 Conclusion
Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 9.
Section G – Safety of Spent fuel ManaGeMent
G.7 Article 10: DISPOSAL OF SPENT FUEL
If, pursuant to its own legislative and regulatory framework, a Contracting Party has designated spent fuel for disposal, the disposal of such spent fuel shall be in accordance with the obligations of Chapter 3 relating to the disposal of radioactive waste.
G.7.1 Regulatory requirements
According to the Act on Nuclear Activities the following definitions apply:
- spent nuclear fuel which has not been disposed of in a disposal facility is defined as nuclear material; and
- spent nuclear fuel which has been disposed of in a disposal facility is defined as nuclear waste.
Reprocessing is not part of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle in Sweden, as described in section C, and the policy and practices for management of spent nuclear fuel is direct disposal, as described in section B.
It is also clearly stated in the general obligations in the Act on Nuclear Activities (10 §) that the holder of a licence for nuclear activities shall be responsible for ensuring that all measures are taken needed for:
- maintaining safety, with reference to the nature of the activities and the manner in which they are conducted; and
- ensuring the safe handling and disposal of nuclear waste arising from the activities or nuclear material arising therein that is not reused.
G.7.2 Measures taken by the license holders
The practical implication is that spent fuel is in practice treated as high level radioactive waste.
G.7.3 Conclusion
Sweden complies with the obligations of Article 10.
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that at all stages of radioactive waste management individuals, soc ety and the environment are adequately protected against radiolog cal and other hazards. In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to:
(i) ensure that criticality and removal of residual heat generated
during radioactive waste management are adequately addressed; (ii) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste is kept to the
minimum practicable; (iii) take into account interdependencies among the different steps
in radioactive waste management; (iv) provide for effective protection of individuals, society and the
environment, by applying at the national level suitable protective methods as approved by the regulatory body, in the framework of its national legislation which has due regard to internationally endorsed criteria and standards; (v) take into account the biological, chemical and other hazards
that may be associated with radioactive waste management; (vi) strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably predictable im-
pacts on future generations greater than those permitted for the current generation; (viii)aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations.
Summary of developments since the last national report
- SKB	submitted	in	January	2011	the	most	recent	cost	calculations	under	the	
Act(2006:647)onFinancialMeasuresfortheManagementofResidualProductsfromNuclearActivities.SSMwillsendaproposalonthesizeoffees and guarantees for the nuclear power plant licensees to the Government in October2011.
- SKB	submitted	in	September	2010	the	RD&D-programme	2007.	The	regulatory authority has evaluated the program and submitted a statement to the Government.
H.1.1 Regulatory requirements
H.1.1.1 The general obligations of license-holders
As accounted for in section E.2.2.1, the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities (1984:3)requiresthattheholderofalicencefortheoperationofanuclearpower reactor shall – in co-operation with the other holders of a licence for the operation ofnuclearpowerreactors–establishandcarryoutanR&D-programmeforthe safe handling and disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste. Every third year the
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
186 programme shall be submitted to the Government, or an authority assigned by the Government, for evaluation.
Also,asaccountedforinsectionE.2.2.5,theFinancingAct(2006:647)requires the licensees to submit, every three years, estimates of all future costs for management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste, and decommissioning.Thelicenseeofanuclearpowerreactorshallbasecostsestimateson 40yearsofoperationwithaminimumremainingoperatingtimeof6years.The licensee of nuclear facilities other than nuclear power reactors shall base cost estimatesandthebuildupofadequatefinancialresourcesontheexpectedremaining period of operation.
H.1.1.2 Basic provisions and license obligations
BasicsafetyprovisionsarestipulatedintheActonNuclearActivities(1984:3). TherequirementsarefurtherclarifiedinthegeneralsafetyregulationsSSMFS 2008:1.Intheregulationsitisstatedthat,inordertoensureadequateprotectionat all stages of spent fuel management, the licensee shall: 1. establishdocumentedguidelinesforhowsafetyshallbemaintainedatthe
facility as well as ensure that the personnel performing duties which are important to safety are well acquainted with the guidelines; 2.	 ensure	that	the	activities	carried	out	at	the	facility	are	controlled	and	develo-
ped with the support of a quality system which covers those activities which are of importance for safety; 3.	 ensure	that	decisions	on	safety-related	issues	are	preceded	by	adequate	in-
vestigation	and	consultation	so	that	the	issues	are	comprehensively	examined; 4.	 ensure	that	adequate	personnel	is	available	with	the	necessary	competence	
and suitability on all respects needed for those tasks which are of importance for safety as well as ensure that this is documented; 5.	 ensure	that	responsibilities	and	authority	are	defined	and	documented	with	
respect to personnel carrying out work which is important to safety; 6.	 ensure	that	the	personnel	is	provided	with	the	necessary	conditions	to	work	in	
a safe manner; 7.	 ensure	that	experience	from	the	facility’s	own	and	from	similar	activities	is	
continuously utilised and communicated to the personnel concerned; and 8.	 ensure	that	safety,	through	these	and	other	measures,	is	maintained	and	conti-
nuously developed.
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
IntheRadiationProtectionAct(1988:220)itisstipulatedthatradioactivewaste shall be handled and disposed of in a manner that is satisfactory from a radiation protectionpointofview.MoredetailedrequirementsonthehandlingofradioactivewasteandnuclearwasteatnuclearfacilitiesarestipulatedinSSMFS2008:22. Theregulationsputrequirementsonwastemanagementplansandregistrationof wasteandreportingtotheSSM.Atthefacilityaregistershallbekeptoverwaste thatwithoutfurthertreatmentistobetransferredtodisposalinSwedenorisintendedtobetemporarilystoredformorethantwoyears.Theregistershallbe subdivided into items such as packages, components, containers or other units corresponding to the handling of the waste.
For	each	item	the	register	shall	contain	information	on: 1.	 identity; 2.	 the	origin	of	the	waste	or	what	part	or	parts	of	the	facility	it	comes	from; 3.	 the	treatment	of	the	waste	and	its	physical	and	chemical	form; 4.	 the	amount	of	waste; 5.	 the	nuclide	specific	content	of	radioactive	substances	and	a	date	of	reference; 6.	 the	level	of	external	radiation	at	a	specified	distance	and	date; 7.	 the	storage	position;	and 8.	 the	date	of	treatment	(for	waste	intended	to	be	temporarily	stored	for	more	
than two years the date for intended treatment shall be recorded).
A	report	concerning	the	past	calendar	year	shall	be	sent	to	SSM.	The	report	shall	 comprise a summary of: 1.	 which	amount	of	waste	that	has	arisen	or	by	other	means	has	been	brought	to	
the facility; 2.	 waste	that	has	been	registered	according	to	section	6; 3.	 waste	that	has	been	transferred	to	disposal	or	has	been	transported	away	from	
the facility; 4.	 waste	that	at	the	turn	of	the	year	exists	at	the	facility	and	information	on	its	
position; and 5.	 experiences	of	the	handling	of	the	waste	and	a	follow-up	of	the	plans	established.
There	are	also	regulations	on	the	protection	of	human	health	and	the	environment	 in	connection	with	the	final	management	of	spent	nuclear	fuel	and	nuclear	waste	 (SSMFS	2008:37).	The	purpose	of	these	regulations	is	to	limit	the	harmful	effects	 on human health and the environment in connection with the disposal of spent nuclear	fuel	and	nuclear	waste.	Discharges	to	air	and	water	from	a	facility	to	the	 surrounding	environment	are	regulated	in	SSMFS	2008:23	(see	section	F.4.1.2).
In addition there are requirements concerning the long-term safety of a disposal	facility	in	the	regulations	SSMFS	2008:21.	According	to	the	regulations,	the	 safety assessment for a disposal facility should also comprise features, events and processes that can lead to the dispersion of radioactive substances after closure.
As	presented	in	section	E.2.2.3	regulations	concerning	clearance	of	nuclear	 and	non-nuclear	waste	has	been	issued,	SSMFS	2008:39	and	SSMFS	2010:2,	respectively.
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
H.1.1.3 Criticality and removal of residual heat
The	revised	general	safety	regulations	(SSMFS	2008:1)	state	that	radiological	accidents shall be prevented by the design, construction, operation, monitoring and maintenance of a facility. It follows that a criticality analysis as well as an analysis of heat generation and removal of residual heat must be included in the safety report supporting the licence application for any nuclear facility. The	licence	application	for	Clab	included	a	criticality	analysis	as	well	as	an	analysis	 of heat generation. A re-assessment of both the criticality analyses and heat generation	was	performed	and	submitted	in	the	application	for	ongoing	extension	works.
H.1.1.4 Interdependencies in waste management and minimisation of
radioactive waste
The	fact	that	the	licence-holders	are	responsible	for	the	handling	and	disposal	 of the radioactive waste they generate provides an incentive to consider all steps from	waste	generation	to	disposal.	Detailed	requirements	are	stipulated	in	SSM’s	 regulations:
- An	up-to-date	inventory	of	all	spent	fuel	and	radioactive	waste	on-site	(SSMFS	
2008:1	and	SSMFS	2008:22).
- Measures	for	the	safe	on-site	handling,	storage	or	disposal	of	waste	shall	be	 analysed	and	included	in	the	safety	report	of	the	facility.	The	measures	for	 on-site handling shall consider the requirements on safety posed by the continued	handling,	transport	and	disposal	of	the	waste.	The	safety	report	shall	 also include measures, which need to be taken on-site to prepare for the safe transportation,	storage	or	disposal	in	a	nuclear	waste	facility	(SSMFS	2008:1).
- If	such	waste	is	generated	that	does	not	conform	to	the	specifications	in	the	 safety report, measures for the safe handling of this particular waste shall be documented	and	SSM	notified	before	any	measures	are	taken.	The	documentation	is	subject	to	a	twofold	safety	review	by	the	licensee	before	notification	 (SSMFS	2008:1).
- Plans	shall	be	established	for	the	handling	and	disposal	of	all	waste	that	exists	 at the facility arises at the facility or in other ways is brought to the facility. The	plans	shall	include	e.g.	amounts	of	different	categories	of	waste,	estimated	nuclide	specific	content	and	sorting,	treatment	and	interim	storage	of	the	 waste.	The	plans	shall	be	reported	to	the	authorities	before	the	waste	is	generated	(SSMFS	2008:22).
- The	possibility	that	radiation	doses	to	personnel	can	increase	when	releases	to	 the environment are limited shall be taken into account during optimisation, as	shall	the	consequences	of	other	waste	management	alternatives	(SSMFS	 2008:23).
- Human	health	and	the	environment	shall	be	protected	from	detrimental	effects	 of	ionising	radiation,	during	the	time	when	various	stages	of	the	final	management of spent nuclear fuel or nuclear waste are being implemented as well as in	the	future	(SSMFS	2008:37).
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
H.1.1.5 Protection of individuals, society and the environment
General	radiation	protection	provisions	are	described	in	section	F.4.1. SSM	has	particularly	addressed	radiation	protection	of	the	public	and	the	environment in connection with radioactive waste management in three different regulations	(SSMFS	2008:37,	2008:21	and	2008:22,	see	E.2.2.3).	In	summary	it	is	 required that:
- a	disposal	facility	for	spent	nuclear	fuel	or	nuclear	waste	shall	be	designed	so	 that	the	annual	risk	of	harmful	effects	after	closure	does	not	exceed	10E-6	for	 a	representative	individual	in	the	group	exposed	to	the	greatest	risk;
- the	final	management	of	spent	nuclear	fuel	and	nuclear	waste	shall	be	implemented so that biodiversity and the sustainable use of biological resources are protected: and
- human	health	and	the	environment	shall	be	protected	during	the	operation	of	 a nuclear facility as well as in the future.
H.1.1.6 Biological, chemical and other hazards
AnEnvironmentalImpactStatement(EIS)mustbesubmittedtogetherwithan applicationforalicenceaccordingtotheActonNuclearActivitiesandtheRadiationProtectionAct,asaccountedforinsectionE.2.Itisstatedinthegeneral considerations in the Environmental Code that due consideration shall be taken to possible effects from chemical, biological and other hazards. It follows that chemical, biological and other hazards during the operation of a nuclear facility must beaddressedintheEIS.
As	stated	in	H.1.1.2	SSM	requires	that	up-dated	registers	be	kept	for	all	waste	 and	spent	nuclear	fuel	at	a	nuclear	facility.	The	registers	shall	for	every	waste	item	 (e.g. package or component) include information on, among other things, the treatment and the physical and chemical form of the waste.
The	question	of	chemical	and	biological	hazards	with	regard	to	the	long-term	 performance	of	a	disposal	facility	is	addressed	in	SSMFS	2008:21.
Only	packages	approved	by	SSM	have	been	allowed	to	be	transported	to	a	 disposal	facility.	For	this	approval,	the	waste	must	comply	with	the	conditions	 stated	in	the	safety	report	of	the	disposal	facility.	Furthermore,	the	licensee	has	 to submit documentation showing that due regard has been taken to all relevant aspects, including biological, chemical and other hazards with regard to the longterm performance of the disposal facility.
H.1.1.7 Strive to avoid actions that impose impacts on future generations
One	purpose	of	SSMFS	2008:22	is	to	limit	the	harmful	effects	of	radiation	from	 the	waste	today	and	in	the	future.	In	SSMFS	2008:23	it	is	also	stated	that	human	 health and the environment shall be protected from the harmful effects of ionising radiation	during	the	operation	of	a	nuclear	facility	as	well	as	in	the	future.	SSMFS	 2008:37	has	general	requirements	stipulating	that	human	health	and	the	environment shall be protected from detrimental effects of ionising radiation, during the time	when	various	stages	of	the	final	management	of	spent	nuclear	fuel	or	nuclear	 waste are being implemented as well as in the future. All these regulations strive
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
190 to avoid actions that impose reasonably predictable impacts on future generations greater than those permitted for the current generation.
H.1.1.8 Aim to avoid imposing burdens in future generations
As	described	in	section	E.2	the	practices	for	the	management	of	spent	fuel	and	 radioactive	waste	are	governed	by	principles	adopted	by	the	Swedish	Parliament. The	first	governing	principle	reads	”The	expenses	for	the	disposal	of	spent	nuclear	 fuel and nuclear waste are to be covered by revenues from the production of energy	that	has	resulted	in	these	expenses.”	The	second	principle	reads	”The	reactor	 owners	are	to	safely	dispose	of	spent	nuclear	fuel	and	nuclear	waste.”
The	key	words	(underlined)	imply	that	burden	on	future	generations	should	be	 avoided,	especially	with	regard	to	the	fundamental	aspects	of	safety	and	costs.	The	 key words also imply that action should be taken without postponement, i.e. the generation	that	has	benefited	from	the	nuclear	power	generation	should	also	deal	 with the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.
Thus,	the	holder	of	a	licence	to	operate	a	nuclear	facility	is	primarily	responsible for the safe handling and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, as well as decommissioning and dismantling the facility.
H.1.2 Measures taken by the license holder
H.1.2.1 The general obligations of license-holders
Cost calculations
Costcalculationshavesincethebeginningofthe1980’sbeensubmittedbythelicense-holders of a nuclear reactor, in cooperation with the other holders of a license fortheoperationofnuclearpowerreactors,onanannualbasis.SKBsubmittedin January2011themostrecentcostcalculationsundertheAct(2006:647)onFinancialMeasuresfortheManagementofResidualProductsfromNuclearActivities.
RD&D Programme 2010
The nuclear industry, through its co-owned company SKB, has performed researchonfinaldisposalofradioactivewastesincethemid-1970’s.Theformal requirementforaR&D-programmetobesubmittedforregulatoryevaluationwas establishedin1984whentheActonNuclearActivitieswaspromulgated.During the1990stheresearchwasintensifiedwithextensivefeasibilitystudies(ineight municipalities).In2001-2002twomunicipalitiesapprovedfurtherinvestigations. Theinitialsiteinvestigationswereconcludedbytheendof2007andtheresults reportedinpreliminarysitedescriptions.InJune2009theboardofSKBdecided tochooseForsmarkassiteforthedisposalfacilityforspentnuclearfuel.InMarch 2011,SKB’sapplicationsforapermittobuildadisposalfacilitysystemweresubmittedtotheSwedishRadiationSafetyAuthority(SSM)andtheEnvironmental CourtinStockholm.Since1986SKBhasproducednineR&Dprogrammeswith KBS-3asthemainalternativeforthedisposalofspentfuel.SKBsubmittedin September2010theninthRD&D-programmetotheGovernment.
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
H.1.2.2 Basic provisions and license obligations
The	measures	taken	by	the	licensees	regarding	general	safety	requirements	are	to	 be	found	in	sections	H.3.2,	H.4.2,	H.5.2	and	H.6.2.	
H.1.3 Regulatory control
H.1.3.1 The general obligations of license-holders
Nuclear waste fees and guarantees for 2010 and 2011
SSM	reviewed	the	cost	calculations	and	submitted	a	statement	with	suggestion	for	 the	size	of	fees	and	guarantees	to	the	Government	in	October,	2009.	The	Government	decided	in	December	2009	on	the	size	of	fees	and	guarantees	for	2010	and	 2011.	SSM	is	currently	reviewing	the	most	recently	submitted	cost	calculations	to	 determine	and	suggest	to	the	Government	the	size	of	fees	and	guarantees	for	2012	 through	2014.
Evaluation of the RD&D Programme 2010
SKB	submitted	in	September	2010	the	RD&D-programme	2010.	The	regulatory	 authorities have evaluated the programme and submitted a statement to the Government.	The	main	conclusions	from	the	regulatory	review	were:
- The	account	for	the	ongoing	site	investigations	and	other	preparatory	work	 to	support	a	license	application	for	the	extension	of	the	disposal	facility	for	 short-lived low- and inter mediate level waste could have been more detailed. SSM	therefore	recommended	the	Government	to	require	SKB	to	conduct	consultations	with	SSM,	in	order	to	be	appropriately	informed	about	the	regulatory requirements on contents and quality of the collection of arguments and evidence	(“Safety	Case”)	in	support	of	the	application,	planned	to	be	submitted	in	2013.
- SKB	should,	in	close	cooperation	with	the	nuclear	power	reactor	operators,	 further detail and develop the planning for decommissioning of the reactors as well	as	the	assessments	of	different	categories	of	waste	expected	to	be	generated during decommissioning.
- SKB	should	in	the	next	RD&D-programme	to	be	submitted	in	2013,		further	 develop detailed planning for the establishment of a disposal facility for longlived low- and intermediate level waste.
H.1.3.2 Basic provisions and license obligations
Regulatory	control	of	measures	taken	by	the	licensees	regarding	general	safety	 requirements	are	to	be	found	in	sections	H.3.3,	H.4.3,	H.5.3	and	H.6.3.
H.1.4 conclusion
Sweden	complies	with	the	obligations	of	Article	11.
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
Each Contracting Party shall in due course take the appropriate steps to review:
	(i)		the	safety	of	any	radioactive	waste	management	facility	existing	
at the time the Convention enters into force for that Contracting Party and to ensure that, if necessary, all reasonably practicable improvements are made to upgrade the safety of such a facility; (ii) the results of past practices in order to determine whether any
intervention is needed for reasons of radiation protection bearing in mind that the reduction in detriment resulting from the reduction	in	dose	should	be	sufficient	to	justify	the	harm	and	 the costs, including the social costs, of the intervention.
H.2.1 Regulatory requirements
H.2.1.1 Existing facilities
By	the	time	the	Joint	Convention	entered	into	force	for	Sweden	the	situation	as	 regards safety of radioactive waste management facilities was satisfactory.
The	elements	of	the	Joint	Convention	are	since	long	implemented	as	requirements in the legal and regulatory framework and implemented in the management of	radioactive	waste.	Dedicated	inspection	and	review	activities	carried	out	in	the	 early	2000’s	confirmed	that	the	licensee’s	activities	were	in	conformance	with	the	 legal	and	regulatory	requirements.	This	conclusion	has	been	reaffirmed	during	 subsequent inspection and review activities.
H.2.1.2 Past practices
Asdescribedintheintroduction,sectionA.5.2.7,aspecialfeeisleviedonthe nuclearpowerutilitiesinaccordancewithaspeciallaw,theStudsvikAct,tocover expensesformanagingnuclearwastefromoldexperimentalfacilities,inparticularthefacilitiesatStudsvik,theÅgestareactorandtheuraniummineinRanstad.Thespecialfeeisthesameforallfournuclearpowerutilities,currentlySEK 0.003perkilowatt-hour,anditisreassessedannuallybasedonaproposalbythe regulatory authority.
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
H.2.2 Measures taken by the license holders
H.2.2.2 Past practices
ThefourutilitiesoperatingnuclearpowerreactorsinSwedenformedaspecial company,ABSVAFO(Sydkraft,Vattenfall,ForsmarkochOKG)todealwiththeir responsibilitiesaccordingtotheStudsvikAct(SeeE.2.2.6).ABSVAFOwasformerlyownedbyStudsvikNuclearABbutwasinMarch2009acquiredbythe nuclearpowerproducersinSweden(ForsmarksKraftgruppAB,RinghalsAB, BarsebäckKraftABandOKGAB).
According	to	estimates,	SEK	1.8	billion	(equivalent	to	approx.	€	120	million)		 will	be	needed	up	to	the	year	2045	to	meet	the	expenses	for	these	activities.	The	 activities	performed	by	AB	SVAFO	are	closely	monitored	by	SSM.	
H.2.3 conclusion
Sweden	complies	with	the	obligations	of	Article	12.
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
H.3 Article 13: SITING OF PROPOSED FACILITIES
1.			 Each	Contracting	Party	shall	take	the	appropriate	steps	to	ensure	
that procedures are established and implemented for a proposed radioactive waste management facility (v) to evaluate all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the
safety of such a facility during its operating lifetime;
(vi) to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a facility on
individuals, society and the environment;
(vii) to make information on the safety of such a facility available
to members of the public;
(viii) to consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity of such a facil-
ity, insofar as they are likely to be affected by that facility, and provide them, upon their request, with general data relating to the facility to enable them to evaluate the likely safety impact of the facility upon their territory.
2.			 In	so	doing,	each	Contracting	Party	shall	take	the	appropriate	
steps to ensure that such facilities shall not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting Parties by being sited in accordance with	the	general	safety	requirements	of	Article	11.
H.3.1 Regulatory requirements
H.3.1.1 Assessment of safety and environmental impact
According to the Act on Nuclear Activities a licence is required to construct, possess and operate any nuclear facility. A licence application must contain an EIA. TheproceduresforcarryingouttheEIA,aswellasitscontents,arespecifiedinthe EnvironmentalCode(seesectionE.2.2.4).Thelicensingprocedureisdescribedin sectionE.2.3.1.TheEIAmustcontainthefollowingelements:
- A	description	of	the	activity	or	measure	with	details	of	its	location,	design	and	 scope.
- A	description	of	the	measures	being	planned	with	a	view	to	avoiding,	mitigating or remedying adverse effects.
- The	information	needed	to	establish	and	assess	the	main	impacts	on	human	 health, the environment and management of land, water and other resources that the activity or measure is likely to have.
- A	description	of	possible	alternative	sites	and	alternative	designs,	together	 with	a	statement	of	the	reasons	why	a	specific	alternative	was	chosen	and	a	 description of the consequences if the activity or measure is not implemented.
- A	non-technical	summary	of	the	information.
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
In addition to the EIA the preliminary safety report for a proposed spent fuel management	facility	is	of	key	importance	for	licence	application.	Requirements	on	 the content of the safety report are given in the general regulations concerning safety	in	certain	nuclear	facilities	(SSMFS	2008:1),	and	include	for	example:
- A	description	of	how	the	site	and	its	surroundings,	from	the	standpoint	of	 safety, can affect the facility.
- A description of the design basis, including the requirements that have determined	the	design	and	construction	of	the	facility.	Descriptions	of	facilities	for	the	 handling of spent fuel or nuclear waste shall contain requirements that are determined by the description of safety in the particular disposal facility after closure.
- A description of measures taken to ensure adequate protection of workers, the public and the environment from radiation, as required by the Radiation Protection Act and regulations promulgated according to that act.
As	described	in	section	E.2.2.1	the	operators	of	nuclear	power	plants	must	jointly	 perform	a	comprehensive	R&D-programme	for	the	safe	management	of	spent	nuclear	fuel	and	nuclear	waste.	The	purpose	of	this	programme	is	to	demonstrate	that	 timely actions are taken to evaluate the safety and impacts of proposed facilities and	that	all	relevant	site-related	factors	are	studied.	The	programme	must	be	submitted every third year for regulatory review.
H.3.1.2 Public information and involvement
There	are	several	procedures	that	serve	the	purpose	to	involve	the	public	in	the	 siting of new spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste facilities. As mentioned above, an	EIA	must	be	performed	for	any	new	nuclear	facility.	Swedish	legislation	emphasizes	the	role	of	the	public	and	other	stakeholders	in	the	EIA.	The	developer	 must initiate early (long before a licence application is submitted) consultations with those parties that might be affected by a new facility. Parties that must be consulted include:
- municipalities	that	may	host	the	facility;
- regulatory	authorities,	primarily	SSM	and	County	Administrative	Boards;
- national	environmental	organisations;
- local	interest	groups;	and
- affected	individuals,	e.g.	those	living	close	to	a	proposed	location.
The	County	Administration	Boards	have	an	important	function	besides	participating	in	the	consultations.	They	are	requested	to	assist	the	developer	in	identifying	 stakeholders	and	to	facilitate	consultations	and	an	exchange	of	information.	
Furthermore,	the	circulation	of	the	nuclear	power	plants’	joint	R&D	programme for comments provides a broad range of concerned parties with information regarding new facilities as well as a possibility to state opinions.
AccordingtotheAct(1992:1537)andOrdinance(1981:671)ontheFinancingofFutureExpensesforSpentNuclearFueletc.,themunicipalitiesthatmight host a spent nuclear fuel or nuclear waste facility, including a disposal facility, arereimbursedfortheirowninformationtothepublic.Municipalitieshavebeen reimbursedfortheirinformationactivitiessincethemid-1990s.CurrentlythemunicipalitiesofÖsthammarandOskarshamnarereceivingreimbursement.In2004
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
196 theParliamentapprovedanewregulationintheFinancingAct,whichmadeitpossiblefornon-profit-makingorganisationstoapplyforfinancing.Non-profit-makingorganizationsareentitledtofinancialsupportfromtheNuclearWasteFund until12monthsaftertheEnvironmentalImpactAssessmenthasbeenannounced bytheEnvironmentalCourt(fordetailsseesectionE.2.2.4).Decisionsconcerning reimbursementtomunicipalitiesandnon-profitorganisationsaremadebySSM.
H.3.1.3 Consulting contracting parties
The	Environmental	Code	specifies	that	if	another	country	is	likely	to	be	affected,	 the responsible authority as designated by the Government shall inform the competent	authority	in	that	country	about	the	planned	activity.	The	country	concerned,	 and the citizens, who may be affected, should be given the opportunity to take part	in	the	consultation	procedure.	The	Government	has	designated	the	Swedish	 Environmental	Protection	Agency	to	be	responsible	for	this	task.	Such	information	shall	also	be	supplied	when	another	country,	which	is	likely	to	be	exposed	to	 a	significant	environmental	impact,	so	requests.
H.3.2 measures taken by the license holders
H.3.2.1 General
All planned spent fuel and nuclear waste facilities, including repositories, will be sited,	constructed	and	operated	by	SKB.	The	supporting	RD&D-programme	is	 also	run	by	SKB.	The	following	activities	are	currently	carried	out	by	SKB:
- The	RD&D-programme	has	been	reported	every	third	year	since	1986.	The	 most	recent	RD&D	report	was	submitted	in	2010.
- Consultations	and	an	EIA	for	the	planned	encapsulation	facility	(Clink)	and	 the	disposal	facility	for	spent	nuclear	fuel	began	formally	in	2002,	but	in	practice	started	in	the	mid-1990’s.	The	consultations	were	concluded	in	May	2010.
H.3.2.2 Consultations and environmental impact statement
Early consultations have been carried out for both the encapsulation plant and the disposal	facility	for	spent	nuclear	fuel,	in	both	Oskarshamn	and	Forsmark.
Extended	 consultations	 began	 during	 2003	 with	 the	 county	 administrative	 board, other government agencies, the municipalities, the citizens and the organizations	that	are	likely	to	be	affected.	The	consultations	were	coordinated	for	the	 encapsulation	plant	and	disposal	facility	for	spent	nuclear	fuel.	The	consultations	 related to location, scope, design and environmental impact of the activity or measure and the content and structure of the environmental impact statement.
The	extended	consultations	initially	mainly	dealt	with	the	scope	of	EIA.	Preliminary	scoping	reports	were	prepared	as	a	basis	for	discussion.	Viewpoints	and	 proposals that emerged during the consultations were taken into account in the planning of the continued EIA process.
In the subsequent investigation phase, results from investigations and studies as well as proposals for facility design were presented at the consultation meetings, and the participants were given an opportunity to state their views.
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
In	May	2010,	the	consultations	were	concluded.	All	questions	and	viewpoints	 that	have	been	stated	in	the	conclusions,	together	with	SKBs	answers	and	comments,	 are reported in its whole in the compiled documentation from the conclusions.
A	preliminary	version	of	the	environmental	impact	statement	(EIS)	for	the	 whole	disposal	system,	including	the	spent	fuel	disposal	facility	in	Forsmark,	has	 been presented within the framework of the EIA consultations. In addition to the formal	consultations,	extensive	information	activities	have	been	aimed	at	municipalities, organizations and the public.
The	last	facility	that	will	be	built	in	the	LILW	programme	is	the	disposal	facility	for	long-lived	low	and	intermediate	level	waste,	SFL.	A	decision	on	the	siting	 of this facility will be made in a couple of decades at the earliest.
H.3.3 Regulatory control
SSM	reviews	SKB’s	R&D	programme	and	circulates	it	for	comments	to	a	number of concerned organisations (e.g. universities, government agencies, NGOs and municipalities	that	might	host	a	spent	nuclear	fuel	facility).	When	the	review	is	 completed	the	R&D	programme	together	with	SSM’s	recommendations	are	sent	 to the Government for its decision.
SSM	have	regular	consultations	with	SKB	regarding	progress	in	the	siting	of	 the planned facilities. SSM	 is	 consulted	 regarding	 the	 EIA.	 The	 concerned	 County	 Administrative	 Boards	are	also	consulted	regarding	the	EIA	and	thus	exercise	some	regulatory	 control,	however	not	in	the	fields	of	nuclear	safety	and	radiation	protection.
H.3.4 conclusion
Sweden	complies	with	the	obligations	of	Article	13	
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
(i) the design and construction of a radioactive waste management
facility provide for suitable measures to limit possible radiological impacts on individuals, society and the environment, including those from discharges or uncontrolled releases;
(ii) at the design stage, conceptual plans and, as necessary, techni-
cal provisions for the decommissioning of a radioactive waste management facility other than a disposal facility are taken into account; (iii) at the design stage, technical provisions for the closure of a
disposal facility are prepared; (iv) the technologies incorporated in the design and construction
of a radioactive waste management facility are supported by experience,	testing	or	analysis.
H.4.1 Regulatory requirements
The	general	safety	regulations	(SSMFS	2008:1)	apply	to	the	operation	of	all	types	 of nuclear installations, including facilities for treatment, storage and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
H.4.1.1 Suitable measures to limit radiological impact
Therequirementsforlimitingthepossibleradiologicalimpactonindividuals,society and the environment, including those from discharges or uncontrolled releases, are founded upon the basic provisions stipulated in the Act on Nuclear Activities(1984:3).Thisisclarifiedfurtherinthegeneralsafetyregulations(SSMFS 2008:1)inwhichitisstatedthatnuclearaccidentsshallbepreventedthrougha basicfacility-specificdesignthatshallincorporatemultiplebarriersaswellasa facility-specificdefence-in-depthsystem.
Defence-in-depth	shall	be	achieved	by:
- ensuring that the design, construction, operation, monitoring and maintenance of a facility is such that abnormal events, incidents and accidents are prevented;
- ensuring	that	multiple	devices	and	measures	exist	to	protect	the	integrity	of	 the barriers and, if the integrity should be breached, to mitigate the ensuing consequences; and
- ensuring	that	any	release	of	radioactive	substances,	which	may	still	occur	as	 a result of abnormal events, incidents and accidents, is prevented or, if this is not possible, controlled and mitigated through devices and prepared measures.
H.4.1.2 Conceptual plans and provisions for decommissioning
TheActonNuclearActivitiesstatesthattheholderofalicencefornuclearactivi-
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
ties is responsible for ensuring that all necessary measures are taken to ensure the safe handling and disposal of nuclear waste, or nuclear material that is not reused, as well as the safe decommissioning and the dismantling of facilities.
Chapter	9	of	the	general	regulations	concerning	safety	in	nuclear	installations	 (SSMFS	2008:1)	contains	requirements	on	decommissioning	plan	and	a	specific	 operational safety assessment to be carried out as soon as a decision has been taken	on	final	closure	of	a	disposal	facility.
The	regulations	on	planning	before	and	during	decommissioning	of	nuclear	 facilities	(SSMFS	2008:19)	comprises	requirements	for	decommissioning	with	respect to documentation, alternative actions and waste management with regards to radiation protection.
H.4.1.3 Technology provisions for closure of repositories
The	general	regulations	concerning	safety	in	nuclear	installations	(SSMFS	2008:1)	 stipulate that analyses of conditions that are of importance for the safety of a facility shall be carried out before a facility is constructed and taken into operation. This	is	further	specified	in	the	regulations	concerning	safety	in	connection	with	 the	disposal	of	nuclear	material	and	nuclear	waste	(SSMFS	2008:21)	where	it	is	 stipulated that for repositories, the safety assessments shall also comprise features, events and processes that can lead to the dispersion of radioactive substances after closure.	Such	safety	analyses	shall	be	made	before	the	commencement	of	disposal	 facility construction, operation and closure.
H.4.1.4 Technology supported by experience
The	general	regulations	concerning	safety	in	nuclear	installations	(SSMFS	2008:1)	 specify requirements regarding design and construction. It is stated that the design of	the	facility,	with	adaptation	to	the	specific	conditions	of	each	facility,	shall:
- be	able	to	withstand	component	and	system	failures;
- have	reliability	and	operational	stability;
- be	able	to	withstand	such	events	or	conditions	which	can	affect	the	safety	 function of the barriers or defence-in-depth; and
- have	maintainability,	controllability	and	testability	of	inherent	parts	as	long	as	 these parts are used for their intended purposes.
Additional requirements related to design and construction are:
- The	design	principles	and	design	solutions	shall	be	tested	under	conditions	 corresponding to those that can occur during the intended application in a facility. If this is not possible or reasonable, they must have been subjected to the necessary testing or evaluation related to safety.
- The	design	solutions	shall	be	adapted	to	the	personnel’s	ability	to	manage	the	 facility, in a safe manner, under normal conditions as well as during abnormal events, incidents and accidents that might occur.
- Building	components,	devices,	components	and	systems	shall	be	designed,	 manufactured, installed, controlled and tested in accordance with requirements that are adapted for their importance for safety.
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
H.4.2 Measures taken by the license holders
H.4.2.1 Suitable measures to limit radiological impact
The	safety	philosophy	applied	in	the	design	of	all	Swedish	nuclear	facilities	is	 based on the principles of defense in depth and of multiple barriers to prevent the release	of	radioactive	material	to	the	environment.	They	are	all	designed	to	fulfill	 the	intention	of	the	requirements	in	the	General	Design	Criteria.	The	foundation	 of the safety principle on the defense in depth is emphasized and made clearer through the implementation of that principle in the general regulations concerning safety	in	nuclear	installations	(SSMFS	2008:1).
H.4.2.2 Conceptual plans and provisions for decommissioning
Decommissioning	plans	have	been	developed	by	SKB,	as	part	of	the	basis	for	the	 annual	cost	calculations	(see	section	E.2.2.5).	
H.4.2.3 Technology provisions for closure of repositories
Technical	provisions	for	the	closure	of	the	disposal	facility	for	operational	waste	 (SFR)	have	been	part	of	the	safety	assessment	performed	before	SFR	was	constructed. An updated safety analysis was reviewed before the facility was taken into operation.
H.4.2.4 Technology supported by experience
The	 principle	 of	 proven	 technology	 is	 broadly	 accepted	 and	 implemented	 in	 the	design	and	construction	procedures	for	Swedish	nuclear	facilities.	The	use	 of	properly	environmentally	qualified	equipment	ensures	functioning	of	safetyrelated systems and components under emergency conditions. A comprehensive programme	for	environmental	qualification	has	been	carried	out.	No	major	new	 steps are envisaged in addition to the previous programme, although research and development	continues.	In	the	modernization	work,	the	specification	of	all	new	 installations is carefully checked with respect to environmental requirements.
H.4.3 Regulatory control.
During	the	licensing	process	the	PSAR,	SAR	and	OLC	documents	are	reviewed	 by the regulatory authorities to ensure compliance with fundamental safety principles and criteria. A prerequisite for obtaining a licence is that the regulatory review concludes that the facility is designed according to the provisions in the general regulations concerning	safety	in	nuclear	installations	(SSMFS	2008:1).
H.4.4 conclusion
Sweden	complies	with	the	obligations	of	Article	14.
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
(i) before construction of a radioactive waste management facility,
a systematic safety assessment and an environmental assessment appropriate to the hazard presented by the facility and covering its operating lifetime shall be carried out; (ii) in addition, before construction of a disposal facility, a system-
atic safety assessment and an environmental assessment for the period following closure shall be carried out and the results evaluated against the criteria established by the regulatory body; (iii) before the operation of a radioactive waste management facility,
updated and detailed versions of the safety assessment and of the environmental assessment shall be prepared when deemed necessary to complement the assessments referred to in paragraph (i).
H.5.1 Regulatory requirements
H.5.1.1 Assessment of safety
Requirements	on	the	safety	assessment,	safety	review	and	reporting	are	listed	in	 the	general	regulations	concerning	safety	in	nuclear	installations	(SSMFS	2008:1).	 Many	of	these	requirements	are	not	new	but	were	posed	earlier	as	licensing	conditions	for	facilities	licensed	before	the	regulations	came	into	force.	Some	of	the	 requirements are, however, more comprehensive compared to earlier conditions, and some are new.
The	legally	binding	requirements	regarding	safety	assessments	are	summarised	in	 the following points:
- A	comprehensive	safety	analysis	shall	be	performed	before	a	facility	is	constructed	and	before	it	is	taken	into	operation.	The	analysis	shall	subsequently	 be	kept	up-to-date.	The	analysis	shall	be	based	on	a	systematic	inventory	of	 events, event sequences and conditions that can lead to a radiological accident.
- A	preliminary	safety	report	shall	be	prepared	before	a	facility	may	be	constructed.	The	safety	report	shall	be	updated	before	trial	operation	of	the	facility	may	be	started.	.	The	safety	reports	shall	contain	information	as	specified	 in	the	regulations	The	safety	report	shall	be	supplemented	before	the	facility	 is	taken	into	routine	operation.	The	safety	report	shall	subsequently	be	kept	 up-to-date.	The	safety	reports	shall	be	reviewed,	evaluated	and	approved	by	 the regulatory authority as required.
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
202 The	general	safety	regulations	SSMFS	2008:1,	apply	to	the	operation	of	all	types	 of nuclear installations, including facilities for treatment, storage and disposal of spent	fuel	and	radioactive	waste.	The	basic	provisions	regarding	safety	assessment	 and review and can be summarised in the following points:
Safety Analysis
Analyses of conditions that are of importance for the safety of a facility shall be carried	out	before	a	facility	is	constructed	and	taken	into	operation.	The	analyses	 shall	subsequently	be	kept	up-to-date.	The	safety	analyses	shall	be	based	on	a	systematic inventory of such events, event sequences and conditions that could lead to a radiological accident.
Safety Report
A preliminary safety report shall be prepared before a facility may be constructed. The	safety	report	shall	be	updated	before	trial	operation	of	the	facility	may	be	started.	The	safety	report	shall	be	supplemented	before	the	facility	is	taken	into	routine	operation.	The	safety	report	shall	subsequently	be	kept	up-to-date.	The	content	 of	the	safety	report	is	specified	in	the	regulations.	Before	the	facility	may	be	constructed and taken into operation, the safety report shall be evaluated and approved by	SSM.	The	safety	report	shall	subsequently	be	kept	up-to-date.	In	the	updating	 of	the	regulations	it	has	been	clarified	that	the	safety	report	(SAR)	shall	reflect	the	 plant	as	built,	analysed	and	verified	and	show	how	the	valid	safety	requirements	 are	met.	Plant	modifications	shall	be	assessed	against	conditions	described	in	the	 SAR.	It	has	further	been	clarified	that	all	plant	structures,	systems	and	components	 of	importance	for	the	defence-in-depth	shall	be	described	in	the	SAR,	not	only	the	 safety systems. New safety standards and practices, which have been assessed by the	licensee	and	found	applicable,	shall	be	documented	and	inserted	into	the	SAR	 as	soon	as	corresponding	modifications	or	other	plant	measures	have	been	taken.	 A	few	additional	requirements	on	the	contents	of	the	SAR	have	also	been	added.
Safety Review
A safety review shall determine or check that the applicable safety related aspects of	a	specific	issue	have	been	taken	into	account	and	that	SSMFS	2008:1	appropriate safety-related requirements with respect to the design, function, organisation and	activities	of	a	facility	are	met.	The	review	shall	be	carried	out	systematically	 and shall be documented. A safety review shall be performed within those parts of the	organisation	responsible	for	the	specific	issues	(”primary	review”).	A	second	 safety review shall be performed by a safety review function appointed for this purpose and that has an independent position relative those parts of the organisation	responsible	for	the	specific	issues	(”secondary	review”).
Safety Programme
After it is taken into operation, the safety of a facility shall be continuously analysed and assessed in a systematic manner. Any need for improvement regarding safety measures, engineering or organisational issues, which arise as a result of such	analyses	and	assessments,	shall	be	documented	in	a	safety	programme.	The	 safety programme shall be updated on an annual basis.
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
Periodic Safety Review of Facilities
At least once every ten years, a new, integrated analysis and assessment of the safety	of	a	facility	shall	be	performed.	The	analyses	and	assessments,	as	well	as	 the measures proposed on the basis of these shall be documented and submitted to	SSM.	In	the	most	recent	update	of	the	general	regulations,	the	requirements	 on	Periodic	Safety	Review	(PSR)	have	been	made	more	stringent	in	order	to	use	 these	reviews	for	assessment	of	time	limited	licensing	conditions.	This	means	that	 the	Swedish	approach	to	PSR	becomes	more	in	line	with	the	European	approach,	 where	PSR	is	often	used	in	the	re-licensing	of	the	nuclear	power	facilities.
Modifications
A	safety	review	shall	be	performed	for	engineering	or	organisational	modifications	 to	a	facility,	which	can	affect	the	conditions	specified	in	the	safety	report	as	well	 as	essential	modifications	to	the	report.	Before	the	modifications	may	be	included	 in	the	report,	SSM	shall	be	notified	and	the	Inspectorate	can	decide	that	additional	 or	other	requirements	or	conditions	shall	apply	with	respect	to	the	modifications.
Post Closure Safety
Additional requirements concerning the long-term safety of a disposal facility are stipulated in the regulations concerning safety in connection with he disposal of nuclear	material	and	nuclear	waste	(SSMFS	2008:21)	as	well	as	Regulations	and	 General	Advice	on	the	Protection	of	Human	Health	and	the	Environment	in	connection	with	the	Final	Management	of	Spent	Nuclear	Fuel	and	Nuclear	Waste	 (SSMFS	2008:37).	According	to	the	regulations,	the	safety	assessment	for	a	disposal facility shall also comprise features, events and processes that can lead to the dispersion	of	radioactive	substances	after	closure.	Such	safety	assessments	shall	 be made before disposal facility construction, before operation and before closure. The	safety	assessment	shall	cover	as	long	a	time	as	barrier	functions	are	required,	 but at least ten thousand years.
H.5.1.2 Environmental assessment
TheActonNuclearactivitiesalsostatesthatanEIA(EnvironmentalImpactAssessment) must be carried out for all licensing cases, and that the Environmental Code regulates the way in which the EIA shall be carried out as well as the contents ofthedocumentationintheEIS.Requirementsonenvironmentalassessmentare laiddownintheEnvironmentalCode(1998:808)asdescribedinSectionE.2.2.4.
The	purpose	of	an	EIA	is	to	establish	and	describe	the	direct	and	indirect	impact	 of a planned activity or measure as listed below. Another purpose is to enable an overall assessment to be made of this impact on human health and the environment. An environmental impact statement shall contain the following information:
- A	description	of	the	activity	or	measure	with	details	of	its	location,	design	and	 scope.
- A	description	of	the	measures	being	planned	with	a	view	to	avoiding,	mitigating	or	remedying	adverse	effects,	for	example	action	to	prevent	the	activity	 or measure leading to an infringement of an environmental quality standard.
- The	information	that	is	needed	to	establish	and	assess	the	major	impact	on	 human health, the environment and the management of land, water and other resources that the activity or measure is likely to have.
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
- A	description	of	possible	alternative	sites	and	alternative	designs,	together	 with	a	statement	of	the	reasons	why	a	specific	alternative	was	chosen	as	well	 as a description of the consequences if the activity or measure is not implemented.
- A	non-technical	summary	of	the	information.
H.5.1.3 The licensing procedure
Threedifferentpermits/licencesarerequiredforanuclearfacility:apermitunder theEnvironmentalCode(1998:808),alicenceundertheAct(1984:3)onNuclear Activities(1984:3),andabuildingpermitunderthePlanningandBuildingAct (2010:900).LicensingundertheEnvironmentalCodeandtheActonNuclearActivitiesoccurinparallel.Theapplicationsunderbothlawsmustincludeanenvironmentalimpactstatement(EIS)preparedaccordingtotherulesinChapter6of theEnvironmentalCode.ThesameEISisthususedinbothapplications.
AccordingtoChapter17oftheEnvironmentalCode,theGovernmentshall, afterpreparationbytheEnvironmentalCourt,examinethepermissibilityofthe activity.AfterSSM’spreparationofthematter,theGovernmentshallalsoexamine permit applications under the Act on Nuclear Activities. If the Govern ment findsthattheconstructionandoperationofthefacilityispermissibleaccording totheEnvironmentalCodeandgrantsapermit/licenceundertheActonNuclear Activities,itremainsfortheEnvironmentalCourttograntapermit/licenceand stipulate conditions in accordance with the Environmental Code.
H.5.2 Measures taken by the license holders
SKB	submitted	an	updated	safety	assessment	for	the	disposal	facility	for	operational	waste	(SFR)	in	2001.	The	regulatory	review	was	finalised	late	2003	and	 resulted	in	requirements	on	SKB	to	perform	and	submit	complementary	analyses.	 An	updated	SAR	was	submitted	to	the	regulatory	authorities	in	early	2008.
Short-lived operational and decommissioning waste
Site	investigations	for	the	extension	of	SFR,	with	test	drilling	and	other	investigations	of	the	rock	with	associated	analyses,	will	be	concluded	during	the	first	half	of	 2011.	Preliminary	assessments	show	that	there	are	rock	volumes	in	the	investigation	area	that	are	suitable	for	an	extension	of	SFR.
AccordingtotheAct(1984:3)onNuclearActivitiesagovernmentlicenseis requiredtoextendSFR.Intheapplication,SKBwillpresentthetechnicalsupportingmaterialthatisrequiredtodeterminewhethertheexistingandextended facilitymeetstherequirementmadeundertheAct(1984:3)onNuclearActivities. Apreliminarysafetyanalysisreport(PSAR)ofoperationalsafetyandpost-closure safetywillbeincludedintheapplication.SKBwillalsoapplyforapermitfrom theEnvironmentalCourtundertheEnvironmentalCodefortheentireSFRfacility.
When	all	necessary	licenses	have	been	obtained,	the	construction	works	may	 begin.	SKB	must	consider	the	consequences	of	the	conditions	in	the	licenses	before the start of construction and adapt the planning accordingly. When	the	facility	has	been	built	and	processes	function	as	intended,	SKB	will	 submit	an	application	for	a	license	to	commence	trial	operation.	The	application	
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
will	contain	a	an	updated	safety	analysis	report	(SAR)	with	updated	assessments	 of pre-closure and post-closure safety, plus updated safety-related technical specifications.	The	purpose	of	the	trial	operation	is	to	gather	experience	in	preparation	 for routine operation.
Long-lived operational and decommissioning waste
At	the	start	of	2012,	SKB	plans	to	apply	to	French	authorities	for	licensing	of	a	 transport	cask	(ATB	1T)	for	transport	of	BFA	tanks	containing	long-lived	low-	and	 intermediate	level	waste.	Validation	of	this	licence	will	be	performed	by	SSM. SKB	plans	to	commence	interim	storage	in	SFR	of	long-lived	waste	from	the	nuclear	power	plants	when	routine	operation	for	the	extended	facility	begins. An	account	of	different	disposal	facility	concepts	for	SFL,	including	a	qualitative	 assessment	of	their	long-term	safety	function,	will	be	presented	in	2013.	The	goal	 of the study is to choose one or a couple of disposal facility concepts to proceed with.	Together	with	the	results	of	other	SFL	work,	the	study	will	serve	as	a	basis for continued efforts to compile supporting material for the safety assessment planned	for	2016.
Based	on	the	results	of	the	assessment	of	long-term	safety	that	is	planned	for	 2016,	preliminary	requirements	can	be	made	on	the	site	for	the	disposal	facility	 (SFL).	The	continued	research	and	safety	assessment	work	will	probably	lead	to	 modifications	of	these	requirements	before	they	are	used	to	evaluate	a	candidate	 disposal facility site
SKB	is	carrying	out	unit-specific	decommissioning	studies	together	with	the	 nuclear power companies to accumulate a more detailed body of data for estimating waste volumes, material quantities, activity quantities and decommissioning costs	for	the	nuclear	power	plants.	The	results	of	the	studies	will	serve	as	a	basis	 for designing the capacity of future repositories for decommissioning waste and for the safety assessments required in the licensing process.
H.5.3 Regulatory control
The safety case as a basis for licensing and nuclear supervision
The	safety	level	to	be	attained	and	maintained	by	the	licensee	of	a	nuclear	facility is	defined	in	the	licensing	process.	
The	licence	to	build,	possess	and	operate	the	facility	is	granted	by	the	Government.	This	government	licensing	decision	is	applied	for	and	granted	early	in	the	 design	process.	These	licence	conditions	requires	that	a	preliminary	safety	report	 (PSAR)	be	submitted	and	approved	by	the	regulatory	body	before	major	construction	activities	are	started.	A	renewed	safety	report	(SAR)	and	operational	limits	 and	conditions	(OLC)	should	also	be	submitted	and	approved	by	the	regulatory	 body	before	trial	operation	commences	and	a	supplemented	SAR	should	be	submitted and approved by the regulatory body before routine operation commences . For	a	disposal	facility,	the	safety	assessment	should	comprise	features,	events	and	 processes that can lead to the dispersion of radioactive substances after closure, as described	in	section	H.5.1.1.	Such	a	safety	assessment	shall	be	made	before	disposal facility construction, and before operation and before closure.
The	PSAR,	SAR	and	OLC	documents	are	reviewed	by	the	regulatory	authorities,	to	ensure	compliance	with	fundamental	safety	principles	and	criteria.	Based on this licensing procedure, and on approval by the regulatory authorities,
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
206 the	SAR	and	OLC	documents	become	the	legally	binding	documents	regulating	 technical	configuration	and	operating	limits	and	conditions,	often	referred	to	as	 ”the	safety	case”.	This	”safety	case”	may	be	regarded	as	defining	the	minimum	 safety level that the licensee is legally committed to maintain as a condition for a	permit	to	operate	the	facility.	Hence,	the	safety	case	also	provides	the	basis	for	 regulatory supervision.
Additional licence conditions can be prescribed by the regulatory authority over	time,	based	on	national	and	international	operating	experience	and	new	research results.
H.5.4 conclusion
Sweden	complies	with	the	obligations	of	Article	15.
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
H.6 Article 16: OPERATION OF FACILITIES
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
(i) the licence to operate a radioactive waste management facility
is	based	upon	appropriate	assessments	as	specified	in	Article	 15	and	is	conditional	on	the	completion	of	a	commissioning	 programme demonstrating that the facility, as constructed, is consistent with design and safety requirements;
(ii) operational limits and conditions, derived from tests, opera-
tional	experience	and	the	assessments	as	specified	in	Article	 15	are	defined	and	revised	as	necessary;
(iii) operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection and testing of a
radioactive waste management facility are conducted in accordance	with	established	procedures.	For	a	disposal	facility	the	 results thus obtained shall be used to verify and to review the validity of assumptions made and to update the assessments as specified	in	Article	15	for	the	period	after	closure;
	 (iv)	 engineering	and	technical	support	in	all	safety-related	fields	
are available throughout the operating lifetime of a radioactive waste management facility;
(v) procedures for characterisation and segregation of radioactive
waste are applied;
	 (vi)	 incidents	significant	to	safety	are	reported	in	a	timely	manner	
by the holder of the licence to the regulatory body;
	(vii)	 programmes	to	collect	and	analyse	relevant	operating	experi-
ence are established and that the results are acted upon, where appropriate;
(viii) decommissioning plans for a radioactive waste management
facility other than a disposal facility are prepared and updated, as necessary, using information obtained during the operating lifetime of that facility, and are reviewed by the regulatory body;
	 (ix)	 plans	for	the	closure	of	a	disposal	facility	are	prepared	and	
updated, as necessary, using information obtained during the operating lifetime of that facility and are reviewed by the regulatory body.
H.6.1 Regulatory requirements
The	general	regulations	concerning	safety	in	nuclear	installations	(SSMFS	2008:1)	 contain	legally	binding	requirements	relevant	for	all	the	obligations	of	Article	16.	 These	requirements	are	summarised	below.
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
H.6.1.1 Initial authorisation
As	mentioned	in	section	H.5,	a	preliminary	comprehensive	safety	report	is	required before the construction of a spent nuclear facility. A complete safety report, which also takes into account the results from commissioning tests, is required before the facility is taken into operation.
H.6.1.2 Operational limits and conditions
Documented	up-to-date	Operational	Limits	and	Conditions	(OLCs)	are	required	 containing	the	necessary	operational	limits	and	conditions,	as	further	specified	in	 a	separate	appendix	to	the	regulations.	The	OLCs	shall	together	with	the	operating	 procedures ensure that the conditions postulated in the safety report are maintained	during	the	operation	of	the	facility.	The	OLC’s	shall	be	subjected	to	a	twofold	 safety review by the licensee and submitted to the regulatory authority for approval.	The	licensee	shall	notify	regulatory	authority	about	any	changes,	after	they	 have been subjected to a two-fold safety review.
H.6.1.3 Established procedures
Suitable,	verified	and	documented	procedures	are	required	for	all	operational	states	including	accidents.	The	procedures	for	operability	verification	and	procedures used in other operational states than normal operation shall be subjected to a twofold safety review by the licensee. Procedures for maintenance important for safety	are	also	covered	by	the	requirement.	Maintenance	programmes	shall	be	 documented. Inspection and testing of mechanical components shall be carried out according	to	qualified	methods	and	verified	procedures.
H.6.1.4 Engineering and technical support
The	licensee	shall	ensure	that	adequate	personnel	is	available	with	the	necessary	 competence and suitability needed for those tasks which are important for safety, and	also	ensure	that	this	is	documented.	A	long-term	staffing	plan	is	required.	The	 use of contractors as opposed to own personnel should be carefully considered in	order	to	develop	and	maintain	adequate	in-house	competence.	The	necessary	 competence	should	always	exist	in-house	for	ordering,	managing	and	evaluating	 the results of work carried out by contractors of importance for safety.
H.6.1.5 Procedure for characterisation and segregation of waste
All	waste	to	be	disposed	of	in	SFR,	which	is	described	in	detail	in	section	D.1.4.3,	 must	conform	to	predefined	waste	acceptance	criteria.	The	characteristics	of	each	 waste	type	are	documented	in	a	Waste	Type	Description	(WTD).	The	WTDs	are	 prepared	by	the	waste	producer	in	close	contact	with	the	licence	holder	of	SFR	 (SKB).	The	completed	WTD	is	submitted	to	SSM	for	approval.	SSM	reviews		the	 WTD	and	may	issue	specific	conditions	for	the	disposal	of	particular	waste	type.	 To	ensure	consistent	and	comparable	WTDs,	guidelines	have	been	issued	for	the	 structure	and	content	of	the	WTDs.
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
Waste	to	be	disposed	of	in	shallow	land	burial	facilities	are	specified	and	described	in	the	licences	(see	section	D.1.4.4).	The	licensee	must	notify	SSM	at	least	 3	months	in	advance	of	each	disposal	campaign	and	must	then	provide	information about each waste package.
H.6.1.6 Reporting of incidents in a timely manner
The	general	regulations	concerning	safety	in	nuclear	installations	(SSMFS	2008:1)	 contains	one	chapter	about	reporting	requirements	and	an	annex	specifying	these	 requirements	for	various	types	of	events.	The	following	is	a	brief	summary:
- Reporting	without	delay:	emergency	alarm	events	and	events	and	conditions	 in	category	1	(see	below).
- Reporting	within	16	hours:	INES	events	at	level	2	or	higher.
- Reporting	within	7	days:	a	comprehensive	investigation	report	about	alarm	 events	or	events	and	conditions	in	category	1.
- Reporting	within	30	days:	a	comprehensive	investigation	report	of	events	and	 conditions	in	category	2.
In addition, there are requirements on daily reporting of the operational state, and the occurrence of any abnormal events or disturbances, and requirements on a comprehensive	annual	report	summarising	all	experience	important	for	the	safety	 of	the	plant.	Specifications	are	given	about	the	contents	of	the	different	reports	and	 further interpretation of the reporting requirements is given in the general recommendations.
In	one	of	the	basic	paragraphs	of	SSMFS	2008:1,	requirements	are	given	on	 actions	to	be	taken	by	the	licensee	in	cases	of	deficiencies	in	barriers	or	in	the	 defence-in	depth	system.	These	actions	include	first	assessment,	adjustment	of	the	 operational state, implementation of necessary measures, performance of safety reviews	and	reporting	to	SSM.	A	graded	approach	is	allowed	here.
In	appendix	1	of	the	regulations,	events	and	conditions	are	specified	which	 require different responses, depending on the category of events they belong to. Three	categories	are	defined:
Category 1
Severe	 deficiency	 observed	 in	 one	 or	 more	 barriers	 or	 in	 the	 defence-in-depth	 system, as well as a founded suspicion that safety is severely threatened. (In these cases the facility must be brought to a safe state without delay).
Category 2
Deficiency	observed	in	one	barrier	or	in	the	defence-in-depth	system,	which	is	less	 severe	than	that	which	is	referred	to	in	category	1,	as	well	as	a	founded	suspicion	 that safety is threatened. (In these cases the facility is allowed to continue operation under certain limitations and controls).
Category 3
Temporary	deficiency	in	the	defence-in-depth	system,	which	arises	when	such	an	 event or condition is corrected and which, without measures could lead to a more severe	condition,	and	which	is	documented	in	the	Technical	Specifications.	In	all	 three cases, corrective measures shall be subject to a twofold safety review by
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
210 the	licensee.	The	results	of	these	reviews	shall	be	submitted	to	SSM.	Regarding	 category	3	events,	there	is	no	requirement	to	make	a	specific	report	to	SSM.	It	is	 sufficient	to	make	a	compilation	of	these	events	in	the	annual	report.
H.6.1.7 Programmes to collect and analyse operating experience
The	licensee	shall	ensure	that	experience	from	its	own	facilities	and	from	similar	 activities in other relevant facilities is continuously analysed, used and communicated	to	the	personnel	concerned	(SSMFS	2008:1).	It	is	further	required	that	all	 events and conditions which are detected and which are important to safety are investigated in a systematic manner, in order to determine sequences and causes, as well as to establish the measures needed in order to restore the safety margins and to prevent recurrence.
The	results	of	the	investigations	shall	be	disseminated	within	the	organisation	and	 shall contribute to the development of safety at the facility. In accordance with SSMFS	2008:1	it	is	the	responsibility	of	the	licensee,	as	long	as	the	disposal	facility is in operation, to continuously keep informed of the conditions of importance to the assessment of disposal facility safety, also after closure.
H.6.1.8 Decommissioning plans
The	general	regulations	concerning	safety	in	nuclear	installations	(SSMFS	2008:1)	 a chapter on decommissioning has been added with requirements on:
- A	preliminary	plan	for	the	future	decommissioning	of	the	facility	to	be	compiled as before construction of a facility.
- The	 decommissioning	 plan	 to	 be	 supplemented	 and	 incorporated	 into	 the	 facility’s	safety	report	before	the	dismantling	of	the	facility	may	be	initiated
- A	decommissioning	plan	and	a	specific	operational	safety	assessment	to	be	 done	as	soon	as	a	decision	has	been	taken	on	final	closure	of	a	facility.
The	plan	should	include	measures,	which	must	be	implemented	to	ensure	the	safe	 containment of the generated nuclear waste.
H.6.1.9 Plans for closure of disposal facility
The	general	regulations	concerning	safety	in	nuclear	installations	(SSMFS	2008:1)	 states that a facility for the disposal of nuclear waste shall be designed so that the barriers can provide the required safety without monitoring or maintenance after the	disposal	facility	is	closed.	The	regulations	concerning	safety	in	connection	 with	the	disposal	of	nuclear	material	and	nuclear	waste	(SSMFS	2008:21)	specify	 that the safety assessments for a disposal facility shall also comprise features, events and processes which can lead to the dispersion of radioactive substances after closure, and that such analyses shall be made before disposal facility construction, before operation and before closure.
The	safety	assessment	for	a	disposal	facility	shall	cover	as	long	a	time	barrier	 as functions are required, but at least ten thousand years. In addition the regulations specify that it is the responsibility of the licensee, as long as the disposal
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
facility is in operation, to continuously keep themselves informed of conditions of importance to the assessment of disposal facility safety, also after closure.
H.6.2 Measures taken by the license holders
No	 radioactive	 waste	 management	 facility	 has	 been	 commissioned	 since	 1988	 when	the	disposal	facility	for	radioactive	operational	waste	(SFR)	was	licensed	 for operation. As described in the introduction, two additional facilities need to be constructed and taken into operation: a disposal facility for short-lived low and intermediate level decommissioning waste, and a disposal facility for the disposal of long-lived low and intermediate level waste.
The	general	regulations	concerning	safety	in	nuclear	installations	(SSMFS	 2008:1)	contain	legally	binding	requirements	relevant	for	all	obligations	of	Article	 9.	These	requirements	are	summarised	below.
H.6.2.1 Initial authorisation
According	to	current	plans,	SKB	is	to	submit	a	licence	application	for	a	disposal	 facility	for	short-lived	low	and	intermediate	level	decommissioning	waste	in	2013,	 and	operation	is	planned	to	commence	in	2020.	The	disposal	facility	is	planned	 to	be	co-sited	with	the	existing	disposal	facility	for	radioactive	operational	waste	 (SFR).	An	expansion	of	this	facility	to	accommodate	short-lived	decommissioning	 waste was foreseen in conjunction with planning and licensing and is still judged to be the best solution for this waste.
Also according to current plans, the disposal facility for long-lived low- and intermediate	level	waste	will	be	sited	in	about	2035.	The	origin	of	this	waste	is	 primarily research, industry, medical applications, corecomponents and certain internal	components	from	nuclear	power	reactors.	The	waste	is	currently	stored	at	 Studsvik,	at	the	nuclear	power	plants,	and	at	Clab.	A	dry	interim	storage	for	longlived waste, from other power plants than Oskarshamn, will be put into operation for dry interim storage.
H.6.2.2 Operational limits and conditions
The	operational	limits	and	conditions	for	nuclear	facilities	are	described	in	the	operational	limits	and	conditions	(OLC),	a	document,	which	is	considered	to	be	one	of	the	 cornerstones	in	the	governing	and	regulation	of	the	Swedish	nuclear	activities.	Every	 OLC	is	facility-specific	and	is	approved	by	SSM		as	part	of	the	licensing	condition.
The	original	OLC	for	each	facility	is	derived	from	the	safety	analyses	in	the	 SAR,	in	which	the	behaviour	of	the	facility	is	described.	Corrections	and	updating	 takes place, when new and better knowledge is available, either from research, tests or	operational	experience.	Suggestions	for	changes	in	OLC	are	reviewed	carefully	 from the safety point of view at different levels in the operating organisation and are finally	approved	by	the	regulatory	body,	before	they	are	included	in	the	document.
The	fact	that	OLC	is	reviewed	and	revised	regularly	has	contributed	to	making	 it a living document. It is also part of the quality and management system and used	frequently	in	particular	by	the	operations	staff.	An	essential	part	of	OLC	is	 the	general	clause	that	says	”...should	any	doubt	appear	about	the	interpretation	of	 the	text,	the	general	purpose	of	OLC	shall	be	guiding.	This	means	that	the	facility	
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
212 in	all	indefinite	situations	shall	be	maintained	or	brought	respectively	to	a	safe	 state.”.	Other	parts	of	OLC	are	the	description	of	the	background	to	the	document.	The	background	description	is	important	for	preserving	and	transferring	to	 new	staff	the	knowledge	and	experience	of	those	who	participated	in	the	original	 production	of	OLC.	Modified	and	maintained	equipment	must	pass	an	operability	 test	to	verify	that	the	equipment	fulfills	specified	operational	requirements	before	 being accepted for continuous operation.
H.6.2.3 Established procedures
All activities that directly affect the operation of the facility are governed by procedures of different kinds covering normal operation, emergency operation and functional	 tests.	 Maintenance	 activities	 according	 to	 an	 approved	 maintenance	 programme	are	also	to	a	great	extent	accomplished	according	to	procedures,	however, not always as detailed as the operating procedures, in which activities are described	in	sequence,	step	by	step.	Signing	off	of	the	completion	of	steps	carried	 out	in	the	procedures	is	mandatory	in	most	cases,	in	order	to	confirm	the	completion	and	facilitate	verification.
The	operating	personnel	are	deeply	involved	in	the	production	and	revision	 of	operating	procedures.	The	development	of	procedures	follows	specified	directives, which include the reviewing of the documents, normally, by more than one person other than the author, before being approved by the operations manager or	someone	else	at	the	corresponding	level.	The	same	applies	for	the	revision	of	 procedures.	The	revision	of	procedures	is	to	be	carried	out	continuously,	when	 new	experience	is	obtained	particularly	in	the	case	of	maintenance	procedures.	 Emergency procedures have been developed in order to deal with anticipated operational occurrences.
H.6.2.4 Engineering and technical support
The	principles	for	staffing	are	reported	in	section	F.2	(Human	and	financial	resources). Competence that might not be completely available within the own organisation	at	all	plants	is	for	instance	expertise	and	resources	for	materials	and	chemistry	 assessments,	radiation	shielding	and	environmental	consequence	calculations,	expertise and resources for software for safety applications and also process control and	measurement	techniques.	In	particular	the	IT	functions	have	normally	been	 outsourced,	but	are	still	available	on-site.	The	intention	is	always	to	have	the	ordering competence within the operating organisation, and the capability of evaluating the results of analyses, calculations, etc. performed by consultants.
H.6.2.5 Procedure for characterisation and segregation of waste
The	responsibility	for	the	collection,	segregation,	characterisation,	treatment	and	 conditioning	of	radioactive	waste	rests	with	the	waste	producer.	The	waste	producers have therefore implemented routines for ensuring that the waste complies with	the	predefined	WTDs	or	with	the	licence	conditions	for	the	shallow	land	 burial	facilities	(see	section	H.6.1.5).
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
H.6.2.6 Incident reporting
Incidents	significant	to	safety	are	reported	according	to	the	non-routine	reporting	 requirements	in	the	technical	specifications.	Two	types	of	licensee	event	reports	 (LER)	exist.	The	more	severe	one,	called	abnormal	event,	requires	the	facility	to	 inform	SSM	within	one	hour.	A	final	report	shall	be	submitted	within	ten	days	 from the time of the event and the analysis of the event and appropriate measures to	prevent	recurrence	shall	be	approved	by	SSM.	Only	a	very	limited	number	 of	events	of	this	category	have	occurred	at	the	Swedish	facilities	over	the	years.	 These	events	are	typically	also	of	such	a	dignity	to	warrant	reporting	in	accordance	 with	the	International	Nuclear	Event	Scale	(INES).
The	other	type	of	LER,	called	RO	(Reportable	Occurrence),	is	used	for	less	severe	events.	This	type	of	event	is	mentioned	in	the	daily	report,	which	is	sent	to	the	 regulatory	bodies,	followed	up	by	a	preliminary	report	within	seven	days	and	a	final	 report	within	30	days.	The	reports	are	reviewed	at	different	levels	within	the	operating	 organisation and approved by the operations or production manager before submittal.
The	front	of	the	standardised	report	form	describes	the	event	in	general:	identification	number,	title,	reference	to	OLC,	date	of	discovery	and	length	of	time	 until corrective actions were completed, conditions at the time it occurred, system consequences, a contact person at the plant and activities affected by the event.
On	the	reverse	side	of	the	document	a	description	of	the	event	is	given.	The	following titles are used:
- Event	course	and	operational	consequence;
- Safety	significance;
- Direct	and	root	causes;
- Planned/decided	measures;	and
- Lessons	learned	by	the	event.
If	the	description	of	the	event	is	extensive	additional	pages	may	be	attached	to	 the	form.	Reports	are	also	required	in	accordance	with	OLC	when	the	permitted	 levels	of	activity	release	from	the	facility	are	exceeded	or	in	the	event	of	unusually	 high	radiation	exposure	to	individuals.	These	types	of	non-routine	reporting	are	 primarily	directed	towards	SSM.
H.6.2.7 Operating experience analysis and feedback
The	objective	of	the	analysis	and	feedback	programme	concerning	operating	experience	is	to	learn	from	their	own	and	others’	experience	and	thus	prevent	recurrences	of	events,	particularly	those	that	might	affect	the	safety	of	the	facility.	The	 operating	experience	feed-back	process	consists	of	a	wide	variety	of	activities	 within	the	plant	organisation	as	well	as	externally.
H.6.2.8 Decommissioning plans
As	described	in	section	H.6.1.8,	the	general	regulations	concerning	safety	in	nuclear	installations	(SSMFS	2008:1)	comprises	requirements	for	the	preparation	of	 decommissioning	plans	for	all	nuclear	facilities.	So	far	only	generic	and	general	
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
214 decommissioning plans have been prepared as part of the basis for the nuclear power	 utilities’	 cost	 estimates	 for	 dismantling	 and	 disposal	 of	 spent	 fuel	 and radioactive	waste	(see	section	H.4.2.2).
H.6.2.9 Plans for closure of disposal facility
The	closure	of	repositories	will	not	take	place	for	at	least	30-50	years	according	to	 current	plans.	Closure	is	thus	still	part	of	SKB’s	RD&D	programme	and	an	issue	 for future safety assessments.
H.6.3 Regulatory control
H.6.3.1 Initial authorisation
The	regulatory	control	is	achieved	through	the	procedures	described	in	sections	 E.2.3.1	 (Licensing)	 and	 E.2.3.3	 (Institutional	 control,	 regulatory	 inspection	 and	 reporting).
H.6.3.2 Operational limits and conditions
SSM	reviews	applications	for	changes	in	OLC,	and	for	exemptions	from	OLC.	 Based	on	the	application	and	information	provided	by	the	licensees,	and	the	associated safety analyses, assessments are made about how the proposed changes or	exemptions	contribute	to	the	risk	profile	of	the	facility.
A	few	years	ago,	the	regulatorinspected	the	training	and	retraining	in	OLC	 of operational, maintenance and technical support personnel. Included in the inspection	was	how	documentation	was	used	and	kept	up	to	date.	The	regulatory	 authority	concluded	that	the	use	of	OLC	was	well	understood	and	the	training	of	 operational	personnel	was	well	organised.	However,	it	was	found	that	the	training	 could be improved for other groups who come into contact with the requirements of	OLC,	for	instance	personnel	in	the	maintenance	and	chemical	departments.	It	 was	also	concluded	that	updating	OLC	was	sometimes	slow,	due	to	limited	staff	 resources and that consultants were often used for this important task.
H.6.3.3 Procedures
Operational	 and	 maintenance	 procedures	 are	 normally	 not	 reviewed	 by	 SSM.	 Only	in	connection	with	event	investigations	would	SSM	ask	for	a	procedure	to	 be submitted for review. In the frame of quality assurance inspections or review of	quality	audits	made	by	the	licensees	(see	section	F.3)	have	SSM	looked	into	the	 routines used for updating procedures.
H.6.3.4 Engineering and technical support
SSM	has	not	so	far	specifically	inspected	the	engineering	and	technical	support	 available at the facilities. In connection with other inspections and reviews, the staffing	situation	has	occasionally	been	commented	upon.
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
H.6.3.5 Characterisation and segregation of waste
As	described	in	section	H.6.1.5	all	waste	types	must	be	approved	by	the	regulatory	 function	before	disposal.	Compliance	with	regulations	is	verified	by	inspections	 both	at	the	waste	producer	and	the	operator	of	the	disposal	facility,	e.g.	SFR	or	 shallow	land	burial	facilities.	The	inspections	cover	e.g.	administrative	routines,	 documentation, equipment, and radiological measurements.
H.6.3.6 Incident reporting
Licensee	event	reports	are	reviewed	upon	arrival	by	the	responsible	site	inspector,	who	asks	the	facility	for	clarification	if	necessary.	As	a	routine	all	LERs	are	 screened once a week by a standing group of inspectors and specialists in order to assess the event, the analysis and the measures taken by the licensees. If there has been any regulatory concerns the issue is brought up at a management meeting and a	decision	made	about	any	further	measures	to	be	taken	by	SSM.
H.6.3.7 Experience feedback analysis
The	regulatory	control	is	achieved	through	the	procedures	described	in	section	 E.2.3.3	(Institutional	control,	regulatory	inspection	and	reporting).	The	regulator	 has also in connection with event investigations and in connection with other inspections	and	reviews,	followed	up	the	experience	feed	back	programme.
H.6.3.8 Decommissioning plans
The	decommissioning	plans	(see	section	H.6.1.8)	must	be	submitted	to	SSM	for	 approval before the decommissioning and dismantling activities may be started.
H.6.3.9 Plans for closure of disposal facility
As	described	in	section	H.6.2.9	the	closure	of	repositories	is	still	an	R&D	issue	 and	SKB	has	thus	not	yet	presented	any	definite	plans.	It	is	however	part	of	SKB’s	 RD&D	programme	which	is	subject	to	regulatory	review	every	third	year.	The	 long-term	safety	aspects	of	the	backfill,	which	will	be	of	key	importance	in	the	 closure	planning,	have	been	identified	as	one	area	requiring	significant	efforts
H.6.4 conclusion
Sweden	complies	with	the	obligations	of	Article	16.	
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure
that after closure of a disposal facility: (i) records of the location, design and inventory of that facility
required by the regulatory body are preserved; (ii) active or passive institutional controls such as monitoring or ac-
cess restrictions are carried out, if required; and (iii) if, during any period of active institutional control, an un-
planned release of radioactive materials into the environment is detected, intervention measures are implemented, if necessary.
H.7.1 Records keeping
Generally, the implementing organisations are responsible for the development andmanagementofrecords.Nevertheless,R&Disbeingcarriedoutonthesesubjects.Theregulationsonfilingatnuclearplants(SSMFS2008:38)containsrequirementsforrecordmanagement,underwhichspecifieddocumentsconcerning location, design and inventory of waste are required to be kept in archives, for morethan100years.Relevantrecordswillbetransferredtonationalandregional officialarchiveswhenfacilitiesaredecommissionedorclosed.Theauthority’s documents are regularly transferred to national archives as regulated in the Act onArchives(1990:7)andregulationsissuedbytheNationalArchivesofSweden. Thismechanismhasbeeninplacesince1618.
H.7.2 Measures taken by the license holders
The	R&D	activities	performed	by	SKB	as	a	basis	for	the	design	work	on	repositories is based on that the design shall be such that the safety of a closed disposal facility is not dependent on surveillance or monitoring, but that some institutional controls	can	be	assumed	to	exist	even	after	closure,	for	example	safeguards.
H.7.3 institutional control
Requirements	 for	 institutional	 control	 after	 closure	 are	 not	 established	 or	 formally	decided.	The	general	regulations	concerning	safety	in	nuclear	installations	 (SSMFS	2008:1)	stipulate	that	a	facility	for	the	disposal	of	nuclear	waste	shall	be	 designed so that the barriers provide the required safety without monitoring or maintenance	after	the	disposal	facility	is	closed.	This	is	further	specified	in	the	 regulations concerning safety in connection with the disposal of nuclear material and	nuclear	waste	(SSMFS	2008:21)	in	which	it	is	stipulated	that	safety	after	closure of a disposal facility shall be maintained through a system of passive barriers. Also the regulations on the protection of human health and the environment in connection	with	the	final	management	of	spent	nuclear	fuel	and	nuclear	waste	 (SSMFS	2008:37)	require	that	the	long-term	performance	of	a	disposal	facility	 should not rely on any active measures.
Section H – Safety of Radioactive WaSte ManageMent
The	four	shallow	land	burial	facilities	for	low-level	waste	(Oskarshamn,	Forsmark,	Ringhals	and	Studsvik)	-	are	located	within	the	premises	of	the	power	plant	 or industrial facility at that location. Access restrictions to the repositories are, therefore, maintained through the access restrictions that apply for the entire facility.
In	the	case	of	SFR,	relevant	authorities	have	not	yet	decided	what	measures	 for	institutional	control,	either	active	or	passive,	will	apply	post-closure.	However,	 the basic philosophy is applicable, that high levels of safety and radiological protection of public health and the environment shall be independent on institutional control.
In the case of the four shallow land burial facilities for low-level waste, institutional	control	is	requested	for	a	period	of	up	to	50	years	after	closure	of	the	 disposal facility. It is for the owner and operator of the disposal facility to demonstrate how the requirement for institutional control can be maintained over that period.	For	longer	periods	of	time,	it	is	foreseen	that	the	environmental	hazard	 and risk is principally of a non-radiological character. Prolonged requirements for institutional	control	may	be	issued	by	county	or	municipal	administrations.	The	 municipalities’	detailed	development	plans	are	also	of	importance,	by	providing	 conditions concerning the use of the land. All nuclear facilities, including shallow land disposal facilities, are within areas where detailed development plans have been established.
Exempt	waste	may	be	deposited	on	municipal	disposal	sites,	and	will	be	subject to institutional control as decided by county or municipal authorities.
According to the regulations on the protection of human health and the environment from discharges of radioactive substances from certain nuclear facilities (SSMFS	2008:23),	the	holder	of	a	licence	shall	conduct	environmental	monitoring. All discharges from facilities for the storage or disposal of radioactive waste shall	be	monitored	by	nuclide	specific	measuring	programmes.
H.7.4 intervention measures
As	described	above,	the	regulations	(SSMFS	2008:1,	2008:21)	stipulate	that	a	 facility for disposal of nuclear waste shall be designed so that safety after closure of a disposal facility is provided by a system of passive barriers. Prior to the disposal	facility	closure,	the	final	safety	assessment	must	be	renewed	and	approved	 by the regulatory authority. If the regulatory authority approves the closure of the disposal facility the licence holder may be relieved from his responsibilities and obligations.	Thus,	if	intervention	measures	are	needed,	it	will	be	the	responsibility	 of	the	State.
H.7.5 conclusion
Sweden	complies	with	the	obligations	of	Article	17.
This page is intentionally left blank
Section I – TranSboundary MoveMenT
I.1 Article 27: TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENT
1. Each Contracting Party involved in transboundary movement shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that such movement is undertaken in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Convention and relevant binding international instruments. In so doing: (i) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall take
the appropriate steps to ensure that transboundary movement is authorized and takes place only with the prior notification and consent of the State of destination; (ii) transboundary movement through States of transit shall
be subject to those international obligations which are relevant to the particular modes of transport utilized; (iii) a Contracting Party which is a State of destination shall
consent to a transboundary movement only if it has the administrative and technical capacity, as well as the regulatory structure, needed to manage the spent fuel or the radioactive waste in a manner consistent with this Convention; (iv) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall autho-
rize a transboundary movement only if it can satisfy itself in accordance with the consent of the State of destination that the requirements of subparagraph (iii) are met prior to transboundary movement; (v) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall take
the appropriate steps to permit re-entry into its territory, if a transboundary movement is not or cannot be completed in conformity with this Article, unless an alternative safe arrangement can be made.
2. A Contracting Party shall not licence the shipment of its spent fuel or radioactive waste to a destination south of latitude 60 degrees South for storage or disposal.
3. Nothing in this Convention prejudices or affects: (i) the exercise, by ships and aircraft of all States, of mari-
time, river and air navigation rights and freedoms, as provided for in international law; (ii) rights of a Contracting Party to which radioactive waste is
exported for processing to return, or provide for the return of, the radioactive waste and other products after treatment to the State of origin; (iii) the right of a Contracting Party to export its spent fuel for
reprocessing; (iv) rights of a Contracting Party to which spent fuel is
exported for reprocessing to return, or provide for the return of, radioactive waste and other products resulting from reprocessing operations to the State of origin.
Section I – TranSboundary MoveMenT
I.1.1 regulatory requirement
There are four different Acts that must be considered in order to obtain a complete picture of the Swedish regulatory requirements regarding transboundary movement of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste:
- the Radiation Protection Act (1988:293);
- the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities;
- Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009; and
- the Act (2000:1064) on Control of Export of Dual-use Products and Technical
Assistance.
Sweden has implemented Council Directive 2006/117/Euratom of 20 November 2006 on the supervision and control of shipments of radioactive waste and spent fuel in the national legislation, i.e the Radiation Protection Act and the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities.
In summary, and as specified in the Radiation Protection Act, a licence to export spent nuclear fuel or radioactive waste from Sweden cannot be granted if the destination is: i. south of latitude 60 degrees south; ii. a State party to the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention which is not a member of
the European Union; iii. a State that has forbidden the import of spent nuclear fuel or radioactive waste; or iv. a State that, in the opinion of the responsible Swedish authorities, does not
have the technical, legal or administrative resources to manage the spent nuclear fuel or administrative resources to manage the spent nuclear fuel or radioactive waste safely.
The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority has the jurisdiction to decide on the export of nuclear material and nuclear equipment as defined in the Annex 1, Category 0 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5May 2009. Export cases that are of a principle importance can be decided by the Government. An application for the export of spent fuel of Swedish origin must incude an assurance that the material will be returned to Sweden if it cannot be taken care of as planned.
SSM Regulations and general Advice on control of Nuclear Material etc. (SSMFS 2008:3) contains stringent national requirements in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. It establishes e.g. the procedure to fulfill the requirement in Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009.
I.1.2 regulatory control
Sweden follows the administrative procedures set forth in the Directive 2006/117/ Euratom in order to ensure that states of destination and states of transit have the opportunity to give their prior consent, and are notified as is stated in the directive.
I.1.3 experience of transboundary movements
Studsvik Nuclear AB carries out volume reduction of radioactive waste on a commercial basis, by incineration of combustible waste and melting of scrap metal. The activities are to a certain extent based on services to companies abroad, and
Section I – TranSboundary MoveMenT
Studsvik imports radioactive waste and scrap metal for the purpose of volume reduction. The remaining radioactive waste is re-exported to the country of origin. Approximately one hundred transboundary shipments of this kind is carried out each year.
I.1.4 Conclusion
The Swedish party complies with article 27.
This page is intentionally left blank
Section J – DiSuSeD SealeD SourceS
J.1 Article 28: DISUSED SEALED SOURCES
1. Each Contracting Party shall, in the framework of its national law, take the appropriate steps to ensure that the possession, remanufacturing or disposal of disused sealed sources takes place in a safe manner.
2. A Contracting Party shall allow for re-entry into its territory of disused sealed sources if, in the framework of its national law, it has accepted that they be returned to a manufacturer qualified to receive and possess the disused sealed sources.
Radiation Protection Act
All handling of disused sealed sources is covered by the Radiation Protection Act (1988:220). According to the Act, anyone that has conducted activities involving sealed sources has to ensure the safe management and disposal of the disused sealed sources, which also includes securing that there are financial resources secured for the handling and disposal of the disused sealed sources. The Radiation Protection Act allows the re-entry of disused sealed sources into its territory for return to Studsvik Nuclear AB (SNAB).
Regulations
Detailed requirements on the handling of disused sealed sources are found in the following regulations issued by the SSM.
- Regulations on the Control of High Activity Sealed Sources (SSMFS 2008:9) stipulate that high activity sources for which no further use is foreseen must be sent either to the supplier, to the manufacturer or to an approved facility for waste management within six months. The holder must notify the SSM which keeps a register.
- Regulations on Radiation Therapy (SSMFS 2008:33) stipulate that in the case of the purchase of radioactive sources or equipment, which contains such sources, a plan shall be drawn up for the future handling of radioactive waste.
- Regulations on Accelerators and Sealed Sources (SSMFS 2008:27) stipulate that the license-holder shall ensure that an up-to-date and documented plan exists for decommissioning the plant. The plan shall include an analysis of the resources needed to take care of all radioactive substances and radioactive demolition waste in a safe way from a radiation protection point of view.
- Regulations on the Use of Equipment in Industry Containing Sealed Sources or X-Ray Tubes (SSMFS 2008:40) stipulate that equipment containing a radioactive source for which no further use is foreseen, shall be sent to a radioactive waste management facility within six months.
- Regulations on Smoke Detectors for Domestic Use Containing Radioactive
Sources (SSMFS 2008:47) stipulate that the units are collected and sent for dismantling.
- Regulations on Smoke Detectors for Industrial Use Containing Radioactive
Sources (SSMFS 2008:47) stipulate that the disused units should be taken care of as radioactive waste and returned to the supplier or manufacturer.
Section J – DiSuSeD SealeD SourceS
- Regulations on Import, Export and Reporting on Radioactive Substances
(SSMFS 2008:10) stipulate that to import or export disused sealed sources a license is needed and the import/export must be reported to the competent authorities.
In addition to the regulations, the SSM also can issue license conditions that concern the management of disused sealed sources.
Producer’s Responsibility Ordinances
Two ordinances establish producer’s responsibility for disused sealed sources: the Ordinance on Producer’s Responsibility for Electrical and Electronic Equipment (2005:209) and the Ordinance on Producer’s Responsibility for Certain Radioactive Products and Orphan Sources (2007:193). In effect, the license-holder can fulfill the responsibility established in the Radiation Protection Act of safe handling and disposal of a disused sealed source by handing it over to a producer.
J.1.2 Disused sealed sources and radioactive waste from medical use, research and industry
The licensee report to the SSM when a practice involving sources ceases (delicensing) or when the holder of a particular source have transferred the ownership of the source to another licensee, sent it back to the manufacturer/producer or have scrapped the source (sent it for waste treatment). Table J1 shows the data for registration and de-registration of radioactive sources for the years 2009 and 2010. It can be noted that about 3 to 4 % of the sources are de-registered per year which amounts to about 200 sources per year.
Section J – DiSuSeD SealeD SourceS
Nuklid No of sources Nuclide No of Sources
Nuclide No of Sources Nuclide No of sources
Am-241
43 Am-241
81
Am-241
12 Am-241 17
Am-241/Be
6 Am-241/Be
11
C-14
1 Cd-109
Au-198
1 C-14
4
Cd-109
14 Cm-244 1
Ba-137m
1 Cd-109
18
Cf-252
1 Co-57
Br-82
2 Cf-252
7
Co-60
71 Co-60
C-14
3 Co-57
2
Cs-137
75 Cs-137
Cd-109
29 Co-60
304
Fe-55
12 Fe-55
Cf-252
9 Cs-137
576
Fel
6 Fel
Cm-244
3 Fe-55
16
H-3
2 H-3
Co-57
5 Fel
14
Ir-192
2 I-125
Co-60
381 Gd-153
3
Kr-85
5 Kr-85
Cs-137
710 H-3
22
Pm-147
2 Pb-210
F-18
2 Ir-192
5
Po-210
13 Pm-147 6
Fe-55
42 Kr-85
29
Se-75
1 Po-210
Fel
25 Mo-99
1
Sr-90
6 Ra-226
H-3
14 Pb-210
1
Sum
223
Rb-86
Hg-203
2 Pm-147
17
Sr-85
Ir-192
3 Po-210
31
Sr-90
Kr-85
56 Pu-238
1
U-235
La-140
1 Ra-226
5
Sum
Na-24
3 Rb-86
1
Ni-63
2 Se-75
3
Pm-147
13 Sr-85
1
Po-210
118 Sr-90
15
Pu-239
1 U-235
1
Ra-226
3 Yb-169
1
Se-75
2
Sum
1170
Sr-90
9
Tc-99m
1
U-238
1
Sum
1491
2009
2010
2009
Deregistrered sealed sources
Registered sealed sources
Table J1: Registration and Deregistration of Radioactive Sources
Disused sealed sources to be disposed of are sent to Studsvik Nuclear AB (SNAB). SNAB is the only approved radioactive waste management facility in Sweden for handling radiation sources that need a license and currently receives approximately a little more than 200 sealed sources per year. However, SNAB is not required to accept, handle or dispose of disused sealed sources. The company operates on a commercial basis. Hence, problems may arise if the holder of a sealed source cannot afford the cost for the handling at Studsvik, or if Studsvik refuses to handle a sealed source.
After treatment, the disused sealed sources are stored by SNAB, pending disposal in disposal facilities for either short-lived low and intermediate level waste (SFR) or long lived low- and intermediate level waste (SFL).
SNAB receives approximately a little more than 200 disused sealed sources per year. Table J2 shows the inventory of disused sealed sources stored by SNAB, and table J3 shows the inventory of radioactive waste from medical use, research and industry stored by SNAB. The tables comprise all disused sealed sources and all radioactive waste delivered to SNAB between 2006-01-01 and 2010-12-31. SNAB is currently compiling an inventory on all disused sealed sources and ra-
Registred sealed sources equipment Deregistred sealed sources equipment
Section J – DiSuSeD SealeD SourceS
226 dioactive waste from medical use, research and industry received between 1991 07 01 and 2005 12 31. This material has been conditioned together with nuclear waste and is now being stored in the interim storage facility for solid intermediate level waste, AM (see section D.1.4.2).
Table J2: Inventory of disused sealed sources stored by Studsvik Nuclear AB 2010-12-31. The activity is the activity at the time of delivery.
Nuclide No of sources Activity (Bq) Estimated volume Disposal
(litres)
Am-241 504 000
2,02E+10 13 670 liter1
SFR
Am-241 383 290
2,19E+11
2* SFL
Am-241
72
2,88E+11
*
SFL
Ba-133
6
2,06E+07
*
SFL
C-14
3
1,11E+07
*
SFL
Cd-109
4
1,86E+08
*
SFL
Cm-244
1
1,11E+09
*
SFL
Co-57
253
1,99E+10
*
SFL
Co-60
210
4,12E+12
*
SFL
Cs-137
293
2,95E+12
*
SFL
Fe-55
37
7,59E+10
*
SFL
H-3
12
6,01E+12
*
SFL
I-129
6
1,19E+07
*
SFL
Ir-192
11
2,60E+07
*
SFL
Kr-85
16
2,73E+11
*
SFL
Mn-54
1
7,40E+05
*
SFL
Na-22
1
7,40E+06
*
SFL
Ni-63
27
1,16E+10
*
SFL
Pm-147
31
1,52E+12
*
SFL
Po-210
2
9,00E+08
*
SFL
Ra/Be
1
3,70E+09
*
SFL
Ra-226
148
1,72E+11
*
SFL
Sr-90
55
2,50E+11
*
SFL
Tc-99
1
3,33E+05
*
SFL
Th-232
1
0,16E+06
*
SFL
Tl-204
1
3,70E+06
*
SFL
1 Radiation sources from smoke alarms intended for households. 2 Radiation sources from smoke alarms intended for the industry. * The estimated net volume is 3 736 litres, see also Table D12.
Section J – DiSuSeD SealeD SourceS
Table J3: Inventory of radioactive waste stored by Studsvik Nuclear AB 2010-12-31. The activity is the activity at the time of delivery.
Orphan sources
License-holders are required to take all measures necessary so as not to allow for sealed sources to become out of regulatory control. On rare occasions orphan sources have been found. If the responsible license-holder cannot be identified, the State will provide financial resources for the management and disposal of the source. This is made possible through a special governmental funding arrangement that allows the SSM to use up to EUR 100 000 per year to cover the costs for the management and final disposal of orphan sources but also radioactive non-nuclear waste from past practices, e.g. radium and thorium products possessed by private persons.
Nuclide No of waste Activity (Bq) Estimated volume Disposal
consignments
(litres)
Am-241
11 1,05E+10
*
SFR
Ba-133
3
4,80E+07
*
SFL
Bi-207
8
4,25E+08
*
SFL
C-14
8
1,01E+09
**
SFL
Cl-36
2
1,02E+08
*
SFL
Co-57
26
1,19E+09
*
SFL
Co-60
15
1,88E+07
*
SFL
Cs-137
15
8,69E+08
*
SFL
Eu-152
1
2,00E+02
*
SFL
H-3
18
4,64E+07
**
SFL Allowed to decay
I-125
58
1,02E+10
* to clearance levels
I-129
1
4,00E+04
*
SFL
I-131
1
8,80E+00
*
SFL
Kr-85
25
5,96E+09
* Sent for recycling
Ni-63
4
2,20E+09
*
SFL
P-32
70
3,78E+08
**
SFL
Pm-147
2
1,35E+07
*
SFL
Ra-226
124
5,17E+08
*
SFL
S-35
16
4,59E+09
**
SFL
Sr-90
4
2,25E+08
*
SFL
Th-232
556 g 2,29E+06
*
SFL
Tl-204
1
4,00E+02
*
SFL
U-235
1885 g 1,51E+08
*
SFL
U-238 790 107 g 9,83E+09
*
SFL
Y-90
1
2,22E+05
*
SFL
* The estimated net volume is 3 736 litres, see also Table D11. ** Treatment: incineration.
Section J – DiSuSeD SealeD SourceS
J.1.3 regulatory control
At research centers and hospitals inspections are planned and performed by SSM at regular intervals. The whole practice is inspected, also the routines for treatment of waste and the interim storage rooms for radioactive waste and sealed sources. Inspections at industries are infrequent due to the large number of facilities. The handling of disused sealed sources and back-end issues in general are usually brought to the notice of the SSM in connection with inquiries by licensees on these issues.
J.1.4 conclusion
The Swedish Party complies with the obligations of Article 28. There is however ongoing work to improve administrative matters concerning the handling and disposal of disused sealed sources in a manner that is satisfactory from a radiation protection point of view.
Section K – Planned activitieS to imProve Safety
K.1 Review of the license application for an
encapsulation plant
SKB submitted a license application under the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities for an encapsulation plant in November 2006. Extensive supplementary material was submitted in November 2009. The regulatory review of the application will be co-ordinated with the review of a license application for a disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel under the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities and the Environmental Code (see also K.2). The licensing procedure is presented in section E.2.3.1.
K.2 Review of the license application for disposal
of spent nuclear fuel
SKB submitted a license application under the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities to establish a disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel at Forsmark, in the minucipality of Östhammar, 16 March, 2011. The regulatory review of the application will be co-ordinated with the review of a license application for the encapsulation plant under the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities and the Environmental Code (see also K.1). The licensing procedure is presented in section E.2.3.1.
K.3 License application for a disposal facility for
decommissioning waste
SKB has initiated the consultation process to site a disposal facility for shortlived low and intermediate level decommissioning waste. The plan is extend the existing disposal facility for short-lived low- and intermediate level waste (SFR) to also accommodate decommissioning waste. SKB plans to submit applications under the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities and the Environmental Code in 2013 and to have the disposal facility in operation in 2020.
K.4 Development of waste acceptance criteria for
long-lived waste
Disposal of long-lived waste, e.g. core components, is planned to take place when decommissioning of most of the Swedish NPPs have been initiated. Long-lived waste therefore has to be kept in interim storage. Continued efforts are needed in order to establish proper acceptance criteria.
K.5 Effects from the Fukushima accident
The TEPCO Fukushima NPP nuclear accident has led to renewed risk and safety assessments in EU member states with nuclear power programmes. On May 12, 2011 the Swedish Government tasked SSM with carrying out a Swedish review, among other things entailing:
- To	give	a	comprehensive,	integrated	report	on	the	“stress	tests”	of	concerned	
Swedish nuclear facilities which shall be conducted on the basis of the agreed common requirements within EU (as decided by the European Council on March 25, 2011 and to be conducted as approved by the European Nuclear Safety Regulator’s Group on May 25 ).
- To	report	on	the	measures/actions	which	the	nuclear	industry	has	taken	as	a	 result	of	the	“stress	tests”	until	autumn	2012.
Section K – Planned activitieS to imProve Safety
- Make	an	assessment	of	the	effectiveness	of	the	measures/actions	which	the	 industry has taken at that point. SSM has close contact with STUK, Finland and other European authorities working	with	the	“stress	tests”	in	order	to	harmonize	the	procedures.	The	network	set	 up by the Western European Regulators’ Association (WENRA), where all European countries with nuclear power are members, is also important in this regard. The Swedish safety assessments include SKB and the interim storage for spent nuclear fuel at Clab at Oskarshamn.
K.6 Updated decommissioning plans
The decommissioning plans for the Swedish nuclear power plants will be updated and further detailed during the reporting period. This will give a better basis for planning, estimation of waste volumes and cost calculation.
liSt of abbreviationS
ALARA
As Low As Reasonable Achievable (a principle applied in radiation protection)
ABT 1T
Waste container for transportation of long-lived low- and intermediate level waste
ACL
The Central Active Laboratory
AFS
The Swedish work environment authority regulations
AM
Interim storage for low and intermediate waste (Studsvik site)
AS 1-4
Waste storage facility (Studsvik site)
ASAR
As operated Safety Analysis Report
AT
Storage facility for solid intermediate waste (Studsvik site)
AU
Storage facility for radioactive waste (Studsvik site)
AV
Swedish work environment authority
BAT
Best Available Technique
BFA
Rock Cavern for Waste (Oskarshamn site)
BKAB
Barsebäck Kraft AB
BLA
Rock vault for concrete tanks (part of SFR facility)
BMA
Rock vault for intermediate level waste (part of SFR facility)
BNFL
British nuclear Fuel Ltd
BSS
Basic Safety Standards
BTF
Rock vault for low level waste (part of SFR facility)
BWR
Boiling Water Reactor
CHP
Combined Heat and Power
Clab
Centralt Lager för Använt Bränsle (Central interim Storage for Spent Fuel)
Clink
Integrated central interim storage facility and encapsulation plant
COGEMA Compagnie Général de Matières Nucléaires CONVEX
IAEA Convention Exercises
CTH
Chalmers Tekniska Högskola (Chalmers institute of Tecnology)
DG
Director General
ECURIE
European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange
EIA
Environmental Impact Assessment
EIS
Environmental Impact Statement
ENSREG
European Nuclear Safety Regulators’ Group
EU
European Union
FA
Storage facility (Studsvik site)
FEP
Feature, Event and Process
FKA
Forsmarks Kraftgrupp AB
FR0-A
Treatment facility for radioactive non-nuclear waste (Studsvik site)
GDC
General Design Criteria
HA
Incineration facility (Studsvik site)
HCL
Hot cell laboratory (Studsvik site)
HELCOM
The Helsinki Commission
HERCA
Heads of European Radiation Control Authorities
HM
Treatment facility for intermediate level waste (Studsvik site)
HRL
Hard Rock Laboratory
liSt of abbreviationS
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
ICRP
International Commission on Radiation Protection
ID
Evaporation facility (Studsvik site)
IGD-TP
Implementing geological disposal of radioactive waste technology platform
INES
International Nuclear Event Scale
INEX
OECD/NEA International Nuclear Emergency Exercises
INRA
International Nuclear Regulators’ Association
IRRS
Integrated Regulatory Review Service
ISO
International Standard Organisation
KBM
Swedish emergengy management agency
KBS-3
Proposed method for disposal of spent nuclear fuel
KSU
KärnkraftSäkerhet och utbildning AB (the Swedish nuclear Training and Safety Center)
KTH
Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan (Royal institute of Technology)
LER
Licensee Event Report
LILW
Low and Intermediate Level Waste
LLW
Low Level Waste
MOX
Mixed oxide fuel
MSB
Swedish civil contingencies agency
MTO
Interaction between Man-Technology and Organization
NEA
Nuclear Energy Agency within the OECD
NGO
Non-Governmental Organisation
NKS
Nordisk kärnsäkerhetsforskning (Nordic Nuclear Safety Research)
NORM
Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials
NPP
Nuclear Power Plant (including all nuclear power units at one site)
NR-MEG
Nuclear and Radiological Medical Expert Group
OECD
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OKG
Oskarshamns Kraftgrupp AB
OLC
Operational Limits and Conditions
OSPAR
Convention for the protection of the marine environment of the north-east atlantic
PHWR
Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor
PSAR
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report/ Preliminary Safety Report
PSR
Periodic Safety Review
PWR
Pressurized Water Reactor
QA
Quality Assurance
R&D
Research and Development
R0-A
Treatment facility for radioactive non-nuclear waste (Studsvik site)
RAB
Ringhals AB
RASK
SSM methodology for rapid response inspections
RD&D
Research, Development and Demonstration
RO
Reportable Occurrence
SAKAB
Company managing non-radioactive hazardous waste
SAMÖ-KKÖ National emergency preparedness exercise in spring 2011
liSt of abbreviationS
SAR
Safety Analysis Report/ Safety Report
SFL
Disposal facility for long-lived low- and intermediate level waste
SFR
Disposal facility for short-lived low- and intermediate level waste
SFS
Swedish Code of Statutes
SKB
Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co
SKI
Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate
SMA
The melting facility (Studsvik site)
SMHI
Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute
SNAB
Studsvik Nuclear AB
SoS
Swedish National Board of Health
SOU	
State	Official	Report
SR-Site
The long-term safety assesment for the repository for spent fuel
SRV
Swedish Rescue Services Agency
SSI
Swedish Radiation Protection Institute
SSM
Strålsäkerhetsmyndigheten (Swedish Radiation Safety Authority)
SSMFS
SSM Code of Regulations
STUK
Finnish Nuclear and Radiation Safety Authority
TS
The tank and silo facility (Studsvik site)
TSO
Technical Support Organistation
UA
Waste storage facility (Studsvik site)
WENRA
Western European Nuclear Regulators Association
VLLW
Very Low Level Waste
WTD
Waste Type Description